























after "Cerûainly, Empedocles fr,129 bears witness to Pythagoras' extraordinary
memory;" add:
îv ôé 'rts èv reívororv àvì¡p nepruíota eiöois,
ôs ôì uírrorov npaníôcov èxrrioa'ro nÀoû'rov.
navroíliv 'r< ¡rríÀrora oogôv ènrripavoç ëpyav'
ónnóte yàp ncío1ow òpélawo npaníöeoorv,
þô,d ye rGw ðvrav rdvrav Àeúooeoxev .ëxaotov,
rcaí 're ôéx' àv0poínav raí T' eirootv o.iioveoot"v.
p.252
after the above text add note "43a"; in the notes add "43a: See pp.89-91 for further
discussion of this fragment and the association of Empedocles with Pythagoras."
for "havg" rgad'has"
for "Amas (1982a)" read "Amas (1986a)"; for "Annas (1982b)" read "Annas (1986b)"
after "dialogues" add "as my argument will demonstrate"
for "drrixoa ...rrpo-yVc."td." read "àrriroa yàp àv6prîv r< rcaì yuvanrtßv ooþôv
nepì 'rà 0ãa npciy¡ara"
for "and in the central Asian area (close to the Black Sea)" read "and in the area around
the Black Sea'
delete "are"
for "à ld'read "as in"
for "in a specific 'place of punishment' (ôrraro'rri prov)" read "in 'places of
punishment' ('rà örxarorT rtci.a: 249a6)".
under SudA s.v. <Þ<pexÚ6rrs (DK742) (2 Schibli): in line 4, for "ne(rît' ' read "ne (<8"
under Cicero,Tusculanae disputationes, I.16.38 (DK7A5) (7 Schibli): in line 3, for
"etlim" read "etiam"
for "works of...in this regald;" read "works of the Neoplatonic allegorist Porphyry, and
Numenius, Celsius and Origen, in this regard;"
for "all of which post-date Pherecydes by at least 800 years" read "all of which
considerably post-date Pherecydes"
for "(b)..." read "But, (b)..."
for "rather, he is using 'Orphic things'...as part of the nebulous notion of 'Orphic
things"' read "rather, he is using 'Opþéa as a generic and pejorative teÍn, a part of all
the odd ideas which Hippolytus follows...as part of the nebulous mass of ideas relating
to Orpheus (including, the term 'Orphic')."
for "dissatisfactory" read "unsatisfactory"
for "See also Keuls,E . Water-carriers in Hades ??" read "See also Keuls,E. (1974) The
Water-c arri.e,r s in Hade s HakkettAmsterdam [not seen] ?"
for we came here to be punished and we ought to be punished' - cf. p.30."
delete "the"
under Edwards,A.T. (1985), for "GRBS 26,215-131" read "GRBS 26'215-231"
for "Kirk,G.S. & Raven, J.E. (1975)" read "Kirk,G.S. & Raven, J.E. (1957)"
zì, \ .cl.¡s
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This thesis investigates the appearance of reincarnation (often termed
metempsychosis or palingenesis) in earþ Greek thought, and traces the idea from
its flrst appearance in the religious and mystic movements of Greece and Magna
Graecia, to its fullest expansion and expression in Plato's philosophical discourses.
Primarily an examination of literary sources, this thesis does not focus on
unrealizable questions such as the origins and entry of the concept of reincarnation
into Greek thought/belief. Rather, it is a chronological survey of the movements
and authors for whom there is extant evidence of reincarnation doctrine/s, and also
an attempt to elucidate whether metempsychosic thought in Greece can be
described in terms of development and continuity
The main text of the thesis focuses on an assessment of Pythagoras and the
Pythagorean movement, Pindar (Olympian 2 and fragment 133), Empedocles, and
Plato. This final, and largest, section investigates Plato's use of the "baggage" of
reincarnation (immortality, Seelenwanderungslehre, anamnesis etc.). By analysing
the circumstances and inæntions which herald the introduction of seemingly
disreputable metaphysical speculation into the philosophical dialogues of Meno,
Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus, Timneus artd Inws, this thesis tenders a number of
opinions as to what motivated Plato's use of reincarnation.
lv
This section points to the conclusion of this thesis - that in no two sources
on reincarnation in early Greek thought can a single cohesive doctrine be found.
Reincarnation was adapted and indeed exploited to its fullest potential by all of the
religious, speculative, and, finally, philosophical movements that adopted it. Far
from being a static or orthodox belief (as in Buddhism, for example), throughout
the study of earþ Greek thought on reincarnation, we can trace bold, creative and
independent developments of the concept far beyond doctrinal or heretical limits.
This thesis concludes with five appendices relating to other aspects of
reincarnation in the Greek world. Appendices A, B and C investigate three
sources tradiúonally linked with reincarnation, but for which this writer cannot find
suffucient illustration of this phenomenon: viz, Pherecydes of Syros, the "Orphic"
movemenls, and Plato's Gorgias. Appendix D is an analysis and criticism of the
theory linking shamanism and transmigration; and Appendix E assesses macro-
/microc os mic reinc arnatio n and etern al recuff ence.
The va¡ious thinkers or movements discussed in this thesis are not
visualized as existing in a vacuum separate from one another: indeed, throughout
this work a number of recurring elements suggest common bonds, even if direct
influence cannot be assumed. The preponderance of evidential linla with Magna
Graecia, for example, is one of those many threads which build up the rich, albeit
fragmentary, tapestry of reincarnation in early Greek thought.
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Our two soules thzreþre, which are one,
Though I must goe, endure not yet
A breach, but an expansion,
Thy ftmmes rnakes my circle just,
And mak¿s m¿ end, where I begunne.
(John Donne,4 Valedictio n forbidding mouming)
i'"¡r 1
INTRODUCTION
Àeortt2¿íôoo roô'Apíotorvoç np òç QíLuwov tòv'O pQeoteLeor4v
rrCIvreî"ôç Trrrrr1òv öwo, Àéyovro ô'öcu oï fiop' CIoîôr puneévreç
petd tqv to0 píoo tel.eucr¡v euôatpovoOot, 'ci oôv, ô ovór¡te'
el.nev 'oo r4v to2¿íotr1v orco0vrlroretç, iv' ovonaóo.1t
roroôotpoviov roì" nevíov rl,oí<ov;'
Plutarch Ap o p hthe gm. Lac oni c. 2 2 4 e
"Etemity is a terrible thought. I mean, where's it going to end?"
T.Stoppard Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead
What is reincarnation?
As a descriptive term, "reincarnation" is deliberately vague: it is an
adequately all-embracing designation for a number of phenomena that are, in the
Greek examples, so similar as to be almost one. Thus petepyó1o:orç,
petevoropdroorç, and æal,r"ryeveoia - while strictly different in meaning - in
practice refer to the one circumstance, 1 and that is the transmigration of the soul
from one body to another, with the implication that this movement occurs after the
"death" of the first body.2 Reincarnation implies more than one incarnation of the
lFor example, Servius A. iii,ó8 writes "Pythagoras non petepyó2¿olorv sed æol,r11eveoíav esse
dicit." Rohde (1925) p.361,n.84 gives a brief history of the vocabulary: æcll"r11eveoío is the
ea¡liest attestation (Plato Phaedo 70c); perevool¡rdtrrlorç is frequent but late; and, "The word
most commonly used among ourselves, peæpryú¡¿olotç, is among the Greeks precisely the least
usual." Cf. H.S.Long's 1948 thesis "A Snrdy of the Doctrine of Metempsychosis in Greece from
þthagoras to Plato". As Philip (1966) p.165,n.4 notes, "'metempsychosis' has only pretensions
to correcûless".
'If the movement occrrrs from a living body to another, or as a journey away and return to the
same body, this is an entirely different phenomenon, although one often confused with
reincarnation. See Appendix D for a discussion of shamanism and related ideas. Cf. Pindar fr.
131 on the "dream soul".
*
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soul, generally into different bodies, often including animals, and sometimes
plants.3 As a system, reincarnation can be described as a "cycle".
The transmigration of the soul depends on the ability of this entity to
survive the death of the body.a In atl of the examples discussed in this thesis, the
soul is "non-mortal" or "deathless" (oOdvotoç) - it has eternal or, as in
Empedocles, long-term temporal immortality. The most imporfant aspect of the
continued existence of the soul is its potential function as a carrier of individuality,
character, and memory.s
A theory of reincarnation presupposes one of two post-mortsm scenarios:
first, incarnation is random and not connected with any system of ethics or
concept of moral progression. For example, the "primitive"6 idea that the soul
enters a body, carried on the winds, is more often connected with the creation and
frst incarnation of human-beings in cosmogonicaVanthropogonical literature.
Aristotle De animn 410b19, for example, refers this theory to the Orphics and, by
implication, to reincarnation. 7
3 
See Chapter 3 (Empedocles).
oln the Greek context, reincamation is incompatible with the Homeric description of the soul,
because it does not exist as a separate and separable entity.
t It is simple to think of this carrier as akin to a computer "floppy disk", which can hold
information and be transferred from computer to computer, accessible to each.




The random system is morally purposeless. Lacking systematization,
reincarnation would seem to incline the adherent to fatalism or belief in the
inevitability of events: and if this were not limited by a [post-mortem] monitoring
of behaviour (for example, a doctrine of retributive justice), it would be useless as
a practicable religio-social systems and therefore be no stimulus to live a life of
virtue (in Platonic terms). Of course, moral dissatisfaction within this system
cannot exist if there is no retention of memory: however, this does not in any way
make for an attractive belief, and would have little to recommend it to those
promulgating soteriology.
The second form that a theory of reincarnation can take is illustrated in the
evidence of the early Greek thinkers,e and is by far the more logical conception.
That is, reincarnation is connected with an eschatology developed on ethical
principles, where justice is served by post-mortem judgement, punishmenlreward,
and/or future incarnation. Thus, one's behaviour in this world determines one's
incarnation in the next.
This theory of reincarnation comes with heavy moral baggage: in its most
developed form, reincarnation can become the raison d'être for the ills and
t A simplistic example: to lead a life of outstanding moral rectitude, yet be incarnated as a
cockroach in the next life would, if a continuí|y of memory is assumed, be no stimulus to live a
life of virtue (in Platonic terms). Cf. Churchill's statement: "It is conceivable that I might well be
reborn as a Chinese coolie. In such a case I should lodge a protest" - quoted by Fisher (1993)
p.xrr.
n It is also the one best lnown in modern times, for example, in Indian beliefs.
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injustices of society, explaining the inexplicable - cripples, birth defects,
deformities, social disadvantages, and even bad luck. It can also, to a certain
extent, reduce attribution of these seemingly unjust handicaps and,/or boons to the
whims of gods, and therefore shift responsibility to the actions of the individual.lO
Thus reincamation can become a legalistic, yet personally reassuring, foundation
for a society's moral code.
As for the other "baggage" of reincarnation, intimately connected with
moral and ethical metempsychosic thinking, one finds proscriptions intended to
limit the ways that a believer can unintentionally offend in lífe (and thus be
punished in the afterlife or next lifetime). Some are logical: vegetarianism, for
example, is usually grounded in a prohibition on killing, not from respect or pity
for animals, but because of the damage that killing an ensouled creature (perhaps a
relative)ll does to ono's o\ryn moral record.l2 Cf. the terïns of Theseus' criticism
of Hippolytus:
rifu vôv oö1et rCIi ôr'<iyó1cov Þopôç
oftorç xorc{Leu', 'OpQéo t' övort' ëyov
pór1eue ¡rol,l.ôv ypoppdtrov cr.pôv rorcvoóç
(Hippolyns 952-4)
loBeyond this, it can link with predetermination, although this is another morally ambiguous
aÍea.
11e.g. Empedocles fr.137; cf . lnws of Manu 5.55
t'Plutarch, in his survey of abstinences, gives a number of reasons for vegetarianism: (1) based
on religion/mysticism (do not eat ensouled creatures); (2) do not eat animals because they possess
reason just as we do (i.e. exænd human justice to animals); (3) animal products are not
wholesome or not hygienic (i.e. health reasons). Of these reasons, Plut¿¡ch ranks reincarnation
and religious reasons quite low: Tsekourakis (1986) provides a full discussion of this, cittng De
esu carnium, etc.
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Ensoulment may also include plants and vegetables, and the devotees of extreme
forms of reincarnation belief do not plough the land, or cut vegetables etc.13
An idea of great significance to the Greek thinkers is the implication that -
because of the dichotomy between the soul that survives (carrier of memory etc.),
and the body that perishes - it is the soul which is all-important. Further to this is
the judgement that the body is a burden on the soul, leading the soul astray: thus
its influence must be minimalized. Therefore reincarnation is often linked with an
ascetic lifestyle - a neglect of the bodily and material.la In many cases this implies
a rejection of traditional social mores, particularly if reincarnation is an esoteric
beliei or, as in Greece, not intimately connected with the traditional beliefs of the
community. For this reason, esoteric reincarnation teaching, generally poorly
t'This is not seen in the Greek world, although Empedocles warns his followers to stay away
from beans and laurel. Adherents of Jainism, for example, also f,rnd souls in earth, water (fog,
clouds, rain, seas, dew, snow etc.) and hre, and adopt a cautious policy of prevention. Cf. the
stories associated with Mani (Í1. AD 220-240, founder of the Manichaeans) which illustrate the
concept of the "Living Soul" or "animism": Henrichs (1979). Stories in the Cologne Mani Codex
tell of vegetables bleeding and crying out when cut. Those who injure vegetables and trees are
destined to be reincarnated as the same, but it is the task of the highest level of Manichaeans (the
"elect") to eat as many plant souls as possible, to free these souls without fear of harm to
themselves. The other Manichaeans reap the benehts of giving melons and cucumbers to the elect
by becoming melons and cucumbers or an elect in the next life. The Indian parallels with
Manichaeanism have been detailed by V/est (1977) p.66,n.4 and Henrichs (1979). The idea of
rebirth according to one's offence is present both in ¡he lnws of Manu and in Greece (cf. Plato
Laws 870{ q.v.), although the idea of reincarnation into exactly the same form is not expressed
wifh such def,rnition. There a¡e few grounds for close comparison with the Greek examples
(despite evidence for Mani's occasional following of the Neoplatonists) in Indian and other
systems, primarily, no doubt, because the Greek systems are always set into a background of
traditional religion.
to A belief in reincarnation is very hard to prove by any means other than literary records. For
example, I could suggest that an absence of grave goods might indicate a belief in the superiority
of the soul to the body - that is, a belief in reincarnation - because nothing had been provided for
the body in the traditional afterlife. Unfortunately, this is hardly a bala¡ced argument, because a
lack of grave goods can have many other significances. But, if we look at the problem from a
literary perspective, in Laws 959aff there is a ruling forbidding extravagant bu¡ial rites because
the body meâns nothing - it is merely the semblance of the soul.
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understood by non-adherents, is often mocked, despised or violently opposed -
reactions which are found in the Greek examples.15
This is a brief summary of the concept of reincarnation, and also an introduction to
ideas which appear in greater detail in the following chapters.
The origins of reincarnation in Greece
Reincarnation first appears in the Greek world in the sixth century BC, and
is rarely absent throughout the Classical period. It is found explicitly in the corpus
of material associated with Pythagoras, Empedocles, Pindar, andf is at its fullest
development in Plato. Denied by Aristotle (De animn 407b20ff.), it did not
resurface again until the time of Plutarch.l6
The appearance of beliefs or theories of reincarnation could have occurred in
Greece in two ways
(a) as an import: This is, in many ways, the simplest solution. Although the field
of contact was not very wide, the evidence is non-existent. India is usually the
frst suggestion; for example, the Hindu ktws of Manu are reminiscent of





statements made by Empedocles.lT Moreover, Buddhism was in its formative
stages at approximately the same time as Pythagoras was ûeaching; nevertheless,
evidence for cultural links with India cannot be substantiated before the Hellenistic
^18Age.
Herodotus 2.123 suggests that reincamation had its origin in Egypt,
whence it was borrowed by the Greeks. Yet, there is no attestation of
reincarnation in Egypt, despite our extensive knowledge of Egyptian religion, and
we should always bear in mind Herodotus' passion for attributing Greek ideas to
the Egyptians - it is proverbial, but unlikely.le Eastern origins2O (Mesopotamia
etc.) are postulated by M.L.West,2l and Northern (particularly Thracian and
shamanic) origins by Dodds and others. The former seem to be too far removed in
the area of religion per se (although one cannot doubt that mythology, cosmology
and astronomy have many comparative linl$), and the latter, particularly the
shamanic connection , are far from promising.22
However, I would not deny that the Greeks were great borrowers of ideas
(not only in religious fields), and were open to the introduction of new religious
17Cf. Empedocles fragments DK 31 B 139, 136,137 (although the concept of alextalionis is
absent) and Laws of Manu 5.55: "Me he will devou¡ in the next (life), whose flesh I eat in this."
Cited by West (1971) p.61 & n.4,
rsAlnond (1987), For example,D.L.9.6l-3 on Pyrrho (4th century BC). The evidence for
Buddhist influence on later Alexardrian and Roman writers is fa¡ from certain, despite our
lanowledge of cultural connections.
tn Richa¡dson (1937) p.61
toEven Far Eastem, for example, a Taoist origin in China: Hussey (1972) p.'73.
21west (1971)
22 




cults and deities.23 However, on this issue one can conclude little from such
limited evidence.
The other option is that, (b) reincarnation has a "home grown" origin.2a
Reincarnation could have been, for example,
(Ð a "logical" step from primitive analogies between crop regeneration
(agricultural rebirth, as it were) to spiritual rebirth. That is, the notion that the
eternal ploughing-sowing-reaping cycle of nature was analogous to a human cycle
of birth-death-[rebirth]. The origin of the Eleusinian Mysteries is sometimes
thought to reflect this ideaf.2s
(ü) a development from resurrection stories, such as that told about the phoenix.26
The link between reincarnation and resurrection is not, however, as close as it may
seem; indeed it is based on antithetical ideas2T - the former relates to the soul, the
latter specifically to the rebirth of the body.
" For example, that of Cybele which does not appear to be connected with the afterlife or
soteriology : S fameni Gasparro (1985 ) pp, 1 8,89- 103.
to As B u¡kert notes, arising from transformation nor. invention: Burkert (1993) p.260; cf . Burkert
(1983) p.119
25 Meyer (i986) p.7
26 Herodotus 2.'73;Minor Latin Poets ll,p.648ff.
" As Origen (De principils) found out when he attempæd to combine the two into Christian
doctrine. Reincarnation eventually bec.dme a heretical belief, and was affirmed as an anatìema in
AD 553:Refoulé (7963); Solnsen (1982Ð pp.481-486.
t,
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(iv) as an independent explanation of the appearance of evil or injustice in this
(üi) a development from the notion of metamorphosis of gods to humans, and
humans to animals or plants:28 "survival and transmogrification add up to
- . --tometempsychosis"." Moreover, theriomorphism is a so-called "primitive" idea,
traceable to the pre-Hellenic world.3O
world, an idea which I have discusse$/above."
(v) part of a cosmic phenomenon whereby similar ideas surface in completely
different and unconnected parts of the world at the same time. This could cerøinly
be true of reincarnation in Greece and India; it is, nevertheless, unprovable.
More productively, one might ask what had occurred in the seventh and
sixth centuries to produce such a plethora of popular new religious phenomena -
DionysiaciBacchic, Eleusinian, Pythagorean, "Orphic"? A lot of very general ideas
have been postulated about this period: it has been seen as a time of upheaval, and
a time of increasing social anxiety about life and death, with perceptions of death
becoming increasingly more angst-ridden, and death itself more fearful.
" Richardson (1987) p.61
'n Barnes (1979) I,p. 105
30 Bacigalupo (1965) pp.267fr. Cf. Snell (1960) p.36
" I will deal with this further in the sections on Plato.
\ .,t
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All of these new religious phenomena have a common element - they
offered positive promises and reassurance about this life and/or the afterlife to
people as individuals, rather than as a community or polis. This common motif is,
more often than not, soæriological: that is, the post-mortem salvation of the
individual from oblivion. Linked with the awareness of individuality may be a
dissatisfaction with the traditional gods because of their perceived lack of interest
in individuals, or their hostility towards human welfare,32 or the remoteness of
Olympian religion, which engendered a desire for personal relationship with a
deity.33 This does not imply a rejection of traditional religion - initiation into a cult
did not forbid the adoption of other beliefs, or regard this practice as heresy.'o
The Eleusinian Mysteries stand somewhat apart from the other examples in
that they remained frmly rooted in traditional eschatology, and had an aura of
respectability which other movements lacked, just as they lacked the patronage of
the state which Eleusis enjoyed.35 Other groups, particularly those linked with
reincamation beliefs, acquired neither the respectability nor the central nature of
the Eleusinian Mysteries - they tended not only to be geographically marginal, but
also attractive to the marginahzed.36 The fact that most evidence for reincarnation
tt Dodds ( 1 95 1 ) p.29 -31,: the "shame-culture".t'Moore (1916) p.116
3a cf. Hippolytus who, at the stfft of the play, has just rehrrned from the Eleusinian Mysteries, but
is also pursuing some sort of ascetic (perhaps Orphic) way of life: Euripides Hippolytus 952-954,
quoted above.
3s Contra Graf fl974),I doubt that Orpheus/Orphics had a large role in the Eleusinian Mysteries.
Moreover, the Mysteries do not seem to grant immortality, the power of reincarnation, or life
after death: e.g. Clay (1989) p.263.
'u'Women, for example. See Appendix B on the attraction of women to Bacchic/Dionysiac cults.
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beliefs comes from the boundaries of the Greek world (rather than Athens and
Attica) must be significant.3T
New (non-Homeric3s ) ideas about death entered Greek thought in the
seventh and sixth centuries. It is impossible to know whether the new movements
brought these beliefs with them,3e or whether the groups - as seems more likely -
were reacting to a need or mood within the community. The rise of the individual
is thought to be the catalyst for this desire for more than post-mortem existence as
a powerless shade in Hades. This grim view of death (cf. Achilles' bitter tirade at
Odyssey 11.488ff.) made the Eleusinian mysteries and like cults popular because
they promised something different and reassuring after death.aO
" Pythagoreans in Magna Graecia; Orphic/Bacchic groups at Olbia on the Black Sea; unusual
burial prescriptions at Cumae; the Derveni papyrus found north of Thessalonike; gold plates from
Southern Italy, Thessaly and Crete etc. See the relevant chapters.
38 For Homeric views of death and the soul see: Claus (1981); Solnsen (1982a); Warden (1911);
Sourvinou-Inwood (198 1); Bremrner (1987).
3elt is often assumed that the belief in punishments in the underworld is an Orphic innovation,
despite the fact that we know so little about the Orphic movement: see Appendix B. The biggest
problem is that Greek beliefs about death 'rvere never fxed or systematized.
a0Isocrates Panegyrikos 4.28: "...those who partake of the rite have fairer hopes concerning the
end of life."
Aristophanes Frogs 48-455: "To us alone is there a sun and joyous light after death, who have
been initiated.."
Pindar ft. 137: "Blessed is one who goes under the earth after seeing these things. That person
knows the end of life, and lanows its Zeus-given beginning."
Homeric Hymn to Demeter 480-483: "Blessed is the mortal on ea¡th who has seen these rites, but
the uninitiate who has no share in them never has the same lot once dead in the dreary
darlness." The Homeric Hymn to Demeter (3&-369) appears to be the fust example of the
different post-mortem fates of initiates and uninitiated, The idea of punishment per se in Hades,
including eternal punishment, is present in Homer (e.g. Iliai 3.218f.). As a general (and
comparafive) feature of afterlife descriptions, punishments, and the fate of those not initiated, are
more significant than rewards: Foley (1994) pp.55,63; cf. Pausanias 10,31.9-11 for Polygnotus'
famous painting of fhe Undenrorld and its punishments, including the retributive punishmcnt of
the son, who mistreated his father, being throttled by the father: Nilsson (1935) p.211. This is the
Lex talionis.
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Moreover, it was a promise to the ordinary person: the breaking down of
the boundaries of Elysium by mysteries and initiations which allowed the initiate to
go where only heroes formally trod, is indicative of the spirit of these
movements.al
Of course, modern scholarship must see things in quite a different light to
the ancient perspective, and these are ideas unlikely to be clearly articulated, or
conscious in the minds of the community. But certainly the age of the mystery
cults, and the origins of this "quick-fìx" ideology seem rooted in an anxiety which
did not previously exist. Ideas such as inherited guilt, the randomness of divine
justice, and the increased possibility (and publicity) of post-mortem punishment,a2
seem to lead not only to the "quick-fix" ideology of the Eleusinian Mysteries,a3 but
beyond this to an increasing purification anxiety and regulation of purification.#
If anything, it is indicative of a mood or spirit rather than a conscious
recognition of anxiety: as the world becomes larger, the place of the individual
becomes more insignifi.cant, and as the world becomes larger, so too do the
influences which geographical spread (through colonization) bring to bear. One
a1 Specifically, see Chapter 2 on Pinda¡'s Second Otympian.
a2All 
aspects of what Dodds (1951) tenns the "guilt culture" See also Pa¡ker (1983) p.201. It is
noticeable that episodes such as war, plague and famine can also influence these desires.
o'For example, Diogenes the Cynic (D.L. 6.39) asked why an evil man should get better
treaünent than an honest man after death just because he had been initiated.
aaI wouldnot term this "Puritanism", as Dodds (1951) and Richardson (1987) pp.50-60 do: the
term should not be used out of context, particularly since it has connotations inconsistent with the
Greek example. Cf. Appendix B, for "Orphic" "Puritanism".
1,3
might conclude therefore that the introduction of innovative (religious) thought is
a consequence of internal and external influences and pressures.
Deflection of guilt and anxiety also lies in purifications and sacrifices. This
makes people responsive to the services of quick-fix cults (such as Eleusis), and to
the itinerant mendicant priests, initiators and charlatans whom Plato despises and
, ,,1
,ülé Theophrastus' "superstitious Man" visits.a5 The latter example illustrates a i': í
paranoid (and presumably exaggerated) concern for purity which was part of the
mood in Greek religion from the sixth century.
Further connected to the changes in thinking of this period is the new
priority given to the soul. The Homeric yrlî¡ was equivalent to life - it vanished
into nothing on death.au A fragment of Pindar (fr. 131) reveals the flrst
consciousness of the soul as something other than the seat of the emotions: the
body dies, but an image of life survives; this image sleeps when the body is
conscious, but wakes when the body sleeps and has prophetic dreams.ot This is
possible because the soul is from the gods, and its divine reality is perceived only
when isolated from the body. Further to this is the idea (suggested by the
Pythagoreans and./or "Orphics"?) that the soul survives because it is immortal: if
the soul survives death, then it also existed before birth.
as Republic 364c ff . (q.v.); Characters XYI.\2 (see Appendix B).
ou Wa¡den (7971); Claus (1981)
ot Cf. Donnay (1983); Vegleris (1982).
t4
It is not a great step from the concept of the perishing body and surviving
soul to a dualistic perception of body and soula8 which is part of reincarnation in
Greece; cf. Empedocles' ooprôv ol,l"oyvôvrt neprotÉl"l"or.¡oo [sc. the daimon?]
xrî(l)vl.
49
One wonders what benefits or attraction reincamation beliefs offered that
other beliefs did not. The most obvious would relate to the desire not simply to
have a happy afterlife, but to live again - to maintain the link with the body. It
seems, in popular thought, that we only think of a person in terms of the body.50
This is illustrated by the corporeal nature of soul descriptions (as Homeric shades,
for example), and by our percepúon of ghosts etc., as images of the body.sl
Yet reincarnation is not resurrection, nor are the two beliefs compatible,
and the majority of Greek opinions on reincamation would imply that the incarnate
life is not the best life.
In this sense, reincarnation belief is its own worst snemy in terms of
attracting disciples, and it is not difficult to see why it v/as never a large and
popular belief in Greece. It cerøinly does seem to be that "drop of alien blood"
(Rohde). The Eleusinian mysteries, on the other hand, remained the most popular
ot Taken up by Plato, for exarnple, at Cratylus 400c and Phaedo 62a-e.
on or 31 B 126
to cf. Kahn (1971) p.9: reunion with the body as a blot on the soul's condition.
st Part of the problem is an inability to describe the incorporeal, which I will discuss in the main
text. On ghosts: Nilsson (1949) pp.87ff.
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initiation ceremonies in the ancient world, and survived. Movements founded and
reinforced by fear, but which offer a simple release from this fear, are more likely
to survive than movements which engender continuous anxiety amongst their
members.s2 The same is true of movements which do not shun or offend against
conventional mores. 'We see the dangers engendered by seclusionist (or sectarian)
practices in the Greek world not only in the bloody reaction against the
Pythagorean movement (q.v.), but also in the very marginalized nature and
influence of the alternate thinkers.
*
Methodology
For modern scholars, the arrival of reincarnation in Greece can only be set
against an unfortunately vague and theoretical background. For the Greek
doxographers, reincamation traced its origins to the Orphics and/or the
Pythagoreans, and this attribution has been adhered to by later scholars, because,
regardless of whether these movements did initiate reincarnation belief, they are
also our earliest sources. In this thesis I have attempted a consistent and
chronological account of the appearance of reincarnation doctrine or belief in
Greece. I have posited a number of questions, and reached fewer absolute
conclusions. It is ineviøble that restoring doctrines of personal religious belief
from fragmentarlr, diffuse, late or second-hand sources will be nigh impossible.
5t Through, for example, a strict and anxiery-filled bios
t6
In terms of defining the administrative processes of reincarnation, I have
found Walter Burkert's questions to be a useful and adaptable measure:53
Does every living creature have an immortal soul that migrates from
one incarnation to another? Do plants have such souls? Do they
only enter certain species of animals? Do only certain special
individuals, even among men..undergo this wondrous
experience?...Is the soul newly incarnated immediaæly after the
death of the old body, in which case Hades becomes unnecessary,
or is there an intermediate phase, which would have Hades there, as
a way station? Is the process of palingenesis the work of blind
natural forces..? - or is it the execution of a penalty assessed in a
judgement of the dead? Is there an endless, cyclic movement, or is
there a fall at the beginning and a salvation at the end which is
permanent - or perhaps has as its alternative an eternal damnation in
which case the concepts of Elysium and Tartarus again become
relevant?5a
I have established the following foci for my investigation:
(a) can we restore a coherent doctrine of reincarnation among the early Greek
thinkers?
(b) if so, is it possible to postulate a chronological or ideological development of
this idea; and,
(c) can this be expressed as a development of thought from "belief' to
"philosophy";5s related to this,
(d) is there any evidence for development from a common source of belief, for
example, (the traditional suggestions) "Orphism" or Pythagoreanism?
t' Bu¡kert (197 2) pp.l33 -134
soBu¡kert attempted to apply these to the Pyttragoreans, with limited success due to the
problematic evidence (which tends to mention few of these features!).
tt For example, for many years it was taken for granted that rational thinking grew from (or as a
reaction to) irrational belief by way of theology, with Empedocles as a sort of liminal Janus
f,rgure, illustrating both sides (the religious Katharmoi and the rational Physics|
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(e) to what extent was reincarnation (metempsychosis/transmigration) part of
practical eschatological belief in the ancient Greek world? For example, is it
legitimate to talk of reincarnatton "cults", in the sense of metempsychosic beliefs
expressed through ritual, as in, for instance, a mystery religion or group
movement, with an established liturgy or mythic foundation?s6
Or, (Ð should theories of reincarnation be considered esoteric and personal belref,
or expressions of hypothetical conceptions of the Presocratic and Platonic
ideologists? That is, can we differentiate between betief and usesl'? 'In this
context, are there any remnants of material culture from the sixth to fourth
centuries BC that are indicative of a realized or practised belief in reincarnation?s8
Other related questions will appear as recurring motifs throughout this
work:
(g) were Greek theories of reincarnation grounded in ethical or moral
considerations or aims?
(h) were thoughts on reincarnation particularly prominent in any specific localities
in the ancient Greek world, and what significances, if any, can be drawn from these
manifestations?
tu Cf. Buddhism, by way of an example.
tt In the sense of exploitation of an idea for reasons not connected with personal convictions
regarding reincamation?
5'This can be connected with question (e): for exaurple, liturgy, mortuary f,rnds, burial practices
etc. I have conrmented on the problematic natu¡e of this category of "evidence", above.
*
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Thus, this thesis traces the movement of what is essentially a religious
conceit from its problematic beginnings in "belief', to its greatest prominence (yet
also its greatest ambiguity) in ancient Western tradition in the dialogues of Plato.
Addendum: Appendices
This thesis concludes with frve appendices relating to various other aspects
of reincarnaúon in ancient Greek thought, but which cannot be considered as part
of the chronological study of reincarnation, because they offer arguments or
discussions of five areas that are popularly or traditionally associated with
reincarnation in Greece, but which, in reality, have dubious connections to this
concept. First, the "Orphic" movement, Pherecydes of Syros, and Plato's Gorgias
are often thought to be reincarnationist, or to provide evidence for the beginnings
of reincarnation theory. Second, Appendices D and E provide analyses and
criticisms of the scholarly, rather than (ancient) traditional, links between




Transmigration/reincarnation is flrst held with any degree of definition to
be a belief of Pythagoras of Samos, who moved to Magna Graecia in
approximately 530BC.1 Pythagoras has the distinction of being one of,most
mysterious characters of antiquity, despite a rich doxography .2 Lack of earþ (let
l The point of whether transmigration is equivalent to reincarnation has been discussed: cf. Philip
(1966) p,165,n.4. Pherecydes has been thought to be the fi¡st to inftoduce reincarnation to the
Greek world; I have considerable doubts about the reliability of this úadition and have discussed
the problem in Appendix A.; cf. also the Orphic tradition (Appendix B),
zTwo Vita Pythagorica exist, by Porphyry and Iamblichus; the laæ dates and external influences
give litfle hope of reliability. On Iarnblichus see Clark's (1989) clear discussion of his aims
(pp.ix-x), with the particular note that Iamblichus preserves none of his sources (p,x). Porphyry is
a Neoplatonic allegorist; on allegorizing of the Pythagorean symbola (the "tradiúon of exegesis"),
see Grant (1980) pp.300-302. I have discussed particular problems of Neoplatonic sou¡ces for the
Presocratics in Appendix A. Guthrie (1962) p.156 notes, for exanple, the Neopythagorean love
of the ma¡vellous which resulted in such re-growth (and re-interprelation) of primitive
superstitions; this combined disastrously (for doxography) with their credulity and lack of critical
faculty. In terms of sources, they rely on a doxography ûaceable to Aristotle; yet even in
Aristotle's time Pythagoras was a semi-legendary figure: Raven (1948) p.16, but particularly
Philip (1963) p.264, who traces Aristotle's sources to the (contemporary) school at Tarentum
headed by Archytas. Dodds (1951) p.145 would see Pythagoras as the manufacturer of his own
legend, in the Empedoclean tradition. However, it is possible that A¡istotle lmew of several
different Pythagorean schools - cf. Gutbrie (1962) pp.147,180); Philip (1963) pp.253ff. Barnes
(1919) comments on the rich doxography: "Pythagoras had the wisdom to write nothing" (I,
p.100). Doxography backs this up to a certain extent; tradition has it that Pythagoras wrote
nothing, and his followen observed silence on his oral teachings: on silence/secrecy cf. Isocrates
Busiris 29; Aristoxenus apud D.L. 8.15; Porphyry W 79 (thought to be from Dicaearchus);
Iamblichus W 199; in comedy, Alexis fr.197 Kock. Guthrie (1962) p.152 tries to work out what
was secret - i.e. religious "arcana" or scientihc thought? On the lack of writings: e.g. Plutarch
Alex.fort. 1,4,328 (= KR no.267); Iamblichus W 199 writes that there were no writings until the
time of Philolaus. Apart from these two problems (silence and lack of reliable contemporary
writings) there is the problem of ipse dixit, and with it the wholesale ascription of later
Pythagorean writings to the master - including poetry under the narne of Orpheus (Ion of Chios -
DK 3682); also, cf. the "speeches" of Pythagoras in Iamblichus W 54-57 (to the women of
Croton): Cla¡k (1989) pp.xvü-xviii; and the þthagorean Hteros Logos (Ianblichus W) 28):
Blank (1982) p.172. There is, for example, a collection of third centuy pseudepigrapha andlater
anonyma'. Clark (1989) p.xix; Armstrong (7977) p.84ff. gives a sunmary of these, but
concentrates on later material. A fourth difficulty is the legendary status given to Pythagoras by
later generations, and the tradition of miracle-working which a¡ose from this reputation: even in
Aristotle (the fragments of his lost work on the þthagoreans, cited mainly in Aelian W 2.26
and Apollonius Historia mirabilium 6: DK 74,7 = fragments l9l, 192 Rose) such miracles exist.
Burkert (7972) pp.l4l-146 gives a complete list and discussion. However, the majority of
miraculous ascriptions are late. As Bolton (1962) pp.l64-165 has seen, there is a succession of




alone reliable or contemporary) evidence has led to comparison with every
conceivable type of rehgious and secular "leader" from magus3 to Rotarian,a
Newton5 to Freemason,ó daimon1 to monk8, social revolutionarye to the
Neopythagorean answer to Jesus.l0
miracle-mongers - indeed they have all performed ttre same sort of miracles. Cf. Burkert (1985)
p.303 and Burkert (1972) pp.147-155. The similarities of these hgures @pimenides, Abaris,
Znroaster, Aristeas and Pythagoras) in such miracles as bilocation, near-death experiences and
etc. are the primary reason for the appearance of shamanism in Greek scholarship. See my
discussion in Appendix D. Bolton (1962) pp.165,183 ftaces the mi¡aculous tradition from
Heraclides of Pontus - cf. Guthrie (1962) pp.163-165 - and notes that H.P. has made all of the
figures confonn to a pattern centering on Pythagoras.
3Usually witl the Eastem connotations of the word: Détienne (1972) p.44; Maddalena (1964)
p.103 cites Burkert (1972),
oMorrison (1955) p.152
tBarnes (1979) I, p.100f.
6 "Joseph Smith": id. (p,102); von Fritz (19a0) p.96. Both Freemasonry and Rotåry are an
attempt to explain the fact that Pythagorean life is to Pythagorean politics as oil is to water. yon
Fritz shows the flaws in this view even as he attempts to explain that it allows people with
differentbackgrounds and convictions to share one corunon belief.
tDéúenne (1959) pp.28-29; this idea perhaps comes from Aristotle fr.192 Rose - cited by
Morrison (1955) p.138 - where it is claimed that there a¡e th¡ee sorts of beings - gods, men and
beings like Pythagoras. The obvious parallel is in Empedocles fr.112 and fr.146.
tBremmer (1992) p.206 on comparisons between the Bíoç flo0oyóperoq and the vita manastica.
Also, Cornfoñ (7922) p.139; KR p.2I9; Burkert (1985) p.303.
nDétienne (1981) p.221on the "deviance" (is this perhaps a bad translaúon of the French? cf.
Burkert (1982) p.2 on Détienne's "chemins de la deviance") of Pythagoreanism. The
structualists (particularly Détienne) have had a f,reld-day with the supposed rejection of
traditional polis values inherent in abstention; not to mention the inversion of the relationship
between gods and men in denial of sacrifice, and the signíhcance of the resurrected Golden Age.
They have singular difficulty in reconciling (1) the antithetically prominent role of Pythagoreans
in polis politics, and (2) the Pythagoreans' acceptance in such a role, for all thei¡ lack of
conformation otherwise. For structuralist views: Détienne (1981), (1972) and (1959); Détienne &
Vernant (1989); Vernant (1991); Gordon (1981); Berthiaume (1982) offers a slightly more
practical assessment. Cf. Bu¡kert (1919) p.11: "I do not think Lévi-Strauss has proved anything".
Also Dowden (1992). Bremmer (7992) p.206 seems correct - contra Détienne (1981) p.277 - on
the different protest against society offered by the Cynics: viz., þthagoreans exist within the
community system, but Cynics deny the community; Christian hennits etc.. leave the community.
On þthagorean politics: Minar (1942); von Fritz (1963) col.210ff., and von Fritz (1940).l0Navia (1990) p.viii. And as the opposite - a Faust hgure (iáid). Not to mention: Christian
Scientist (Mary Baker Eddy) - (låld); hierophant undergoing katabatic journeys - cited by Burkert
(1985) p.299; moral reforrner - there is at least some evidence of this: von Fritz (1940) p.95;
Morrison (1955) p.135; Einstein - Navia (1990) p.viii; sase - Herodorus 4.95; Vlastos (1970)
p.111; Aimee Semple Macpherson - Dunbabin (1948) p.373; relieious reformer - Cornford
(1922) p,138; charlatan (cf. Heraclitus fr.40 and fr.729); leader of a oolitical club along the
Athenian lines (i.e. conservative, oligarchic) - Minar (7942) pp.25,26 and Dunbabin (1948)
p.360 who points out that most of the evidence for Pythagorean clubs dates after the two revolts;
and, of course, shaman.
2t
I tend to think (if anything can be made of so little evidence) that
PythagorasiPythagoreanismll was the prototype for Empedocles and his beliefs;l2
the parallels between the earþ Pythagoreans and Empedocles (about whom we
have the most complete knowledge of metempsychosic beliefs in earþ Greek
thought) seem to make this connection clearer.l3 The dual beliefs of reincarnation
and abstinence in earþ Pythagoreanism are found fully realized in Empedocles,
although set in a wider cosmological picture.
It is a problematic decision: Magna Graecia was a "hot-house culture"la of
religious beliefs which may have influenced Empedocles;t5 the most cited source is
"Olphism" (see Appendix B) - a fairly safe option considering how little we know
about it. ff the Orphic movement is based around some sort of biosr6 (as seems
certain), then it does bear more resemblance to Pythagoreanism than other circles
tt I do not see a semantical problem in the interchangeability of "Pythagoras" and
"Pythagoreanism": I use the terms to refer only to the earliest years of the movement, from
Pythagoras' a¡rival in Croton (c.5308C), until the first revolt in the early fifth century when
Pythagoras left Magna Graecia,
t2 And, as such, hardly "a unique experiment that failed": Burkert (7982) p.21.
t'Iamawa¡eof thedangerof this "apriori" method-asGuthrie (1962)pp.177f.callsit: viz.,
circumstantial evidence. There is a tradition for Empedocles' being a pupil of Pythagoras
expelled from the Pythagorean school for revealing Pythagorean secrets (D.L. 8.54-56). In
Empedocles fr.729 he is an admirer of Pythagoras (see my discussion of this in the relevant
chapter). As admirer of the Pythagoreans: Theophrastus apud Simplic. in Phys. 25,19. Both
Pa¡ker (1983) p.291, and Barnes (1979) I, p.323,n.77 use Empedocles to restore Pythagorean
doctrine, as does Claus (1981) p.714 - wirh caveat.
la Woodbury (1966) p.598; cf. Burkert (1972) p.ll2.
15Empedocles lived c.494-434; cf. the probable doctrines followed by Pindar in OIy.2 and fr.133
(q,v.).
tu On the idea of the úlos: Burkert (1985) pp.301f.
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such as the Dionysiac mystery culß.17 On a number of points one can separate
Pythagoreanism from these movements (for example, Eleusis et al):
(1) Pythagoreanism is founded on the words of a human;18 Bacchic cults on a
god; Orphic cult on a mythic figure.le On this point Pythagoreanism resembles
Empedocles' beliefs: no god appears to predominate as a fîgure of worship.2o The
movement appears to be based less on worship than on promulgating a way of life
(bios).2r This does not imply rejection of the gods in any way; in Empedocles'
cosmic system the traditional names for the various deities are retained even
though he is moving towards a grasp of immatenùity." To continue the
Empedoclean parallel, it was possible for a human to assume god-head, as
Empedocles does at fragment ll2. Despiæ this, there is little evidence of
Pythagorean worship as such, apart from the leader's obvious charismatic force.2t
tt Cf. Bu¡kert (1982) pp.125-133.
tt The Pythagorean mythology is late. For example, I cannot agree with Koller (1971) about "Die
Jenseitreise, ein pythagoreischer Ritus" of the thi¡d century BC: þthagorean groups do not
appear to exist afrer the fourth century BC - Guthrie (7962) p.180. However, Pythagoras is
connected with a katabatic joumey (in Parmenides): Burkert (7912) p.163; Burkert (1969)
pp.25,21. For Raven (1948) p.22, Parmenides is a dissident Pythagorean; cf, Blank (1982)
pp.1,68,174.
tn Burkert (1985) p.300.
2oThere is a tradition linking Pythagoras with Apollo in the contexts of (a) Hyperborean Apollo:
Aristotle fr.191 Rose; cf. Marcovitch (1916) pp.334ff.; (b) Apollo Genitor with an altar for
bloodless sacrif,rce: numerous references in Burkert (1912) pp.180,n.108; cf. pp.113,119-120);
also cf. Détienne (1972) p.46 on offerings - he makes Apollo Genitor into the patron of the
universal health food store; (c) Delphic Apollo: by means of etymology - Skutsch (1968) p.151. I
would hardly call this evidence of a tendency to monotheism contra Gomperz (1901) p.139, who
bases his discussion on very late evidence. Of cou¡se, the ascetic tradition would be in keeping
with Apolline moderation: cf. Cornford (1922) p.145 and Minar (1942) p.130.
tt Of course, in Christian tradition the two do come together in the monastic life.
"This is not fully realised until Plato: cf. R.Renehan "On the Greek Origins of the Concept of
Incorporeality and Immateriality" GRB.S 21 (19 80) 105-138.
"Again tradition makes Pythagoras a god or a daimon; his nea¡ contemporaries seem to regard
him as all too human: cf. Heraclitus fragments 40 and 129. On Pythagoras' cha¡isma: Kahn
(1979) p.tra.
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(2) Although there is little to suggest that Pythagoreans lived in communes
together (a "way of life" does not necessarily imply a life together),z  there seems
to have been a spirit of community involvement, founded on the tradition of
Pythagoras as a moral reformer, pulling Croton together into a strong unit.25 It
does seem as though these points fit well with the supposedly aristocratic position
of the Pythagoreans (viz. in political clubs and power; as reformers, but
independent).26 Burkert may be closest when he sees Pythagoreanism as a
"sect".21 Republic 600b (where Plato makes his only reference to Pythagoras by
name) may be significant in this respect.2s
(3) Nor was Pythagoreanism akin to the "quick fix" cults such as the
Eleusinian mysteries or cathartic Dionysiac revels; admittance may have been by
degrees (cf. the monastic novitiate),2e and the fact that it had a bios stresses the
2ade Vogel (1966) p.187; Burkert (1982) pp.l5ff. on communal property. It is easy to picture
Pythagoreans as hippies, especially in the light of the Middle Comedy evidence: see Brerruner
(1992) p.205; Détienne (1981) pp.227ff.lists exanples; a fuller listing is in DK 58 E (pp.478-
480).
25 Dunbabin (1948) p.361.
'uDebate rages over the aristocratic tendencies of the þthagoreans. Tradition holds that the
þthagorean movement was one of the aristocracy - D.L. 8.3 - while the Orphics were from a
lower class.
ttAlso Guthrie (7962) p.1.48. "Sect" has unfortunate connotations, but Burkert's definition -
Burkert (7982) p.3 (quoted in Appendix B) - does ht the movement well.
" <r¡.1"ò õù eï pù ôr¡pooíot, iõíqt floiv f¡1e¡rôv æorôeíoç crutóç (ôv \É^¡erat "Opqpoç
yevéoOcn, oï èreîvov r11ónrrlv èæí ouvouoíqt rai toîç {lotépotç öôóv two æopéôoocv píoo
Opr¡prrr]v, õoæep flu0a1ópcrç oùtóç te ôro$epóvtorç enì toótcp tìlotu¡ìh, rqì ol i5otepot ëtt
rqì vôv llu0crlópetov rpóruov êæovopó(ovteç toô píoo ôtaQaveîç rq ôoroôow eìvot Èv toîç
cíl.l"orq; Long (1948) p.28 believes that Pythagoras is being held up as a moral teacher; cf. Raven
(1948) p.1. I wonder whether this passage is not also making the point that Pythagoras left none
of the mimetic writings which Plato criticises at Republic 364b-365a (contra D.L. 8.6-8).
tn Timaeus apudlarblichus l? 72 suggests a five year silence; this implies communal life and is
no doubt a reflection of the late date of the sou¡ces. Ìsdinau. (1942) p.28 gives a convenient
srrrnmary of lamblichus' (W 7l-74) stages of induction into the Pythagorean movement.
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permanence of its followers. As Burkert has noted,3O the Pythagoreans use the
"tools" of these movements - catharsis, abstinence, ritual - but in an entirely
different and permanent context. Instead of a few days of abstinence and ritual
lust¡ation (as at Eleusis), life becomes a permanent search for that formerly
temporary state of purity.3l Obviously this is not a state of affairs which would be
welcome to everyone; it involves a complete change of lifestyle - a point which
may help to explain the revolts against the Pythagoreans. A blend of political
power" and promulgation of unusual tife-style might well produce an explosive
sih¡ation.33 Moreover, at Eleusis there seems to have been little stress on an
initiate's moral obligations during life (apart from the exclusion of murderers, for
example).34 Compare the Orphic movement with its burden of guilt to work
through, or the crime of the dairutn in Empedocles. More differences will become
apparent as I discuss aspects of doctrine.
The majority of commentators accept that transmigration is the only
beliefldoctrine that can be attributed to Pythagoras on certain grounds.3s This is
confirmed by fragment 7 of Xenophanes of Colophon (apud D.L. 8.36):36
'o Burkert (1935) p.303
" Parker (1983) p.299; cf . Burkert (1985) p.302: "the bios has disca¡ded culf'.
32Especially if it was anti-democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic in a time of tyranny: Burkert
(1985) p.303 tenns it "elitism"; cf. Minar (1942) p.127 on the lower class tastes of the tyrant
Micythus of Rhegium (and the Peisistratids) who favou¡ed Orphism. Cf. Appendix B.
" Cf. the tradition that beans were forbidden because of their link with democratic voting:
Morrison (1955) p.148; Grant (1980) p.301 cites Ps.-Plutarch and (p.302) Hippolytus Ref. 6.27.5.
Also Gurhrie (1962) p.185.
3o Parke (1986) pp.59-72 on the routine of the Eleusinian mysteries.
35 Lack of evidence denies Pythagoras a role - despite the huge tradition - in the mathematical
discoveries which bear his nane: Burkert (1972) - cited by Kahn (1974) p.162; cf. p.169 - would
see no scientific side to Pythagoreanism before Hippasus; Barnes (1979) I, p.101 agrees thar
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ö õè nepì" outoô Qrlotv o{ltcoç ë1er
roi æoté ¡uv otuQel"r(opévou orcól.oroç æoptóvto
Qaoìv É.æotrtîpcr rcoi róôe Qdo0at ëzcoç'
"lloûoor pqôÈ þóm(' , érceì r] qíl,ou avépoç åotì
VoIú, crlv ëyvrov S0e1(apév¡ç oiorv."
This passage illustrates three important points: the idea of continuity of self -
shown by the "recognition" of the puppy by Pythagoras; the fact that the human
soul can transmigrate into dogs (and by assumption, into other animals, although
this is not shown);" a¡¿ the popular recognition of transmigration in a period
þthagoras was not mnthemnticus. Conîra - cf. the review of Burkert (1972) in de Vogel (19'70):
also Guthrie (1962); and Long (1948) p.15 who wavers on the opinion that Pythagoras might
have made somc discoveries. As for Pythagoras' pollmathy (in Heraclitus fr.129), it does not
necessarily imply learning/knowledge specif,rcally in mathematics or science: cf. Kahn (1979)
pp.113-114.
36The ascription is D.L.'s own; however, there is little doubt that it refers to Pythagoras.
Maddalena (1964) - in a review of Burkert (1962) Weisheit unl Wissenschafi: studien zu
Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon (Verlag Hans Carl,Nürnberg = lnre anl Science in Ancient
Pythagoreanism, 7912) - is one of the few who believe that the fragment does not refer to
transmigration or to Pythagoras (pp.l11 & 113). This is part of an attempt (mainly successful) to
contradict Burkert's theory of Pythagoras as mystic/shaman (p.103). For Maddalena, Pythagoras
(if it is þthagoras) recognises "..non di un suo defunto amico, ma soltanto d'un suo amico" (cf.
p.llZ,n.l). He relates this to the theory that all arimals and humans are composed of particles of
the sane (p.115; not a contemporary view). I find this rather implausible, as did Burkert in the
English edition of Weisheit [= Bu¡kert (1972) p.120,n.1]. For example, Maddalena - who
suggests that Plato projected metempsychosis back onto the Pythagoreans, and that it did not
really appear as a doctrine until the fifth century (p.116,n.2) - cites (p.116) Phaedo where
Socrates has to explain the Pythagorean theory of transmigration to Sfurunias and Cebes
(themselves Pythagoreans).
3t Cf. KR p.224 for this point. One could, of course, restore the doctrine to include transmigration
only from humans to dogs and vice yersa, oÍ even postulate that dogs are a higher incarnation,
based on the scanty evidence, but it seems very unlikely. As Gomperz (7901) p.126 notes, the
Greeks had a reputation for cruelfy to animals (contra Egypt, where some animals were
worshipped as gods). It would thus seem to be considerably worse to be incarnated as an animal
than as a human - as this fragment shows.
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contemporary with Pythagoras' lifetime.3s For Xenophanes could not successfully
satirize beliefs which were not recognizable to his audience.3e
The first of these points is very important in the history of reincarnation. It
is indeed a sine qua non of any inælligible system of reincarnation that there is
some continuity of self (usually through memoryoo - cf. Platonic anamnesis). This
is especially so if reincarnation occurs within a moral framework of reward and
punishment, viz., when the soul has to remove itself from the reincarnation
cycle/ladder by living "good" lives. Without some sort of continuity, a soul is blind
to the path which it should best pursue. It is the precepts of Pythagoreanism
which should act as a necessary aide-mémolr¿ in this case.
On the subject of memory, one of the Pythagorean rules stated that a
Pythagorean could not get out of bed in the morning until he/she had recalled to
mind all the events of the previous day, in order.al It has been assumed that such
cultivation of memory can be of assistance in recalling not only recent events, but,
if enough care is taken, previous lives.a2 Certainly, Empedocles fr.129 bears
witness to Pythagoras' extlaordinary memory;43
tt Long (1948) only mentions the flrst two points; he alludes to general lcrowledge of the doctrine
only in the fifth century (p.21) with reference to Herodotus 2.123.
'n Claus (1981) p.115. On the intended audiences of the Presocratics, vide Thesleff (1990) p.113;
he believes that Xenophanes \ryas one of the first of the Presocratics who intended his work to
reach a wider audience.
ooLong (1948) makes this connection with personal identity (p.26f.).
ot lamblichus W 1,65; Frankel (1975) p.274.
"Vernant (1991) p.330. Barnes (1979) I, p,108 on "experiential memory".o'As Morrison (1955) p.136 comments, one of the few early pieces of evidence which are not
hostile or ironic. A note of caution - if it were not for Empedocles' own claim to remember his
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To return to fr. 7, the continuity of self (personal survival)4 is given
primitive expression through Pythagoras' recognition of the soul's "voice"
(bark).as As Frankel comments, "..the soul is reborn as a dog, not is a dog."a6
The soul's identity (ego?)47 is seen as a separate (and separable) entity, giving
personality to the body, and transferring that personality to the next body that it
ensouls.as
As to the actual mechanics of transmigration, we have very little early
evidence. Herodotus' overview of reincarnation (2.123) lixks with Aristotle's
criticism of the Pythagorean view of the soul at De animn 407bI2-26: that is, the
past lives, one could take the passage to mean simply that þthagoras w¿rs a good historian of
past events; one can do the same with Ion fragment.4 (D.L.7.120), as I have demonstraæd in
Appendix A.; cf. Pa¡ker (1983) p.291 and Maddalena 09e) p.176,n.2. Long (1948) p.2l - in
what I believe to be a mandatory and incorrect judgement - thinks that the passage shows that
þthagoras could only remember the past 1000 years. I do agree, however, that we cannot assume
great accuracy in this passage: for example, we cannot say that Pythagoras was in his 31st
incarnation - as Long (ibid) açrees. D.L. 8.4-5 lists þthagoras' past incarnations, on the
doubful authority of Heraclides Ponticus. Cf. Ovid Metamorphos¿s 15.158-164. Rohde (1925)
Appendix X, p.598ff., discusses the significance of the incarnations, as does Skutsch (1963)
p.151, based on etymology. There is a modern work (1925) which lists þthagoras'
reincarnations back to 600,0008C when his heavenly soul was incarnated in the body of a
Tlavatli chief!: cited by Navia (1990).
ooBarnes (1979) I, p.105, who contrasts this with psychic survival (p.115),
ot Bremmer (1937) p.85 notes that in the underworld souls make squeaking or humming noises -
they do not speak. Gerber (1970) p.251 cites Bowra's comment that the word used of the dog's
voice in fr. 7 is usually used of human s, and vice-versa.
ouFrankel (7975)p.273;cf.Vernant(1991)pp.190 &330:"Itisthe soulinmeandnotmysoul."
As Barnes expresses it (1979) I, p.106, "Metempsychosis is the doctrine of the transcorporation
of the self; and the psych¿ is the self."
a7 Burkert (1985) p.300.
atClaus (1981) p.115; cf. Long (1948) p.27.Itis the primitive prototype of the Platonic soul of
Phaedo. However, it is not seen as the life-force or seat of consciousness of the body: Lesher
(1992) p.74,n.1. On the question of the immortality of the soul in Pythagorean thought there are
no slatements comparable to Empedocles fragments 11 and 772: cf. Guthrie (1962) pp.181 &
196.
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idea of the random nature of the soul's journey from body to body. Zvntz would
argue that aimless wandering from incarnation to incarnation was a feature of early
Pythagorean belief - an illustration of the lack of coherent thought on the soul in
the sixth and early fifth centuries.oe \Vhat one would look for is some sort of
reasoning behind "good" and "bad" incarnations (for example, a moral "ladder" of
"bad" + "good" incamations).sO However, as Long has remarked, Herodotus is
merely providing a summary of what he sees to be happening but knows little
about; he is not defining a comprehensive doctrine.sl There would appear to be
Iittle ethical or moral significance in such a cycle of incarnation.
Is it relevant that the dog is being punished? That is, is life as a dog a
punishmenr for the once-human soul? If punishment is required (and this is
assuming more than the evidence can convey), why would Pythagoras stop the
(necessary) blows? The link of kinship may be the reason; preservation of the
beater's own soul might also be relevant. The problem with this kind of reasoning
is that it ignores Xenophanes' satiric intent.52 The fact that the soul in the dog was
ae Zlntz (7971) pp.264 &264,n.5); Philip (1966) p.152 agrees. Burkert (1982) p.19 believes that
belief in transmigration took no "dogmatic fortrr"; it is dangerous to presume this because of the
lack of evidence. Claus (1981) pp.115,118 discusses the problem of continuify of more than one
view of psyche in the same period (and the inherent cont¡adictions); for example, the Homeric
view of psyche at death, and the view expressed in Xenophanes, Cf. Guthrie (1962) p.378.
'oLong (1948) p.27 protests against a "mechanical a¡d non-moral process", an objection with
which I would agree.
tt Long (1948) p.27, who also believes that Herodotus is referring accurately to the Pythagoreans
(e.e., p.23).
t'Lesher (1992) pp.79f . summarises the views of the majorily of commentators who believe that
Xenophanes is satirising transmigration. Lesher believes that it is the ridiculous idea that
Pythagoras can recognise souls that is being attacked: i.e., it is an attack of much the same sort as
Heraclitus fr.129. Long (1948) p.17 accepts the passage, but asks - with good reason - whether it
may be "sati¡ical exaggeration".
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a friend of Pythagoras' suggests that it once inhabited the body of a Pythagorean:
thus the fragment makes a mockery of the intent of the Pythagorean bios by
presenting a Pythagorean (who - presumably - followed þthagoras' dictums)
incarnated in a lower rather than higher life.s3
The other option is that there is only one incarnation and it is a punishment
life - and for this there is no Pythagorean or comparative evidence.5a
One must assume that incarnation back into human form (at least) is
eventually possible.5s It would be a very depressing outlook for the future if it
were not.
The next question is whether one can restore an ultimate aim to the
system.56 There is no evidence for the number of incarnations or the length of time
required to complete the cycle.sT Long believes that Herodotus 2.123 is based on
Pythagorean beliefs,ss and that the details given are correct (viz., the length of the
t'It was notbeing held up as an example of Pythagoras' illustration of the consequences of not
listening to his precepts.
tnBut cf. Pinda¡ fr.l33.
tt As i.t all systems of reincarnation in this early period.
5uFor example, Empedocles uses transmigration (founded on a basis of a "fa.ll" of mankind) as
part of a wider cosmic system, Jaeger (1947) p.64 restores a Pythagorean cosmology, as does va¡
der Waerden (1952) pp.129ff. also, including a doctrine of eternal recrurence - see Appendix E.
s7 cf.T;-ller (1881) p.485. There is no idea of the body as prison/tomb of soul which one sees in
Phaedo or Cratylus.
ttRatherthanalostaccountofmetempsychosis-Long(1948)p.23. Tomin(1988)p.30would
agree that the 3,000 years is a Pythagorean featufe.
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cycle is 3000 years and this involves incarnation in all measure of creatures). The
passage seems to me to be much closer to Empedocles fragments 117 and 115.5e
As for the end of the cycle (if there is an end?), there is no evidence to
assume either an Empedoclean aim for divinity (apart from the report in Aristotle
fr.l92 Rose that Pythagoras was - presumably - a daim.onic figure) or a Pindaric
heroification.uo Likewise there is no hint of re-absorption into a common soul
rnass.ut Indeed it is impossible to find a likely end to the cycle if one knows
nothing about the beginnings. There is no hint of any original sin requiring
atonement (as in Orphism; cf. Pindar fr.133) through reincarnation, although
discharge of some sort of burden of guilt is a common dcnominator in Southcrn
Itatian religion.62
Obviously, questions on post-mortem judgement, reward and punishment
and the mechanics of the next incarnation, cannot be answered with any degree of
certainty:63 however, parallels will be drawn in the chapters on Empedocles and
Pindar.
5e I do not see the absence of plants or the time difference (cf. fr.115) as significant if - on Long's
(1948) p.21 theory - Herodotus is merely making a short sunmary.
uo As B olton (19 62) p. 1 29, Guthri e (19 62) pp.202f . and others assume.
utI<Rp.224; Maddalena Q9e) p.115 would see this as a possibility.
u'That is, salvation religion - Cornford (1922) p.141. Parker (1983) pp.291,300: it recurs in
Empedocles and Pindar and is certainly present in the Orphic evidence. Iarnblichus l? 85 f,rts
Pythagoras into this guilt culture: "Pleasu¡e is in all circumstances bad; for we came here to be
punished and we ought to be punished." Cf. Dodds (1951) p.152; Minar (1942) p.105.
utPhilip (1966) pp.152-153, Bu¡kert (1972) pp.l33-734, and Barnes (1919) I, p.104 offer a
comprehensive list of questions which cannot be answered about tle Pythagoreans without
reference to a very wide and va¡ied field of sources, as Burkert's responses show: "Each of these
questions is answered in more than one way in the ancient tradition, and there would be small
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The only links which do bind Pythagorean transmigration to some sort of
doctrine are the taboos and abstinences, which, I think, supply part of the ethical
background.* It is a logical step to postulate - in the presence of a large number
of rules and taboos (symbola; acousrnnta) placed on cortain forms of behaviour
and custom within the movement - that hfestyle was relevant to Pythagoreanism
and (by the nature of the precepts) to the soul's ethicaVmoral well-being.
Abstention from beans is the most famous injunction in the
Pythagorean/Orphic tradition, a result of Empedocles fr. L4l,6s and one which is
rich, symbol-laden and contradictory.66 It seems likely that the abstinence from
prospect of success in an undertaking to crystallise out a sharply defined 'doctrine of
Pythagoras'." (p.135). Note thât the gold leaves have no validily as examples of Pythagorean
eschatology - contra Zuntz (1972) pp.321,343,387,383,392f. who uses them to give an ethical
dimension to Pythagoreanism; cf. Seaford (1986) p.9 &.n.34.
6a Transmigration can be the sine qua non of the abstinences; but this does not necessarily mean
that transmigration precedes the taboos, for it provides a plausible rcason for the taboos - a very
cyclic and possibly contradictory argument. Cf. Kahn's comment - (1974) p.165 - that
reincarnation provides for a mystical view of life and destiny, and a cult society with
vegetarianism as a form of pollution. See Douglas (1975) p.55: "Pollution rites in essence
prohibit physical contact..It seems that physiological pollutions become important as syrrbolic
expressions of other undesirable contacts which would have repercussions on the structure of
social or cosmological ideas."
6s 6erl,oí, æqvõerLor, rudprov öno ;¿eîpoç É1eoOor.
uu Cf. Aristoxenus' comment that in fact beans were þthagoras' favourite food because of thei¡
purgative value: apud Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae IV.11.4-6, cited by Grant (1980) p.300, who
believes that the contradictions in the tradition led to allegorizing of the symbola; thus a
prohibition against eating heart is interpreted as "do not harm your soul by eating it with
worries" (p.301); cf. D.L. 8.18, Vlastos (1970) p.117,n.62 associates Aristoxenus' view with his
rationalising of magical elements; Guthrie (1962) pp.1.69,19L with his friendship with the last of
the Pythagoreans.
Cf. Parker's (1983) p.361 conunent that Iamblichus W 106, "..sums up the ambiguities of the
tradition when he states explicitly that Pythagoras banned such foods as were indigestible, or
alien to the gods, or on the contrary, sacred to the gods or so worthy of honour, or, finally, liable
to interfere with the purity, moderation, or mantic por¡/ers of the soul." (!) Parker - sq.
R.S.Brumbaugh & J.Schwarfz (1980) "Pythagoras and beans: a medical explanation" ClassicaL
World 13, 427f . - interprets the taboo as resulting from an "easily observable causal connection",
viz. from favism: fabiavicia are deadly to those Mediterranean dwellers suffering from a certain
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beans is more of a primitive taboo than a meaningful injunction.6t Other symbola
(mostly cited from Aristotle's fragmentary work on the Pythagoreans) give
prohibitions on similarly superstitious grounds.us
Other alimentary taboos/injunctions can be linked more specifically with
reincarnation (especially on the testimony of Empedocles).6e Evidence points to
the Pythagoreans' being vegetarian, or semi-vegetarian. That they were known for
their vegetarianism was well enough recognized for it to be parodied in Middle
Comedy at Athens in the fourth century.70
inherited enzyme dehciency (p.365). For other "meanings" of the taboo (particularly associated
with eschatology), cf. Bu¡kert (1972) pp.183-184 and Guthrie (1962) pp.184-5: e.g. beans
resembling testicles, the gates of Hades, the universe; their appearance when bu¡ied; their lack of
nodes, and etc... Vide Parker (1983) p.365: "Ancient explanations certainly present the bean as a
bizarre, polluted, and structurally ambiguous product, associated with sex, the cycle of birth and
death, and Hades". I have already mentioned the link with democratic voting: Minar Q9aD p.64.
Breruner (7992) p.212 associates the ban with the Pythagorean desi¡e to control life, including
emotions and, in this case, bodily functions. This is a quite persuasive point of view; cf. the
explanation of Cicero apud Atiltss Gellius Noctes Atticae IV.2, that flatulence (from beans) upset
the Pythagorean' s mental ranquillity.
utCf. Mina¡ (7942) p.64; Philip (1966) pp.155f. Détienne (1972) p.40 disagrees. Guthrie (1962)
p.167 noæs that although the traditions antedate the sixth century, nevertheless we only have
evidence for their appearance in Pythagorean belief in the fifth century.
utFor example: spitting on one's nail-clippings; stirring tle fire with a l¡nife, For examples:
Burkert (7972) pp.l71-173; KR pp.226f. on the list from Iarnblichus Protrepticus 21 (= ¡1¡
58C6). There is no case for saying that these prohibitions fust a¡ose among the þthagoreans,
because similar precepts a¡e found in Hesiod Works and Days 727,742-3,'779: cf. West (1971)
p.217; Burkert(1972) pp.173,n.57 &178 Parker (1983) pp.292f. Moreover, there appears to be
a common root to these prescriptions, which also appear in similar fomts in other societies:
Gutìrie (7962) p,185,n,2; West (1971) p.66 on Uparishad parallels; Long (1948) p.26; Puker
(1983) p.292 notes that despite their prevalence in comparative anthropological discussion, there
is little Greek evidence.
unThe links could also be made on comparative evidence such as ¡he lttws of Manu (5.48,55) -
West (1971) p,61 - or from Buddhist beliefs. However, the fact ttrat a close Greek contemporary
exists with a similar doctrine makes the assumptions more plausible.
toFor example, Détienne (1981) p,228 discusses fr.219 Kock from Alexis' Tarentines wherc
vegetarians fight over pieces of dog meat; I wonder whether this is an analogy with Xenophanes
fr.7; more likely it is a mark of social degradation. Détienne p.227f . gives a short list of examples
from the fragments of New Comedy. He notes - along with Guth¡ie (1962) (p.187) - that the
comments may also refer to the Cynics; certainly there was a traditional way of referring to
"wise" men and philosophers witl unusual life-sryles, viz. dkty, smelly, ragged and barefoot,
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The nature of the abstention from meat (i.e. vegetarianism) is problematic.
One side of the tradition reports that not only eating meat, but killing animals,
sacrificing animals to the gods at the altar, and - most radically - associating with
butchers and hunters were activities to be avoided.Tl Another opinion is that there
were degrees within the movement, and certain Pythagoreans placed firmer
restrictions on meat-eating than others.72 The less radical tradition is expressed by
Iamblichus who reports that the group ate only foods (including animals) into
which souls did not enter.73 Another point of view is that animals not benefîcial to
mankind could be eaten (for example, goats and pigs which interfere with
agriculture) but more domesticated animals (llving close to man - for example,
sheep and cattle) could not, and the working ox was strictly forbidden.To This
would seem to be an indication of the degree of distance of domestic relations
between humans and animals, which was expressed in terms of their ensoulment'7s
eating herbs and drinking water. von Fntz (1940) p.76 makes the point tìat these Pythagoreans
may be the survivors from the acousmatici who fled from Magna Graecia after the second revolt
in the fifth century.
ttEudoxus apudPorphyry W 7 (DK 1489). Berthiaume (1982) offers a concise discussion of
butchers. His sources for the Pythagoreans are late (e.g. Philostratus: p.81-2).
ttlamblichus W 81,87: the acousmatici and the mnthemaÍici. Porphyry W 3'r- defines the two
groups: the former do not know all the secrets of the movement (and only partially abst¿in); the
latter have full, deep knowledge (and tully abstain): Guthrie (1962) pp.I92ff.; Bu¡kert (1982)
pp.20f. However, in any movement like this there will always be adherents going to further
extremes than others: cf. self-inflicted penances among Christian ascetics (scourging etc.).
t'D.L.8.19
tnAristoxenusfr.25,2ga V/ehrli (see DK 58D; D.L. 8.20 on the ox); cf. Ovid Metamarphoses
15.110-115 and 720-745. The large secúon on Pythagoras at Melamorphoses 15.60-478 may
reflect the influence of Empedocles - Burkert (1912) p.180,n108; as Little (1970) pp.355,343-4
has perceived, however, for all that it purports to discuss Pythagoras' ethics and reincarnation
beliefs, it is really concerned with the concept of renewal in terms of transfonnation/evolution.
Cf. van der'Waerden (1965) col. 853, 854.
75 cf. Vernant (1991) pp.298f.
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thus it is a matter of which animats a human soul can enter in.76 As well as this,
there were other forbidden animals which must surely fit into the "taboo" category
- the absúnences appearing to have no rational grounds.TT A restriction on eating
the heart and womb is obvious as these are representative of life.?8
As the structuralists (Détienne, Vernant et al) have noted, a consequence
of the Pythagorean rejection of animal sacri.fice would be a position beyond the
pale of Promethean religion, and, as such, apart from the polis. It implied
destruction of the proper ordered relationship and traditional channels of
communication between men and gods and, if the aim was to return to a Golden
Ag"," a rejection of the Olympian gods and/or descent into chaos.8o
My major objection to this point of view is the lack of evidence. Surely
such a rejection of gods and institutions, and an assumption of the divine, could
76 That the psyche is seen as human regardless of whether it is ensouled in a human or animal
body is expressed in Xenophanes fr.7.
77The ban on white cocks is likewise mysterious, although Marcovitch (L916) - based on
Lucian's Gallus - gives numerous associations, including that with Apollo and prophesy (pp.332-
335). Guthrie (7962) p.190 gives comparative examples, Cf. Iævy (1965) pp.55-56. Other
unusual bans a¡e on mullet and blacktail (D.L. 8.33): the red mullet evidently ate corpses and
dead fish as well as being blood-coloured and sacred to Hecate - cf. Parker (1983) p.362, who
atso (p.261-3) discusses the fish banned at Eleusis, and the reasons for the bans.
tt A ban on eating eggs and oviparous animals is also understandable in these tenns: Pa¡ker
(1983) pp.26l-3; cf. Guthrie (1962) p.188 for other testimonia. To the hea¡t and womb can be
added the loin, testicles, marrow, feet and head - Porphyry W 43,
tnBeans are the opposite of spices, and spices a¡e the foodpar excellence of the Golden Age:
Détienne (1981) p.222.
toThis area is úeated by Détienne (1981) pp.2I7-222, (1972) pp.Mff, and (1959); Détienne &
Vernant (1989); Vernant (1991) p.280 on the correct place of men between beasts and gods;
Gordon (1981) in toto. Pa¡ker (1983) embraces a lesser fonn of these concepts, when he st¡esses
that taboos are expressions of partition (p.295).
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not have passed without some backlash.sl The structuralists would argue, though,
that the intentions of the Pythagoreans' actions were secret even to themselves.s2
But there does not appear to have been a conservative reaction on religious
grounds,83 nor is there any evidence for Détienne's "anti-system...counter-polis".84
After the revolts, the Pythagoreans were depicted in fourth century comedy as
crazy, but hardly a danger to the stability of the polis. At Croton, the Pythagoreans
were prominent in the life of the polis, and tradition makes Pythagoras moral
reformer to the beleaguered city.85 Politically prominent Pythagoreans could not
exist on the margins of society.tu For example, (after the revolts) Archytas was
81 Unfortunately there is no record of the reaction to Empedocles' claim to divinity - fr,I72 - to
compare. VideYemant (1991) p.296 on the removal of sacrif,rce equating with the removal of the
boundary which prevents men from achieving divine status.
t'Or, 
as Détienne (1931) p.222 a4ues, reforming the city from within is the milder form of this
rejection, practiced by those Pythagoreans who ate some meat. The radicals practised total
rejection.
83The two revolts in Croton - c.510 and c.450BC - seem to have been politically motivated: von
Fritz (1940) p.92;Minar (1942) p.64. Contra Apollonius of Tyana øpudlanblichus l? 254-64,
who states that the uprising was a result of the þthagoreans' irritating habits which their
opponents found insulting - cited by Morrison (1955) p.148.
tn Détienne (198 1) (p.222).
tslamblichus W 37 - late evidence, of course; Dunbabin (1948) p.361; von Fritz (1940) pp.95f.
Morrison (1955) pp.149-150 makes the comparison with the role of Epimenides at Athens.
tucf, Breruner (7992) pp.205-2|4, esp. p.212: Brernrner would see the Pythagoreans as an
a¡istocratic group struggling to keep their place in a nouveau riche (mercantile) society through
the aid of self-regulating props (the symbola), rather than as a marginal group shunning the
polis. However, Athenian political clubs, facing similar problems in the democratic transition do
not have religious precepts. Contra Bremmer's concept of the rules, I would argue that (a) the
symbola existed before Pythagoras founded his group; (b) they are more [kely to be peasant
beliefs - Pa¡ker (1983) p,292: it is unlikely that even land-based aristocrats would revert to such
primitive superstitions; (c) the political situation in Magna Graecia was heading towards tyrant
dynasties rather than democracy (cf, Theron of Acragas; Dion of Syracuse). The ttrreat of rule of
an individual to this group cannot be totally rejected, of course. Cf. von Fritz (7963) co1.244,
Berthiaume (1982) p.120,n.43 on Détienne and marginalization.
36
dem.ocratically elected to rule in Tarentum even though he was a strong
Pythagorean follower.sT
The rationale behind vegetarianism in these movements (Orphic,
Pythagorean and Empedoclean atike) is that the soul transmigrates into animal (and
sometimes vegetal) bodies; to kill an animal is to destroy the receptacle which
holds the soul.
Barnes has questioned the connection betvieen reincarnation and the killing
of animals:
If death marks not the cessation of life but rather the transformation
to a different vital form, death will often be a boon for the victim;
and a metempsychosic killer might well reason that the slaughter of
a sheep rwas a deed of moral worth, in that it removed a person
from the tedium of ovine existence and accelerated his return to the
divine from which his psychic peregrinations began.*t
This point of view neglects (a) the effect that the killing has on the slayer's own
soul when he/she becomes a murderer (for example, a worse life for the murderer
in the next incarnation); (b) the possibility that it may have been necessary for that
soul to live out its full life span before passing to the next life (in requitaUpenance,
for example); and (c) that - as in Empedocles fr.137 - one may be doing the ill
deed to a relative.8e I concede that there is no evidence in Pythagoreanism to
87von Fritz (1940) p.97.If anything, there seems to have been a heightened tolerance towards
unusual religious beliefs in Magna Graecia (cf, Theron of Acragas in Chapær 2).
tt Barnes (1979) l, pp.724f. refening mainly to Empedocles.
8e cf. Porphyry De abst.lII,26
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suggest any scenario in particular; however, (a) seems explicit in the prohibition
against killing, although it implies a judgement for which there is, again, no
evidence (apart from comparative).e0 I will discuss this ethical dilemma in Chapter
3 (Empedocles).
It does seem that if anything was strictly banned, it would be the actual act
of killing - rather than eating - because, after death, the soul no longer inhabits
the body,el and so it would not particularly matter what happened to the body.
However, if one sees all animals as akin - attested as a Pythagorean
beliefe2 - then it seems that eating an animal's carcass can be likened to
cannibalism:e3 the departed soul has tainted the body with its identity. Kinship
may be implied in Xenophanes fr. 7: unfortunately this is our only early evidence.ea
The fraternal nature of the Pythagorean movement (including the supposed
equality of women) may hint at the links of kinship.es The Pythagoreaneu ban on
eoJust as there is little evidence to support the notion of return to the divine in Pythagoreanism
contra Empedocles er a/.
elNotmerely in Homeric death descriptions; Claus (1931) p.112 notes that the popular view of
death is still that the psyche leaves the body; this is the use of psyche even in Empedocles
(fr.138).
e2Particularly by Polphyry De abst.III,26. Guthrie (1962) p.200 & cf. p.186 comments that this
notion of kinship presupposes transmigration. I would hesitate to call this a sine qua non: as I
mentioned, above, one could have a doctrine of reincarnation where the fate of the body was of
no concern.
n'Cf. the horrific example given in Empedocles fr.137 (and fragments 128, 1.39 and 136);
Détienne (1981) pp.218 &.270,n.8 would cite Hesiod Works and Days 716-9.
eo And it only applies to dogs, as KR p.224 note!
nt Women: Iamblichus W 54-51 on Pythagoras' speech to the women of Croton; at W 261 he
lists seventeen prominent female members of the Pythagoreans - vide Clark (1989) pp.xvii f. for a
brief discussion of this. Détienne (1972) pp.l24f. sees the inclusion of women as a way of
controlling women's disruptive influence; for example the belief that women were most sexually
a¡oused (and thus at their most alluing) in summer when men 'ffere at thei¡ weakest - Hesiod
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burial in wool - Herodotus 2.81 - is obscure: perhaps it too can be explained as an
example of abuse of kinship (for it is not necessary to kill a sheep for its wool)
Bans on killing, along with other taboos, are concerned with individual
purity, and it is no surprise to find testimony to other forms of asceticism among
the Pythagoreans. There is testimony to customs such as wearing simple white
clothes, avoiding contact with impurity (for example, by not washing in water used
by other people), eating and drinking in moderation, controlling reactions such as
laughter, and physical desires, observing periods of silence etc. It is an Apolline
life of moderation;e7 the connection seems to be that a life of greatest control and
moderation brings greater rewards to the soul after death.
*
Works and Days 586 - and that there was to be no sex in summer: D.L, 8.9, cf. West (1971)
p.160. Of course - apart from the admission of women - the same bonds of kinship could be
applied to the Athenian clubs: cf, Mina¡ (1942) pp.22-26, using G.M.Calhoun Athenian clubs in
politics and litigatíon (Burt Frarklin;N.Y.;1970 [facsimile]) to make his analogies with Athens.
Also, Burkert (1982) p.14.
e6 Perhaps Orphic?
nt Guthrie (1962) p.203 on Apollo as the god most closely linked with the Pythagoreans. Cf.
Cornford (1991[facs.]) p.194. I have discussed this, above, n.19. There is another forrr of
purification which has been connected with Pythagoras' own thought; tlis is mental catharsis:
purity achieved through philosophy - Guthrie (1962) pp.204ff.; Cornford (1922) p.143 on
theoria; cf. de Vogel (1966) p.16. KR p.228 suggest that purification is achieved by observance
of the orderliness of the universe. The link is the "partition" - Parker (1983) p.295 - and
orderliness of the Pythagoreans' own lives which rely on the set rules: Long (1948) p.27. There
is certainly no parallel for this in Empedocles; indeed, it is a Platonic doctrine present in tle
"Pythagorean" Phaedo, which may account for its appearance in early Pythagoreanism: Pa¡ker
(1983) p.298. The stumbling block is proving that Pythagoras involved himself in philosophy:
Kahn (1974) p.169. That catharsis could be achieved through activities other than lustration is
shown in the Bacchic tradition. Purification through music has also been suggested as a
Pythagorean precept - cf. the Corybantic rites: Burnet (1952) p.97; Cornford (7922) p.145 (who
calls it "psychotherapy"). It is less anachronistic than philosophical catharsis, but as Pa¡ker
(1983) p.298 suggests it may have been viewed as curative; cf. Cornford (1922) p.1,43.
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I have attempted to illustrate how the traditions of
transmigration/reincarnation and the Pythagorean lifestyle interconnect to form a
picture of an unfortunately opaque bios - a picture lacking any deeper meaning
because of the paucity of evidence." It is unfortunate that the early evidence is so
sparse and the late evidence so influenced by subsequent forms of ascetic
behaviour. Cerøinly it is impossible to restore to the Pythagoreans anything near a
complete doctrine of reincamation without drawing too heavily on comparative
data. In my opinion, Empedocles' system (minus the cosmic implications) rests on
a basic framework of Pythagorean ideas, a point which I will discuss in the relevant
chapter. What does emerge, though, is that the motivations of the Orphic
movement (vide Appendix B) and the Pythagorean movement rest on very
different foundations, and that even in earþ thought there is no signs of a coherent
development of a reincarnation "doctrine" from one to the other or from religion
to philosophyee - a feature which I find recurring throughout early
metompsychosic thought in Greece and the western colonies.
" As Gut¡rie (1962) p,1.66 notes, Pythagoras' teaching must have offered something great, or he
would not have become a legend by the 5th century.
nnAs Gomperz (1901) p.123 - for example - would see when he makes Orphism and
Pythagoreanism the male and female sides of the same entity. Cf. Appendix B for a discussion of
this perception.
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CHAPIER 2: RECONSTRUCTING A DOCTRINE OF REINCARNATION:
PINDAR OLYMPIAN 2 AND FRAGMENT 133
Pindar Olympian Ode 2.56-80
...ei ôé vtv ëlcov oç oiôev rò ¡réÀIov,
öcr" Oovóvtcov pèv evOdô' audr' oæól.a¡rvot Qpéveç
rorvdç ëtrocv,- rd ô'åv tQôe Âròç oryQ
aÀrcpo rotd yûç ôrró(er cuç e10pÇ
Ióyov Qpóoarç ovó69'
ioorç ôè vórteoorv oieí,
ioctç õ'êv o¡réporç cÍl,rov ë71ovreç, orovéotepov
êoloi ôérovtor piotov, ou 2¿0óvo toptiooovteç åv 1epòç ó*p0
ouõè róvrtov öôrop
rervdv rcpd ôíottov' al,l,d æapd ¡rèv cpíotç
Oeôv, oin"veç Ë2gorpov euopríotç, ciôorpuv vÉpovtol
aiôvo' toì" ô' atpooópotov ór1éovc rcóvov-
öoor. ô' étól"pooov Éotpìç
é.ratépcoOt peivovteç anò naynav oôírr¡v ë1er"v
yr4¿óv, ËtelÀov Âròç ôôòv rcopd Kpóvou tóporv' ëvOo porópcrrv
vôooç órecvíôeç
oôpcr æeprrcvÉolorv, cÍvOe¡ra ôè lpoooô Ql"éyer,
td pèv lepoóOev oæ' o1l,oôv ôevôpérov, öôop ô' dÀl,o Qépper,
öpporot tôv 1époç ovqæÀérovrt raì oteQcÍvorç
Bouî"oîç év ôpOoîor'Poôopóv0uoç,
öv æocr1p ë7çt <¡tê4cç é.toîpov oútQ nópeôpov,
róorç é æcivtrov 'Pécç uréptotov Ë1oíooç Opóvov.
llnÀ€óç te roì Kdô¡roç åv toîorv clÉlovtot'







Pindar Fragment 133 (Bergk): I
oÎor" ôè @epoeQóvo norvdv naÀaroô nÉvOeoç
ôé(etor, Ëç tòv{inepOev öl,rov reívorv êvótrp ëteï
ovôrôoî VùXdç rccíì"tv'
ér tôv pooúfeç oyouoì xoì o0éver rporævoì ooQíg te pÉlrotor
civôpeç oö(ovt" éç õè tòv l"ornòv 1póvov ripcoeç
oyvoì æpòç avOpcirccov raì¿0vtot.
*
l The numbering of the fragment is that of Bergk; the fragment is sometimes refened to as 137
(Turyn) or 127 (Bowra).
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Olympian 2 is dated to 476 BC, the year that Pindar arrived in Akragas
(Sicily). At Akragas he composed two Olympian Odes for its ruler, Theron
(Olympian 2 and 3), epinicians to celebrate Theron's victories at the Olympic
Games of that year, as well as other works which have survived in fragments, but
which give no information about Theron's, or Pindar's, religious beliefs. Olympian
3 is a strict epinician or victory ode, incorporating a traditional Olympian or, one
might say, Pindaric, theology. Olympian 2, on the other hand, differs radically
from the typical Pindaric formula, and although it remains laudatory, it is an
eschatological poem, dealing with reincarnation. It is also pitched at a more
personal level than the Otympian 3.2
Briefly, Olympian 2 says that when a man (presumably Theron) obtains a
certain wealth of knowledge, he is able to see the future.3 He sees that when he
dies his soul is judged (by a nameless judge). Those with a good record from their
stay on earth go to a place full of sunshine, a place where there is little toil or
hardship of any sort, but only a happiness with the gods; the bad undergo harsh
punishment. After a certain period in this existence (the poem does not specifrcally
state this, but it is the obvious conclusion to draw; one presumes - especially with
lines 68ff. as a guide - that it is a period equivalent to a life-time) the soul is
2See Robbins (1984), who suggests that Oly.2 deals with personal issues, whlle OIy.3 is shorter,
and was intended for a great civic occasion, He finds "intimations of irnnortality" in both poems,
but disguised: in OIy.3, Theron has reached the next world, as predicted in Oly.2.
3 Cf. Empedocles fr,129 - an example of this }nowledge acquired through many incarnations.
Rohde (1925) p.443 xä 41 would interpret this knowledge to mean that a person in the top rank
of human society would obviously think he was going to become a hero in the afterlife.
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incarnated back to an earthly existence, and the cycle begins again. ff the soul
keeps itseH pure for three lives on each side of the grave (i.e. six in total), it passes
(no judgement is mentioned, but there must be some means of judging whether the
lives have satisfactorily fulfilled the conditions) along the sacred way of Zeus, past
the Tower of Kronos to the Islands of the Blessed in Oceanus. This is a paradise
ruled by Rhadamanthys, Kronos and Rhea, and the home to heroes such as Peleus,
Cadmus and Achilles.o But it is also a paradise open to any soul who can fulfil the
requisite number of good lives.
Fr.133 (cited in Plato Meno 81b-c), is thought to be a fragment of a
threnos (dirge).s It has long been associated with Olympian 2 because of the
metempsychosis in both poems. It cannot be dated with any certainty, nor is it
known where, or for whom it was written. The attribution to Pindar is almost
certain, because of the preceding lines in the Meno:
oThere is considerable debate about how Achilles got to this happy paradise, since we last saw
him supremely discontented in a very different place in Odyssey ll477ff. Koniaris (1988) p.258
suggests that Pindar has given Achilles the only thing he lacked in the Odyssey - happiness, and
he points out that Olympian 2 is much concerned with happiness; he also suggests (pp.z$ff .)
that Achilles is the best known hero in the ancient world, and to put him in this paradise is a way
of showing that translation it is the best that one can hope to achieve. Solnsen (7982) p.20 poins
out thât, in the poem, Thetis pleaded for Achilles to be removed there, and that Pinda¡ bad
invented this to explain his presence (for whaæver purpose it might serve). Vernant (1981)
pp.289ff. discusses the two faces of death in ancient Greece: viz, death as glorious and death as
unbearable. He comments that the view of Achilles in the Undenryorld in Odyssey 11 is a radical
denial of the lliad's concept of heroic death. Achilles is not able to rejoice in his heroism in
Hades; he is ext¡emely unhappy. Konia¡is' (1988) argument does not seem quite so trite in this
context.
t The argument about whether the fr. comes from a dirge is hardly relevant here, and extremely
difficult to answer. V/hat is a dirge? - Olympian 2 discusses death and it is not a dirge.
Wilanrowiø-Moellendorff (1922) p.252 was the frrst to advise caution about considering fr.133 to
be part of a dirge; Lloyd-Jones (1984) p.266 agrees; the view is opposed by Sandys (1915) p.586;
Farnell (1930) p.333; Woodbury (1966) p.599, mainly, it seems, on the grounds of tradiúon.
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Oi pèu Lé1ovréç eior tôv ïepérov 'cE roì ieperrôv öootç
pepé?,qre ruepi ôv perayetpíÇovîor l,ó1ov oîor"ç t' elvar ôrôóvqr'
\Éyet ôè raì llívôopoç roi öl"l"or æoÀl"oì" tôv æorr¡tôv, öoor
Oeîoí eiorv. ö ôè l"eyouor, toorí Ë.otuv' al,î,d orcóner, ei oor
õoroôorv <ilqef Àé1etv. Qooi ydp cnv yulfrv toô avOpcímou
el,vor oOdvstov, rqì totè pèv teLeutôv, ö ôr\ cæo0v¡oKarv
rol.oôor, totè ôè ndl.tv 1íyveoOor, aæóî,l,uo0at ô' oöôéruote'
ôeîv ôTì ôrd taôto éç éoróroto ôroprôvat tòv Bíov'
olorv ydp cìv -
[= Pindar fr.133]
"Ate oôv rl VuXrl oOrÍvatóç te oôoo roì toll,dxrç yelovuîo, roi
eroporuîc rai td évOóôe rqì td åv "Ar"ôor¡ roì" ædvta yprlp"ara,
our ëorr-v öct ou pepd0qrev'6
Persephone is the controlhng deity of fr.133: mankind pays to her the
penalty which is their punishment for her grief.T This penalty is exacted "below":
that is, somewhere in the Underworld, and after eight years of this punishment (the
form of which we do not know) the souls are restored to earth in the ninth year
and incarnated into the bodies of kings, wise men and so on. At the end of this
6The similarities with Empedocles' frr. 8, 11, mdl29 are striking; however, the concepts are
ea¡lier (pre-Pannenidean), so the similarities may be coincidenøI. One presumes that Plato
includes Empedocles ¿unong his "divinely inspired" poets: he was certainly the foremost pre-
Platonic thinker on reincamation. See Rose (1936) pp.79-80 on att¡ibution of the fragment; also
McGibbon (19ó4b) p.7,n.8.
tsandys (1915) would appear to be in the minority here, in interpreting the woeigrief as
belonging to those paying the penalty; for the different viewpoints on the causes of Persephone's
grief see: McGibbon (I9øb) pp.7ff.; Rohde (1925) p.442 xä 34; Dodds (1951) p.155; Rose
(1936) p.85; Lloyd-Jones (1984) p.260. With regard to Persephone, we have two separate
religious cults - that of Eleusis (where she is Kore in the cult of Demeter) and that of the
"Orphics" (see Appendix B). There is considerable distinction made between Kore, daughter of
Demeter, and Persephone, Queen of the Dead - she is almost another person. The so-called
Eudemian theogony details the destruction of Dionysus-Zagreus by the Tiøns and the subsequent
revenge of Zeus which produced the human race. This Dionysus was the son of Persephone; her
grief is understandable, ard also her hatred of the human race (part-Titânic) from whom she
exacts her notvò. West has reconstructed the Eudemian theogony from the Rhapsodic theogony
via what he sees as the "Cyclic theogony" and parallels with Apollodorus' Bibliotheca. He dates
the Eudemian theogony to c.5008C, claiming that it was the poem of Orpheus lrrown to Plato
and Aristotle. See the review of West in CPh LXXXI (1986) 754-159 for a summary and
discussion of these arguments.
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single life, the souls become heroes. One can presume that these heroes go to an
Elysium/Islands of the Blessed.
At this point, I would like to address what one might call the different
"administrative processes" of reincarnation in each of the two poems, instead of
regarding them as two aspects 'of one doctrine. Certainly, conflating the poems
appears to make possible the restoration of a much more of a coherent doctrine of
reincarnation. This is what the majority of scholars have done.8 I am very
sceptical about the value of this.e The Ode and the fragment appear, to me, to
8Conflating Olympian 2 and, fr.l33: Sandys (1915) p.590,n.1; von Fritz (1957) p.85; Bluck
(1958b) pp.405-406; Rohde (1925) p.445 xä 42; Farnett (1930) p,15; Lloyd-Jones (1984)
pp.259ff.; Zunrz (1971) p.85; Des Places (1949) p.175. Viewing as inconsistenü McGibbon
(1964b) p.8; Solnsen (1968) p.505;Rose (1936) pp.80 & 93. Rose (1936) even suggests that the
fragment was written for a Greek from the mainland!
I want to point out a major anomaly in the traditional interpretaúon of these two passages. If I
can sum up what schola¡s think about these passages, it would go like this (it is almost a
syllogism): first, both passages are by Pindar. Second, both passages ¡efer to a doctrine or belief
in reincarnation. Therefore, third, both passages refer to the sanrc doctrine ofreincarnation, and,
four, both passages combine to restore for us not only the religious beliefs of Pindar's patron,
Theron of Akragas, but also the more general beliefs of Sicily and Southern Iøly as a whole. I am
not ovedy exaggerating the influence of these two passages; scholars have leapt on them as
providing our only solid evidence for Akragantine religion. It is hard to blame them: a big
problem when dealing with the eschatological beliefs of Southern Italy is not the poucity of
evidence per se, but the fact that every bit of it appears to contradict the next. To find even two
vaguely similar doctrines in a "reputable" autior like Pinda¡ is equivalent to winning X-Lotto.
So, what results? - basically, an amalgarn of the two passages, with any difficulties or lacunae
being filled from the corpus of eschatological evidence from Magna Graecia.
eBt.l37 is a salutary lesson to those commentators convinced that Pindar had certain religious
beliefs (viz, reincarnation, Orphism, etc.). Fr.l31 is quoted by Clement of Alexandria with
reference to the Eleusinian mysteries. This mystery cult is a long way removed from the
reincarnation debate, its purpose being to guarantee a happy afterlife;
ö)"ptoç öottç iôôv èreiva
roíl.ov etorv {mò 10óva'
otôev ¡rèv protou tel"e.utov
otôev ôè ôróoôorov oplclv.
The text per se is not relevant to my argument; merely, the point should be made that by these
examples one can see that Pinda¡ could adapt himself to the particular religious beliefs of his
patron/subject. It is also a warning not to conflate all of the eschatological fragments into one all-
embracing doctrine. As Rohde (1925) writes, Pindar "owes nothing to the Eleusinia" (p.447 x1i
48).
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refer not to a common doctrine of reincarnation, but to two doctrines.lO It is only
Iiterary tradition which links the poems. My first objection is the fact that the
divine protagonists are different (radically so); this should indicate that the poems
are not to be considered as parts of a whole system.
As well as the different divine figures, the ideas behind the incarnation
process are different; in Olympian 2 there is a judgement based on the soul's
behaviour in its previous incamation; in fr.133, Persephone is punishing all the
souls, regardless of their behaviour; it is punishment for bringing her grief. In
Olympian 2, those judged fit go to a temporary paradise while the bad endure
ærrible labours. In this poem the soul has a choice - it can act well or it can act
badly; it is self-determined. In fr.133 Persephone acts like Empedocles' Necessity:
all the souls suffer the same fate, good or bad. Endeavouring to fi.t fr.133 with the
ideas expressed in Olympian 2, it has been suggested that Persephone is the
(nameless) judge in lines 59-60;11 she is, therefore, also the judge at the final
incarnation (i.e. after the three good lives in each world - 1.68-89). At this final
judgement (fr.133) she makes all the souls, regardless of their past record of good
lives, suffer a final period of punishment (termed aî ennaetens) to make up for
(unspecified) grief caused to her. This, in turn is followed by a final life on earth in
the highest human role - kings, wise men, etc.. An alternative is that Persephone
r0 One might question the chances of two differing doctrines of reincarnation occurring in one
poet. However, all it would require would be two patrons with different beliefs - vide fr.l37 by
way of example (previous note).
tt Zwtz (1971) p,86.
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inflicted the eight year punishment after every incarnation, but this does not fit with
Olympian 2 and the judgement which separates good and bad.
The major stumbling blocks to this conflation were mentioned above, the
primary objection being that Persephone is not mentioned in Olympian 2. Instead,
there is simply the mysterious "One" (oç :/.59). Pindar had no objection to naming
her in fr.133 as a judge-like figure. Moreover, his use of other Homeric gods in his
Islands of the Blessed shows that he was not inventing a new theology.12 There
must have been a reason for not specifying the name of the god. Obviously, the
available judges did not fit in here (though he could use Rhadamanthys as a
controlling figure in the Islands of the Blessed; 1.75). T\e other alternative is that
he deliberately did not wish to name the judge. This might be the case if the judge
were Hades; H.J.Rose points out that Hades has a reputation for severe
punishment of wrong-doing, and was named (even euphemistically) with the
greatest of reluctance because of his ill-omened role as ruler of the Underworld.l3
Hades appears n Olympian 9 (1.33) in Hermes' psychopompic role, leading
mortals down to the dead. He may have had a judicial role in Aeschylus'
Eumenides (1.210fÐ; and in Aeschylus' Suppliants: "it is said, another Zeus
makes final judgement on wrong-doing among the dead" (230fÐ.14 However,
r2Koniaris (1938) p.247 connrents that there is no reason to suppose that Pindar saw the
Underworld as a different place post Troiam captam.
tt OCrr' s.v. Hades, p.484; Rohde (7925) p.238 writes that the "One" is borrowed from the
teaching of "mystic separatists". He does, however, cite Plato on the judges of the Underworld:
Hades, R-hadamanthys and Minos (p.239). Lloyd-Jones (1984) p.254 very tentatively suggests
that the judge might be the "subteffanean ZÊ\s"i by this I presume he means Hades. He does not
believe this Zeus is the judge.
toReferences and t¡anslation from Garland (1985) pp.52,53.
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there are few references to Hades as a judge, and, to my knowledge, no scholars
have suggested Hades as the "Orìe" n Olympian 2. The other altemative is that
Theron's religious beliefs included a judging figure who did not appear in the
traditional religion, and Pindar wished to gloss over this. I will discuss Pindar's
strong traditional stance, below.
*
To begin with Olympian 2,lines 56-83 give quite a clear description of a
reincarnation process.tt It is a process involving a judgement, and "sentencing" to
temporary paradise or a life of toil. A certain amount of conjecture is needed to
realise the system fully. My fairly conservative interpretation of the system is as
follows; for the good soul, judgement brings a stay (a lifetime - whether in human
tt The debate over the meaning of èotpiç èrcrtéparft was resolved satisfactorily when tìe Greek
was examined. Other cotrnnentators had looked to what possible views lhe phrase could have
expressed, or, for example, the link of the number three with other beliefs. For example, Demand
(1975) p.355,n.38 tenuously links Pindar and Empedocles on the basis of their use of the number
th¡ee. These discussions are abstuse; cf, Long (1948) who argues that in a doctrine of
reincarnation the souls (which have "fallen") can only pass from this world to their fural dwelling
place, not from the judgement place in the Undenvorld (which Olympian 2 implies). This
illustrates all too well my point about conflating the fragment and the Ode: in doing so, Long has
lost sight of what the Ode actually says - vide von Fritz (1957) pp.85ff. and McGibbon (1964b)
pp.5ff. For an unsound interpretation of the Ode's purpose see Segal (1985) p.211. Nisetich
(1988) pp.7ff. thinks that Theron saw poefry as the means to salvation and irunortality. One is
reminded of Shakespeare's Sonnet 19 and Spenser's LXXV. As Konia¡is (1988) p.246
comments, irnmortality achieved through poetry is a "truism". id. (p.269) on the Ode as a "quasi-
revelation"; also Bowra (1964) pp.72l-722. Sandys (1915); Gildersleeve (1907) pp.150-L51 see
3 lives in total. Against this, von Fn¡z (1957) pp.85ff.; McGibbon (1964b) pp.5ff.; Bluck (1958b)
pp,405ff.; Rohde (1925)p.445 xä 42; Woodbury (196ó) p.616; Rose (p.93) see 6lives in total
(th¡ee in each world). Lloyd-Jones (1984) p.261,n.37 cannot decide! Three lives in each world
must be the minimum requirement to qualify for the Islands of the Blessed. There has also been
a minor scholarly skinnish over lines 62-62, about whether the lines mean that this temporary
paradise is in pennanent equinox, or if it means that earthly night and day are reversed in this
paradise (as fr.129 suggests for Elysium; Rohde (1925) agrees: p.443 x1i 37). It is hardly
relevant to reincarnation. For the arguments see, especially, Woodbury (1966) pp.600ff: the
equinox as a mean between mortality and immortalify; the equinox as a metaphor for politica-l
equality); Gildersleeve (1907) p.150; Lloyd-Jones (1984) p.255 suggests that days and nights may
be of equal length in the underworld, but points also to the evidence of fr.l29.
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or cosmic time) in a paradise that is similar to, but not the same place as, the
Islands of the Blessed where the heroes dwell.16 Because it is necessary to live
well three times in the upper and lower worlds (1.68-69),17 at some stage the soul
must be incarnated into our world afær its judgement. This creates considerable
diffîculty; is incarnation in our world a punishment for the errant soul which
spoiled its paradise-lifetime? If so, the life in paradise would not be counted among
the lives lived satisfactorily. Therefore, to get three satisfactory lives on earth, a
soul would have to sacrifice deliberately three lives in paradise so that it could
actually get to earth. This would imply a minimum of nine lifetimes before
translation to the Islands of the Blessed.ls This is based on the assumpúon (which
the Ode irnplies) that the soul is capable of making moral choices about what sort
of life it will lead.le This makes the concept of deliberately sabotaging one's lives
implausible.
The most logical way for this to happen is for the incarnations to alternate:
the soul has one lifetime in our world, then the paradise or punishment life, then a
tu Solnsen (1968) pp.503ff. on the problem of two paradises; see also note 46.
17 
See, also, Nilsson (1935) pp.2l4ff.
18 The number nine has some interesting parallels: Guthrie (7962) pp.252-253 makes the analogy
with the nine years in fr.133; Plato's 9000 years in the Phaedrrs; Empedocles' 9000 year cycle
(if there are three seasons to a year), Did nine perhaps ht the poem better than any other number?
Cf. Marcovich (1964) who compares the evidence for eight years.
reThe conclusion of Lloyd-Jones (1984) is that after death the souls a¡e all punished by being
made feeble-witted, his translation of ondl.opvot Qpéveç (/.57). There is no indication of this in
any doctrine of reincarnation, nor would it make sense. As Konia¡is (1988) pp.249ff. has rightly
argued, the removal of rational choice tirough feeble-wittedness makes the system i¡relevant
(and amoral). Moreover, the regular translation of oædl,apvoç is lawless or wicked, not feeble-
minded, The argument is not even logical. Lloyd-Jones (1984) reached his conclusion on the
basis of (he "ancient grief' of fr.133: making men feeble-minded is how Persephone exacts her
punishment for the murder of her son Dionysus-Zagreus.
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lifetime in our world and so on.to This fits with other comparable Greek doctrines
of reincarnation, although it is unusual for the life of reward or punishment to be
considered as a.assessable part of the system, because it is generally a life over
/\.
which the soul has little self-determination. One wonders how much souls learn or
remember of their punishment or reward? It is a sine qua non of any intelligible
system of reincarnation that there is some continuity of self (usually through
memory). Yet there is no mention of the souls losing their memory by drinking of
the River of Forgefulness (Lethe), as in Plato's Republic and Virgil's Aeneid.
The judgement itself creates problems, primarily because Pindar glosses
over the fate of the wicked (for obvious reasons - Theron is only interested in his
own fate, and would not like the alternative that he could also go the way of the
wicked). All we learn about the wicked is that they endure labour which cannot
be looked upon (1.67). This would appear to be a sort of Hell or purgatory. ft.129
perhaps offers a glimpse of this world: after describing an Elysium, Pindar
contlnues,
'o Von Fritz (1957) p.86 believes in a strict alternation of earth/Hades. He thinks that the soul is
unable to earn merit in Hades, but stâys there to be purified by punishments (this is the influence
of fr.133 on his argument). He admits (p.87) that he intends to establish a closer relationship
between Pindar, Empedocles and Phaedrus. McGibbon (79&b) p.5 points out that, for Pinda¡,
paradise in Olympian 2 is not the place of recompense; rather it is what the soul desires to attain.
I would add that in fr.133 the place to which Persephone sends the souls obviously is a place of
recompense; there is no evidence that it is an Elysium, and indeed, it seems unlikely. V/ith regard
to von Fritz's (1957) theory about merit in Hades, McGibbon (1964b) comments that for the
souls this first paradise is, in a sense, a purgatory, because it is not their hnal destination. He
believes that paradise was a test of how one responded to one's reward or punishment (i.e.
favou¡able or unfavourable circumstances), and denies passivity of the souls in paradise: i.e. it is




évOev tòv öæerpov épeóryovrcr orótov
pl.q?Cpoi ôvoQepôç voxtòç nora¡toí..zr
Can the wicked also be incarnated on earth after a life of this sort? It does not
seem that Pindar is using the Empedoclean idea that our world is Hell; of course,
our world is obviously inferior to a life in paradise, however temporary.z2
There is another possibilityl that although the soul can choose what sort of
life it will lead, it cannot choose the place where it will lead this life. That is, it is a
random placement (i.e. in this world or in the Underworld). This does not imply
the removal of judgement altogether. I am suggesting that one must imagine a
duality of worlds: a definite division into a "good world" and a "bad world", both
in our world and in the Underworld; that is, the good are randomly incarnated only
on the "good side" of the two worlds, and the wicked are randomly incarnated
only on the "bad side". This is a highly complex idea!
And what of the distinction between good and bad? It is hardly clear-cut; it
seems that only an exemplary life will be counted towards one's quota of six lives.
Does that mean that anything less than perfection is sent, as a matter of course, to
this purgatory? If there is to be a scale of incarnations (as in other systems of
belief), this is where it would occur. What I am suggesting is that earth (because it
is inferior to paradise) is where the mediocre (rather than the truly wicked) are
" On Pindar's gloss of the wicked, see Bowra (7964) p.lzl.
22 This would indicate that the soul had not suffered a "fall" , as some commentators would like to
see,
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sent. This does not seem to create as many problems as the above suggestions. In
this system, one could live three good lives on earth, then three good lives in
paradise, in that order; or alternate good lives. It does, in fact, seem to imply a
certain randomness, but one that is really controlled by the judge. Of course, a
good life in paradise (where one does not have to do anything by the way of work)
would perhaps be easier to achieve than a good life on earth, surrounded by moral
temptations. In this sense, earthly life would be a greater test of the soul than
paradise.23 This is an idea that has caused interpreters of fr.133 considerable
difficulty: is the life on earth to which Persephone sends the souls a reward or a
final test? I will discuss this, below.
The point which must be made is that there appears to be no maximum
time limit in which to achieve one's six lives. That is, it is possible to get to the
Islands of the Blessed after six straight good lives, but, presumably, one could
waste an untold amount of time in mediocre and bad lives along the way. There is
no indication that the good lives can only occur in the top echelon of human
incarnations (as Empedocles and Plato Phaedrus 249a would have it). That would
seem to remove the necessity to work one's way up a scale of lives, achieving a
morally perfect score in each. Moreover, Olympian 2 does not specify the
necessity for the six lives to be lived one after each other. In addition, it seems
t3 Mccibbon (1964b) p.6 wonders what there is to do in paradise? One suggestion is thar the time
is used simply for puriltcation - ill analogy might be made to Keul's thesis on the water-carriers
in Hades: Garland (1985) p.63. Fr.l29-130 describe a paradise where the dead ride horses,
wrestle, and play draughts and lyres.
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perfectly possible to live, for example, four good lives on eârth and three in
paradise, as long as one fulfils the minimum requirement.2a One's ability to
recollect past lives would affect the length of time it took to pass through the
system to the Islands of the Blessed; morally speaking, reincarnation is a way of
learning from one's mistakes and being rewarded for this.25
There are a number of other questions which can be posed about this
Ode:26 fîrstly, where does the judgement occur? Lines 56-57 state that it occurs
immediately after death. The judgement either occurs in the world of the dead, or
in some sort of transitional place between our world and the underworld: a sort of
waiting-room or "way-station" for the souls. Although judgement occurs
immediately, there is no indication how long the soul must wait between
incamations. That there is a judgement between each life seems certain.
Secondly, what happens to those who never achieve any good lives? Do
they keep getting another chance, or are they eventually made to live in eternal
damnation?27 This is linked to the question, above, about a maximum limit on
incarnations. There is no limit given in the Ode, because the fate of the wicked is
not of paramount importance to the poet or his patron. There might be a moral
2a Bluck (1958b) p.408 on number of lives, He cites Phaedrus as an example of giving only the
shortest way of get[ing out of the cycle.
2s Although, the "time out" ought to be more important than ext¡a lives as a time for reflection.
This is an idea found in other systems of reincarnation, but not the Greek.
26 
Questions based on those posed by Burkert (1972) pp,733-134,
" Rohde (1925) gives the alrernarives: p.M6 xä 45.
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rather than a ûemporal 1imit28 For example, Empedocles had a temporal limit - his
cosmic cycle was fîxed at 10,000 seasons." And, how low is it possible to sink in
incarnations (if incarnations are linked to morality)? A¡e incarnations limiæd to
human bodies, or can one - as Empedocles believed - become roôpóç te rópq te
Oó¡rvoç t'oio:vóç re roì ë(oî"oç ël.Ioroç i10óç (Empedocles' fr.117)? Finally, is
it possible to by-pass the incarnations completely?3O Achilles, for example, has
obviously entered the Islands of the Blessed by the back door.3t Was this because
he was the most famous heroic figure of antiquity? One might cite the example of
Menelaus who circumvented death by immediate translation to Elysium (Odyssey
4.56L-6Ð.32 Menelaus received preferential treatment because he was the son-in-
law of Zeus.
Thirdly, how or why did the system begin? Either the system had always
occurred since the cosmos was created, or else it was the result of something the
soul did. That is, the soul "felT', and is being punished for its fall. This is the basis
of the Empedoclean and Platonic systems of reincarnation. In both of these writers
the soul was divine, and was attempting to regain its diviniry.33 In Olympian 2,
this is certainly not occurring. There is no suggestion that the soul originally
ttlvith regard to fr.133, McGibbon (1964b) notes (if I am interpreting him correctly) that if a
soul reaches the highest human positiorr of virtue before tne explration of a time limit, then + u*l''; "
qright be a moral impossibility for it(-o_.noJ€ain immediate release. t',-r l " fi, q r- ì.
2e Empedocles' fr.115. 'i
3o Mccibbon (1964b) p.8 believes that the vi¡tuous lives are the only means of release.
31 
See note 3.
32Reference from Koniaris (1988) p.254.Pindar could have lifted his description of the Islands of
the Blessed straight from this passage in rhe Odyssey.
33 In¡fr.l3ithe soul is "from the gods"; cf. Empedocles fr.115 -his daimonr a¡e also from the
gods,:i.e. divine.
'l I ,.... ,. ,.
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dwelled in the Islands of the Blessed and was thrown out.3a Indeed, there is not
even the semi-immaæriality of the soul that one finds in Empedocles (Plato has
realised immateriality with his winged souls: Phaedrus 249a). Pindar's souls seem
to be the "images" that we see in the Underworld in the Homeric Neþia n
Odyssey 11. Indeed, the system, as Pindar describes it, appears to have begun after
the Homeric period!
These last questions have highlighted how traditional and Homeric is the
background to Pindar's system, despite the reincarnation. This is equa[y relevant
to fr.133, so I will discuss the two together, below. What is most strongly
indicated from my discussion is how little is realizable about this particular belief in
reincarnation. Ethical and moral problems which are raised and answered in other
doctrines are not eveî preser¿r in Pindar. Morally speaking, reincarnation is a way
of leaming from one's mistakes and being rewarded for this, but this is not tackled
here. The idea is, I think, that we are to view Theron as having passed through the
system already, and now just finishing his last life, and about to be transferred to
the final destination or the paradise. Thus there is no need to tackle the
implications of memory onfutur¿ lives. But why the poem is so non-committal on
the specifics of this remains to be seen.
There seems'to be two alternatives for interpreting fragment 133. Firstly, it




3a Bluck (1958b) p.409,n.2
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reincarnation in toto. This would mean that after someone dies, Persephone exacts
a penalty of eight years spont in the Underworld; in the ninth year the soul is
incarnated into the highest mortal ranks and then, is heroified. As a herorone A
presumes,the soul joins the other heroes in their traditional home in Elysium. This 
/l
implies a single incarnation, then translation to Elysium. The obvious question is,
what happens if Persephone is not satisfied with the soul's performance in the eight
year punishment?3s Does the soul repeat this period, or do all souls pass on the
Elysium, regardless? That is, it is a token punishment; this makes the scheme
morally pointless.
The second alternative is that fr.133 describes the last stage in a doctrine of
reincarnation. That this is more promising can be seen by the conflation of ideas
expressed n Olympian 2 with this fragment. I have discussed the problems with
this, above. The only point on which the two even vaguely agree (and this is
conjecture) is that the final stage in both is attainment of heroic status in the
Islands of the Blessed. A point of (negative) evidence is that in both doct¡ines it
appears that the souls do not reach divine status - that is, they never become
gods.36
'sRose (1936) p.91 uses this problem to argue for fr.133 as the last stage of a cycle of
reincarnations: for failing the eight year punishment, the soul is sent down the scale again.
McGibbon (1964b) pp.9-10 on Persephone's power in this matter.
'u Unlike in Empedocles' and Plato's systems.
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Indeed, fr.133 appears to have more in common with Empedocles' fr.I46
than with Olympian 2:
eiç ôè tÉl,oç pcivterç te xsì" upvórcol.or roì filtpoí
r oi æp ó¡ror ovO p címoror.v érn10ovíoror" æÉl,ovtau
Common sense supplies one reply to this parallel: in a scale of incarnations, kings,
and so forth are obviously the highest on the human scale." Moreover, it is
tempting to see Theron as one of these "leaders" (destined to become a god after
his frnal life, in Empedocles' system). It is quite possible that Pindar and
Empedocles were following a common source." Empedocles, after all, was an
Akragantine, and would have been about twenty years old when Pindar visited.
This (presumably) rules out the possibility of Pindar's using the work of
Empedocles, but could indicate a common source in Akragas.3e The Sicilian city,
and indeed Magna Graecia as a whole, seem to have had what L.Woodbury calls a
"hot-house culture"4O of religious, semi-mystical cults, the details of which have
not survived sufficiently to aid us: the "..flowers..from this short-lived but
gorgeous garden."al One only has to think of the whole Orphic-Pythagorean
problem in relation to the South of Italy, to understand the complexity of the
" What happens to women? No female incarnations are mentioned. But cf. Timneus (q.v.) for
women as the second incarnation of degenerate men.
"Griffrth (1991) compares the Kotharmoi and Oty.2, concluding that there are many
similarities: viz, metempsychosis; Necessity; the number three; oatl-taking; good works; crowns
of wreaths; praise of Akragas. He would conclude that, "Theron and his fellow citizens,
therefore, (whatever Pindar's view) seem to have believed in the t¡ansmigration of souls, for
which reason Pinda¡ seems to have portrayed it in this ode." That is, it is an Akragantine belief.
(p.54)
'n On the possible common source in Akragas: Duchemin (1955) pp.326 &.327; Demand (1915)
pp.347,354,357.
ao Woodbury (1966) p,598.
ot ibid
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issue.a2 Moreover, it is ludicrous to write, asZuntz has, that, "..I cannot visualize
Pindar, or Theron, indulging in theological abstrusities of this kind" fviz,
Persephone; Dionysus-Zagreus; the "Orphic" theogony, etc..f.a3 We know
nothing except what Olympian 2 tells us about Theron's beliefs. He may well have
devoted many hours to the "abstrusities" of his particular beliefs.a
To return to Empedocles'fr.146,therc is a greater anomaly with fr.133 of
Pindar (and with Olympian 2).In Empedocles' system, the daimon becomes a god
afær its final human incarnation; n Olympian 2 and fr.133, the soul does not
advance to divine status, but becomes a hero. In effect, therefore, Empedocles'
daimon is divine, and Pindar's soul is immortal in the Homeric sense (but compare
fr.131 - note 41). This is a considerable ideological difference; it is unlikely that a
common source would vary so much in its fundamental details.
There are, however, two ways in which the emendation from god to hero
could have happened. Achieving divine status might have formed (with regard to
Olympian 2) parf. of Theron's belief, and so Pindar's elevation of him to merely
ntl think it is now possible to shed a little more light on the Orphic question. Zuntz's (lg7I)
atgument that Orphism cannot exist without a Dionysian cult (and therefore there was no
Orphism in Sicily) has been ovemÍed by new evidence: see Cole (1980) pp.223-232. Lloyd-
Jones (1984), by violently swinging towa¡ds an almost pre-Wilamowitz (Glaube) acceptânce of
many dubious aspects of the "Orphic" movement, has reopened a debate that has been creeping
along in the middle-ground since Linforth (1941). I will come back to my impressions of
"O¡phism" later: see Appendix B. Lloyd-Jones (1984) pp.248ff .,264ff.,esp.269-277 discusses the
new discoveries (the c.465BC gold leaves from Hipponion; the bone tablets from Olbia).
a3Zuntz (19'71) p.86,n,3; against this see Lloyd-Jones (1984) p.263.Pindar gives no details of
any regulations of life-style etc., but this would presumably not be appropriate to the context?nocf. Griffrth (1991): "'When Theron purchased this ode, he gave to the poet various
specif,rcations.." (p.53)
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hero status could have been a disapproving gloss on his patron's ambition.as This
is not such wild speculation as it may seem, and would seem to point to something
which very few commentators have grasped: Pindar's refusal to commit hubris
If anything can be said about Pindar's own religious beliefs, it is that they
are traditional.a6 This comes across not only n Olympian 2, bttt in his other
eschatological fragments.aT At Pythian 3.61, for example, he writes pri, QíÀo
VùId, píov o0óvotov oneûôe. In Olympian 2, reincarnation (which is, as
as A modem analogy is the recently released "politically correct" (i.e. censored) editions of the
"Biggles" series.
'uMccibbon (1964b)p.5;V/oodbury (1966) p.598; Duchemin (1966) p.324,176 on Hesiod. One
notes that Pindar's nomenclature for the soul varies; at L57 he uses Qpéveç (spirits), at 1.90
{pevóç (to mean "heârt"); at 1,70, he uses yulì¡; in fr.133 he uses yo2¿d¡: Rohde (1925) p.442x1i
35. Also, Zunrz (7977) p.85. Cf. Dodds (1951) p.138 on the ill-defined vocabulary of the 5th
cenhry.
a7 One might argue that fr.131 is an exception:
raì oôpcr pèv nóvtolv ene¡at 0avcltcp æepro0eveî,
(oùv ô'ëtt l¿inetot oiôvoç eiõoll.ov' tò lclp éott póvov
èr Oeôv' eüõet ôè æpoooóvrolv pelérov, otop
eöôóvteootv èv æo),Loîç ôveípotç
ôeírvuor reprrvôv é$épruoroov yaÌ,.en6v te rpíotv'
It is, however, the traditional, Homeric view of the soul as a shade or image taken one step
further into the realm of dream-consciousness: Rohde (1925) p.7. It is the lnst extånt description
of such: Lloyd-Jones (1984) p.268; Sandys (1915) p.589,n.2. See Dodds (1951) pp.102-134 on
dreams. Our Empedoclean and Platonic views of the soul make us search for evidence of the
soul's divinity in Pindar, and also for a fall whereby the soul lost its divinity and was cast into the
cycle of incarnations. Pinda¡'s traditional view of the soul belies this. It is useless to search for
the later idea that the soul returns to the place from which it came @efore a fall, for example).
Neither Olympian 2 and, fr.l33, nor any of the other eschatological fragments mention this. See
von Fritz (1957) pp.87ff. on the Platonic idea of the soul. He does not make clear the analogy
with Empedocles' daimon which also returns from whence it came. Also - esp. Phaedrus and the
view of the soul as a fallen divinity - McGibbon (lg6/.b) pp.5,7; Bluck (1958b) arguing against
von Fritz (1957): pp.407ff,401n.8.,413). Ztntz (1977) cannot f,rnd a fall, but invents one (p.86):
there must be, he postulates, an "obscure myth" to account for Persephone's grief at the soul's
fall. This is a dangerously Christian ideai viz, that the sinner grieves Persephone by his
behaviou¡, in the same way that the Christian sinner crucifies Christ once more by his
behaviour: Rose (1936) p.85. This is not a part of ûaditional Greek belief. As Rose (iáid) points
out, the only real grief the gods feel is when a favourite is killed. Persephone's grief could be due
to her kidnapping by Hades (however, it is Demeter's grief which is the focus of the myth: see
the Homeric Hymn to Demeter; moreover, she would have no reason to punish the human race
for this). The only other source of Persephone's grief is in the myth of the slaying of her son,
Dionysus-Zagreus: Rose (1936) pp.85-86.
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F.Solmsen has pointed out, what one considers to be the most well-known belief
of Magna Graeciaas ) is only given two lines sandwiched between two nearly
standard (i.e. HomericÆIesiodic) accounts of the happy fate awaiting "heroes" in
the Islands of the Blessed (see also fn.1.29 and 130). It seems, as Koniaris has
pointed out, that Pindar considers a happy life afær death of more importance than
the achievement of immortality (Empedocles' priority). Koniaris also notes that a
doctrine of metempsychosis should minimize the importance of the body;ae I
would suggest that Olympian 2, at least, does not do so. Rather, the emphasis is
on the body keeping the soul pure (lines 69-70), and the concept of the soul as the
more permanent and important entity is not prominent. Fragment 133, on the other
hand, does deal with the soul in a less corporeal manner.
One might argue, therefore, that Pindar may have slotted Theron's beliefs
into a raditional background. This seems quite possible.50 In the canonical
HesiodicÆIomeric scheme, only the exceptional went to Elysium after death. The
majority of the dead stayed in the Homeric house of Hades. There was no room
for reincarnation (or even promotion) in this system. 'When Pindar is faced with
ot soLnsen (1932) p.19
ae Koniaris (1988) p.25a
soFarnell (1930) pp.335 e.n8 on Pindar as "double-minded" and making up an "appropriate
conglomerate" for Theron. Rohde (1925) is alone in claiming that Pinda¡ is giving his own
beliefs in Olympian 2; see Woodbury (1966) p.598 on Pinda¡ and patronage. Lefkowitz (1985)
p.271 on the problem of taking Pinda¡ at his word (in the scholia). Des Places (1949) p.60 on the
impossibility of retrieving any of Pindar's real thoughts on religion! V/ilamowitz (1922)
pp.248ff. rema¡ks that Pinda¡'s views are derived from sources about various beliefs, and so the
conclusions are not consistent with other views of, e.g. the Underworld.
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fitting reincarnation into the system, the Islands of the Blessed become the final
resting place for all ttre (heroif,red) souls. This is exceptional.sl
This brings me back to the point about heroes (Pindar) vs. gods
(Empedocles). One could argue that Pindar's traditional (Apollines2 ) religious
beliefs would not allow him to commit hubris by making humans into gods.53
That is, Theron believed in an Akragantine metempsychosic eschatology (with
similarities to Empedocles' doctrine of becoming a god),sa but in Olympian 2
Pindar modified Theron's grandiose future, so that he was heroified, rather than
deified, upon death. Unfortunately for this argument, Diodorus Siculus (1I.53.2)
recounts that Theron \'/as granted the rank of hero upon his death.ss There were
no grandiloquent Empedoclean claims of divinity for Theron.56 This would belie a
powerful pseudo-Empedoclean cult operating in Akragas, and prove the Pindaric
sr von Fritz (1957) p.88; Solmsen (1968) pp.504ff. Olympian 2 could only be described as
"syncretistic": Solmsen (1982) p.19; Koniaris (1988) p.241.That is, it integrates beliefs which do
not usually appear in conjunction. The idea of two paradises is without parallel. Certainly it has
created problems for Pindar in differentiating between the two (i.e. making the hrst less attractive
than the second, but still a paradise): Solmsen (1968) pp.503ff. McGibbon (1964b) p.6 sees a
parallel to the two paradises in Aeneid 6: the Elysium where we see Anchises' soul does not seem
to be its final resting place. McGibbon sees this as "reproducing a genuine tradition of Orphic-
þthagorean eschatology" (lbld).
52 Woodbury (1966) p.598; Rose (1936) p.92; Duchemin (1955) p.327.
tt hubris: Rose (1936) p.92; Bowra (196a) p.189.
sa 
See note 34.
55 Diodorus is, of course, notorious for confusing sotuces, chronologies, raditions etc.
56 Empedocles' fr.112.
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promise of heroification.5T It is certainly an impossible situation to resolve without
knowing what Theron really believed.ss
The presence of Persephone in fr.133 seems to me quite irreconcilable with
Olympian 2. It is also irreconcilable with Empedocles' beliefs, for she is not
57 Theron as a posthumous hero: Diodorus Siculus IL53 .2 cited by Bowra (1964) p.123 . Bowra
(p.189) believes that denying men üanslation to gods was integral to Pindar's religious beliefs. I
would agree. Pindar is "remarkably cautious" (låld).
tt It seems unlikely that Pinda¡ - for literary re¿ßons - is simply conflating various religious
elements out of the "gorgeous garden" of South Iølian cults. To build on my suggestion further:
fragment 133 cannot be specif,rcally dated or given a reliable provenance. There was never a
single doctrine of reincarnation which was held unchanged by a great majority of Greeks for any
length of time. Reincarnation in Greece was a hotchpotch of strange cult pracúces generally
looked at askance by contemporary authorities. Thus it should be no surprise to hnd different
beliefs in reincamation existing in pockets throughout the Greek world. To t¿ke this even
fu¡ther, we should not be surprised to find that Pinda¡, a widely travelled and widely employed
poet, might have written on two different religious doctrines which both featured reincarnation. It
seems to be assumed that because Pindar wrote both passages, and because both a¡e based on a
similar eschatology, that the two passages must be linked to the same doctrine.
It is well lsrown that Pinda¡ also produced at least one poem on the Eleusinian Mysteries - a
different cult again. It seems to me that Pind¿r's genius lay more than a little in his flexibility
and eclecticism - his ability to produce what was appropriate for the context, and for his patron.
Is this too large jump on the part of poet and patron? Of course, if Theron did hold a personal
belief that he 'ivould be deihed after death, then his actual fate in civic religion would be
irrelevant.
If my tentative suggestion that Pindar glossed over and "Homerized" the specihcs of Theron's
belief is viable, it raises a question which I am not sure can be answered - to what extent in the
ancient world could a powerful political ruler and patron of the a¡ts make his poet assimilate
religious views which were foreign and perhaps anathematical to his own religious beliefs? And
could a clever poet or artist get av/ay with twisting these religious views to his own more
conservative sttance, yet still continue to be employed?
Somewhere in these two passages there must be a kernel of truth, but the poet is not obliged to
give us the whole truth. As Pindar himself says, (Olympian2.83-88):
Full many a swift arrow have I beneath mine arm, within my quiver, many an
arrow that is vocal to the wise; but for the crowd they need interpreters. The
true poet is he who lnoweth much by gift of nature, but they that have only
learnt the lore of song and are turbulent and intemperate of tongue, like a pair
of crows, chatter in vain against the god-like bird of Zeus. (tr. Sandys)
Some couunentators see this as a reference to a mystery religion which must remain secret. I
would suggest that it is deliberately mysterious for another reasont it refers to the many things
that Pindar knows about Theron's belief but is not going to repeat, perhaps because it is indeed
"chatter in vain against the god-like bird of Zeus" - that is, heresy against his tradiúonal religion.
Is this the poet's way out? - to skim over the details of his patron's rather odd beliefs, to hint of
what is revealed to those in the know, and thus to get neatly out of the problem of having to
reconcile his beliefs with those of his patron?
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mentioned in his fragments.se Fr.133 has traditionally been seen as the last stage
to the doctrine of reincarnation of Olympian 2.T\at is, after the six good lives, the
soul comes up before Persephone who condemns it to eight years of punishment,
then releases it in the ninth year to a final life on earth in the highest ranks of
mortals. The soul is heroified after this final life, and translated to the Islands of the
Blessed.
The eight years of subservience to Persephone ha/ been difficult for f¡a.lrc-
scholars to explain. It is, in the context of Olympian 2, a second period of
atonement, if we consider the pursuit of six pure lives as the flrst atonement. This
is without parallel in other theories of reincarnation.60 It has been suggested that
the nine years (in total) imitâte the traditional period of banishment for the gods.
This ennaeteris - the nine year period for the expiation of blood-guilt - acts as a
final period of atonement in Hades. The crime is compleæly paid for after this
soJoum 61
The question, of course, is why it is necessary? If it were not for the
definite reference to punishment, one could âssume - although it is without parallel
- that the eight years was simply a waiting period before the final translation. If the
5eRose (1936)p92
uo Mccibbon (1964b) p.9
ut Rohde (1925) pp.442 xä, 34, 444 xä 40. He ciæs Apollo (who slays Python) as serving Hades
for an ennaeteris, and deltnes it as 99 months (8 years and 3 months). Also Rose (1936) p.89:
questioning this, but at a loss for any other explanation. McGibbon (1964b) p.9 reminds us that
the punishment is paid specifically to Persephone, not to Hades.
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fragment does describe the final stage in a cycle of reincarnations, one might
assume that there was an eight year wait betrveen each incarnation. If fr.133 is
linked wtth Olympian 2, this is impossible.u' The irony is that if fr.133 is the final
stage in another doctrine of reincarnation, one has to ask the same unanswerable
question - why? As McGibbon has argued, the only viable solution is if the second
atonement covers a crime that the first atonement (i.e. the cycle of reincarnation)
did not.63 If one is to link the fragment with Olympian 2, then the second
punishment can only cover a crime committed against its exactor, Persephone; the
flrst punishment was, therefore, by analogy, paid to someone else. I can think of
no parallel to this; indeed, the duality seems artificial. Identifying the crime against
Persephone must, therefore, be fundamental to understanding the fragment.
In this regard, Bluck cites two of the gold plates from Thurii: 64
And I have paid the penalty for deeds unrighteous...I have sunk
below the bosom of the Mistress, the Queen of the underworld.
And now I come a suppliant to holy Persephoneia, that of her grace
she send me to the seats of the hallowed.65
He associates this plate with another (1cîpe nqOcòv tò ædOr1¡rc' tò õ' oörcco
æpóoOe ånercóvOerç: Kern OF 32f3) to illustrate that there has been a special
ennaeteris in Hades ("never suffered before"), followed by an appeal to
62 Bluck (1958b) p.407
utMccibbon (19ó4b) p.8; Bluck (1958b) p.411 sees the cycle of incarnations as included in an
overall punishment - the notvó of fr.l33.
6aBluck (1958b) p.411
ut This is a reconstruction of a possible archetype based on OF 32d4, ú, d6-7, e6-7 . Cf . Guthrie
(1935) p.173, for a full summary.
&
Persephone. On the face of it, the similarity is strfüng. The following line (OF
32f4) is 0eòç Ë1Évou é( av0pcircoo.
OF 32d4ff. is ambiguous, though. The penalty was certainly paid to
Persephone, but the form it took is not discernible. As McGibbon suggests, the
penalty could have been a cycle of reincarnations. Other gold plates do mention a
cycle. He further points out that OF 32d4ff. allows the possibility that Persephone
refuses the suppliant. The punishment has been in the nature of a test.66 Pindar's
fr.133 seems to imply that translation to Elysium is immediaæ and standard
(without further judgement), not after the ennaeteris, but after the final life on
earth. This firmly contradicts the gold leaves which are set so permanently in the
world of the dead.
Is this final life on earth a reward or a fînal test of the soul's purity?67
McGibbon notes that the only reward which the soul desires is to be translated to
the Islands of the Blessed, so therefore life on earth is not a reward.68 That the
final life on earth is a test is perhaps more plausible except - and few commentators
uu Mccibbon (1964b) pp.gff.
ut Anot¡er suggestion (by von Fritz) is that it is only possible for the soul to be t¡anslated to the
Islands of the Blessed from our wodd. There is no evidence for this necessity. von Fritz (1957)
pp.85 & 86; against this: McGibbon (1964b) p.5 and Bluck (1958b) p.410 cittng Phaedr¿rs where
translation occurs from the place of recompense. In Olympian 2 one would think that translation
occurred from the place of judgement.
ut Mccibbon (1964b) p.7 arguing against von Fritz (1957) p.86 (a test) and Bluck (1958b) p.a0S
(a reward); he also emphasises that the purpose of each incarnation is to pudfy and punish the
soul. A high human incarnation would be desirable for tle soul in the cycle of incarnations. Cf.
Empedocles - all earthly lives are hell when one is st¡iving to reach heaven. Rohde (1921 p.a42
xii 35 thinks that the final earthly life is a recompense for the soul's sufferin g, i.e. a reward.
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have grasped this - it is belied by the confident nature of the fragment: there is no
indication in fr.133 that men who have reached these august heights do not at once
become heroes upon their deaths.6e It is an impossible situation to resolve,
particularly because the context of the fragment is unknown.to Commentators
mereþ assume its connection with Olympian 2, regardless of the fact that we
cannot make this connection, and indeed cannot even prove it was written in
Sici1y.71 McGibbon, who seems to me the most rational of these commentators, is
forced to emend the traditional reading of the fragment; this, he admits, is "less
natural", but makes the fragment correspond to Empedocles' and Plato's similar
views on the final incarnation. As I hope that I have demonstrated above, this is
possible, but only if one can show that Pindar deliberately adapted beliefs which
were closer to the Empedoclean/Platonic norm.t'
There is a final issue that should be raised in regard to fragment 133 (and,
in some respects, Olympian 2): what religious beliefs are being described? Many
scholars see fr.133 as part of an Orphic doctrine of reincarnation. This is not only
because it has become almost a tradition to regard all doctrines of reincarnation as
un Because we do not Isrown what comes next in the poem, we cannot be completely certain about
this conclusion.
ToMccibbon (1964b) ppJ & 11 asks why Plato cited this passage on reincarnation if it was
problematic? The answer is twofold: to support his view that the soul lived many times (but does
fr.133 show this?); to justify living righteously. Plato, therefore, considers this the final stage for
the righteous in a cycle involving many lives. One can only hope that it js a passage from Pinda¡!
7r Zuntz (1971) p.87,n.1
72 There is another even less palaøble solution: Pinda¡ has poorly grasped the details of Theron's
beliefs, and has made these mistakes through ignorance, Cf. Defradas (1971) who discusses the




being linked with Orphism at some stage of their development (rather like
Herodotus ascribing Greek inventions to Egypt). Indeed it is positively easy to
make fr.133 "Orphic". This is because of Persephone's unexplained presence in the
fragment. Persephone can be linked to Orphism by the Eudemian Theogony, which
tells of the murder and devouring of her son Dionysus(-Zagreus) by the Titans, and
7,ets' destruction of the Titans with his thunderbolt; the human race was formed
from the ashes of the Titans. Therefore, humans are part-Titanic, and share the
Titanic guilt. The eight year punishment (in Hades where she is Queen?) is
accounted for by this explanation.
If fr.133 was part of an impersonal poem, in purely myttric form (i.e. like a
theogony or cosmogony), the presence of Persephone could be explained. It is a
problem, however, if the fragment comes from a practical personal poem (like
Olympian 2) where the events apply to a real religious belief. It does not appear to
fit into any known religious doctrine. The bugbear of the supporters of Orphism
has always been that it has been impossible to prove anything definite about the
movement.?3 If fr.133 relates to beliefs held in Magna Graecia, the field is even
wider; according to Zuntz, Persephone was "outstandingly the goddess of
Akfagas".74
73See Appendix B. On Orphism in Pindar see: Rose (1936) pp.80-96 (supporter); Lloyd-Jones
(1984) pp.246-282 (adamant supporter); McGibbon (1964b) pp.7ff (denying ir); Bluck (195Sb)
p.410,n.10; Rohde (1925) p.417 (emphatic denial based on Wilamowitz's Glaube); Dodds (1951)
p.155; Farnell (1930) pp.l5;336-338; KR p.348; Des Places (1949) p.60; Duchemin (1955)
p.323;Zuntz (1,971) pp.86,n.3;87;318ff. (on gold leaves; emphatic denial).
laZuntz (19'71) p.88 also thinks that Persephone was the goddess of Theron's cult in Otympian 2.
It seems doubtful: surely Pindar would not have hesitated to name her? Rohde (7925) is inclined
to this view also (p.447 xä 41). He cites the following: in Pythian 12.2, Pindæ calls Akragas
61
A simila¡ problem exists with attributing the poems to the Pythagorean
movement. That is, reincarnation is commonly ascribed to Pythagoras simply on
the basis that he had a doctrine of reincarnation (not necessarily this one). This is
presumably what has happened in the scholia (Schol.Ol.i.l23: Drachmann I92),
and in Clement (Stom.I.103), where one finds the comment that "Pindar is here
following Pythagoras". 7s
There is a third attribution of the beliefs - to some sort of mystery cult.
Olympian 2, lines 56ff (on knowledge) have been partly responsible for this, but
more so the enigmatic lines 83ff. Some commentators see a reference to secret
doctrines learned by initiation. That is, the arrows which Pindar does not shoot are
analogous to secret doctrines which will only be understood by the initiated. This
is a very tenuous association of ideas, and obviously owes not a little to Pindar
ft.I37 on the Eleusinian mysteries.T6
Õepoe{óvaç ëôoç; Olympian 6.94ff.: ..Qotvrróæe(cv opQéner Adpotpcr, }.^euríææor te
0uycrrpòç Èoptov..
ttOn the þthagorean movement in Pindar: Demand (1975) pp.347-348 (denying it); Solmsen
(1968) p,505; von Fritz (1963) col.189 (on possible parallels for restoring Pythagoras'
S e e I e nw ande r un g s I e hr e .
76 Farnell (1930) pp.15,335 (an Orphic mystery cult); Demand (1975) pp.350ff. (a Cret¿n mystcry
cult); Nisetich (1988) p.18 (mystical doctrines of some sort). On the interpretation of lines 83ff.:
Most (198ó) pp.311-315; Race (1979) pp.257-256; Koniaris (1988) pp.247ff. (emphatic denial).
Debate of this sort on Olympian 2 and ft.133 is, as we have seen, dogged by a series of
contradictions: godsÀeroes; divinity of soul/inunortality of soul; mystery cullrevelations;
reward/punishment, and etc. I arn convinced that the only way of solving these contradictions is
by somehow finding out the extent of Pindar's adoption of these beliefs - an impossibility.
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Empedocles lived approximately 494-434 BC, and was a citizen of Akragas
in Sicily.l Diogenes Laertius VIII supplies most of the details about Empedocles'
life, much of it apocryphal, which has led some commentåtors to see Empedocles
as a "medicine man"2, a "divine magician"3 and./or a shaman. He has also been
regarded, on very doubfful evidence, as a great democrat and statesman (by
Timaeus), the inventor of rhetoric (by Aristotle), and the founder of an Italian
school of medicine (by Galen).4 This confusion is, in no small way, the fault of
Empedocles himself: he was, as Dodds comments, "the creator of his own
legend".s This is evident, for example, in fragment 111:
Qdppaxc ô'öooo 1eyôor xsrôv roi lqpooç öÀrop
æeúo¡, êreì" poóvcp oot é.ycò rpovéro rdôe æóvta.
æaóoerç ô' oropdtrov avépotv pévoç oi t'èæì yaîov
ôpvópevot rcvoroîor rataQ0tvó0ouorv opoúp cç'
roi ærÍl,rv, tiv e0éIqo0a, r¡sÀívîLta rveópor' ëna\e::''
Ot1oetç ô'é( öpBporo rel.qrvo0 raíprov ou2¿¡róv
ovOpcíræor.ç, Or1oerç ôé roì. é( oó2¿poîo Oepeíou
þeópora ôevôpeóOp r;'rÍro,, f tdt' oi0épr vatq oovtolf ,
dÇetç ð'e('Aíõao raroQ0t¡révou pévoç óvôpóç.
And also in fragment ll2:
1 ,,^ó Qil,or, oì péya cÍotu rdto (ovOoô'Arpdyovroç
t This is more than relevant when one considers the great tradition of reincarnation and related
beliefs in Southern Italy: Pindar and Theron at Akrugas; þthagoras at Croton; the gold leaves;
the "Orphics" etc. See the relevant chapters and appendices. Seaford (1986) pp.t0-12 suggests
that Empedocles was influenced by the mystic doctrines of this area.
2Burnet (1959) p.199
'Dodds (1951) p.145; Wrighr (1981) p.9 on his alleged medical larowledge.o¡.L. 8.5+ff; as a result of this confusion, Jaeger (1965) p.295 - for example - can see
Fmpedocles as a "philosophical centaur" blending Ionian physics and Orphic religion.
5 Dodds (1951) p.145
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vríet' cÍv' örpo æóLeoç, o1o0ôv peÀ^eôr¡poveç ëpycov,
((eívov oiôoîot î,rpéveç rorót4roç cÍnetpor,)
yai"per" èyô õ'u¡rîv 0eòç öpBporoç ouréo 0vr1tóç
æroÀ^eôpar petd rôor tecpévoç, cóonep ëorxev,
torvíarç re neplorentoç otéQeoív te Oal^eíor,ç'
ftoîotv öp' dvf irro¡rot êç doteo n1l"eO<Íovca
ovôpdorv r¡ôè yuvor(i oepí(opau oì" ô' cÍ¡r'ëæovtor
popíor e(epéovteç önq æpòç répôoç araproç,
oi pèv pcvtoouvéov Ke1pnpévor, oi ô'åæi voóoorv
rcsvroírov åæúOovto rl"óerv e{r¡réo prÍ(r"v,
ôr¡pòv ôfl 2¿oÀ.erfl or reroppévorcopQ' óôóv¡orv>.
The tradition is too confusing to be definite about Empedocles life and beliefs, and
although it linl¡s him to Pythagoras (see below), it is impossible to tie him to any
one existing system of religious/cosmological belief.6
With regard to his philosophy, it has been argued that he was writing in
answer to the Eleatic school. He is certainly not a believer in Parmenides' monism,
but he does take some Parmenidean concepts (the Sphere; the impossibility of
coming-into-being from nothing - fr.l2), and incorporate them in a limited
pluralistic system of six elements.T As Inwood points out, no direct ans\¡/er was
propounded to the Eleatic problem until Plato's Sophist, and Empedocles does
not appear to be answering Parmenides intentionally. He does not (in the extant
fragments) state why he has chosen to start from a pluralistic basis.s
uwright (1981) p.57
tFor a discussion of Empedocles' philosophical influences, see: Wright (1981) pp.4,9); KR
p.324; Inwood (1992) pp.22-27 .
slnwood (1992)p,23
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Debate continues to rage about the fragments of Empedocles. It has
always been presumed that the extant fragments came from the two poems Physics
(IIEPI OT>EO> or TA OT>IKA) and Purifications (OI KA@APMOI); and
evidence from Diogenes Laertius (8.77) and the Suda attests to this. However, the
exact structure of these poems is not known, nor their order of composition: it is
impossible to prove which poem/s the fragments come from. However, it is
generally conceded that the physical fragments (dealing with physiology,
embryology, botany etc..) make up the Physics (written first), and the more
metaphysical speculations belong to the Purifications. This is a hazy division: the
unique cosmic cycle appears to be common to both.e Concerning the relationship
of the two poems, the orthodox view is that although at flrst sight they seem
diametrically opposed, there are, in fact, very close links between the two, and,
indeed, the Purifications can be seen to depend in many respects upon the
cosmology and ideas of the Physics.ro
There are a large number of fragments, mainly from the Purifications,
dealing with the workings of Empedocles' doctrine of reincarnation. I have also
eFor this debate see: Inwood (1992) pp.8-19; Wright (1981) pp.20,77-86;Zilflltz (197I) pp.239-
244. Predicrably, they have all reached different conclusions: Inwood has the fragments
belonging to one poem; Wright has fwo; Zuntz atl,aches more of the fragments to a large and
idiosyncratic Purffications. Wright (p.20) calculates that l6-20Vo of the poems have survived in
fragments.
toThere is a great deal of literature on this problem of the unity, or otherwise, of the nvo books.
See: A.A.Long (1966); H.S.Long Q9aÐ; but especially Kahn (7971) for a summary of rhe
debate.
7t
included fragments which clarify certain cosmic processes important to the
doctrine.rr
These flrst fragments are thought to have formed part of the Physics, and
deal with the mechanisms of creation. Their relevance to reincarnation, and the
place of reincarnation in the cosmic cycle, will be made clear, below;
Fr.8
cÍI),o ôé tot épéco' 0úorç oóôevòç éotiv oædvto:v
Orrqtôv, ouôé ttç oul,opévou Oovrítoro teÀ"eucr¡,
oÀl.o póvov pí(rç te ôrd)"Àa(íç te pryévtorv
êorí, qúor.ç ô'éæi roîç óvopcÍÇeror ovOpcírnoror"v.
Fr.9
oi ô' öte pèv rotd Sôtc pr1évr' eiç aiOÉp'i<rorvtot>
ri rotd 0qpôv oypotéprov 1évoç fi rotd OcÍ¡rvcov
r¡è rot'oirovôv, tóte ¡rèv tó <yÉ Qaou> yevÉoOar,
1 ôr 1 ôeut€ Ò 07[or(prvu(,)ou, 1o Ò 01) ÒuoÒotpovo 7EoîFov'
fii Oéptçf roì.Éouot, vópc.o ô'ËæíQnpr roì aúróç.
Fr.l29L2
frv ôé tr,ç åv reívotorv ovrlp æepróouo eïôóç,
öç ôfi ¡rr¡rtorov npanilôolv Ërtr¡oato rcl,oûtov.
navtoíorv re p.o,?.rora ooQôv enrr1pavoç ëpyatv'
örcæóte ydp rcdo'¡orv ópé(arto npozuiôeootv,
þeîó 1e tôv ðvtcov æcÍvrr¡v l.eúooeorev ëroorov,
rsí te õér'ov0pcílæorv roi t'eixoolv oióveoorv.
Fr.110
ei yop xol oQ'oôrvfrorv {mò æporí.õaoorv épeíoaç
rlThe numbering of the fragments is t¿ken from Diels-Kranz (DK). Inwood (l9g}), Wright
(1981), and Zunlz (197L) all provide a different order, and re-number the fragments. I have
followed the text and prose translation of V/right; Inwood's poetic translation is quite
meaningless in places, but one which he defends as an attempt to reflect the ambiguity of the
Greek. The order of the fragments is based on Wright also; Inwood's order is almost identical,
but his belief in only one poem confuses the issue.
t2 
See Addendum at the end of this chapter for a discussion of this fragment and its presumcd
reference to Pythagoras.
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eupevéroç roOapf orv e¡onteóoerç peLÉc¡or.v,
tsûtd tÉ oot pdl,a nuvra ôr' aiôvoç æopÉoovtor,
dl"l,o te no?J¡"'ónò tôvôe rtcrloe>ot' outd yap oöter
toôt' eïç frOoç ëxootov, örnl Qóouç èotìv é.xóotol.
ei ôè oú y' all,oícov ènopé(ecr oÎ.a rot'dvõpoç
pupío ôerld rcélovtor cÍ t'<ipBÀóvouor pepípvoç
fr o'öQap êrÀ.eíyouor nepw)rapêvoro 2¿póvoro
oQôv aotôv rcoOéovra QíÀqv éæì yéwcv iréo0or'
navraldp io0r Qpóvqorv ëyer xai vópotoç oloav.
The following fragments are from the Purifications
Fr.l I
vriærou ou ydp oQrv ôol,t2¿óQpovéç eior péprpvor,
oi ôf¡flryeoOar rcópoç our éòv el.rcí(ouorv,
fi ct rata0v¡orcerv te xoì e(ó}"Àuo0ot ordvc¡.
Fr.l I3r3
CIÀ¡.d d toîoô'ercírerp' óoei pé1a XpñVru c rcpcÍoorov,
ei Ovqtôv rce p íerpr" no l"uQ0epéolv ovO p c(morv;
Fr.15
our cìv avr\p toro0ta ooQòç Qpeoi ¡rovteóoorto,
éç öQpa pév te Btôor", tò ôî¡ Bfotov rcÀÉouor,
tóQpo pèv oôv eioív, rai oQrv napa ôerld raì Ëo01"ó,
æpìv ôà æó1ev te pporoì" roì. <Ëneì"> l"óOev, oóõèv dp'eioiv.
Fr.115
ë.ocrv ovdyrqç Xpîpo, Oeôv y{Qropo æo}.oróv,
oiôtov, æl"atéeoor roteoQpr'¡1ropévov öprotç'
eôtÉ ctç oprcÀorínor Qóprp Qíl"o yùîo f¡nvf
föç roìf ércíoprov opoptrloaç êruopóooq,
ôoípoveç oite porpoírovoç À^el,riloor Bíoto,
tpíç pr"v ptpiaç ôpcç onò ¡rordpo:v okÍÀ,qo0or.,
Qró¡revov novtoîa ôrd 1póvor eïôea Ovqtôv
aplolÉoç prótoro ¡reto},ì.dooovta rel.eúOouç.
ci0éptov pèv ydp oQe ¡révoç æóvtovôe ôrórer,
nóvroç ô'eç 10ovòç oôôoç cæéætuoe, loîo ô'eç oulóç
r¡el.iou QaéOovtoç, ó ô' aiOépoç ëppoÀ^e ôfvorç'
13 æol.oQ0epéo¡v is unfortunately vague: does it mean "many dying" (referring to the number of
people), or "much-dying" (dying many times)? The latter would fit the context of reincamation
better.
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cÍÀÀoç ô'é( dl,l,ou ôé1etot, onryéouor" ôè rcdvteç.
tôv rsì åyô vôv ei¡rt, Quyùç 0eó0ev roì oÀr¡cr¡ç,
veíreï ¡rarvopévcp æíouvoç.
Fr.I17
fiôn ydp rot' éyô yevópqv roûpóç te xópr¡ te
Odpvoç t'oio:vóç te roì" ë(oÀoç ël.l.oroç i10óç.
Fr.126
oaprôv oì,Àoyvdlc reprotéÀl,oooa [sc. the daimon?] lrtôvt
Fr.118
rlsôod te roì" rórr¡oo iõôv oouvqOeo 1ôpov.
Fr.121
...o.repnê.a 1ôpov...
ëvOo Qóvoç te rótoç æ roì öl"l,orv ð0vea rqpôv,
(oólpqpoi te vóoor roì o'r¡yreç ËpTo te þeuoró)
..."A'rnç ov Àet¡rôvo rCItd orcóroç rlldorououv.
Fr.124
rô nónot, ô ôet}.òv Orn1tôv yévoç, ô ôuorÍvol"pov,
oirov è( epíôo:v ër te otovolôv åyÉveo0e.
Fr.128
ouôé crç frv reívor"ov "Apqç 0eòç ouôè Kuõorpóç
oóôè Zeòç Booul"eòç ouôÈ Kpóvoç oóôè flooetôôv,
aÀl"d Kúcptç BooíÀ^era,
c4v oi y'eúoepÉeoorv oycÍIpoorv il.dorovto
ypoætoîç te (cþr"or ¡rópotoí te ôarôol,eóôporç
opópuìç t' orprltor 0roíorç Àrpdvor te 0uóðorç,
tovOôv te orcovõdç peî,ítorv þí.rtovæç åç oôôoç,
toópcov ô' farpítororf Qóvorç oó ôeóero Þo:póç,
ol"Àù póooç to0t' ëorcev Èv ovOpcimotor péyrotov,
0upòv aroppaíoovtaç Ééô¡revct r1éo yuîa.
Fr.139
oipot öt'oó æpóoOev pe ôról"eoe vllÀ€èç frpop
npìv o1éth Ëpya popûç nepi ^1eí)'zat pqcíooo0at
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Fr.136
or¡ æaóoeo0e Qóvoto ôooq1éoç; oux éoopûte
sÀl,q^ooç ôóøtovteç crrlôeí1¡or vóoro ;
Fr.145
toryóptot 1ol"erfl otv al,óovteç rorórq orv
oönote ôerlaícov o2¿érrlv l,cr${oete 0u¡róv.
Fr.I37
pop$tv ô' al"î"d(ovto æaqp Qíl"ov oiòv oeípoç
oQó(et é.neu1ó¡revoç péyo vriætoç Toi ôè nopeOvtatf
Àtooópevov Oúovreç' Té õ' ovnroootoçf öporÀÉorv
oQó(aç êv pel<iporou rorÌ¡v ol"e1óvcto ôoîto.
cöç ô' aötroçraré.p'uiòç el"còv rcì" pr¡tépo æoîõeç
Oupòv oæoppoioovte QíÀoç rctd orÍproç ëôooor"v.
Fr.140
ôdQvnç [rôv] góÀÀr¡v cÍrco na¡mav ë.1eoOar
Fr.141
ôerl"oí, ærivôerì"ot, rucÍ¡rcov äno "treîp aç ë1e o0ar.
Fr.127
åv 0rlpeoo léovteç öperÀs2¿Éeç lopoteôvot
yíyvovtot, õó0vot õ' åvi ôévôpeorv rlurópororv
Fr.146
eiç õè tél.oç pdvtetç te rql opvórol,or roì" irltpoí
r oi æp ópor óv0 p círcor"or"v éær1Oovíor o¡. rcé Àovtor'
ë.vOev avoBì"ooroôot Oeoì flpfiot Qéprotor.
Fr.147
oOovútotç öì.Iororv öpéocor outotpdrce(or




The importance of the cosmic cycle to Empedocles' doctrine of
reincarnation should not be over-emphasized. Until the work of Wright and
Inwood it had been virtually ignored, and only tenuous connections had been made
between the scientific Physics and the metaphysical Purifi,cations. And yet, not
only are there quite definite structural similarities between the cosmic cycle and the
series of events in which the daim.on is involved, but it is possible to see, without
over-reaching the contents of the fragments, that Empedocles' doctrine of
reincarnation forms part of his cosmic cycle. Moreover, it is the events in the
cosmic cycle that enable reincarnation to take place
T\e Physics' fragments give a picture of Empedocles' cosmos.to Its
creation is reasonably simple; the cosmos and ever¡hing in it, including mortals,
are composed of only four elements or "roots" - earth, 'water, air and fire. These
exist, at the beginning, in the Sphere.ls They take up the whole Sphere: there is no
void. Scientifically speaking, they could movo themselves; however, Empedocles
la Fragment 35: "But I shall turn back to the path of song I traced before, leading off from one
argument this argument: when strife had reached the lowest depth of the whid and love comes
into the center of the eddy, in her then all these things unite to be one only; not immediately, but
coming together from different directions at will. And, as they were being mixed, countless types
of mortal things poured forth, but many, which strife still restrained from above, stayed unmixed,
alternating with those which were combining, for it had not yet perfectly and completely stood
out as far as the furthest limits of the circle, but part remained within and part had gone out of
the frame. And, in proportion as it continually ran on ahead, a mild, irunortal onrush of perfect
love was continually pursuing it. Immediately what were formedy accustomed to be inmortal
became mortal, and fonnedy unmixed things were in a mixed state, owing to the exchanging of
their ways. And, as they were being mixed, countless types of mortal things poured forth, fined
with all kinds of forms, a wonder to see." (tr. V/righÐ
tt Solmsen (19S2b) provides a discussion of the "sphairos" and its cycle, and the problem
temporal or eternal immortality.
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has chosen to have two forces - Love and Strife - to act upon the four pure
substances. Following tradition - and through inability to express incorporealitytu -
he calls Love by the Olympian name Aphrodite or, mofe often, Kypris. Love is the
governing principle at the beginning of the universe, and Strife has no power.
Love has unified all of the elements as one, and it is a perfect world in the Sphere.
It is a Golden Age of the gods, where the gods are the four elements as well as
Love and Strife. There is another aspect to the Sphere, and that is its identification
with "holy mind", which is the perfection of thought achieved by the four roots
being perfectly blended in the Sphere.17
Our cosmogony starts when Strife begins to grow in power and Love
correspondingly wanes. Strife takes over at a time that has been ratified by oaths
uphetd by a stronger force - Necessity. The place of Necessity in the cosmology is
not explained, but it is an important force. The growth of Strife in power brings in
separation (Love unites, Strife separates) among the elements. This causes the
Sphere to break down, the daimons are released or created, and compounds are
formed by the mixing of the elements. This is the moment when the human race,
animals, plants, and etc. are formed.tt Strife gains momentum and at a fixed time
becomes all powerful (the moment of Total Strife). There is no description of this
moment, but it is the opposite of what occurs at the moment of Total Love (the
16 
See Renehan (1980)
" wright (19s1) pp.70-72tt This poses an interesting question: Love is inevitably seen as a good force, Strife as a bad;
however, it is only through the action of Strife that human beings a¡e fonned. It is a striking
paradox that has unexpected ramifications later in the cycle.
77
Sphere). Now, in the cycle, Strife wanes and Love grows. This is evidently the
period when monsters grow (fr.57), for it reveals the reverse effects of Love acting
on Strife.le Love increases to the moment of Total Love and the Sphere. At this
point the cycle begins again (in the sense, however, that it does not have a formal
beginning, nor does it ever truly end20 ).
In human terms, the consequences of this cycle are devastating. There is
no true birth or death, because nothing comes from nothing, and something cannot
pass away into nothing - there is no void. Birth is a mingling of the elements, and
death is a separation back into the elements. Love holds the daimons in her
perfect unified world, but these are daimans without identity. It is necessary for
Strife to release the daimons and let them mix with the elements to gain identity
However, Strife is also a bad and dangerous force; it gives the daimon
individuality, but as it does this, it forces the daim.on into the cycle of incarnations
Fragment 115 clarifies the system; at the breakup of the Sphere, Strife acts
on the daim.ons. The daimons (presumably made up of the elements, as no
independent existence is possible in the cycle) must obey the dictates of Strife by
Necessity: this is a cosmic 1aw.21 However, Strife brings violence, murder, and
bloodshed - the daimon falls prey to Strife, is thrown out of its perfect world, and
re Another paradox?
to Because there can be no "coming-into-being".
" It also explains how a sin can be committed in a theoretically sin-free area, among the gods:
see Solmsen (1982Ð p.470.
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into the newly created cosmos where Strife is growing. This is our world. The
daiman has to wander in our world, being incarnated for 30,000 seasons (a vague
term), until it has gone through the whole ladder of incarnations of plant, animat
and human. Eventually it reaches a position where, having attained the wisdom of
all its incarnations, and knowing how to avoid further sin and therefore furttrer
incarnations, it is accepted back as a god, and lives in bliss for the rest of eternity.
But, of course, there is no eternity for the daim.on, for the cycle is temporal and at
the moment of Total Love, ever¡hing reunites in the pure elements, all
individuality is lost, and the cycle begins anew. There is no eternal recurrence, for
this implies immutable combinations of elements, and the cycle does not allow this
(see Appendix E). For the same reason, the same individual is unlikely to occur
again in the next cycle (except by chance¡.'2 This, in brief, is the cosmic cycle with
which the docrine of reincarnation is closely associated.23
The issue of whether reincarnation requires an immortal soul can be seen in
a different way in Empedocles' theory. T\e daim.on is temporarily immutable rn
the period of Love -l Strife, but immutabiJity is not immortality. To maintain the
limited pluralism of the cosmic cycle, immortality cannot be possible. As Inwood
has rightly commented,
22The cycle can be considered as a linear progression, as Barnes (1919) II, p.8 has illustrated.
23 It is not relevant here for me to discuss all the interpretations of the various parts of the cycle.
The best summaries are provided as follows: V/right (1981) pp.60-741' Barnes (1979) II, ppJ-
8,197; Rohde (1925) p.384; KR p.3A-45. I have found Inwood (1992) to have the most
comprehensive and cohesive arguments, especially with regard to reincarnation and the cosmic
cycle, and it is his ideas upon which I have based my discussion.
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Nothing in the doctrine of reincarnation requires a strictly immortal
being; one which lasts long enough to be born in several different
incarnations will suffice. 2a
The daimnn
An understanding of Empedocles' use of the term daim.on is essential for
understanding his concept of reincarnation. The term daiman is thought to be
equivalent to psyche, and to equate with the soul.t5 Strictly speaking, if there is
no psyche then there cannot be metempsychosis.26 The term psyche is used only
once in the fragments (fr.138), where it seems to be equivalent to "lÍe".27 One
wonders why Empedocles did not luse psyche: the majority of commentators on his
work substitnte psyche.28 The most logical answer is that the word psyche could
not express what Empedocles wanted it of it,2e and therefore he turned to the
word daiman; to see the daim.on simply as the psyche may be ignoring the broader
cosmic picrure.
Daiman was an unfortunate choice in many ways; it has even more shades
of meaning than psyche.It can be interchangeable with 0eóç (god), and in authors
from Hesiod to Plato it refers to a race of "intermediate beings" who dwell
between heaven and ea¡th. It can also replace the term psyche, which itself could
zalnwood (1992) p.52;he is only referring to Empedocles here, and the peculiar circumsta¡ces
that his cosmic cycle allows. As he points out, our view of the soul as immortal is heavily
influenced by Plato.
25 
See Claus (1981) p.118
'u Bames (19'79) II, pp.199,186; see Rohde (1925) p.361,n.84 for a discussion of tenninology.tt Claus (1981) p.112
" Rohde (7925) p.404,n.8 I
'n Or was loaded with other connotations.
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have the connotation of an entity disappearing at death.3o The daim.on is usually
immortal, and divine.3l Empedocles does not describe or adequately define what
he means by daiman It is usually presumed that his daimon was immorüal,
because immortality of the soul has always been a sine qua non of reincamation.
The point of metempsychosis is that the soul does not die with the body, but is
transferred to another body.
What do the fragments teIl us of the daiman?32 Nothing about its physical
constituency. It is evident (frr. 1I5, 126) that the daim.on functions in the same
way as the psyche in other doctrines of reincarnaúon - that is, it is transferred
from one body to the next. It seems mereþ a question of different terminology.
One presumes from the creation myth that every mortal has a daimon assigned to
him/her. Because Empedocles mentions being incarnated in a bird and a fish, as
well as into other human bodies, it is apparent that animals were also carriers of
the soul.
He also mentions having been a bush. The evidence is quite clear: fr.l21
gives the top of the scale for bushes/trees as the laurel. Some scholars have
wondered if vegetables and the like were included in the list of carriers. There is no
3oBremmer (1987) discusses the problems inherent in using "existing anthropological
terminology to describe the'psyche'..", but also the greater difhculty of inventing new
terminology: pp.4-5
" Gut¡rie (19 62) pp.3 1 8ff.
" The following discussion attempts to reconcile dichotomies and invalidities in the arguments in
Dodds (1951) pp.153,154,166); Bu¡net (1952) p.249; Wnght (1981) pp.59,64-65,71); Barnes
(79'79) II, pp.l97-200,186,188); Rohde (1925) pp.379,381ff..; KR pp.359,348; Zuntz (1911)
p.277; and Inwood (1992) pp.33ff,50-59.
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mention of this in the fragments (apart from fr.141 which is suspect and
controversial, and could have other associations).33 Because of the restrictions on
eating anything that could harbour a soul, if vegetables were included there would
be very little else left to eat; even philolphers have to be practical?
To return to the question of immortality, as discussed above, in
Empedocles' particular cosmic cycle, nothing is truly immortal except the sx
elements. All compounds are destroyed at the moment of total Strife and total
Love, and there is no mention in the fragments that anything survives.
We presume that the soul is also a compound of the elements. In this case,
the daim"on must have been created in the Golden Age, have fallen as Strife took
hold (when mortals \ryere created), and have been incamated back to a level where
it achieved the status of the gods over 30,000 seasons (fr.115). Then, at the
moment of total Strife, all compounds are destroyed and the elements completely
separated. This system would have worked much better f the daimon had existed
eternally, throughout the cycle: that is, tf the daimans all existed blissfully in the
Sphere with the gods (the elements). Fragment 115 seems to suggest that the
daimons existed before Strife broke up the Sphere. This suggests pre-existence
which does not answer the question of how the daim.ons could exist in the Sphere,
when one would presume that - as the cycle tries to show - only the six immortal
"For some of the signif,rcances of beans see Bu¡kert (1972) p,183. Cf. Chapter 1 for a full




elements should exist. Evidently, the ideal condition of the Sphere (the unifying of
all the elements) produced these daim.ons, and, as I have discussed above, Strife
gave them their individuality. Thus, by saying that Strife "created" the daim.ons,
one could provide a satisfactory solution.
The function of the daim.on as it passes from one body to the next seems
clear: it must function as a carrier of the daimon's identity and retain the memory
of the daimon's incarnation until the daiman has reached a position of such
wisdom (as Empedocles believed he had reached - fr. 146) that it could be
transported to a place among the "immortals". This is what Dodds calls the
"occult self'(p.I53). Daimons must have some means of perception, and it is
widely agreed that their thought functions are a result of their initial assimilation
into the "holy mind" of the Sphere. The importance of "mind" in a cosmos created
by a philosopher is obvious.
If it were not for the destruction of everything at the terminal points of the
cosmic cycle - and the compleûely new beginning - one could accept Kirk and
Raven's suggestion that the daim.on is a portion of pure Love which is
contaminated by Strife, but remains immutable. This does not explain what
happens to this portion in the period of total Strife, and, unfortunately,
Empedocles left no description of the consequences of total Strife, apart from the
complete separation of the elements. It is metaphysically and physically impossible
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to explain what happens to Love, but surely it cannot remain immutable except
during Total Love.
The "fall" and the ounishment
Ttre daim.onr were forced into the cycle of incarnations by the very force
that created them. This can be seen in terms of a fall or "primal sin" (although
these terms should not be interpreted according to Christian dogma). The sin was
bloodshed, and, as the cycle shows, there was no choice involved in the fall: it was
caused by Strife, but cont¡olled by Necessity. It had the appearance of a voluntary
act (fr.139) but was part of the cosmic plan.
The punishment for the fall is to endure a series of incarnations into
"corporeal envelopes"'o for 30,000 seasons. Presumably, this means that the
daim.on has 30,000 seasons to redeem himself and bring himself up to a godlike
level on the scale of incarnations (fr.146).3s As Barnes describes it, it is a life of
woe for the "journeying homunculus, condemned to lodge in a succession of dirty
doss-houses".36
'o lRohde, p.3'79)
'5 Do we restore a ladder of incarnations to be ascended to the divine? Or can a daimon literally
go from a boy to a girl to a bush, a fish etc.?
'u Barnes (1979) p.197
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The road back to final happiness
The útle of Empedocles' poem gives the vital message on how to move up
the scale of incamations: by purifications. The fall was caused by bloodshed:
therefore the purification is by cleansing of all blood crimes. This is all the more
important in the world of incarnations because the animal you kill may contain
another daimon, which will make your crime all the worse (akin to caruribalism).37
This is the explanation of fragments 136, 137, 140 (and I4l?). They are
prohibitions designed to inform those not as wise as Empedocles how to remove
all traces of carnality from their persons and so move up the scale."
The specific methods of purification are not known, apart from not killing
or eating flesh. This is the most important restriction in the doctrine, and
Empedocles emphasises the horror of what might happen if the warnings are not
heeded in fragment 137.3e It is probable that Empedocles also believed in a strict
ascetic lifestyle.ao
Fragment 117, with fr.115, illustrates that the daimon must pass through a
succession of lives in all of the four elements (earth, water, air and fire)
" On killing and/or eating animals: Bames (1979) I, p.124f .
38 A denial of corporealiy per se does not seem to be implied.
'e The idea of the father eating the son is illogical, in that one might expect the father to die
before the son. However, tie example must have been chosen for its horror, and the exaggeration
is very effective.
a0 Possibly following the Pythagorean model - cerøinly his doctrine seems to be one stream of
those views which flourished in Southern Italy from tle sixth century. See Chapter I for details
of the Pytlagorean ascetic lifestyle. However, Empedocles does not seem to mention any sexual
prohibitions.
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Presumably, fire refers to living under the sun. It has been argued, quite
reasonably, that Empedocles did not really remember being ro0póç te rópq te
Od¡rvoç t' oiowóç re rai ë(oloç ë1,Àoroç i10óç. Wright and Inwood, for
example, both point out that Empedocles løew that to have reached his high
position he must have passed through the four elements in a variety of forms;
therefore, he was plucking these from the air simply as illustrations for others not
so fortunate to have grasped the overall picture.al It is an interesting hypothesis,
but of little practical purpose: Empedocles would hardly admit to having made up
his evidence.
Burkert has raised some interesting questions about the mechanisms of
reincarnation in the Pythagorean system of beliefs, which are equally relevant to
Empedocles, and equally frustrating to answer, due to the fragmentary nature of
the evidence, and Empedocles' deliberate impenetrability or uncertainty as to the
details.a2 If we apply the same questions to Empedocles' theory, it appears that
every living creature is a potential receptacle for a daimon, and plants (trees,
a'Inwood (1992) p.56
a2 Burkert (19-12) pp.733-134.I have discussed these questions in the Introduction:
Does every living creature have an irunort¿l soul that migrates from one
incarnation to another? Do plants have such souls? Do they only enter certâin
species of animals? Do only certain special individuals, even among
men..undergo this wondrous experience?...Is the soul newly incarnated
immediately after the death of the old body, in which case Hades becomes
unnecessary, or is there an intermediate phase, which would have Hades tìere,
as a way station? Is the process of palingenesis the work of blind natural
forces,.? - or is it the execution of a penalty assessed in a judgement of the
dead? Is there an endless, cyclic movement, or is there a fall at the beginning
and a salvation at the end which is permanent - or perhaps has as its alternative
an etemal damnation in which case fie concepß of Elysium and Tartarus
again become relevant?
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bushes), but presumably not vegetables, are included in this; all individuals can be
inhabited by a daimon,but it appears that only the very wise can remember any of
their incarnations. Empedocles mentions no way-stations where the daimons wait
for incamations. He does mention a Hades; in his theory it is life on earth that
equates to Hades: the daimon has dropped to earth for punishment.
Regarding the apparently supervised placement of the dairu¡r¿ in its
particular "clothing", a tantalising fragment (fr.l26) suggests that a female agent
was in charge of controlling the daim.ons' incarnations. However, we know
nothing else about this, and another source gives the fragment with a masculine
agent. If it ¿s a female agent, the only candidate is Necessity, who seems to
control the whole exercise, but about whom Empedocles is parúcularly vague.a3
There is fairly strong evidence that the choice of incarnations is not blind-
luck. Chance would render a moral system without point. One would presume
that before rising up to the next incarnation the daimon would have to have
satisfactorily "passed" his previous incarnation, through following Empedocles'
precopts on purity. There is no evidence of how this 'Judgement" might have been
managed (although cf. fragment 126, above). No eternal damnation appears, and
it could not be eternal, given that "eternity" does not exist in the cosmic cycle.;
however, if the daimnn did not learn from its experiences - and there would not be
much point to the system if recollection was not possible - it might spend its
o'wright (t9ït) p.277
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allotted portion of incarnations in lowly (and impure) lives, and never achieve
"immorlality"
And what is the final step for the redeemed daim.on? After reaching the
highest mortal incarnation, he becomes a long-lived god. This is not as afi
immnrtal, for only the elements are immortal (fr.I47). It seems that Empedocles
was jumping the gun a bit in describing himself as a god:4 he may have been
referring to his next incarnation? His divinity was assured at that point, so he
could confidently call himself a god.os It could also have been, one might think, a
carrot held out to his audience to encourage them to emulate his purity and
wisdom, and thus reach divine status also
These gods are described in fragments I33 and I34; they are not
anthropomorphic, and the problems inherent in describing anything in terms other
than purely corpore#u has resulted in their having a most odd appearance:
oóôè ldp ovôpopár¡ reQoffi rotd yuîo réKootot,
[ou pèv oæò vcrvroro õóo r]¡Íôot oiooouot,l
oó rcóôeç, ou Ood yo0v', oo prlôea Àalvrievto,
oXX<ì Qplìv i"epr\ roì" o0éoQotoç ën?rtro poûvov,
Qpovríor róopov ütcovra rctoiooouoa Oofotv. (fr.134)
aa Although tradition records that he jumped into the volcanic crater of Mt. Enra to prove his
divinity. This frst appears in Heraclides Ponticus (apud D.L.8.67-68 & ff.). D.L. 8.70ff. gives
other similar accounts. V/right (1981) p.16 casts doubts on this on the grounds of the
impossibility of Empedocles' overcoming the geographical obstacles!
n5 This is suggested by Wright (1981) p,73.
a6 Fragment 133: "It is not possible to bring (the divine) close within reach of our eyes or to grasp
him with the hands, by which the broadest path of persuasion for men leads to the mind." (tr.
Wright)
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One wonders how more prosaic minds (interested in the material rewards of the
"afterlife") would enjoy this; this may explain why, in fragment I47, Empedocles
promises that the final place of the daim.on is at the "hearth and table" of the gods,
and omits the fact that his gods are borderline-incorporeal. But it does seem a
quite fitting end for a philosopher to achieve: a union with mind and blissful
thought, until that final paradoxical destruction which brings immortality through
union with the pure elements.
In sum, one could very easily put - as so many scholars have - Empedocles
into the "mad-scientist'' category. This is a great pity as he is the best-preserved of
all the Presocratic philosophers, and a close examination of his fragments reveals
an original thinker fighting an uphill battle to express original concepts (such as
incorporeality) for which there existed no regular terminology, in a period when
philosophy was struggling against religious and poetic barriers to become a subject
in its own lJ:ght;41
rô qil,or, oÎôo pèv oövex'óþOeíq rccipo póOorç
oöç éyô ê(epéol póÀo ô'opyol"eq ye téturtat
cvôpdor roì ôóo('ql"oç enì Qpévo æiottoç oppú. (fr.114)





Addendum: Empedocles and P)¡thagoras
Fragment I29 (quoted above) is thought to express Empedocles'
admiration for either Pythagoras or Parmenides.as D.L. 8.54 summarizes the
ancient debate, which decided in favour of Pythagoras. The passage contains an
explicit reference to reincarnation,ae and the ability to recollect one's past lives.
Empedocles is illustrating that true wisdom is achieved only by remembering
everything from the past as well as the present, and learning from it, so that
eventually one can undergo homaiosis with the "Universal Mind". The recollection
of past lives appears as a common theme through the fragments (139, 136, I45,
146), and also appears in his advice to Pausanias (fr. 110) not to get side-tracked
by trivialities. The ability to recollect was ascribed to Pythagoras in antiquity,
based almost entirely on this fragment, and modern scholars have tended to agree
that Empedocles was referring to Pythagoras. Certainly nothing of this nature is
ascribed to Parmenides, but Pythagoras' wisdom was proverbial.50
There is a tradition - based on Timaeus, the Sicilian historian - that makes
Empedocles a pupil of Pythagoras (or, as their lifetimes do not coincide, another
otHowever, cf.Ztntz (1971) p.265f. who believes that Empedocles is stating his debt to both
Pythagoras and Parmenides (i.e. sitting on the fence.)
ae Contra Barnes (1979) I,p.104, who thinks that it does not suggest transmigration or
Pythagoras, It could, however, refer to a writer of history in the sense that an historian should
have the ability to see accüately for generations?
50 Burnet (1952) pp.1,99-200; Rohde (1,925) p.395 x 34; V/right (1981) p.256; KR p.335 note that
Empedocles' use of proportion in the composition of his universe is similar to the Pythagorean
use of proportion; for example, in fr.96 Empedocles believes that bone is made up of 2 parts
water,2 parts earth and4parts fire. Barnes (1919) II, p.9 comments thatEmpedocles is "apoor
intellectual cook" who "never tested his own recipe"l
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source makes Empedocles' teacher an unknown Pythagorean). According to this
tradition, Empedocles was expelled from the Pythagorean school for stealing
Pythagoras' discourses and making them public.5l A similar story has Empedocles
as a pupil of Parmenides, and yet another makes his teacher Anaxagoras (D.L.
8.s4-s6).
As I have noted, the philosophical lixl$ between Empedocles and
Parmenides are slight.52 Regarding Anaxagoras, there are no positive grounds for
suspecting anything other than an acquaintance with his works. It is the
Pythagorean connection which is the strongest, and this is no doubt because of the
obvious similarity between the Empedoclean and Pythagorean doctrines of
reincarnation. The ascetic lifestyle is an immediate similarity, as is the reasoning for
it. There is also the "fact" that Pythagoras was renowned for his memory of past
lives and could, according to Heraclides, list them. (D.L. 8.4).s3
These are similarities obvious to any casual observer of the two doctrines.
The fact is, however, that close examination shows that the two doctrines aro,
ideologically, quite different. The reincarnation doctrine of Empedocles is integral
to his cosmology: it is all part of a greater pseudo-scientific world system. The
þthagorean doctrine is the basis, in itself, lor a religious cult with no greater
5t Note Minar (1971) on Empedocles and Pythagoras, viewed in terms of Empedocles "un-
Pythagoreanism" (p. 5Off .).
t'See von Fritz (1963) cols.189-191 for the few simila¡itics,
t'Guth.ie (1962)p.ßa
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cosmological significance.to It is Pythagoras rather than Empedocles (as Jaeger
believes) whom one would class as the "centaur" blending primitive philosophy
and religion. Empedocles, on the other hand, has moved that important step
towards pure philosophy: one might say that Empedocles has grasped - tentatively
- at the "big picture".ss
to On the question of influences, von Fritz (19ó3) cols,190-191 would see a common link between
Empedocles, Pindar and Phaedrus.
tt I am not entering into a debate on the scientific achievements of Pythagoras. It is unlikely that
he himself made any, and the lack of evidence confuses the issue (see Chapter 1). Empedocles,
on the other hand, slated his ideas on many physiological, bot¿nical, and embryological matters,
although he left few explanations that one could classify as "scientific" in the modem sense. This
is the basis of Aristotle's famous gnpe (Physics 252a22-5) that "anyone who says this should not
simply stâte it - he should also give the explanation of it, and lay down some unreasoned axiom
but bring either an induction or a demonsEation." For exarrple, he does seem to have rejected
monism although he never writes why (perhaps out of common sense?). Certainly the pluralist
notion was in line with the developments that the atomists would make, and which Anaxagoras
pioneered. See Bames (7979) II, p.9 for a discussion of this aspect of Empedocles.
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però ôè tòv 0eóv, Éworlooç öcr tòv rcorqcf¡v ôéor, eiæep péì.l,or
æorr¡o'¡ç eîvor, øoreîv póOooç, ó1"1"' oó l,ó1ooç, roì outòç oór fl
¡ruOol.oyrróç, ôtd toûts ôt'¡ oöç rpo2¿eipouç eÎ1ov roi r¡nr"otcírpr1v
póOouç toòç Ai"ocílcoo, toútouç ènoír¡oa, oÎç æpr,rtorç êvétu1ov.
(Phaedo 6lb3-7)
*
Reincarnation appears in two literary forms in the Platonic dialogues: (1)
myths, usually eschatological; (2) tales, primarily heard from anonymous priests
(Meno), mystic groups, subtle people (Gorgias), ancient account (æoì.atóç
Àóyoç: Phaedo, Gorgias, Meno), etc.r
There is considerable common ground between the two, primarily because
their origin is deliberaæly indefinite: Socrates/Plato is pointing out that the
myths/stories are not his own, and by this method he is thus able to put forward
ideas without committing himself to their truth.2 Moreover, although we can
make reasoned guesses, we can never find out with any degree of certainty whose
myths/stories they are. I will discuss this elsewhere; however, Stewart raises an
interesting point: it is possible that the very anonymity of the myths masks the
subjectivity of the source. Perhaps the myths can be traced back to a common
source with which Socrates may not have wished to be associated; for example, if
I See the relevant chapters for a more detailed discussion. I have accepted Guthrie's (1975) order
of tle dialogues, viz, (early) Apology, Crito, lnches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias
Minor, Hippias Major (?), Protagoras, Gorgias, Ion (order uncertain); (middle) Meno, Phaedo,
Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Euthydemus, Menexenus, Crarylus; (late) Parmenides,
Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, lnws.
2Crombie (1962) p.154. Moreover, myths are inherently flexible:as Breruner (1994) p.65 notes,
"The plasticity, multifunctionality, and polysemy of myth always makes its analysis a haza¡dous
undertaking."
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that source were "Orphic", this would make a mockery of Socrates' criticism of
the moral influence of the priests of that movement (Repubtic 364e).3
A "theory" of reincarnation is never offered as a complete and reasoned
whole in any Platonic dialogue, nor does reincarnation appear separate from myths
or stories. Moreover, the details of the reincarnation process differ from dialogue
to dialogue, and indeed from myttr to myth within the same dialogue (cf. Phaedo).
It might be possible, as some commentators have attempted, to coalesce the details
of the various myths and force a doctrine. However, this is fraught with problems
because of the numerous ways that myth can be seen to function in the doctrines;a
this is particularly so since there is no one accepted explanation for the motives
behind Plato's use of myth.
Part of the problem is that Plato deals in concepts which are inevitably
mythopoeic,t beitrg either (a) not "sensible" (for example, the soul is invisible), or
3Stewart's suggestion: (1960) p,96. I do not think rhat this attributes a mean motive to
SocratesÆlato; rather, as I will discuss in the following chapters, Plato uses myth with a great
deal of flexibility. This flexibility is (no doubt deliberately), facilitâted by his preference for the
myths/stories which we tenn Orphic-Pythagorean. These a¡e a mass of poorly differentiated ând
generally anonymous or pseudonymous writings which do not fonn a coherent picture of
commonly held or widely recognized beliefs, but which a¡e convenient for setting the seal of
fradition and antiquity (= veracity) on to simila¡ly vague ideas. It is not my intention to belittle
Plato's own personal beliefs in these chapters. \ù/hen I argue that these type of beliefs (i.e.
"Orphic" etc.) are convenient for Plato, I am not casting a slu¡ on Plato's own religious
convictions - I am, however, pointing out that we are unlikely to be able to restore his own
convictions from his deliberately ambiguous references to esoteric beliefs, used to reinforce often
equally ambiguous arguments: see Meno (q.v.), for example. I will take up this idea again, below.
4*We must not press too fa¡ the statements of a flyü", according to Bluck (1958a) p.157, who
does just that, producing an unworkable conglomerate of the Phaedrus and Phaedo; cf. Bluck
(1958b) p.ala.
5 Hailiweil (1988) p.18
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(b) beyond the realm of thought of the living (that is, post-mortem life).6 Both of
these categories affect reincarnation, to the extent that one might ask that, if
reincarnation only appears in myth, does this show that it is not a trve
doctrine/belief, but a fiction, or representation of something quite different?7
Even relatively simple opinions on the afterlife are provided with a waming: at
Apology 40a ff., after Socrates has told the Athenian judges his view that death is
one of two things, he concludes, ei taôt' ëortv olr¡0fr. Post-mortem myths are,
thus, "inevitably elusive and opaque."8
Even before thought on the soul entered the realm of incorporeality,e
description of r¡u2¿r1 was problematic. For example, in the central myth in
Phaedrus, it is clear that the soul does not really grow feathers and take flight.
However, the myth provides the best analogy for what seems to occur (cf.
"butterflies in the stomach").to We know that souls exists because we know that
we are ensouled: that is, empirical proof is impossible, especially as the soul is
invisible. "It is both a tacit acknowledgment of, and an attempted solution to, the
problem of conceiving the 'true nature' of the soul, that Plato should leave rational
6Friedl¿inder (1969) p.182; cf. also the numerous variations on the topography of Hades, and the
changing details of the journey/judgement, which illustrate the difhculty of fumishing a coherent
vision of an unloown world,
7If one views the myths literally, could one then consider the eschatological myths as handbools
to aid one's post-mortem survival?
sHaliwell (1983) p.18. In the same passage in Apology, Socrates refers to an equally vague
source: ..ìi rotò to Le"yópevo petopol,r1 ttç nry2¿over oôoo rqi petoírr¡orç "î VuXî toô tótooroô evOévôe eiç cíIlov rónov. (40c1-9). The point about post-mortem beliefs, is that they are
only beliefs. Is it permissible to be vague and general about things - such as post-mortem
existence and the soul - which are impossible to prove?
e In the thought of Plato: for a discussion of this see Renehan (1980).
t0 That is, titerally fatse, but symboticatty lmte?
9s
argument behind and turn to myth."ll However, not even myth can solve certain
problems about the taxonomy of the soul: for example, what gender is something
which does not have a gender?l2 Or, how does one relate the incorporeal ideal of
the soul if the only vocabulary available is strictly c:orporeal''lr3 Thus, myttr often
describes the soul in terms that openly contradict those of dialectic.
Myth seems incompatible with philosophical discourse - even primitive, by
,14
compaflson:
Oo pavO<Íverç, frv ô' e1ó, ött æpôtov toÎç æatôíotç púOouç
ÀÉyopev; to0to õé nou coç tò öl,ov ei"rceîv yeûôoç, ë.vr õè raì
óÀqeî. (Republic 377 a4-6)t5
Socrates sometimes expresses a (moral) objection to myths (Euthyphro 6a;
Phaedrus 229c-230a; Republic 376e-380c).16 Other philosophers - Prodicus,
Anaxagoras, Antisthenes - justified myths by f,rnding a deeper meaning or
rr Hailiweu (1988) p.17
12 It gets its gender characteristics from the body.
13 Cf. Renehan (1980); also, Halliwell (1938) p.173 on this as an unavoidable problem.
toPlato's myths have long been held as stories,'lnythopoetic" - McCumber (1982) p.34 - and
irrelevant to philosophy. Annas (1982b) has pointed out, however, that the subjects of the three
eschatological myths of Gorgias, Phaedo, md Republic mirror the arguments preceding (and
have similar themes). See also Friedlåinder (1969) p.182 on the myths as a trilogy; and Guthrie
(1975) p.338. Moreover, couìment¿tors have generally been th¡own off tle scent by the problems
with the genre of philosophical myth: that is, its debts to both the literary and philosophical
gemes. The result is that myths are often interpreted as purely aesthetic, or, worse still, they are
seen as a lapse from rational thinking on Plato's part (and to be despised). It is made more
confusing by Plato's attacks on myths and allegorizing (references below). Another problem is
that Plato sometimes uses both mythos and logos almost interchargeably, particularly when the
other term would be more appropriate! Annas cites Republic (the growth of the state is termed a
mythos) as one exarnple of this. See Annas (1982b) pp.119-l21on this. Also, cf. Annas (1982a)
p.349 on the jarring "childishness" of the Myth of Er. On mythosllogos cf . Papadis (1989) p.27 .
1s Dowden (1992) pp.47ff. discusses this. As he notes, Plato does not object to myths as hcúon
per se, but to the idea of wrong knowledge.
16 Ãt Republic 4l4b-15d, false myth is countenanced in a good cause.
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underþing sense in them (trróvolott ), but Socrates also rejects this (Republic
378d).18 Subsequent philosophers, particularly the Neoplatonists and
Neopythagoreans, used allegory to find this "hidden sense".le However, despite
his ambivalence towards myth, Socrates makes extensive use of it, even inventing
myths which Aristotle was hasty to dismiss as "sophisms", "not worthy of serious
considerati on." (Metaphysics 1 000a1 8).20
Because myth is so important in the reincarnation argument, I shall discuss
the ways it can be (and has been) seen to function:
(1) as literally true; that is, what Socrates/Plato truly beheved would happen in the
afterlife.2l Considering the absence of a coherent doctrine, this is not only unlikely,
but also unprovable. Guthrie notes, however, that the second incarnation in the
Timneus (q.v.) is referred to as the "probable story" (..rctd l.óyov tòv eiróto..:
90e8), which he would see as a"jeu d'esprif' .22
17 For the various senses vld¿ LSJ.
tt o Top véoç or2¿ oÎoç te rpiverv öc æ {r¡óvoto rcri ô pú, oXX' <ì öv q}"troôtoç ôv }.rrp1 ev
taiç õó(otç õuoérwærd re rqi operóotcrtcr QtL"ei yipepo0ol"' (Republic 318d7-e1)
tnPeters (1967) p.120 on mythos.
'oReference given by Gutbrie (1975) p.365zlThis is not a contradiction of my previous point (that myth is used of the unknowable: cf.
Apology 40a ff.) - it is merely one expression of how myth can be interpreted,
"Guthrie (1978) p.307. A brief sea¡ch in LSJ produces a number of similar references for
"probable" stories/myths'. e.g. Timneus 48d, 59c. Rather than simply aieu d'espril, one might
see Socrates/Plato's use of eiróç as indicative of deliberate ambiguity. In other cases, this sort
of general statement quickly supplies an answer, and enables the dialogue to move on. In this
particular example from Timneus 90e8, however, I would agree that there is an element of
playfulness. See Stewart (1960) pp.304-5,85), citing other authorities' views on dogma vs. myth.
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(2) allegory/fable, including re-interpretation of older myths. For example, the
Cave in Republic is a simple allegory;23 a more complex atlegory (if it is intended
as such) is the tripartite souVstate (Republic and Laws).z4 The invention of
writing (Phaedrus 274-5) is a fable: "..designed to express pictorially in a story
what could equally well have been said without it" (Crombie).25 Early in
Phaedrus, Socrates says that he has no time for the fashionable pursuit of
allegorizing myths, but prefers to accept them and get on with learning to know
himself.26 Against this, however, compare the allegory at Gorgias 493b (q.v.): the
flrst ooQòç trivrlpl told the myth; the second ro¡ryòç ov4p made an allegory of
tt.21
ff we cannot determine whether a myth is meant to be inærpreted
allegorically, then we can only draw speculative conclusions. For example, the
theory of recollection tn Meno has been regarded as an allegory: when
demythologized, this denies the theory any literal meaning, regarding ov<Ípvr'¡otç as
a metaphor.2s Compare the use of what Morgan terms eikones (among which he
23zaslavsky (1981) p.154 sees it as, "an attempt to give in imagistic shorthand, as it were, a
matrix for understanding types of human behaviour". On the Cave, see Crombie (1962)
pp.114ff.; Stewart (1960) pp.14ff,ù15; Guthrie (1975) p,518; Annas (1982a) pp.253ff .,262. On
the Cave and analogy: Strang (1986).
2aSaunders (1962)
25 Crombie (1962) p.153
tu cuthrie (1,975) p.399
" Blank (1991) p.28
"I have doubts about the intended function of recollection in Plato's thought, seeing it as
intended more to prove the immortality of the soul than form a working doctrine. ovópvr¡otç
can be t¡anslated as "remembering", "recalling" or "recollecting", so in itself it is ambiguous.
The point which I an attempting to make is that if we cannot determine whether a myth is
intended as an allegory, the conclusions drawn will vary considerably.
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includes the Cave) as accurate representations of their model: "they are other than
but like what they imitate".2e
(3) Myth as story/philosophical poetry. Linked with the concept of
allegoricaUanalogous creativity is the idea that Plato is playing an intellectual
game with the reader;3O the obvious case of this is the one hundred or so inventive
("playful") etymologies tn Cratylus.3l Cf. Phaedrus 276d-e. Also, for example,
Republic would seem to be on the boundary berween "literally true" (that is, as a
practical plan with serious intent) and make-believe or story (as a far from ideal
utopia).32 Yet, Socrates describes himself at Phaedo 61b5 (surety ironically?) as
ottòç our fl prOoloyrróç. Beyond the literal sense of a myth one is also aware
of the metaphorical.33 A final sense is that of myth as a charm or spell (I^aws
903b; Phaedo Il4d7).
(4) a tool for making analogies; or for pointing the way to where truth can be
found by a process of "drawing the mora1".34 This can be combined with (2),
above.
tnMorgan (1990) pp.150ff. bases this on Sophist 235d. This seems to be a fai¡ definition of
allegory: cf . Oxford Literary Terms s.v. allegory.
'ocurhrie (19'75) p.555; Crombie (1962) p.154 sees some myths designed simply to be
impressive.
3l Ferwerda (1935) (p.26S). According to Krell (1988) p.166, Cratyfus is Plato's "opera buffa".
32On utopias in general: Ferguson (1975).
33 Stewa¡t (1960) p.236
3a Crombie (1962) p. 153 ; cf. Guthrie (1935) p,239 .
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(5) Explaining things that cannot otherwise be explained in dialectic/rational
terms;" myth is used at the point where an argument reaches its limits:36 it is a
continuation of philosophy by other means3T - "a prolongation into the unknown
of lines established by the philosophical argument".38 Myth as the "purporÛedly
true picture of a religious-moral-epistemological goal that is beyond finite powers
to describe even with the use of Orphic-Pythagorean and mythic devices"
(Morgan).3e The Seventh Letter makes this poinc the highest subjects (viz., the
Forms) are in principle incapable of being expressed in language.aO A similar point
is made atTimneus 29d and 68d. Abstract ideas such as free will and divine justice
can also be impossible to "describe": we lçtow that they exist, but cannot prove
it.at The problem with this type of myth is that it is easy to interpret mere
tt This is, I believe, the use of myth most often found with reincarnation. As Dowden (1992) p.48
notes, however, the danger is that "..the approach of some modern schola¡s to the traditional
mythology supposes it to be nearer Plato's hea¡t tha6he thought." That is, we must not ¿lssume
that Plato literally believed all that he wrote, in mythits or in logos 'tuophir (1991) p.13 who analyzes the Republic in structuralist terms sees that "the logic of
myth..following the general structuralists' claim, consists of certain regularities of oppositions
and homologues of discursive units. These regularities...create a structure for an indefinite
number of variations tlat exemplify the same logic, the same relations between key categories of
thought, the same way to categorize the world and to impose order on human experience..They
provide Greek discourse with a grid that serves logos as a point of departure in its search for
truth, a map of the terrain.." I will discuss Ophir's interpretation of the Republic mylh, below.
Crombie believes that the function of eschatological myths was to explain ideas that go beyond
rational inquiry: they ".,convey a principle by describing one way in which that principle might
be implemented." He notes that the problem is that, in searching for the moral in this sort of
myth, you can never be sure which de¡atls can be discounted. For example, is reincarnation
functioning as an insignificant detail in the myth, or as an important part oÍ the moral itself?
Crombie (1962) p.154; Halliwell (1988) p.18 makes a simila¡ point: the temptation is to select
out the features which can be recognised as part of (other) identifiable doctrines, and to regard
the rest as decorative. If they ale "quasi-poetic expressions of some of the philosopher's deepest
convictions..", this view hardly does them justice.
tt Cf. Dodds (1959) p.384 for another conscious adaptation of Clausewitz.
3t Dodds (1959) cired by Gallop (1975) p.224.
'nMorgan (1990) p.73 he describes the Phaedo myth as "a fabulous attempt to push thinking
where reason should not tread": an epilogue to rational inquiry, rather tlan a surrogate (p.57).
ooRowe (1986a) p.52;Rankin (7964) p.25.
ot Guth¡ie (1935) p.239
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strangeness and surrealism as the disguise of a "deep"42 message (so deep it often
cannot be found: for example, the Politicus myth and to a lesser extent, that in
Phaedrus).43 Is it the distinguishing mark of a myth that to answer unanswerable
questions one has to enter into myth oneself?4
(6) backing up dialectic, as "¡)reef';'5 this sort of myttr is usually introduced or
concluded with tempering words:
Tò ¡rèv oôv tor.oôto ôr"r,o1upíoooOot oöto4 ëyer, roç eyò
ôrelril"u0o, ott npênet voôv ë"1ovn ovôpí' öct pÉvtor ri toôt'
èotìv ii torcôt' ama.. (Phaedo 114d1-3)
The myth at Laws 903d (q.v.) in particular can be seen to back up the preceding
discussion. It is also "designed to charm" (903bI-Ð.4u The most recent view,
put forward by Annas, views myth as an extension of this: it is a "proof' but, more
subtly, it is an illustration in concrete terms of the usually abstract argument of
dialectic.
Halliwell would see Republic's Myth of Er functioning in this way: the
dialogue, he believes, presents an argument for psychic immortality which the myth
a2Thatis, {móvotq.
o'Annas (1986a) makes this point (p.350),
aa It is obviously dangerous to generalize about a/l myths on the same tenns: that is, the Politicus
myth may be nonsensical, but it does not means that all myths are nonsensical. It is important to
rcalize that in the majority of the Platonic dialogues, myths are present for a reason, and usually
that reason is to back up an atgument, They are rarely present for their own sake and, although
they can function purely on the creative literary level, to see them as only such is to belittle
Plato' s cleverness - a cleverness that we a¡e intended to see, in Meno (q.v .), for example.
ot The "body of peltasts behind the hoplites": Jaeger cited by Guthrie (1935) p.239.








reinforces - it gives psychic immortality "place and meaning".aT
crosses into category (5): "..the beliefs or convictions which concern Plato at this
point outrun the scope of cogently rational dialectic."at Moreover, because the
great eschatological myths of Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedril,r occur at the end of
the arguments to which they relate, this makes their function as proofs seem
,49
roglcal.
(7) providing a quick answer to questions that the philosopher is unwilling to state
in dialectic/doctrine. Meno (q.v.) has been seen to illustrate this.
The greatest ,problem with the appearance of reincarnation in myth is
whether it is intended as a believable doctrine, or whether it is a fancy (and used
for any of the above purposes). As Annas comments, "This view encourages us to
read the myths on an aesthetic level, and, like Walter Pater, enjoy the descripúon
of coloured light rather than trying to extract a message."so She is making the
point that there is a second level beyond mere fantasy or "childishness". Zaslavsþ
(wrongly) tends towards this second assumption with almost nihilistic
determination:51
o7 Morgan (1990) p.171 feels the same way about the cent¡al myth of Phaedrus.
a8Halliwell (1988) p.17
4e And they will have a Ereàter emotive influence in this position. However, if they arc too
fanøstic will they counteract the strength of the argument? PoliticuJ may illustrate this: see
Appendix E.
5o Annas (1986a) p.350
tt I am certainly not in agreement with the Euhemerist approach, which has been well and truly
discredited. It is, however, an approach found in both ancient and modern commentators. See




..if someone asserts that a human has the look (idea) of a snake, he
does not mean that the human is literally a snake, but that he acts
like a snake. Similarly, if someone asserts that the soul of a human
leaves a human body and enters the body of a beast, that is not to
be taken at face value as a belief in transmigration of souls, but
rather as a way of describing an alæration in his patterns of
behaviour...whenever in a Platonic dialogue there is an ostensible
transformation from a human into a beast or from a beast into a
human or even from a beast into a beast, this must not be taken
literally, but rather it must be taken as an imagistic way of
delineating an internal transformation within a human from one type
of behaviour to another.52
This may work in some myths (most obviously Timneus) but I fail to see how it
can be applied to every situation. Zaslavsþ would see it as the intention of the
Republic myth, based on the fact that the next life is chosen by the soul;s3 ari
illogical analogy, I believe. Is acting like a snake/beast a self-professed internal
transformation?
And what happens when the dem¡hologized myth does not agree with the
preceding dialectic, as appears to happen (according to Annas) in the Myth of
Er?sa What if the demythologized details do not agree with one's view of their
exponent?st Not knowing how Plato expected the myths to be read is the source
of endless problems such as these,56 which I will attempt to deal with in the
discussions on specific dialogues;
52 Zaslavsky (1981) pp.156-157
53 Zaslavsky (1931) p.158; on the other hand, Zaslavsky sees the idea of recollection not as myth
or "genetic account" but descriptive of the learning process as it occu¡s (p.15).
5oAnnas (1986a) p,352; Halliwell (1988) pp.22ff. disagrees, as does Morgan (1990) p.150 who
sees it as the "natu¡al ending".
ss 
cf. Timaeus (q.v.), regarded as wholly a myth. Does the myth vaunt a hitherto hidden misogyny
on Plato's part?
5u Annas (1986a) p.352
r03
..the frequent appearance in the myths of reincarnation is explained
by Plato's having picked up the idea from some þthagoreans.
Whatever the value of this as a historical explanation - relevant pre-
Platonic evidence being hard to come by - it leaves all the important
questions still open: for why did Plato choose to pick tp this idea
from the Pythagoreans? ff myths have no rational interpretation, we
can only say that the idea had some personal appeal. But surely we
should be asking what Plato uses this notion to do: what idea is of
importance to him for wfüch reincarnation would seem to be the
right symbolic expression?s7
This is the idea that I will follow through in the following chapters: that Plato is
using reincarnation (in myth) for a certain purpose, and that that purpose differs
according to the particular subject of each dialogue.
As a general point, reincarnation does not appear in every dialogue, nor
even in sequential dialogues. Its appearance obviously depends to a large extent on
the subject and ultimate purpose of each dialogue, and also on the speaker and
audience. I am convinced that reincarnation does not appear in the dialogues as a
workable ideology, but rather as a functional tool, used with a definite purpose.
For example, tn Phaedo, it "proves" the immortality of the soul; tn Meno it forms
the basis for a discussion of true knowledge.
There is certainly no canonical Platonic theory of reincarnation.
Reincarnation appears in different forms, and is associated with a multiplicity of
theories on the soul, its composition and appearance. It is a flexible theory, with
5t Annas (1986b) p.120. It is these questions which I will be discussing in the following chapters.
See also Chapter 1, and Appendix B for Pythagoreans and Orphics.
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suitâbly vague origins, lacking any formal ratification in theology or cult. It is
flexible to the extent that, in Republic, the soul chooses its next life, while in Inws,
the next life is awarded through an automatic justice system.
Is reincarnation a pia fraas?st I would not go so far as to deny any belief in
reincarnation to Plato or Socrates (although it would be equally presumptuous to
attribute it as a personal belief¡, however, I do think that we ought not to equate
us¿ with betief.tn I do not intend to belittle Plato's beliefs when I say that they are
irrelevant to my discussions: rather, there is no way of ascertaining from the
dialogues what beliefs he did hold.ó0 My intention is to discuss the contexts within
which reincarnation "beliefs" appear, and the details of any reincarnation processes
which are given, and to attempt to ascertain what function reincarnation has in the
dialogues.6l
To summarize my conclusions in advance, I believe that, (a) it is impossible
to see any development of one coherent doctrine of reincamation in the
58See Armst¡ong (7917) p.29, on Ps.Timaeus Locrus 104de, who believes that Plato's doctrine
(made up of theories of immortality, incarnation and anamnesis) is a pia fraus, designed for those
who could pusue perfection (arete) without it.
'n That is, reincarnation is not a myth, but is used in myth: Vlastos (1970) p.119,n.89. I am not
denying the reality of belief. As Vlastos has recognized, transmigration is often the keystone of
Plato's doctrines, I would (unlike Dodds) be wary of questioning Plato's belief in transmigration
and religion, although it does seem to be more often used as a tool in Plato's epistemological
investigations.
uo Cf. the sweeping statement of "approved" doctrines of Plato in D.L. 3 .67 : ù õè clpéorovto
crutQ toûtcr frv. oOóvotov Ël-e1e d¡v rpu¡¿r¡v xqì æo¡,Io petopQtewupÉ'rr4v oópcrtcr..
ut In sum, I intend to investigate whether reincarnation is a pia fraus .
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dialogues,62 and that (b) reincarnation is used by Plato as part of a collection of
mythico-religious props which function as convenient explanations and/or
ûestimonia, and act - always in myttr - prima¡ily in the manner of categories (5),
(6) and (7), above, without necessarily implying that they are Plato's or Socrates'
personal beliefs.63 Plato has elevated reincarnation from the realm of mysticism
and religion, into the world of philosophy, but paradoxically, reincarnation always
remains mythical in the dialogues.
62Indeed, Plato's views on tie soul itself are far from consistent. Cf. Vernant (1991) p,190 and
Philip (1966) p.163,n.3,
utThat is, use does not necessarily equate with belief, Cf, Lesher (1992) p.80 for a similar
opinion on the Platonic use of reincarnation and myth. As Lesher notes, *We need not suppose
that Plato was committed to the t¡uth of these stories in all thei¡ details in order to grant to them
some degree of respectability."
106
CHAPTER 5: MENO
Reincarnation is int¡oduced into this dialogue through the medium of
"certain priests and priestesses" (81a), and reinforced with a quotation from Pindar
(fr.133). It is introduced at a critical point in the dialogue, when Meno has just put
forward an (unanswerable?) eristic paradox on knowledge,l and for this reason, it
seems that Socrates reverts to a story (not a myth) that he does not wish to credit
to his own devising or belief (note his warning to Meno at 81b2-3 - c),},d orcóæet,
ei oot ôoroôorv <il,qe'n l"éyerv. Qaoì..), but one which forces a new middle line
into the argumenl2
It seems that the function of the reincarnation "doctrine" in this context is
fourfold: (1) it quickly (and simply) supplies an answer to Meno's paradox, and
therefore, (2) ít enables Socrates to return to his previous discussion. Most
importantþ, (3) it provides a (semi-mythic) proof of the immortality of the soul (a
base for the most important argument in the Meno and the Phaedo) and for the
debate on knowledge from recollection which is to follow (learning is recollection:
81d4-5); it is thus, (4) almost a thematic marker for the change of direction of the
argument - the argument is about to veer sharply away from dialectic towards
more transcendental pursuits.
l The paradox is: ..ôç oúr cípa éott (r1teîv ov0pcímrp oöte ô otôev oöte ô pì¡ oÎôev; oöre 1op öv
., 1c 1- r Tc
ö 1e oiôe (r¡roî' oiôe 1óp, roi ouõèv õeî tQ 1e rotoórcp (rltr1oeo4' oüte ô ¡rr1 oiôev' ooõè pp
otôev ö tr (1tr¡oer. (80e1-5) On eristic: G.B.Kerford (1981) The Sophistic Movement C.U.P.,
pp.63ff. Also, Kenny (1969) p.?t1:2; Andetson (1971) p.227. Nl translations are from Lanb
(1924).
t Allen (1959) p.165; Cornford (7971) p.52.
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As Anderson has pointed out, the introduction of reincarnation into the
dialogue should be viewed with suspicion. First, there is Plato's warning (81b2-
3);3 second, the fact that Socrates "heard" (orrixoa lop avôprov Íe Kor TovstKolv
ooQcov ßep1 ro Oero æpoypord..: 81a5-6) the doctrine - he did not "recollect" it;4
third, the use of poetic proof to back it up, and obscure "proofl' at that - the
references are intentionally obscure.s Finally, there is the character of Meno
himself - he is "benumbed" (80a8-b1)6 by Socrates. Meno is a student of Gorgias,
and thus of eristic, but he has no great understanding of what he argues, nor does
he understand Socrates' far from subtle allusions to his vanity (16a9-c2; 80c3-5)
and his comparison to the slave.T Moreover, when Meno does not know
something (for example, the answer to "What is virtue?") he says that he has
"forgotten". It seems that the concept of recollection is tempered with heavy
irony.s
3 There are several parallels to tlis in other dialogues, particulady with reference to myth: for
exanrple, Timneus 72d.
ocf. the reiteration of fomrs of crvópvrlotç/<lvoprpv¡oreo0or at, for example, 81c8, d2, d5, îA,
82a,2, b7, (esp.) e12-13,84a4 etc. Meno's type of learning is based on remembering (and
repeating) what others have told him: Anderson (7977) p.228.
t Cf. my discussion of this in Chapter II: Pinda¡.
6socrates, like the vóprr¡ (flat torpedo sea-hsh or electric ray: vide LSI), eroteî voprôv. The
result is the Socratic phenomenon of aporia: cf. 80a1-2; 80c8-d1. Socrates' reply at 80c6-d1 is a
masterpiece of sophistic repetition of both vopr- and oæop- compounds, and serves to confuse
Meno even fu¡ther. On aporia: Blank (1993) p.428ff.; also, S.Koforan "Beyond Aporia?" pp.7-
44 in Benjamin,A. (ed.) (1988) Post-structuralist classics Routledge,London.
t Anderson (1977) p.232
t Cf.the pun on Meno's name at 71c9: Cobb (p.606-7)
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The doctrine of reincarnation which introduces recollection is (a) derived
from unspecified popular tradition, and (b) of little importance in itself. Its
importance lies in what it supplies to the dialogue - viz, a "proofl' of the
immortality of the soul, based on an old traditional belief.
The details of the metempsychosic process are sketchy:
Oi pèv léyovtéç eior côv ïepérov 'ce roì" i.aperôv öootç
pepél.r'¡xe rcepì ôv pera1¿eqLÇovror l.ó1ov oiorç c' elvot ôrôóvor'
?rÉyet ôè rai flívôopoç roì cÍI}.ot noll.oì tôv norqrôv, öoor
Oeîoí eiotv. ö ôè Leyouor, touri åoov' ol"l,d orcóæEr, ei oor
ôorcoôorv olqef lé1erv. Qaoì ydp tr1v yolt¡v toô ovOpcímou
elvar aO<Ívatov, roì" totè pèv reÀ^eorQv, ö ôr1 orco0v¡oKerv
ral"oôor, totè ôè ædl,rv yiyveo0or", aæóÀÀuoOot ô' ouôé¡core'
õeîv ôi ôrd toôto éç éolrmqto õrcprôvor tòv Bíov'
oÎor ydp cìv -
@epoeQóvo rcorvdv æoÀsro0 æÉv0eoç
õé(etor, eiç tòv'ünepOev öÀrov reívorv é.vcírrp ëteï
ovôrôoî VUXdç ndì.tv,
Ë.x tûv Booulfeç olouoi
raì" oOéver rpcrrcvoì ooQic te péyrotor
cÍvôpeç oö(ovt'. Ëç õÈ tòv l.otròv 1póvov ripc¡eç
ayvoì rpòç av0pcírrorv rsl€ôvtar. [- Pindar fr.133]
"Ate oôv rl VuXi cOrivotóç re oôoo roì rol.Àórr"ç leyovuîc, Kci
écoporuîo raì td Èv0rÍôe roì" rd åv "Arôou roi ærivto ^lpr1para,
our ëortv ö tt ou pepóOqrev' rüote ouôèv Oaupootòv rcoi æepì
operîç roì repì öl"l.ov oÎóv te etvar aucrlv cva¡rvr'¡oOflvar, cÍ ye
roì rcpótepov r1æfototo. cire ytìp dç Qóoeroç oærÍoqç ouyTevo0ç
oijo'qç, roì" pepoOrlroioç rîç VuXîç cincvtc, orôèv rorl"óet ëv
póvov ovoprr4o0évtc, ö ôfl pd0qotv rol,oûor.v cÍvOpomol, tdll,o
ærivto qutòv aveupeîv, åcÍv ctç ovôpeîoç fr roi ¡r1 arorópv¡
(qtôv' tò ydp (qteîv öpo xoì rò pov0cÍver"v ovó¡rv¡orç öÀov
éodv. (81a10-d5)
The secondary role of reincarnation is quite clear: it is a stepping stone to
recollection, providing the proof of immortality necessary to the soul to make
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recollection plausible (and thus solve the eristic paradox). I have discussed the
details of the reincarnation process elsewhere.e
The problem with the mythical proof is that it makes the doctrine of
recollection rest upon a shalry foundation, and the outrageous "demonstration" of
recollection mereþ adds to this. For example, while it aims to deny the role of
sense-experience in knowledge, it nevertheless relies on the said sense-experience
for the demonstration.to Moreover, it is intended to show that "learning"
(pdOno.rç) as such (according to the paradox) does not occur, yet the
demonstration is a clear example of the learning process - indeed, it presupposes
learning:11 the slave is fed the necessa¡y information, and he does not recollectit,
but rather reflects upon it. In most instances he merely has to answer "Noi" to
Socrates' pointed questions. The correct answers do not come blindingly from
space - rather, they are inferred.l2 The process of inference is based on the idea
of all things being akin (8ld1).13 The demonst¡ation is also, as Gulley has pointed
out,14 based more than a little on the idea that the correct question elicits the
eDay (1994) p.23 in her introduction to Vlastos'article lVlastos (1991)], reverses Vlastos'
reincarnation -+ recollection -+ immortality argument, which cerøinly goes against the text. Yet
Vlastos is thinking more in terms of the theory of Fonns, which does not appeff in Meno. Day,
however, has missed the point that Socrates' argument is circular - what it aims to prove is
already presupposed in its proof (see below). Cf. also Guthrie (1975) p.389.
toOn sense-experience: Bedu-Addo (1983) pp.228,240ff.; Morgan (1934) pp.237,240. Sense-
experience "reminds" the soul of what it has forgotten.
ttcobb (1973) p.608; Cobb also suggesrs (p.627) that anamnesis is "a mythical picture of the
process of dialectic".
t'Allen (1959) pp.167-168,174: opinion becomes lnowledge by reflection; cf .97 a-c.
t'Anderson (1971) p.231; Tigner (1970) pp.1,4 points out that kinship is recognised because of
the prenatal view of the ontological families. However, Crombie (7962) p.140 suggests that
a¡amnesis would work more efficiently if all nature were akin ro the soul itself: that is, as in
Timneus where there is a World Soul.
to Gulley (1954) p.197 - cf . Phaedo 73a lor the same process.
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correct answer.ls What the demonstration really shows is that learning does fake
place! Recollection is thus used (although the unwitting Meno does not realise it,
and cannot defend its weak points adequately, and so is exposed as a sophist,
unwortþ of dialectic)tu to provide a solution to Meno's paradox. Moreover,
Socrates had said at 8Ic9-e2 that Meno's paradox would make us lazy rather than
inquiring - however, recollection does absolutely the same. It is the process of
learning, all along, which is important: only this makes us energetic and
t]mqulnng
The real answer (not so much directly to the paradox, but rather tor
Socrates/Plato himseþ has always been present, but is finally made obvious after
the "demonstration" of recollection (and the reductio ad absurdum of Meno's
sophistic views):18
rqì" td pév ^{e. öÀXo our öv ædvo örèp toû }"óyou
ôwoluptoaípr1v' öcu ô' oiópevot ôeîv (qteîv, ö pr1 cç oî,ôe,
peÀriouç öv eÌpev raì, avôptrórepor xoì frttov opyoì" ti ei
oioi¡reOo, ö pt'¡ énotdpeOc, pqôè ôuvotòv elvor eópeîv pr¡ôè
ôeîv (r1teîv, æepi roótou ¡óvt¡ öv ôrapoloí.pr¡v, ei oÎ.óç te eiqv,
rai Ióy..,) rcì" ëpyrp...Boól"e.r oôv, érer"ôr\ ôpovooOpev, örL
(r'¡cqtéov ruepì oô pú tr"ç oTôev, ënt^leqrlocopev ror"vfl (qreîv tí
not' ëoctv ope'cn; (86b6-c6)
ttAllen (1959) p.167 would seem incorrect to view the use of mathematics as non-empirical,
although geometry is similar to the Forms in that it deals with perfect examples. Cf. Cornford
(1971), p.48.
tu Anderson (1977) p.22'7
tt cobb (1973) p.609.
tt cobb (197 3) pp.û5,627
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Yet even after this clear statement, Meno is still pressing the point, without
understanding that it has been answered to the best of Socrates' ability - and, non-
mytlrically. It is truth that is m.ost important (81e1-2)
I do not inænd to argue about the seriousness of recollection in Plato's
doctrines.le Recollection only appears explicitly in Meno, Phaedo and, Phaedrus.
It does not, for example, appear n Republic, which is all the more surprising as
Republic VI is about modes of cognition (<nowledge analogous to vision, etc.).20
Yet it was not abandoned (Phaedrus post-dates Republic).2t However, and this
must be the telling point, tn Phaedrus (where it plays a very important role) it
appears in .yth." There appears to be little consistent ground between the three
anamnesic dialogues.23
re Commentators are split over this, between those who see an¿ürnesis as a serious doctrine -
Allen (1959), Cornford (1971) - and those who see it as weak or absurd: Cobb (1973), Anderson
(t971).
20 Cf. Theaetetus 149a7-'1,51d4, 157c8-d3,l6}e2-l6la4,l6lbl-6,184a9-b} and,2l0M-c1 where
Socrates is presented as a midwife to pupils who produce }rrowledge from within themselves.
This does not necessarily refer to recollection, but rather to the learner's own initiative: Cobb
(1913) pp.626-7. Allen (1959) p.166 and Cornford (1971) p.60 argue against this, but
implausibly. Theaetelus 196-9 also compared the process of learning to capturing birds a¡ld
putting them in a (previously empty) aviary - this is not compatible with recollection: Crombie
(1962) p.146. On "cage" metaphors - Cou¡celle (1965a).
" Mohr (1984) p.34 discusses what replaces recollection in the Republic, and manages to fit
recollection to the doctrine of the divided line (p.39).
22As Scott (1987) p.365 points out, "..recollection emerged from a myth in the Meno and
disappeared into one inthe Phaedrus."
"Morgan (1984) p.250; id. p.2,48 md Allen (1959) p.170 do, however, agree on the Kantian
(transcendental, a priori structües) nâture of Socrates' discourse! Scott (1987) p.349 argues an
anti-Kantian thesis. For a complete (perhaps too complete?) account of recollection see
C.E.Huber (19ó4) Anamnesis bei Plato Pullacher Philosophische Forschungen fV: Max Hueber,
Munchen.
ttz
Thus, the connection of recollection and reincamation is not the obvious
one - recollection of past lives (what one might call Pythag oÍeàî,'o or empirical,
personal recollection)2s - but a unique phenomenon: recollection of the (non-
empirical, impersonal) prenatally acquired knowledge (later known as the
Forms).26 In Plato's dialogues, anamnesis is timited to this second type of
recollection, and there is no intimation of any other kind of recollection, although
Republic allows for a sort of limiæd temporal remembrance of the previous lfe
when making one's choice for the next life. All memory is then removed by
drinking of Lethe (the "amnesic draught"2T ).
Therefore, the link between the two doctrines is functional: reincarnation
and recollection provide the "proof' for the immortality of the soul. The fact that
the immortality of the soul is presupposedby reincarnation (and thus the argument
is circular) does not appear to trouble Socrates/Plato at all, so long as Meno does
not realise this Socratic paradox.2s
2a Empedocle s fr.L29 ; D.L.8,4
'5 Allen (1959) p.167; Cornford (1971) p.55 - facts, dates, etc.
26 Vlastos (1994) p.101 makes the essential point that the link between reincamation and Platonic
recollection is so tenuous that one could easily believe in one wifhout even considering the
relevance of the other, unlike Pythagorean (or Empedoclean) reincarnation where promotion is a
result of empirical recollection.
?7 HaIiweI (19SS) (p.21)
"In fact, immortality is never proved to everyone's complete satisfaction in the dialogues; it
always remains "a pious hope, and an ethical postulate, rather than a demonst¡able certainty":
Shorey (1903) p.40. As Socrates points out, the final proof of immortality can þ obtained only
after death: Phaedo 69d4-6 - ei ô' óp0ôç npou0upr¡Oqv roi rt r1vóoopev, êreîoe éL0óvteç rò
oogèç eioópeOo, öv 0eòç Ê0é?"11, ò}.í1ov üotepov, óç Ëpoi ôoreî.
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CHAPTER 6: PHAEDO
Reincarnation appears twice tn Phaedo, but in different contexts. The first
instance (70c4-d5) is as a reply to Cebes' question as to whether the soul
disappears completely at death (i.e. that the soul is not immortal).l Socrates
replies,
oreyópe0a ôè autò tflôé ærl, eir' äpa é.v "Arôou eioìv oi ytlaì
reÀsucqo<Ívtr¡v trôv ovOpcircclv eire roì" oö. æol.oròç ¡rèv oôv
ëott crç Àóyoç, oô pe¡rvrl¡re0o, éç eioìv åvOévôe oQrrópevot
êreî, roì" ædl"tv 1e ôeôpo oQtrvo0vtor roì lfyvovtor år tôv
reOveórcov' roì ei" toô0' oötcrlç ëye¡ no,Ì"w liyveoOor Ër tôv
onoOovóvtcov toùç (ôvtoç, cÍÀIo rt fi eÎev cùv oi ryuloì" npôu
êreî; oö ydp dv æou nóÀrv éyilvovto pr¡ oôoot, roì toôto
iravòv ter¡r.r1prov toû tCIût' elvor, ei tô övrr Qavepòv yiyvotto,
öct ouôopóOev cÍÀl.oOev yiyvovtot oi (ôvteç rì é.r rôv
teOver¡rr¡v' ei ôè pfr ëocr" to0to, dÀl,ou öv tor¡ õéor Àóyoo.
Cebes agrees with this; Socrates then launches into his proof of immortality from
this already sound2 ground - for Cebes and Simmias are particularly open to "old"
evidence, presumably because of their training as Pythagoreans under Philolaus
(Pythagoreanism being founded on a series of ancient tenets ascribed to the master,
Pythagoras, which must be accepted without question). fu Parker notes,
tFor a fuller discussion of the arguments for irunortalify: Festugiere (1950) pp.90-94 Crombie
(1962) pp.302-324; Gouschalk (1971); Guthrie (1957a); Gallop (19'75) pp.103ff.; Dorter (1972)
pp.210-212. All translations are from Gallop (1975).
2This is ironic, in that Plato/Socrates asswne that it is proved - there is, therefore, no need to
argue about it.
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abnormal doctrine is presented, haJf-playfully, in familiar guise,3 and this use of
mystery/mystic terminology and references continues throughout the dialogue.a
Socrates proceeds to demonstrate that opposites come from opposites
(based on the idea of the processes of coming-to-be).5 The opposite of sleeping is
being awake; thus the opposite of living is being dead; and because things come
from their opposites, therefore the dead come from the living, and in turn, the
living come from the dead:ó eïoìv öpo..ai yoloì" npôu év "Arôor-¡. (7Ie2)1
' Parker (1933) pp.287-2: "Purification becomes the separation of the soul from the body, and, in
place of water, eggs, and the blood of pigs, its agents are self-restraint, justice, courage, and
intellectual activity itself."
o 
Cf . 63c4-7: ciiote ôto tcûto oo2¿ öpoíroç oyavcrrrô, al,l,' eöelæíç eipt eÎvoí tt toîç
teteleucr¡xóor, roí, óonep ye xoì ra),an ),Éye'cot, nol,ò cípetvov toîç o1a0oîç ì\ toîç roroiç.
The debate, of cou¡se, is about where the various mystic elements carne from. Phaedo has been
considered the most "OrphiC' (or Pythagorean?) of Plato's dialogues. Vide Guthne (1975)
pp.339-342; Gallop (1975) p.75; Festugierc (1950) p.124. Cf., for example, the debate of the
body as tomb/prison/sign of the soul: Cratylus 400c; Bluck (1958a) p.163; Courcelle (1966);
Courcelle (1965); Ferwerda (1985); Loraux (1982) p.44: "une stele commemorative"); Gallop
(1975) pp,83ff.; Strachan (1970), esp. on Cicero's Somnium Scipionis. Did Plato get the k)dy-
prison (Qpoupo) idea from a Pythagorean source? A passage in Cicero's De Senectute (20) cites
the Pythagorean prohibition 'de praesidio et statione vitae decedere'. Compare afso Somnium
Scipionis (3.10 = De Re Publica 6.15: 'piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia co¡poris,
nec iniussu eius a quo ille est vobis datus ex hominum vita migrandum est' - ambiguous, as
Strachan (1970) p.216 has seen); D¿ Re Publica 6.14, De Amicitia 14, md Tusc.Disp. 1.74 also
make use of the body-prison (with the more definite 'custodia') idea. Apart from inference,
however, one cannot ¿rssume that Plato took the idea from þthagorean thought (or any other -
pace she continuing "Orphic" question! See Appendix B.). 18a1-9 seems reminiscent of
Empedocles ft. 112 and the role of the despised mendicant priests. Certain types of priests are
t¡eated with scepticism in Apology and Euthyphro - Anderson (1971) p.228 - and at lzws 908d
(where they are ranked with tyrants and sophists); they (especially "Musaeus and his son" and
those using the bools of Musaeus and Orpheus) are openly criticised by Adeimantus ar. Republic
363c-365a.
t Gut¡rie (1975) p.341 terrrs the process "artapodosis".
6 The workings of "logical truth" - Williams (1969) pp.218-221
7 The soul is thus the essential animating agent. Note that "dead", with reference to the soul,
means "no longer animating a body": Crombie (1962) p.307; Gallop (1975) p.89; see V/illiams
(1969) pp.218ff. for the illogical nature of the idea of animation (he prefers embodiment, p.221).
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To back this up, Socrates offers the (illogicat)8 idea (which, in another
form, has proved such a problem in reincarnation doctrine):e if there were no
reciprocal procoss to "coming-to-be", then everything would eventually be dead
(72a12-el; cf. Republic 611a). This argument, in fact, implicttly places
reincarnation in the realm of accepted doctrine - that is, souls are neither created
nor destroyed, but remain fixed in number, yet people are born, and die, and
population never increases nor decreases: this is a 'natural' explanation for
metempsychosis. It is an 'on1y solution' argument, and thus reincarnation becomes
concrete doctrine and can be used implicitly, without need to prove its occurrence.
At this point Cebes introduces the theory of anamnesis:
roì" pr1v, ëQn ¿ KéÞqç urol"opóv, raì" rst' éreîvóv ye ròv l"óyov
ô Eórpoteç, ei o?qOúç èocv, òv où eiroOoç Oopd l"e.yerv, öcu
npîv n príftorç our cíì"ì.o rt fi avdpvrlorç tuylóver oôoo, xoi
xotd roûtov ovó1rq fioù lìpûç åv æpotépcp rr"vì Xpóvc.o
pepoOr¡rÉvol cÌ vûv avopr"pr4¡orópe0o. toôto ôè oôóvotov, ei
pi tiv rou r1pîv n VuXi npìv Ëv tQõe tQ ovOponívrp eiôer
yevéoOar' öote ral taúq o0óvotov rt VuXú cr" ëotxev elvat.
'41.Àd, ô t<éBqç, ë0Í é lt¡rpíaç uruol"oBóv, noîot toóto:v oi
cæoôeí(erç; urópvr¡oóv pe' ou yop oQóôpo Ëv tQ ropóvct
pé¡rrn1pot. (7 2e4-7 3a3)
,., Ii!
t cuthrie (19?5) p.555
e viz., 1f all souls can escape pennanently from the human reincarnation cycle, eventually there is
no-one left on earth and the cycle has to finish; the cosmological repercussion of this is that
everything becomes homogeneous (as if returning to a World Soul?): Crombie (7962) pp.306-'7
points out the wealcress of the argument (it is another reductio ad absurdum): also Gallop
(1975) pp.89-90 on "soul stuffl'. The illogicality is that when one asks tie question "What were
you before you became alive?", the answer is not "Dead.", but "A disembodied soul". Denial of
coming-to-be/passing away is an easy way of illustrating that the number of souls must be fxed;
and the denial is a raditional argunent, appearing in Parmenides and Empedocles.
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Cebes goes on to summarise the demonstration from Meno. With this passage (and
particulady Simmias' question - surely irony on Plato's part, and perhaps
Simmias': c1.73b6-9) we are back in the realm of the sophislpseudo-
philosopher.lO Note also that the argument is not adduced by Socrates as part of
his proof, but he certainly seizes upon it as another way of proving the soul's
immortality (the third so far?), and a far-fetched and illogical explanation of
anamnesis follows,ll based more on "reminding"l2 than "recollecting": frst,
reminding through sensibles (pictures, lyres, etc..), then the carrying back of the
process through sensibles to true recollection of the Forms (74a9ff..).r3 It is the
same system of (noetic)ta recollection of prenatally viewed Forms from the
catalyst supplied by sensibles which features more clearly n Phaedrus, with the
exception of the unusual idea of recollection from dissimi,ars (76a2-4).rs
to cobb (1973) pp.618,619
tt For e*arrple, Socrates easily persuades Simmias that the opposite of recollection is forgening:
"loss of knowledge" (75d10-11).
ttAckrill (1973) p.181 discusses the problems with t¡anslating of remind/recollect. Recollection
in Phaedo serves much the same function as in Meno, so I do not propose to discuss it again; the
new feature is the Forms, and anamnesis serves its second function (the first was the proof of
immortality) as an introduction to this diff,rcult concept. Chen (1990) p.59,n12 discusses the
differences in this new theory of anamnesis. Gallop (1915) p.115 adds that in Phaedo
recollection "is concerned with the understanding of the concepts rather than witi tle proof of
propositions."
t3 Morgan (1984) p.240.Tbe point is not developed, but it seems that not everyone is able to give
an account of the Forms (76b8-c'7); no doubt it depends not only on one's ability to recollect, but
the extent to which one's body has interfered with the soul.
t'Dorter (7972) p.209
rslt is unfortunate that the Form of "Equal" is used in Phaedo, as it is very difficult to grasp
because equality, unlike beauty (the example used in the Phaedrus), is deceptive. Plato never
attempts to prove the existence of the Forms, they are always taken for granted as part of
accepted thought, even during their criticism in Parmenides: cf. Annas (1982a) pp.217ff.; Peters
(t967) pp.47ff.
tt7
The idea of reincamation (or rather, incarnation) is always close to this
subject, though never made explicit. It is not imporønt for Socrates' argument on
the immortality of the soul. For example, Socrates persuades Simmias and Cebes
that total knowledge is received before birth (75e5),16 without any further
discussion of the processes involved in this first incarnation.lT
The fifth proof of immortality follows, that which proves the existence after
death (pre-existence has been shown) of the soul. This argument is based on the
kinship/similarities of properties of the soul and the divine (invisible, unvarying,
composite, immor[al, natural adaptation for ruling), and follows up the idea of the
Seelenwanderung.tt The crux is that, at death, the philosopher's soul, having been
purified of bodily taint, goes towards that with which it is more akin (namely the
divine), while the other (impure: 8lb1fÐ souls stay heavy with "ingrained" (81c5),
Þopúç and yeóôqç (c9) corporeality (83d4-e3) and are kept weighed down in the
world of the sensible QóÞqù toô oer"ôo0ç te roi "Atôou (81c11). These souls are
seen as ghosts in graveyards (c1 I-d4):
roì" oö n y¿ tdç tôv óyaOôv toútoç eIvor, al"lo tdç rôv
Qoóî,cov, ai repì td toraôtc avoyr<Í(ovtor rcÀavôoOor" ôíxqv
rfvouosr tfrç rupotépcç tpoQflç rarfrç oöonç' rai ¡ré1pr ye
toúror¡ rì"ovôvtor, Ëo¡ç öv tfl toô (uvercsroÀouOoûvtoç toû
ocopotoerôoûç éærOopíg évôeOôolv eiç oôpo. êvôoôvtol ôÉ,
öoæep eiróç, eiç toraôto ríOn ônoî' dtt' cìv roì" pepeÀe.cr1ruîar
tó1orr"v ev t@ pfcp. (81d6-e3)
tu Simmias makes the point, quickly rejected, that we perhaps gained the linowledge at the
moment of birth: 7 6cl4-I5 . If so, when did the soul "forget" its knowledge?
ttcallop (1975) p,111 makes the analogy that while a prison can exist before a man is
imprisoned, a body cannot exist before incarnation if the soul is the animating agent.
18Ferwerda (1985) p.?jl3;heconcentrates on the "orphic"/shamanic elements of this
phenomenon.
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This is a unique, and no doubt whimsical, explanation as are the glimpses that
follow, of an implicit reincarnation process, viz. the characteristic lives of the
tainted souls:te gluttons, lechers and drunkards become donkeys (81e5-82a1);
tyrants, robbers and the unjust become wolves and birds of prey (82a3-4);
temperate and just, but unphilosophical, souls become harmless creatures such as
bees, wasps and ants (82a10-b6), fi roì" eiç toutóv ye nabv tò av0pc(rirvov
1Évoç, roì. yiyveo0ar e( outôv övôpaç petpíouç (b6-8).20
Juxtaposed to this is the fate of the philosopher (i.e. the fate of Socrates),
bound by different rules. The philosopher appears immune to any part of the
reincarnation procoss (except for the initial incarnation). This is because only the
philosopher understands the way to complete wisdom (82d9-83c4), and thus
happiness, and the philosopher will be the only soul rewarded by being placed
among gods (and the best sort of men - 63b5-c4);2r as for the rest, olld oeì roû
oópotoç ovsæ^éo è(révot, röote to1ù nóÀrv ntn'c¿w eiç öl,l"o oôpa roì óorcep
orcer"popÉvr1 êpQúeo0ar, raÌ år toótorv cíporpoç eî.vot tflç toô 0eíou te roì
roOopoô roì" povoerôoûç ouvoooíaç (83d10-e3).
le Crombie (1962) p.311; Guthrie (1975) p.341,esp.n.3 on the incarnations as "fantasy".
20For the only parallel to this, cÍ. Timneus 91d-92c, in a simila¡ly light-hearted mood. The
Phaedrus, by comparison, features incarnations in different grades of men (from tyrants to
philosophers). Republic 620atr. is closer, with souls choosing animal fomrs that flt with their
character; for example, Orpheus chooses the swan, Ajax the lion. Cf. Crombie (1962) pp.302ff .
21 Note the corporeality of this vision: it does not appear to end in hom,oiosis; but, cf. Meijer
(1981) p.248.
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Moreover, even after death there is no corporeal-type reward/ for the {-l
philosophic soul; if it indulges in pleasures after death, it is incamated again, and
must endure a process akin to the "endless task of a Penelope working in reverse
at a kind of web" (84a6; the threads are the corporeal "fetters": cf. 67d1). The
reward is simply being with the divine.z2 The punishment is reincarnation.23
The preparations of the philosopher are phrased in a way overtly
reminiscent of mystery religion and the purification therein.2a For example:
rqì, nvôoveúouor xcì oì" tdç tel"etdç Tìllrv oôtot xotaocloovteç
ou QoôIor eïvcr, til"ì,c tQ övq. æóIor aivítteo0or ört öç öv
opúr¡toç rqì atéLeoroç eiç "Arôou cQírqrot, Èv ÞopÞópc.D
reioetor, ó ôè rero0oppévoç te xaì teteÀ.eopévoç åreîoe
oQrrópevoç perd Oeôv ofrrloer. eioìv ydp ôú, óç Qaotv oì" nepì
tdç teÀ^etrÍç, vop0qroQópor ¡rèv rcoÀl.oi, pdrlor. ôé te æa0pot.25
oôtot ô' eioìv rotd crìv èpùv ôó(av our cil"l"or Tì oï
neQtÀoooQqróteç öp0ôç. ôv ôr\ roì" eycò rotd ye tò ôovotòv
ouôèv anê)"tnov ev tQ Bíql, oî,Àd rcovtì tpórrp rcpor0uprl0r'¡v
levéoOou ei ô' óp0ôç æpouOuprl0qv roí cr. r'¡vúoopev, èxeîoe
è1,0óvteç tò ooQèç eioópeOa, ôv 0eòç eeéÀ,1¡, óIíyov öotepov, orç
èpoì" ôoreî . (69c1-d7)26
The purification that we must undergo is not of the regular sort (limited asceticism,
certain taboos, etc.); instead it is a continuous process of keeping the soul
uncontaminated by the body, and never giving in to the body's demands (for
tt Socrates likens himself (incorrectly) to swans singing joyfully before departing into the
presence of thei¡ divine master: 84e3-85b8
t'Annas (1982b) p.127 poins out that the seriousness of this punishment for the soul is disguised
by the heavy irony of the animal tra¡sfonnations. She also argues that reincarnation is a serious
idea for Plato ("not a cracþot personal beliefl': p.127).I would tend to believe this about its use
in later dialogues, but see the Phaedo as rather experimental in that regard.
2aSee: Parker (1983) pp.281-2; de Vries (1973); Hawtrey (1976) for Corybantic elements;
Adkins (1970); Stewart (1972): Guthrie (1975) pp.338-9,339n.1.
t5 
See Appendix B fbr the interpretation of this adage.
2u This is, of cou¡se, reducing the psychic experience to the level of conunon eschatology.
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example, 64c10-e2, on the uselessness of the pleasures of food, drink, sex and
material belongings; also, 67c5-dI;83b6-7).27 It is a separation of body and soul
that is, again, strictly corporeal.
Beyond this purification through denial (which in effect is much the same
as the abstentions of the Pythagoreans; q.v.), it is the actual pursuits of the soul
which are so important that they must be left unintemrpted by the body (66b1-
61b5). The soul appears as voôç (reason/mind/intellect): 65e2-4;65e6-66a9.28 Its
function is to gain knowledge through intellect (not the distorting senses - they
make the soul "dizzy, as if drunk": 79c7), for it is knowledge (love of wisdom)
which is the key to the philosopher's escape from mortality. Partial knowledge can
be gained on earth, despite the body's efforts, but complete knowledge is only
gained after death, in Hades (68b1), so the philosopher thus looks forward to and
welcomes death. Morgan makes the point that Plato has for the first time linked
psychology and epistemology: philosophy has taken the place of other therapeutic
forms of purification,2e with phronesis as its vehicle.3O It is a radical denial of the
ttThis is the flrst stage of Plato's thought on the soul, and a break from traditional thought
(although the idea appears in the sectarian movements). See Loraux (7982) p.20. In the later
dialogues it is the soul itself which needs to be controlled.
tt Solmsen (1983) p.362 noæs that Plato's innovation was to make Mind (voôç) part of soul; on
differentiated unity (tripartition) vs. unity, see Claus (1981) for the history of the soul; Guthrie
(1957a); Hall (1963);Crombie (1962) pp.341ff.;Gerson (1987) p.93.
2e On philosophy as catharsis: Festugiere (1950) pp.723-156,157,766ff.; Blank (1993) p.434 cites
Sophist 230M-e3, where the analogy is made that dialectic is to the soul as the physician is to
tlre body. Dorter (1972) pp.2l2-214 discusses the idea that recollection is (metaphorically)
purification - a doubful theory, because recollection always occurs in myth, while purihcation
does not (purihcation is set in the present, recollection in the past). This dialogue features the
only linking of fhe two, which again is suspect. It also seems unlikely - Dorter (1972) p.215 cites
Stewa¡t's (1960) pp.229,305-6 suggestion - that recollection is the (mythic) image of the
presence of prenatal lnowledge (a "genetic myth"), while purification is the literal version.
t2r
body (cf. 114d8-115a3) - to be incamated is the worst thing that can happen to a
soul.31
Simmias' and Cebes' final objection to immortality (on the grounds that a
harmony [=soul] is unable to exist without its "instrument'' [=body]) uses an
"image" (87b4) which transforms metempsychosis into metamorphosis of a sort.
A weaver (the soul) weaves a new cloak (body) for himself whenever his old
cloak wears out, but he will, nevertheless, eventually die of old age (87b5-88b8).
The implication is that there is neither pre-existence nor post-existence, nor true
incarnation.32 Needless to say, the argument fails.33
'oMorgan (1990) pp.55,63,64. How much of this is an attempt to soothe his friends? For
exarnple, fr nou 2¿oleæôç öv toùç <ÍÀIooç ovOpdræouç æeíoatpt, óç ou oop$opov f¡1oôpor trlv
ncrpoôoov tópv.. (84d9-e1). Certainly, the eschatological myth at the end of Phaedo can be
compared with the myth in Gorgias - an optimistic statement that justice will win out for
Socrates: Annas (1982b) p.139. Every aspect of the dialogue is aimed at justifying Socrates'
confidence tlathe welcomes death - Crombie (1962)p.303.
31r<1¡" incarnate soul is eo facto impure": Chen (1990) p.69. Also, Guthrie (1975) p.338; Gallop
(1975) p.88. Note the extensive discussion on the (paradoxical) prohibition against suicide
(61b9ff.): cf. Cou¡celle (1965); Taran (1966); Currie (1958) p.125; Gallop (1975) pp.83ff.;
especially Strachan (1970) - the prohibition has been seen as Pythagorean (a fragment of
Clearchus ascribes both the body-prison idea and a suicide prohibition to Euxitheus, an unlcrown
Pythagorean); there is also a strong "OrphiC' tradition tlrough Xenocrafes and Olympiodorus.
See: P.Boyancé "Xenocrate et les Orphiques" REA 1948 279tr., and Appendix B. On the
body/soul dichotomy: Parker (1983) pp.281-2; Crombie (1962) pp.303ff.; Gallop (19'74) p.94: it
parallels the sensibleslFomrs relationship.
t'Is this a hint of eternal recurrence? That is, does the \ryeaver weave the same cloak again and
again, so that, "unallegorised", the soul goes into the sane body again and again? This seems
unlikely. Eternal recurrence is an idea which is never made explicit in Plato, although there a¡e
hints in ¡he Politicus myth through the idea of the cyclic recurrence of historical events
(especially disasters such as floods etc..), caused by the reversal of the cosmic revolutions;
Guthrie (1978) (p,193-196). See Appendix E on eternal recurrence. .
tt On the grounds that composite things a¡e mortal, while it has been shown that the soul is
immortal. This picture actually makes sense of the paradox that the soul controls the body, yet
the body has the power to disrupt the soul entirely. The idea at 95d1ff. that the entry of the soul
into tle body was the beginning of its perishing (through "disease") also has some plausibility,
though again, it denies immortality; see: Crombie (1962) p.3M.
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Immortality of the soul is finally conceded by atl parties at 106e8-107b10.
Socrates then illustrates the consequences of the soul's being immortal, in terms
of a myth of judgement (107d3 ff.) in which reincarnation has been seen þy
Annas)'o to blur the overall moral message of the myth and its relevance to
Socrates' approaching death (at 118):
ei ¡rèv ydp f,v é 0óvotoç toO novtòç atoî,Ia1r1, ëppotov cìv frv
toîç roroîç aro0avoôor roô te oópctoç cÍp' aæqlî,ay9at xoì cfrç
oötôv roríoç perd cflç VoIîç' vûv ô'Ërerôfl o0dvotoç Qoivetar
oôoo, ouôepío cìv eir¡ oorfr cÍ}"À,q oroQtryf, roxôv otôè oorqpío
rcþv toô roç peÀdocrlv te roi Qpovrprmóqv yevéoOor,. ouôèv
ydp cil,),o ëlouoa eiç "Arôou ú VuXù ë.p"3erm æIî¡v cfrç rarôeíoç
re roi rpoQîç, ö ôf, roì" pépoto ?,Éyerol coQel"eîv rj Bl,óærerv
ròv teÀ^eucrloovro euOòç Ëv op2¿fl cflç éxeîoe øopeíoç. (107c6-
d6)
Briefly, the myttr runs as follows: on death the soul is taken by its allotted
daiman3s to the judgement place from where it journeys to different areas of
Hades (depending on its purity), accompanied by a psychopompic figure. The
judgement place appears to be in this world, because it is the psychopompos' job
to take the soul between worlds (after the judgement), but 113d1-3 shows this is
not so (see below). The journey is complex, and the more impure souls tend to go
slowly and get lost as they try to find another body (cf. 81c11ff.), until they are
eventually forced by the dairutn to the judgement place. They also take a long
time to reach their place of punishment because no one is willing to accompany
them and show the way. The long journeys (they are eventually taken to the
3o Annas (7982b) p.129
3s 
Cf . Republic 620e1
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correct place) are part of their punishment. In Hades they experience "the things
they must' (107e2-3), and are then "during many long cycles of time" transported
by another guide back to this world.
"Hades", we find, is a generic name for an area of the world that we cannot
see (not necessarily underground). For the world is not as it appears: what we call
earth is really one of many hollows in a greater earth set in the centre of the
heavens (not "Heaven": see 111a3fl), sumounded by aether, and true earth (perfect
and unspoiled, unlike our world)36 is what we would see if we poked our heads
above our ho1low.37 A long description of the true nature of the earth follows
(110b5-1llc2),38 the point being that the true earth is an Elysium (or an Isles of
the Blessed),t' a dazzhng (gold and minerals) earthly heaven,aO where another
race of men (and animats - 111a4-5) dwell in the earthly manner," but alongside
the gods (..roi Qúpaç te raì pavteíoç roì cto0rloerç tôv Oeôv raì" toroótoç
ouvoroioç yíyveoOor outoîç æpòç outoóç' 111b8-c1).
As well as this Elysium, the earth is riddled with deeper hollows
(representing different regions), all interconnected, where streams of water, mud,
lava and flre flow around, pulsed by movement of the earth.a2 The major
36 Allegorical of the soul?
t'Clay (1985) pp.234-235 notes the parallels in Phaedrus and Republic of an allegorical nature:
for example, the Cave,
38 Morgan (1990) p.76 discusses the Pythagorean, Philolaun, and Ionian, influences on the idea.
'n There are indeed islands in this world - l7la6 - surrounded by aether.
oo The very oxymoron shows that this is a myth aimed at the corporeally bound.
or These men live for much longer than us, and surpass us in all the senses and wisdom.
n2On "l'idrologia sotterranea" see Funghi (1930) pp.19lff.
tu
confluence of all the streams is at "Tartarus", into which all the streams pulse and
then surge out continuously and cyclically. The four major streams are Oceanus,
Acheron (flowing to the Acherusian Lake), Pyriphlegethon (flowing to the Styx),
and Cocytus. It is an interesting use of t¡aditional underworld features in a new
setting.
It seems, from this story, that all the souls (pure also) are judged at the
region (presumably the aforementioned underground regions) where their daimon
takes them, and are divided according to their deeds; pure souls are freed,a3 and
sent to live on the true earth, and those who are also philosophers eiç oixrloer"ç
Ëtr roútrov rol,l"íouç aQlrvoôvror (1I4c3-4), and live öveu oropdrolv. This
creates something of a problem, as it would seem that philosophers achieve a rank
higher than gods. Those considered incurably evil are flung into Tartarus for
eternity. Those who lived "indifferently" journey to Acheron, and then sail on
boats to the Acherusian Lake where they live (for an unspecified time) and are
appropriately rewarded or punished. From this point ovoç eipoppévooç 1póvouç
¡reívooct, oi ¡rèv porpotÉpouç, ci ôè Bpolotépouç, æóÀrv érnépæovtor eiq rdq
tôv (ór¡v yevéoetç. (113a3-5) Finally, the souls who have committed grave
offences, but are deemed curable, undergo a rather unusual form of penance: flrst
they spend a year in Tartarus with the incurable (this is presumably as a deterrent
for future sins); then, they are thrown out by the surging streams, and by different
o' rítonep ôeoporclpiolv (114b9): note the recuffence of the motif of freeing from inca¡ceration,
and its obvious allegorical connotations; cf. the moment at ó0b1-c7 when Socrates is freed from
his chains.
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rivers (depending on their type of crime) they pass by the Acherusian Lake (where
the multitude of souls wait - Il3a2-3) where they have to beg forgiveness from
those whom they injured.4 ff they are forgiven, they pass into the Lake (and thus,
eventually, to their next incarnation); if not they return to Tartarus and the cycle
begins anew until they are forgiven.
al.Àd toótcov ôr1 ëvera Xpi ôv ôrel.ql,ó04¡rev, ô Erppío, æôv
æoreîv, öote oæecflç roi Qpovqoeroç Èv tô Þíe ¡retcoleîv' rol"òv
1dp tò &Ol"ov rol 11 ekcìç peyrÍÀq. (114c5-8)
The mention of reincarnation is so brief (107e3-4) that one could almost
miss it, and consider this myth an Homeric story of Hades and Elysium with some
philosophical embroidery. And indeed it seems somewhat anomalous that
reincarnation does not have a higher profile. Moreover, the myth introduces
features considerably different,t/those at 81b ff.: {ìtn"'
(1) there appears to be a different, more traditional view of the soul's crimes. This
could be explained as arising from the switch to myth (that is, the true details have
1 b"en "allegoricibed"). The shift is from the earlier impersonal picture of the
philosopher (intellectual punty) to a judgement based on moral purity (oi te
rol,ôç roi éoirr:ç Bróoavteç..: 113d3-4). Only after this moral judgement is
intellectual purity taken into account. Purification through philosophy appears to
aa One is reminded of the policy in South Australia of bringing young offenders together with
their victims (after road accidents, etc..) to see the consequences of their actions.
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be of secondary consideration (although important, it obviously does not relate to
all the souls) to moral purity (114c1-5).as
(2) As part of this traditionalism, the final myth places more emphasis on the
"other" souls (ordinary people) than on the select intellectual minority (whose
destiny is inexplicable: 114c4-5).In this respect, the Phaedo myth, under all the
geophysical trappings, gives a typical eschatology, in a similar vein to that in
Gorgias 46
(3) There is extensive retention of individuality, necessary in a moral system,
otherwise there is no deterrent or learning value in reward/punishment (the souls
who beg forgiveness illustrate this retention of individuat memory).a7 However,
eternal individuality would seem to go against the concept of purification, because
personality is a reflection of the effect of the body on the soul;48 the philosopher
denies all elements of corporeality, and one would presume that individuality is
part of this.ae Individuality is essentially a corporeal judgement in any case.to It
otThe same situation is encountered in myth at Republic 615a ff., tempered by the fact that
moral purity does not guarantee that we make the best choice - thus knowledge is important after
all (619c). Of course, in the dialogues we do not see such a, Eleaf distinction between the two
types of purification (moral and philosophical), and virtue can be equated with lnowledge, to the
extent that moral error iJ intellectual error. I arn grateful to David Hester for clarifying this for
me, but I still wonder whether Plato is adapting his material for better accessibility to his
audience. On virtue and lnowledge: Prior (1991),
a6 
See point (7) below for a further discussion of the myths "ordinariness".
o' callop (1975) pp.223 -224
aB In Republic it affects the choice the soul makes of its next life, often for the worst.
ae I would not deny the importance and the necessity for individuality: it is morally pointless to
have a system where the soul does not retain memory (or have the abilicy to recall past lives) and
its personal characteristics which have enabled it to reach its present posiúon in the cycle of
reincarnation. Terminology is problematic: it is necessary to distinguish between individuality
(identity) and cha¡acter (personality). That is, it is one's specific cbaracter traits which cause the
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seems almost like a tarnish on the soul, akin to the effects of materiality, which do
a lot to shape individual character
Reincarnation, by its very nature, is "anti-personalist', and it appears as
such particularly in this dialogue: the identity of the body does not matter to the
system.5l Crombie tenders the analogy that nothing is lost when one melts down a
bronze statue, because the metal can be used again (!).s2
Given the rise of awareness in the individual in the fifth century, I rather
doubt whether a system of belief that advocated separation from character,
personality and individoulity, would have been popular. The Eleusinian Mysteries,
for example, provided for a happy after-life seen in corporeal terms (like the
Homeric/Virgilians3 Elysium), fulI of departed shades continuing earthly pursuits
(eating, drinking, gaming etc..). This concept of immortality is closer to that in
Diotima's tale in the Symposium - temporal immortality achieved through what
one leaves behind.sa There seems to have been little concept of Plato's type of
s¿ùne errors in the next life. Certainly the introduction of the tripartite soul in Republic and
Phaedo solves this problem better.
tocf. Morgan (1990) p.68; Crombie (1962) p.32A on the relation of "self' and soul. Itre
concludes that - as in Republic - personal identity is quasi-causal.
5lCrombie (1962)p.324
52 Crombie (1962) p.3?A; also V/illiams (1969) p.219 on ttre same analogy with a key. I am more
inclined to view the soul as a computer floppy disk which can be placed in any computer
(ignoring the problem of compatibility!) and used to "animate" the computer from the command
line. Another suitable analogy, suggested by my supervisor Dr. A. Geddes, is to a record, which
can not only be played on any machine, but is also prone to "tarnishing".
t'On Virgil Aeneid ó: Solnsen (1982d); Solnsen (1982e); Dieterich (1913) pp.154ff.
so Symposium, despite being chronologically placed between Repubtic and Phaedrus, displays
none of their characteristic features (anamnesis, reincarnation, complex eschatology, etc..).
Rather, it offers a new interpretaúon of immortality, based on the embodied soul (rather than the
discarnate, as in the other dialogues): it tenders immortality of one sort for the philosopher, and
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incorporeal immortality (the invisible passing to the invisible to which it is akin)5s
as a general belief in contemporary Athens.56
The dichotomy between the myth and the preceding arguments seems
emphasised by the fact that nothing in the previous discussions of immortality had
made the discarnate soul capable of such corporeal-type acts as penance in a
disembodied state.sT At Il4c3-4 it is stated that philosophical souls will live cíveu
oropdtolv for eternity, implying that, prior to their departure, the souls are not
"bodiless": this seems to point to a very traditional eschatology: viz, (Homeric)
shades, and etc.. Similarly, the earthly heaven of 110b5-111c2 has obvious appeal
to the materially-bound.
(4) one ground of similarity with 81d ff. is the view that the myth culminates in "a¡r
apology for philosophy by sketching its ultimate rewards".58 The important point
is that it is a discussion of rewards in terms that ordinary people understand. I do
not know - and cannot know - whether Socrates/Plato viewed the world,
of another sort for the rest of humanity, The philosopher receives (the usual) eternal immortality
in exchange for virtue - i.e. his soul will go to the gods to dwell. The rest of embodied humanity
can achieve personal inmortality of a limited kind. This vicarious irnmortality comes from the
legacies one leaves behind to continue one's personality/individuality - primarily fame and
offspring. This irmortality seems opposed to Plato's use of the soul as the irunorøl carrier of
personality, through reincarnation, into new bodies. It makes more sense if the soul, when it
leaves the body, is destroyed, so that the only kind of iurmortality available at all is temporal.
See: Gurhrie (1975) p.375; Bels (1985) pp.115,123: Ilackforrh (1950) pp.43,45; Luce (1952)
pp.138-139; O'Brien (1984) pp.185-201; Dyson (1986) pp.60-72. See Krell (1988) p.170 for the
idea of advancing up a ladder of love: love of body -+ love of soul -; love of laws/constitution -+
episteme -+ vision of beauty itself (211a7).
5s Friedländer (1969) p.183
tu Stewa¡t (1960) pp.87ff.
tt Gallop (1975) p.224
tt Morgan (1990) p.71
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underworld, or heavens in this manner;te but it is a coherent picture (removed one
degree back from reality) of the results of philosophy in human terms (reward and
punishment). Thus, it has the usual moral application of this sort of myth - to
direct people to the correct courso by frightening them away from immorality (and
amorality).60 Myth is thus the logical way of explaining the no doubt unintelligible
ideas associated with the teachings of philosophy:61
tò pèv oôv toraôro ôwoppioooOot oötorç ë^¡ew, éç e1ô
õteffil.r0c, ou npéner voôv ë1ovrr" ovôpí' öct pévtor ri taôt'
êotì"v ti tor"aût' äma nepi tdç yuldç tlttôv raì. tdç oirr1oerç,
ëneinep aO<Ívstóv ye rl VoXi Qoívetor oôoa, toôro xoì æpéæerv
por ôoreî roì" cí(rov rrvôr¡veôoor oiopÉvcp oöto4 Ë.1er"v' xol,òç
ydp é xívôrvoç' roi 2¿pr] to toroôto öorep åæ{ôerv ËaucQ, ôrò
ôÌ¡ éyrrrye raï ædl.or pr1róvcrr ròv pôOov. (114d1-8)ó2
As Gallop comments, if one were to repeat the myth over and over like a spell, one
could only look to the future with pessimism,u' considering that the only souls
who get out scot-free are the philosophers - the despised minority.
t'But, see Funghi (1930) p.176. Annas (1982b) p.126 suggests that Plato inroduces tle
cosmology in a specific attempt to move away from the religious tmditions of heaven and hell;
and that, far from being a poetic fancy, it is an attempt to make them part of our actual wodd.
Aristotle (Meteorologica II, 335b33-336L33) thought the geography and hydraulics as
impossible nonsense - "a failed geography lesson"!: Annas (1982b) pp.119-120.
uo Morgan (1990) p.72
ut &b2-6 illustrates the unpopularity (or more particularly the lack of understanding) of
philosophy: otpor yòp öv õÌ¡ roùç æol?'oòç oùtò toôto aroóoovtoç õoxeîv eô æóvu eipfro0or
eïç toùç QtloooQoôvtcç roi (upQdvor cìv toòç pèv æop'f¡rîv ovOpcínrorç rcì nóvr¡, ötr tQ övtt
oi $tloooQoôvteç 0cvotôor roi o$âç 1e oó Lel,r¡0ootv, öt cÍ(roí eforv toûto æúo2¿etv. The
comic poets also provide considerable bad press about the dangerous (but mainly ridiculous)
eccentricities of the philosophers: see DK I,478-480 for references to the Pythagoreans in
comedy; also, of course, Aristophanes Clouds.
u'Cf. 100a ff. on the tools of which the philosophermakes use. Also, 78al-9 on spells; and the
attack on "writings, cha-rms, incanlations" aI" Gorgias 484a4-5.
u'Gallop (1975) p.224
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Part of the problem is the inability to expound upon complex and
contraversial ideas without (as Socrates found) being seen as seditious.e This
appears to be why the pure vision of philosophy is amalgamated with common
eschatology, resulting in a simple system whereby reward/punishment is the
motivation for virtue: the myth serves as a multi-faceted learning too1.6s One
aspect of it is the interesting idea that dialectic serves the philosophers while myth
is for everyone else, rather than myth being "a fabulous attempt to push thinking
where reason should not tread";uu for both logos and mythos appear to reach -
despite the extensive panoply of the myth - the same conclusion.6T
(5) Part of the judgement is the meting out of punishment, and the nature of the
punishments given appear to go against the "deterrent" view of the myth: they are
primarily retributive and vindictive, rather than remedial.6s Gallop sees the
punishments as typically purgatorial, based on the presupposition of rebirth (that
is, the deterrent value).6e However, I would argue that the learning value (to
uoMorgan (1990) p.58, for example, would see the Phaedo as "blatantly revolutionary, anearly
seditious documenf', challenging the Delphic theology and the 'þolis tradition", and, moreover,
anti-Athenian.
us This has left an unpleasant taste in the mouths of many commentators. For example, consider
Annas' reaction to the myth in Republic: "The Myth of Er is a painful shock; its vulgarity seems
to pull us right down to the level of Cephalus..It is not only that the childishness of the myth
jars; if we take it seriously, it seems to offer us an entirely consequentialist reason for being
just..": Annas (1982a) p.349 cf.Ilalliwell (1988) p.18. However, 107c6-8 correlates with this;
see Morgan (1990) p.72.
uu Morgan (1990) p.570; cf. Friedlåinder (1969) p,183
ut That is, dialectic serves the philosopher, and myth serves the ordinary people - therefore, the
obvious technique is to use myth to conmrunicate dialectic.
68Crombie (1962) p.324. Gallop (1975) p.223 disagrees, emphasising their typical purgatorial
nature. The punishments are certainly not as vindictive as those in the myth al" Laws 870d-e,
where, in his next life, a murderer is killed by the same method which he himself used on his
victim.
un callop (1915) p.223
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other souls) of the punishment is played down, and its purificatory function
emphasised.
70
(6) The problem, mentioned above, that the philosopher gains a destiny higher than
the gods (to live bodiless for eternity), from which position he is never ousted, can
only be explained by reference to a higher world than the Olympian. The idea
presumably looks forward to the cosmic system of the Phaedrus myth, where the
world of the Forms is above that of the gods. It is obviously the same sort of place
as that to which the soul aspired while still incarnate (79d1-7).1r Is this, therefore,
the place where the souls were beþr¿ the frst incarnation? This is logical if it is a
place of complete disembodiment. This in turn implies a fall of some sort: perhaps
we should suggest a pre-incarnate situation similar to that in the Phaedrus myth?
(7) There is an obvious inconsisûency in the treatment of the wicked/corporeal
souls. At 81d9-e3 the soul, which is weighed down by its bodily/earthy links,
wanders around graveyards and is eventually imprisoned again in a body with a
character similar to its previous character; 108a7-b3 continues this thread in the
myth. However, in the myth there is no mention of the next life (107e3-4) being
dependent upon one's previous character, because the souls do not pass out of the
punishment cycle until they have paid their penalty (are completely purified?).
Presumably, a second punishment (incarnation in an animal, for example) is not
70 
See point (7) below
tt callop (1975) p.95
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required.T2 However, if that is so, where is the necessity for reincarnation? Surely
all reason has been lost (apart from that of Necessity - who is not mentioned in this
dialogue in her Meno role)? The brief mention of reincarnation seems, rather, to
weaken the point of the myttr made at 114c5-8 (quoted above). The very urgent
appeal in this passage seems to deny that another life is possible, because it stresses
the importance, above all things, of the goodness and wisdom which bring the
ultimate pize. 114d8-115a3 is in a simila¡ vein.
Annas has commented on this volte-face, and beïeves that the problem is
that reincarnation and judgment-style eschatology are essentially incompatible. We
expect that reincarnation will occur as the reward/punishment afær death, but
instead punishment occurs in Hades afær the judgement. To this I would add the
further incompatibiJity of the idea of reincarnation following purification as a
further punishment. Throughout the Phaedo, the worst thing that can befall the
soul is to be associated with the body; yet, in the final myth, when incarnation
would be the most extreme punishment (particularly if it were into a "bad" life),
the idea is not followed through, and reincarnation (the innovative idea) becomes
extraneous and obsolete in the face of older traditional punishments. This
irreconciliation causes the problem of ll4c2-6 - the two sorts of afærlife
(corporeal and incorporeal). It is a problem only resolved in the Phaedrus (q.v.),
where the afterlife is strictly incorporeal, and only the philosopher escapes
72 Thus reinforcing the view that the transformations at 81e5 ff . ue jeux.
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unscathed. As Annas points out,73 in light of the emphasis on the soul's shedding
its materiality, a corporeal paradise is in itseH a bad end for the soul; yet the
"bodiloss" paradise does not really have a place in the cosmology.To This can only
blur the moral message of the dialogue. For example, the under-developed idea of
reincarnation is not able to reinforce the moral consequences of injustice/evil that
would be reinforced in a doctrine which included the ability to leam from one's
past errors (another idea at odds with the paradox of striving to rid oneself of
"self ').
Cent¡al to this myth is the message that it ís now, n this life, that one must
look to one's afterlife (114c5-8; 114d8-115a3), and this, again, is incompatible
with reincarnation, except (as Annas makes clear) for the idea of using fear as a
tool against injustice/immorality. And the scare value of post-mortem mythology
will function regardless of reincarnation: reincarnation simply makes the myth
more frightening because of its sheer repellent eccentricity - for example, the idea
of becoming a honible animal.7s It is only Socrates' concise summary of his
"betefs" (114c5-8; 114d8-115a3), followed by his death - after upholding all of
the principles by which he lived - that save from obscurity the formerly strong
message that justice must win out (eventually).
73 I have made the same point, above.
7a Annas (1982b) p.128
75 Annas (1982b) p.729
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(8) Finally, few precise details are supplied on the practicalities of reincamation,
and the general obscurity of the position of reincarnation makes these details
difficult to fix. For example, the length of the cycle (in and out of the body) is
indeterminable (ev ruol.l.oîç 1póvou roi porpoîç æepróôorç: 107e4), as is the
number of incarnations required. There is no hint of cosmic time scales (as in
Politicus) or of maximum/minimum numbers of incarnations before release (as in
Phaedrus).76
I would assume - from the emphasis that it has received in the dialogue -
that the aim of the cycles is for all souls to be purified: therefore, the cycle should
end when all of the souls are purified to a level where they can pass to the
"Elysium" or (if philosophers) to the place beyond there.lt The waiting-place
between incarnations is the Acherusian area from where souls who have been
punished/rewarded and purified are taken back to the world of the living (113a3-
5). There appears to be no concept of demotion after one's final placement in
Elysium; the idea would be completely out of keeping with the tenor of the myth.
However, it seems that those who dwell in Elysium continue to practise self-
restraint (1 I 1b2-3).
*
tu Rankin (1964) p.122 is wrong to see philosophers escaping after three incarnations - this is the
system oÌ the Phaedras, and it is dangerous to tbrm a conglomerate doctrine.
77 Crombie (1962) p.31,1
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I would conclude that reincarnation does not emerge as a strong,
practicable doctrine but rather as the connecting link throughout the dialogue
between immortality, the Forms, anamnesis and the afterlife eschatology. It seems
the ultimate irony that Socrates tells Simmias and Cebes that he is no "teller of
tales" (61bÐ.78
78 ortòç our fi po0olnyrróç..
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CHAPTERT: REPUBLIC
The clearest presentation of a well-formulated (mythic) system of
reincarnation, in nearly all aspects of the process, is presented in the Myth of Er
which concludes Republic X. Despite an unusual cosmological setting, upon which
is imposed an even odder discussion of musical harmony, it appears to be quite a
logical system, partly, one imagines, because of the materiality of the vision and
the corporeality of the souls. The latter retain close links with their former bodies
in personality and character; moreover, these supposedly immaterial souls display
an almost pathetic human fallibility, which makes their journey to a new life so
similar to earthly progress.
The myth makes clear a number of important points: the cycle is a
continuous one, and there seems no possibitity of complete escape (as in Phaedo).
The soul follows an unceasing circuit of life + "death" -+ journey to judgement
place + judgement -+ journey to place of reward/punishment -) return journey to
meadow -+ joumey to spindle of Necessity to choose next life + ratification of
new life -+ journey to Lethe for drinking of forgeffulness -> incarnation into new
life, and so on. It is almost an automatic cycle of events, so smoothly is it carried
through. However, there is nothing automatic about the unique featwe of the soul
choosing its next life.l
t But, cf. Phaedrus (q.v.)
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The details of the reincamation process are as follows; I will discuss the
various sections of the myth point by point:
1. The myth is introduced as "the story of a brave maÍf'.2 It follows two
significant arguments: frst, a proof of the soul's immortality (608c-611a) based on
the premise that everything is destroyed by its own natural, inherent evil (as, for
example, iron by rust). The evil peculiar to the soul is vice, but it obviously does
not kill the soul, because there are many wicked people walking around who ought
to be dead; therefore the soul is immortal (moreover, the number of souls will
always remain the same: 611a4-8).3
Second, there is a discussion of the earthly rewards for the unjust and just,
concentrating on why the unjust can be seen to reap many benefits on oafih, while
the just do not appear to receive their due. The point is made that both groups
eventually receive what is owing to them in this life, because the just are dear to
the gods, and the unjust hated. Moreover - a very important point in the
discussion - it is agreed that it is worthwhile to be just for its own sake.a 613d-e
gives the earthly rewards/punishments which finally come to both groups in their
old age. Socrates continues that these rewards/punishments are nothing compared
2 All translations in this chapter are taken from Halliwell (1988).
'Cf. Kenny (1969) pp.249-50:justice ls the health of the soul.
o Cf. t¡e story of the Ring of Gyges, and the idea that all humans desire to do injustice with
impunity: 672b2-5. On the Ring of Gyges analogy: Zaslavsky (1981) pp.l66-167 .
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with what the souls receive after death (614^5 ff.). To illustrate this, the Myth of
Er is told
Another prominent thread in the discussion is the benefit of wisdom. It is
the soul's natural desire to seek wisdom, and to keep company with the divine to
which it is akin (611e1ff.) through philosophy. At 589e, for example, Socrates
"proves" that the life of a philosopher is 729 times more pleasant than that of a
tyrant.s The beneficial effect of philosophy is compared to raising an encrusted
statue of the sea god Glaucus from the sea and removing all the barnacles and
earthly incrustations etc. which have hidden its true form. It is one of the most
successful analogies in the Republic.6 The earthly soul has these same
incrustations órcò tôv euôcrpóvrov Àeyopévov åocudoer¡v (6I2a2-3), and must be
purified through its pursuit of wisdom. It is this barnacled soul which ênters into
the cycle of reincarnation in the myth.?
Symbolic references to all of the above points can be found in the Myth of
Er, reinforcing the myth's connection with the rest of the dialogue:
tKerury (19ó9) p.237.The activities of the philosopher are described a¡496d-497a. Is there a
certain amount of pleasure being scored by the philosopher in making the best life like his own?
It certainly shows a well-developed self-interest (which would no doubt be denied). In many ways
Socrates/Plato has not advanced beyond Empedocles: he, too, saw his own type of life as the best"
just under tlat of the gods to whom he would soon progress. Is an element of vindictiveness
present against those who knock philosophy?
6Clay (1985) pp.235-236.Itis obviously similar to the idea of Phaedo (q.v.), where souls must
purify themselves of their earthly accretions, or tamishing; Shiner (1972) p.21 .
? HaIiweU (1988) p,23.
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2. 614b1-8:8
This passage contains one of the clearest parallels with shamanism to
survive in Greek literature.e Pamphylia is a region in southern Asia Minor, and the
shamanic tradition appears mainly in the north (Thrace) and in the central Asian
area (close to the Black Sea),10 so it may be that Er's regionality is significant.
The story is a variation on the traditional katabatic journey, except that this time it
is undertaken not by a "living" person with body and soul (Orpheus, Odysseus,
Theseus, Peirithoos, Heracles, Aeneas etc.) but only by the soul.ll There is, in the
underworld, no meeting with the bodily shades of people as in the above journeys,
but instead a meeting with their souls;
This poses a few questions; for example, how is a soul identified as (for
example), Orpheus or Odysseus (620a4:620c4)? Nowhere more than in this myth
is the problem of the limited incorporeal vocabulary so marked, to the extent that
we think of the souls as shades, or even (as in the Christian Heaven/Hell?) as
"people". One might presume, following the lead given at Gorgias 524e5-525a4
8Er, a Pamphylian, died, but his body remained free of decay for twelve days, at which time he
woke up on his funeral pyre and told the tale of his soul's journey. Note: these are not quotations,
but summaries of the most importânt details of each section.
n I have discussed shamanism in Appendix D. Cf. Morgan (1990) p.25; Ferwerda (1935) pp.277-
2; Halliwell (1988) p.172. For another parallel, see the story of Epimenides of Crete (D,L.
1.114ff.) who slept in the cave of Zeus for decades, during which time he was regarded as dead;
he lived for 150 years; fasted for long periods; and was considered to have been reborn many
times. This is no doubt part of an initiatory tradition. For the details see Burkert (1972) pp.150-
152. Also the stories of Aristeas (id. pp.148-150), Hermotimus, Phormio and Leonymus (pp.152-
153). Cf. also the healing sleep and visions of the cult of Asclepius.
toBurkert (1972)p.762
tt On the kntabasis: R.H.Terpening (1985) Charon an"d the crossing Buclnell U.P.,Lewisburg
(pp.25-62); Wagenvoort (1971) pp.113-161; Robertson (1980) pp.?JI4-300; R.J.Clark (1919)
Catabasis: Vergil and the wisdom tradition B.R.Gruner,Amsterdam.
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that the souls bear distinguishing marks of some soft?l2 I think that the very
corporeality of the vision is intended to reinforce the argument of the preceding
conversation: that is, to reinforce the personal nature of the cycle through the
rewards/punishments and the choice to come, based as it is on each soul's very
individual nature. It also serves to blur the division between life and death.
Certainly, "living" per se does not seem to be a priority in the system; this is the
one part of the cycle which cannot be directly controlled. Moreover, at 618b2-4
the individual character that each soul has is stressed. It is this which is the "factor
X" in how the chosen life wilt be ted (cf. points 5. and 7., below).l3
3. 614b8-616b1:14
tt For example, tyrants' souls have whip marks and scars from false oaths.
13 Haliwell (1938) pp.172ff. sees the corporeality of the vision as a problem in terms of
determining the myth's symbolism, and tentatively accepts the idea that we are to inagine tle
souls as having versions of their fonner bodies, especially in the light of the concept of the souls'
camping etc. Souls ought to be invisible: cf. the "ghosts" of Phaedo 8lc-d. He concludes,
however, that the language problem is "unavoidable" when discussing "other levels of being"
(p.7'73).It is interesting to note that in the main body of the dialogue the soul is tripartite - or a
differentiated unity: Hall (1963) p.69 - but in the myth it appears in its traditional bodily unity.
raEr's soul had gone with a crowd of other souls to a place where there were two chasms in the
earth, and another two in the sky, between which a judgement was held. The just received a tablet
attached to their front, and were sent up through the right-hand opening in the sky; the unjust
received their tablet on their backs, and were told to take the left-hand passage down into the
earth. Er was told that he was to be a messenger back to our wodd, and so had to watch
everything. He saw souls returning from the other chasms and they set up camp in a nearby
meadow and ølked about their experiences.
The souls from heaven were pure, and told ofhappy experiences a¡d visions ofbeauty;
the other souls were dusty and thirsty, and wept about the sufferings they had undergone, and had
wi[ressed, in the 1000 year journey. They told Er that for every injustice the penalfy was ten
times the crime, paid tenfold (i.e. ten human lives @ 100 years/life). A similar system was in
practice for just souls, witl ten-fold rewa¡ds given. The penalties were greater for impiety to the
gods, or parents, and for murder. The thoroughly depraved (mainly tyrants) received eternal
punishment in the lower chasm, and the mouth of the chasm refused to let them exit (it bellowed
at them). Ardiaeus, the tyrant, was being flayed and having his flesh torn off as the souls passed
on their way to the exit. The eternal sinners made the souls fea¡ that they, too, would be refused
exit, so they emerged with great relief.
r4t
The judgement place is at some sort of heavenly cross-roads,ls a midway
point belween the four openings, presumably suspended in space. The exact
location cannot be guessed, but it appears to be somewhere on the earth, rather
than underground. Nearby is a meadow, perhaps between the two earthly
openings. The judges remain unnamed (n Gorgias they are the traditional
Rhadamanthys, Minos and Aeacus who divided the judging between them).16 The
symbolism of evil/left and good/right (of the openings) is a long-established motif.
It is perhaps unusual that, despite the number of journeys which the soul
undertakes in the intercarnate period, the details are not made more specific. There
are none of the pseudo-Guides Bleus descriptions that one finds tn Phaedo.
Moreover, the judgement is played down, as are the punishments/rewards.l7
All of these elements are subordinated to the final choice that the souls
must make, because, as I will discuss further, below, it is the purpose of the myth
to emphasise the consequenc¿s of this choice, and thus, by analogy, how one lives
one's life on earth. The order of the myth is almost a reversal of what one might
expect: that is, it might have been more appropriate (although much less dramatic)
to have begun with the choice, then the life, the punishment and finally the choice
tt Adam (1963) has attempted to draw this: vol.2, p.435.
tu That is, Rhadamanthys' area of jurisdiction is Asia, Aeacus' is Europe, and Minos is the cou¡t
oflrnal appeal:524a.
lTStewart (1960) p,143 believes that the idea of the judged wearing tablets describing their
crimes and sentencing trray have come from the Orphic gold leaves placed in the graves of the
dead, which give directions to the underworld. He compares the simila¡ funcúon of the Egyptian
Book of the Dead. See Appendix A.
142
again. Unfortunately, the drinking at Lethe throws a spanner in the works (see
point 7., below)
The time which the souls have at the meadow to talk about the blessings of
the reward and the horrors of the punishment, offers a unique opportunity for the
souls to learn of others' lives, and learn from them, and thus avoid making the
wrong choice. It seems difficult to believe, after so much prodding in the direction
of the correct choice, that so many souls go wrong. Despite everything, the soul
seems to make an instinctive, irrational choice, based, for example, on greed
(619b7-c1). The time in the meadow is obviously when the philosopher comes
into his own: this is the point emphasized by Socrates in his aside to Glaucon at
618b6-619b1
The mathematics of the punishmenlreward period is unfathomable: it
seems that for the multiple sinner the punishment period would be in excess of
1,000 years. However, this mandatory sort of time period often appears, and its
actuality cannot be relied upon. In Empedocles, for example, there is a period of
10,000 years which evidently means simply "a very long time". However, in
Phaedrus (q.v.) the time scale is a very important part of the working of the
system. Very few people in the ancient world would have lived out one hundred
years, so this is, perhaps, a "cosmic" or mandatory human lifetime. Halliwell sees a
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certain "sense of cosmic order and organisation" in the repetition of "ten" units at
615a.18
There appears to be, unlike tn Phaedo,little emphasis on purification or
"salvific" rites.te It is not mentioned as part of the 1000 year punishment/reward,
although it can be implied in the rewarded soul's brief description of the "visions of
extraordinary beauty", with their mysúc connotations. It is certainly not
emphasized ir any wry.20 Unüke the other dialogues, the Myth of Er seems to
have shaken itself free of some of the traditional religious ideas of divine justice (a
process continued in Phaedrus and Laws). The fact that souls choose their next life
is one illustration of this process; the absence of purification may be another.
4. 616b1-6I7dl:21
This section is interesting for cosmic speculation;22 but, more relevantly, it
seems to emphasise the regularity and eternal nature of the cycle. The picture of
lsHaliwell (1988) p.171;Er lay undecomposed for ten days - 614b5. Brumbaugh (1989) p.S5
would agree that Plato uses a¡ithmetical detâils to show that Justice holds sway in the heavens:
for example, symmetry of speeds, balance of numbers. Cf. Adam (1963) pp.434,437; de Vogel
(1966) pp.202ff., and Shorey (1903) pp.82ff.
tn Morgan (1990) p.a0
20 On mystery vocabulary, cf. note 23 inmy discussion of Phaedo.
" After seven days in the meadow, the souls moved on for four days until they reached ^ 
grear.
column of light which held the sþ. Attached to this was the spindle of Necessity through which
the heavenly rotations turned. The spindle had eight whorls of various distinguishing
cha¡acteristics fixed one inside another, forming a single continuous whorl. The spindle
revolved in the lap of Necessity (in the direction of the heavenly orbit), and a Siren sat on each of
the rims of the whorls. The eight Si¡ens each sang a single note and this made up a concord.
Around the rim sat the Fates, daughters of Necessity - Lachesis, Klotho and Atropos. They sang
of the past, the present and the futu¡e, respectively, and they helped move the rolations with their
hands.
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the Fates singing of the past, present and future (most apt in a reincarnation cycle),
and the dominating figure of Necessity reinforce this impression.2'
5. 617 dl-618b6:24
There are some very unusual, indeed unique, ideas expressed in this
passage. The idea of souls being able to choose their next life is extraordinary. It
is a double-edged freedom though, as I will discuss, below. The organisation based
on a system of lots, is a very corporeal image (like taking a number at the meat
counter of a supermarket!). It emphasises the controlled nature of the process,
and the fairness, for it means that every soul gets a chance for a proper look at the
lives, without having to snatch up what it can get. All randomness is removed
from the system, and the choice becomes wholly that of the soul, as the priest
emphasizes (617d6-e5): yuloì é.Qrlpepor, op26r1 öl,l.qç nepróôou Ovr1toû yévouç
0ovotrlQópor...apeq õè oôéorcotov, div rtpôv roì ac¡rú(rov æÀéov roì ë.l.ottov
otcîç ërootoç ë.(et. cicio éIopévou' 0eòç ovoí"coç. Moreover, there are more
" Cf. the introduction to Parmenides' poem, where he goes up in a cha¡iot with Daughters of
Sun, rides through the Gate of Justice, and comes to the Region of Light where Vy'isdom receives
him: Stewa¡t (1960) p.312.
23 
See Peters (1967) p.18 on Ananke. Also Onians (1954) pp.332ff .; Adam (1963) p.452.
2aThe souls were affanged in ranks by a priest and had first to approach Lachesis. The priest
(picking up lots and lives from Lachesis' lap) told the souls that they had to choose a daimon
(and thus a life) by lots, which he threw on the ground, and then lot by lot in order they had to
pick a Ïfe from a selection (greater than the number of souls present) which he then placed on
the ground also. There were lives of tyrants, men pre-eminent physically, or in breeding, or
ancestry, degenerate lives, male and female, all mapped out .,vith wealth, poverty, length of life
and etc.. The only thing not included was the character of the soul, for that was what the
choosing soul added to the life, and this could not be determined. The souls were warned by the
priest that the choice was theirs alone, so they must be ca¡eful,
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than enough lives to choose from (618a3), including animat Iives (618a3-4). It is
remarkable that more appropriate choices are not made.
The idea of souls "choosing" their own daimnn (equivalent to a life) is
without parallel. In Phaedo, it was the daim.on which led its soul to the judgement
place. Here again, the daiman is a separate entity, resembling in no way the
(shamanic?) conception of daiman seon in Empedocles' system (where it is the
soul itself). Socrates makes a number of allusions to his daimon, or, as he
rationatzes it, his ôorpóvrov or¡peîov ("divine sign": 496c4; Apology 3ld;
Euthyphro 3b; Euthydemus 272e; Phaedrus 242b), but in these passages, the
daimon acts in its traditional role of guardian angel:25 it warns him away from
evil, and has been with him since birth.26
6. 618b6-6l9bl:27
In this section, the myth breaks off, and Plato gives Glaucon one part of the
"message" of the myth. The section can be seen to illustrate the sorts of ethical
2s eudaimonia - happiness - is having a good dairutn. Cf. Clark (19'75) pp.145-163.
tu Without, one might add, pointing him towards good (however, it does this as well in
Xenophon's Memorabilia: Brickhouse & Smith (1986) pp.572,517. Cf. Peters (196'7) pp.33ff. In
Symposium the daimon appears in its third role, as divine messenger between gods and men:
Guthrie (7975) p.375. See also, Guthrie (1957a) p.233;Dodds (1951) p.213;Adam (1963)p.454.
27 The myth breaks offl at the choosing place it is necessary to make the best choice possible, and
this can be achieved only by learning to differentiate between good and bad lives, and by
calculating all of the available elements and combinations (political power/private life,
strength/weakness, cleverness/ ignorance etc) to achieve the best in one's choice. The delmition
of the best life is one which leads the soul to greatest jusüress. Things to avoid are riches and
tyranny.
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choices one has to make throughout life)," even though this goes against the idea
of all of the particulars of one's next life being fixed. The exception is, of course,
what the soul adds to the life it is given, for this is the only flexible element - so, in
this context, Socrates' message makes good sense. I have discussed this
"wildcard" element further, below. Annas agrees that the whole myth serves to
dramatize the consequences of one's day to day decisions, which seem trivial, but
in the context of such an eschatological system, take on greater meaning: it is the
decisions we make that make us the people we àre.'e
7. 619b2-621b730
28 According to Halliwell (1988) p.186.
te Annas (7982a) pp.35l-352. That is, it is an attempt to balance free-will and necessity?
3oReturning to the myth, the hrst lot immediately chose a tyrant's life out of greed and haste; he
discovered when he looked at it properly that he was destined to eat his children and suffer
terrible evils. Then he blamed everyone but himself for his poor choice; he was a man who had
come from the sky exit, and had lived a well-ordered and quite good previous existence, but non-
philosophical.
Those from tie sky generally made bad choices, lacking experience in ha¡d toils; those
from earth chose more carefully, and thus the result was a general reversal in good and evil.
Those who had lived philosophically, and chose wisely on ttre basis of this life, usually kept to a
good life and easy passage from world to wodd.
Er then told of some of the choices of well-lnown souls (é}.eetví¡v te yòp iôeîv eÎvot
rccrì 1eÀoíov rcri 0crupoofqv' xotq oov{0erov 1op to{r æpotépou þíou ro æolÀ,a oipeîo0ot:
620aI-3): Orpheus became a swan because he hated women, and did not wish to be reborn from
one; Thramyras' soul chose a nightingale; a swan chose a human life;
..eïroorÌ¡v ôè l"o7¿oôoav VoXùv élÉo0ot l.éovtoç píov' etvot ôè tr¡v Aiovtoç
roô TeL.crprovíot, Qe{ryouoov övOporrov 1evéoOcn, pe¡nqpéw¡v cflç tôv
önlc¡v rpíoeo4' (620b1-3)
Agamemnon's soul, hating the human race, chose an eagle; Atalanta, a male athlete; Epeis, a
skilled v/oman; Thersites - the buffoon - took an ape's form. Finally, Odysseus chose (he had the
last lot); he searched for the life of a private, peaceful individual, having lost his ambition
through the memory of his former toils. This soul said that even if he'd had f,rst go in the lots he
would have chosen this life.
rol èr tôv cí},?'arv ôÌ¡ fupíolv óocótroq eïç ovOpcimorlç lévcrr roì eïç ötlnk,
to pèv cÍôrro eiç ro ö1pto, rcl ôè õírcrrq eiç tò iipepo petopól,l,ovto, rtri
ndooq pi(erç piyvuopor. (620d2-5)
After the choice was complete, the souls approached Lachesis, and she sent them on
with the daimon of the life they had chosen. Tbe daimon led the soul to Klotho, who ratified the
choice, and then to Atropos, who made [he choice binding. Then the souls went under the throne
of Necessity, and onwa¡ds to the plain of Forgetting (Lethe), to a camp at evening by the river
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This section has created significant difficulties for interpreters:3l firstly,
how can "the soul which had once been Orpheus's" be so frmly identified? Does
this imply that the last life of the "Orpheus" soul was a,s Orpheus? It must, or else
the soul would have no way of identifying itself as such because of the condition of
limited memory (drinking of Lethe after each choice, and so forgetting the
previous life).
ff the last lile of the soul was not as "Orpheus", then how can the soul
possibly be called this? As far as we can tell, the tag "Orpheus" should refer to
physical characteristics - that is, to the body. There is one loop-hole of escape
from this problem: at Lethe, the souls must drink a certain quantity of water;32
however, some drank considerably more (the very senseless): is it possible that
some drink considerably less? The allusion is quite clearly made that Er was not
allowed to drink, and thus was able to report back what he had seen. In Socrates'
concluding remarks (62Iclff.), he states that if we heed the story tòv fç Àú0nç
æotopòv eô ôtoBrloópe0c roì crlv yolr¡v oo pr"cvOqoó¡reOo. Does this mean
that, having heard this story, after choosing our next life we will drink sparingly
Heedless (Ameles), whose '¡/ater a vessel cannot contain. All had to drink a certain amount, and
the less sensible drank more than they needed. At once upon drinking, they began to forget
everything. At midnight when all were asleep there was thunder, and an earthquake, and the
souls went like shooting stårs to their births. Er was not allowed to drink, and woke up on his
pyre at dawn.
tt As in many myths, it is necessary to make some assumptions to make sense of the myth. That
is, it is the nature of a myth to describe things which are imaginary, or to attempt to go beyond
reality.
32On water and drinking of springs/wells etc.: Lincoln (1952) for comparative examples.
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and thus some details of our previous lives will be retained?33 In that case, the
soul's identification as "Orpheus" would have begun from the frst time it drank
sparingly (if the cycle had no beginning);3a before that moment it was presumably
one of the very many other nameless/unrecognisable souls.3s
Relating real-time to this metaphysical system of time is obviously
pointless. Halliwell has pointed out that any attempts at chronology from myttr-life
to real-life are impossible. For example, Herodotus had dated the Trojan'War to
12808C, yet "Agamemnon" and "Odysseus" were already choosing their (next)
lives after their one thousand year reward/punishment.36 In my opinion, Halliwell
is being too pedantic about this: after all, Socrates never tenders a time-frame for
Er's experience. Moreover, although it does not seem indicated here, it is possible
for the idea of human years not to equate 1:1 with cosmic years: consider the
"Great Year" of the cosmos in the Politicus myth, which equates to 10,000 human
years. In this sort of time scale, it would be possible to override the doubts on
chronology - "Odysseus" and "Agamemnon" could thus have had any number of
lives since the Trojan'War.37
3'Halliwell (1988) p.21
tn Certainly there is no idea of an original sin leading to the cycle as punishment. If there was, it
might make the system more satisfactory.
3s But then, to keep this memory, the soul must not drink on any other visits.
36 Halliwell (1983) pp.189-190
" Another solution, based on comparison with modern belief in reincarnation, is that it is
possible for a number of people to have experienced being (e.g.) Cleopara; that is, this soul is
îot the Orpheus, but one of the number of souls who took a turn at being Orpheus. This seems
very unlikely. Eternal recurrence could supply an even more unlikely explanation: see Appendix
E. It is likely that tlle answer lies in the nature of myth per se.
149
Of course, to be reasonable, it seems more likd that the examples of well-
known people are used not because this is what occurred in the system, but
because - their characters being commonly known - they are the best illustrations
of the effect that one's individual character has on what should essentially be a
rational choice.38 They represent the uncontrolled self, and illustrate the dangers
of not analysing one's choice, in the same way that the first lot, who snatch up the
life of a tyrant without considering its implications, illustrate the undoing that an
impulsive, unchecked soul can cause itself.
Odysseus is the best example of this. Although he makes a carefully
considered choice which will make his path through this life quiet and simple, it is
still the wrong choice:3e an essentially sel-fish choice - as all the choices are -
motivated by the wrong aims. In its own way, it is just as bad as the tyrant's life,
especially since Odysseus' next life will almost inevitably be worse. However, he
is at least beginning to show signs of heading in the right direction with his
choices; he certainly did not choose an evil life (from a moral point of view), and
he used his intellect and thought about what was wrong with what he had already
experienced. He would seem to be about one or two steps away from making the
right choice.
38Zaslavsky (1981) regards the example of Epeius as ajoke.
'nHi¡st (1940) pp.67-68 and Blundell (lgg2) pp.1ó8-170 discuss the paraprosdokian of
Odysseus' choice: it is not at all what \À/e expect. Blundell makes the point that only Odysseus,
out of all the souls mentioned, does not persist in the same kind of life as before, but learns from
it. Odysseus is a character admired by Plato, it seems - in Híppias Major he embodies rational
skill in pursuit ofone's goals (p.169).
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The correct choice, uninfluenced by habitation (620a2-3)ao and, inevitably,
the one with least appeal,ar is the philosophic life.a2 This reinforces 611e ff., as
does Socrates' concluding message.
620a7-8 is a unique image: the soul of a swana' tho* is it identifred as
such?) choosing the life of a human for its next incarnation, rci dll,o (Qo
pouor"rd o:oaótcoç. The significance of this is surely that, regardless of the fact
that "Orpheus" does not want to be born of woman in his next hfe, he will be
eventually, particularly if musical animals usually are. It illustrates the irrationality
of his choice, but also may show the pointlessness of such choices, because one
presumes that afær the drinking of Lethe, he will not realise the reasons why he
chose this life. It is a wasted choice, and one that will presumably take another
two lives to compensate for. There is, however, no idea in this myth of animal (or
female; cf. Tim.aeus) incarnation being a punishmeît per se.
A number of questions come to mind about the new incarnate life of the
soul. The flust is in response to the brief note at 6l5cl-2: tôv õè eoOòç
levopÉvcov roì ó}"íyov 1póvov Broóvrolv nêpt ä?r)"a ëÀ^eyev oùr ci(r"o pvnpqç.
ao Zaslavsky (1981) pp.169 -17 0
nt Cf. the discussion of Phaedo, note 56 for references to the unpopularity of philosophical life.
Halliwell (1988) p.187 notes that Plato's view of the tyrant's life is the opposite of the popular
view of power and politics.
a2 Blundell (1992) p.769
o3 On the birds in Republic cf. Skutsch (1968) n.24.
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One can only wonder about lives which are cut off 'prematurely' by disease, injury
or accident (including death at the time of birth). Was death at birth, or by any
other of these 'accidental' means, part of the chosen life (destiny), or was the soul
robbed of a chance for a full-life by other circumstances? That is, by the death of
the body. The problem is that death is usually seen as the separation of body and
soul, and a youthful death would seem to go against nature. Certainly, if death
during youth was part of the life, one would expect this to have been made clear at
the time of choosing (when the tyrant, for example, saw the details of his life). The
only unknown in the life plan appears to be the soul, but it is inexplicable how this
could affect the direction of life so young.*
There must have been a different system for souls whose "vehicles" had
died very young, for there would not have been time for the hfe to have been lived
enough for a fai¡ judgement to be made. This is such a minefield that it is no
wonder it is glossed over.ot
aa The only viable option appears to be that the souls in these young bodies were so evil that there
was a special escape clause to remove them from this wodd before they could grow old enough
for the influence of the soul to take effect. Yet, this idea does not appear to be present at all, or at
least not to the extent that it is seen in Laws (q.v.).
os What are the implications of this system for conception/individuality of children; that is, surely
tlis would mean that, while the container of the soul could resemble its progenitors, the soul
inside would be of a different, older character than the child might appear. If the cycle was a
well-lnown system, how would the concept of a strange soul within a child affect the parents'
expectations of child? Questions like this are unanswerable, based as they ¿ìre on a system which
is incomplete, and unknowable, beyond one generation. Moreover, the assumption relies on a
retention of memory beyond incarnation. The mythic nature of the "proof' must never be
forgotten, also.
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My second question is whether it is possible for a soul to change its
destiny, either inadvertently (having remembered nothing about the intercarnate
world), or inæntionally (having drunk sparingly of Lethe)? That is, is it innate in
the soul to make the best out of one's life, even if ignorant of the reincarnation
cycle? Or is the course of life so fixed that nothing will vary? This seems unlikely
- referring back to the pictures of the different lives, the soul formed the one
unknown factor in the life plan: what the individual soul brought to each life could
not be judged. This gives the life some flexibility. For example, if a soul was in a
bad life, and was strong, rational and fighting, and decided to be philosophical, this
would not appear to infringe Necessity, or Atropos (for the chosen life ls being
lived by the soul).
It would cerøinly be a small ray of hope if the souls had this power. After
all, it is an unusual situation where souls have the power to pick their future lives,
but do not have the power to control what happens within them. The only problem
is that the soul in question must realise that its life needs to be changed, and
inevitably this implies some idea of recollection which is not found in the myttr.a6
The other side of the coin is that it would be much easier for the soul to go further
astray than the life-plan might have implied.
If one's destiny is predetermined by forces beyond one's control, this could
be used to explain all manner of inexplicable occurrences in the world. For
ou Is it presen t at 498d3 -4? Halliwell (1 9 8 8) p.29,n.48
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example, if the soul is are set on a predetermined evil path, then no amount of
human education etc. will affect this path. Is the system thus a way of explaining
the origin of evil?
8. 621b8-d3:
The Myth of Er ends with another message from Socrates:
roì o'ärorç, ô fÀqórolv, p00oç êoó0r'¡ raì or¡r ancíÛ'.ero, roì r1pôç
cìv oóoetev, öv fielOópeOo outô, rai tòv sîç 
^ienç 
rcoto¡ròv eô
ôrapqoó¡reOo roì tr¡v ryo2¿r1v oo prov0qoópe0a' al,I' ôv époì
nerOó¡reOo, vopí(oweç oOdvotov Vo1lìv rcì ôuvocrlv ædvta pèv
rord ové1eo0or, navra ôè o1o0d, tflç dvco oôoô oeì é(ópe0o
roì ôrrorooóvqv petd Qpovrloecoç æavtì tpónco érncqôeóoopev,
iva roì r"¡pîv outoîç Qíî,or ôpev raì" toîç Oeoîç, ootoO te
pévovteç êv0dôe, roì ércerôdv td ô0Ào orlrflç ropr"(ópe0o,
óoæep oi wr4Qópor TreproTerpópevot, rai êvOóõe roì" Ëu tî
^¡tì*êret æopeíg, ilv ôrelr'¡1,ó0opev, et npórtoryev.
(621b8-d3)
One could simply accept this dictum, and that of (618b6-619b1), and see
the myth as a symbolic representation of the correct way of life (caution,
philosophy, moderation). There are, however, some unusual features, the most
obvious of which is that the myth seems to be promulgating the idea that one
should be just for the sake of the rewards one earns (or the punishments one
avoids), rather than for the sake of justice itself: that is, souls pursue justice
through fear of punishment. The horrific nature of the punishments is illustrated
by the flaying of Ardiaeus just inside the exit to the meadow (presumably in sight
of those about to begin their journeys). The idea that justice is promoted for
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inconsequential reasons, rather than for its own sake, has worried commentators
such as Annas and Halliwell,aT who see it as contrary to the discussion of justice
which occurred immediaæly prior to the myth.
I think, however, that the concept of justice for its own sake is a difficult
one to illustrate even in myth, and it is a concept particularly difficult to explain to
others less interested or understanding of philosophy, because the benefits are
intangible4s (indeed, the idea of justice for its own sake, implies that there are no
other tangible rewards), and the life involved so strict. It appears to go against
humnn nature to be a philosopher. Compare, also, 496b7-c3 on the temptations
that keep people from philosophy: roi 1dp @ed1er td pèv ä)v?"a nuvra
rcopeoreóootor rcpòç tò Ë.rneoeîv QrÀoooQfoç, n ôè toû oó¡ratoç voootpoQía
aneíplouos ouròv tôv noÀrcrôv roté1et.
I do think that these commentators are over-emphasising the reward
section. Rewards are dealt with in two lines; moreover, they are in no way
material, but are described as e{mo0eíoç..r4ì" 0éaç apvlóvouç tò rd},}.oç (615a3-
4). This appears to be a transcendental, rather than material, reward. The rewards
are, however, "sensible" (how can rewards be described except in sensible terms?).
If anything, the 1000 year reward seems under-emphasized: it does not reùLy give
the souls anything tangible.ae It seems to be the (illogical) complete opposite of the
at Annas (1982a) pp.349-351; Annas (1982b) pp.130ff.; Halliwell (1988) p.18
nt To the non-philosophcr.
ae Nor is there any indication that it is a chance for reflecúon.
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punishment life. The punishment life is important because it is a deterrent against
choosing a bad life. It is ridiculous to see the reward life in terms of a deterrent
from choostng a good life: however, this is what it appears to be.
If one is to escape through philosophy, which is a matter of gaining the
experience (and thus knowledgeto ) to make the correct choice, one would think
that most experience would be gained by tiving in as many different lives as
possible, and drawing on these for one's choice - however, to get into these lives
one has to make the wrong decisions, and then have the philosophical voôç to
remember them next time. There seems little hint of any recollection doctrine,
unless it is contained in the implication that some souls drink less of Lethe than
others.sl Rather than living the bad lives, it seems that observing them, and noting
the various permutations will suffice; and this is precisely what Er is doing.
This is what the philosopher does - he experiences other lives through
trained observation on earth, as well as after death, so his soul can make the
comect choice sooner than the other, non-philosophical, souls. However, the myth
seems to deny this experience to "ordinary" souls: first, by the 1000 years of
reward/punishment which cause the soul to disregard its purpose and previous life
experiences (often to its detriment), and to rely on the results of the 1000 year
period; second, by the erasure of the soul's memory of the previous life prior to
50 Although experience is not equivalent to knowledge.
sl Haliweil (1988) p.21
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the next incarnation. This second aspect is particularly nâst!, and the motive for it
is very obscure.
If the Myth of Er is a moral tale, as seems to be emphasised, where is the
morality in not being able to learn from one's past experience? There is, to be
sure, a limited opportunity for this: the soul can build upon the experiences of the
life immediately prior; but there seems no way for the soul to capitahze upon the
lives that it has already led before this one, if the knowledge which it gained from
the experience, is lost after that life. That is, as a soul, you choose the next life
with the benefit of hindsight, but then lose the memory of why you made the
choice, and therefore what it was based upon. In the next cycle, it has to be
worked out again. The cycle has timited ethical significance, more so because
there is no escape - no ladder of lives one has to ascend to eventual freedom.
Justice does not conquer all in the end.st
There seems little purpose in attempting to gain any "bonus points" (and
thus a period of post-mortem reward) from life to life, because the result of the
reward period is that many of the souls go out and immediately make a wrong
choice. A soul, unable to realise the repercussions of its choice, could get trapped
in the same few alternating good and bad lives for eternity, particularly since there
seems to be no escape, even for the philosopher (619d1-e5). And what of the
5'As Annas (I982a) p.352 remarks, this would not be realistic. Halliwell (1988) p.23 suggess
that a hnal escape might be possible if one could completely remove the bamacles from the soul.
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repeat offender: is there a maximum number of times that the souls catr live badly,
or is there the prospect of eternal punishment?
ËQq fdp ôî¡ æapolevéo0ar åpcuraryévcp ètépo ùcò ètépoo öæou
eîq 'Apôraîoç é pÉyoç. é ôè 'Apôroîoç..tópawoç Ë1e1óvet..
yÉpovtrÍ re raré.pa anorteívoç roi æpeopótepov oôeþóv, roì"
öl,to ôÌ¡ no\"?"a te xqì svóota eiploopévoç, cöç él'é1eto. é0n
oôv ròv êprrrtópevov eïneîv, oux iiret. Qóvot. orlô' ôv fiter
ôeôpo. (615d2-3)
It is a pessimistic and cruel system:s3 everything is against the soul's
reaching some sort of plateau, where it chooses good philosophical lives and
experiences the rewards for any length of time. Of course, if one could remember
having gone through the system over and over with no hope of escape, it would be
depressing, and lead to a lack of concern for how each life was to be bfd.sa (j,l'
Drinking Lethe almost seems a kindness in the face of this possibility. Moreover,
it seems somewhat ironic that a philosophical life is the most desirable for the soul,
because it is the one that brings least eartltly reward. The only one who sees
Socrates' death as a reward for his just nature is Socrates himself.
The idea of a period of punishment which sets a soul on the correct path is
logical, and appears in many other eschatological myths in Plato (also in Pindar):
the deterrent value of punishment is a frequent theme in the dialogues.ss
However, the opposite is ludicrous: that a reward period, which is obviously made
53 "sadistic": Annas (1982a) p.351
5o That is, it might lead to injustice.
t5 It is, of course, not limited to eschatological contexts: cf. prisons etc.
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up partly of mystic experiences (cf. 615a3-4) could so seriously upset the choice of
the next life. One would ttrink that it should reinforce the value of opting for the
same li[e, or a similar, at the next choice. However, it seems that the 1000 years
of bliss dimmed the vision of the previous life in some way, so that the next life
choice was inevitably wrong. The reward life made the souls lazy, corrupt and
stupid because of the ease of their life, and therefore, their unawareness of toils
and hardships.s6 On the other hand, the hardships of punishment sharpen the
desire to choose a better life. One other solution may be that the rewarded souls
who chose wrongly were those who, like the first lot who chose the tyrant's life,
lacked the element of philosophy to reason out their situation.
The singling out of the life of a tyrant is significant and symbolic, and it rs
this, apart from anything, which linls the myth to the rest of Republic. For
structuralists the emphasis is on cannibalism.st For the rest of us, it is a neat tying
s6 Zaslavsky (1981) p.167; Halliwell (1988) p.22.
5iDombrowski (1984) goes so far as to argue that the Platonic philosopher/guardian shouldbe a
vegecarian, and is not a whit put out by the complete lack of evidence for this practice - indeed, at
404b-c it is suggested that the guardians eat roasted meat. Ophir (1991) p.36 links the roasted,
not boiled, meat symbolically to the boiling of Dionysus by the Titans, and thus to Orphism. On
the other hand, Dombrowski believes that philosophers should be vegetarian to re-establish the
link with the lost Golden Age. He is, I believe, overly influenced by, and has transposed over,
Empedocles' (and the Pythagorean) taboos. On vegetarianism: 3'72a-c, for example, lists the
food stuffs (all vegetal, but including dairy products) of the citizens in the first plan of the
Republic; however, when Glaucon complains about the paucity of treats, the new vision of the
Republic encompasses huntsmen and butchers (313b-c), and the diet "the sort of food we have
today" (372d). This goes against Dombrowski's proclamation, "That the Republic was to be a
vegetarian city was one of the best kept secrets in the history of philosophy": Dombrowski (1984)
(p.7). On butchers in antiquity: Berthiaume (1982) pp.62-10. Cf. Socrates' request for a cock to
be sacrificed at Phaedo 118. On the horrific, degenerative effects of meat-eating: Detienne &
Vernant (1989); Burkert (1983). It seems that, in the dialogues, dietary restrictions ue not in
place because of the fear of (a) eating other souls; (b) offending the gods; or (c) repeating the
Titan's crime, Rather, the prescribed diet appears to be chosen with a view to the citizens' living
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of ends. Plato has little interest in primitive taboos. One wonders, however, if
Ophir is correct that the significance of the tyrant's cannibalism is that it is a
symbol of his breach of the boundary between men (ust) and animals (unjust). For
example (as I have mentioned previously), in Hesiod, animals devour each other
because they have no justice.ss
Two elements stressed in the dialogue are missing from the Myth of Er.
First, the myth does not seem to offer the philosopher any special status (discussed
above); second, there is no mention of the Forms, or higher realities. Both of these
concepts are intertwined in the parables of the Sun, Line and Cave.5e The Forms
(and thus recollection) may be absent because they are inappropriate to the moral
or ethical setting of the myth and its simple ideas of reward/punishment for justice/
injustice. One might suppose that if they were going to be anywhere, the Forms
would have been seen higher than the openings in the sky where the good souls go.
One problem is that in this cycle there is no layered Heaven (as in Phaedrus). It
seems unlikely that it was the Forms which the good souls saw in their 1000 years
sojourn. Of course, seeing the Forms is of no use if all memory is subsequently
erased.uo In the same way, strictly there can be no personal immortality.
*
long and healthy lives (does the diet bear any resemblance to Spartan dietary habits?). Moreover,
there was not a lot of meat available in the area at the time.
ttophir (1991) p.37; Hesiod Works 267-268; Zaslavsky (1981) p.162 notes that eternal
punishment is usually reserved for political criminals.
5n Annas (7982a) p.253
60 To continue a previous analogy, in this case, the floppy disk in the system has had irs
information erased, but is still formatæd.
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This system of reincarnation always remains in the realm of myth, and
functions symbolically; it certainly is not put forward as a canonical religious belief
of the Republic - for when such beliefs appear they are generally traditional. At
540c, for example, guardians go the Isles of the Blessed after death. At 468e-469a
heroes are seen (in a quotation from Hesiod) after death as hallowed spirits,
protective deities wandering the earth. The only other mention of reincarnaúon is
at 498dI-4, and may be simply a playful gibe, or perhaps an anticipation of Book
X. Referring to an argument in progress, Socrates remarks, æeípaç 1ùp oöôèv
ovrloopev, ëoç ov fi reíoropev raì toûtov roì" toòç cÍÀl,ouç, fi rcpoöpyou ct
æor,qoropev eïç ereîvov tòv piov, ötov oôOtç 1evópevot toîç toloótorç
èvtó1coor l.óyotç. This sounds more like a gibe at his opponents than reference to
a specific doctrine.
At 496d9-e2, Socrates remarks that the philosopher is content ei ql oútòç
roOopòç aõrriaç te roì ovooíc,¡v ëp1ov tóv te èv0cÍôe píov próoetar xoì tr1v
oæal,l.o1r\v ootoô petd xoÀfrç eÀrcíôoç iÀ^eóç te roi eu¡revrlç ana)')"a\erat.
This does not imply reincarnation. There is further ambiguity at 498c1-4: referring
to the young men in the state, Socrates says that when they grow old tóte riôq
oQétouç vépeoOot rcì" pr¡õèv &)")"o rpametv, ö tt pr1 nrÍpepyov, toòç ¡réÀì"ovtoç






llepi pÈv oôv oOovooioç oo{ç irovôç' æepì ôè eflç iôÉoç oùrRç
ôôe l^erté.ov' olov pÉv êott, ætivt¡ æúvtcoç Oeíoç eîvar roi
porpôç ôrr11r1oeo4, ô õè ëorrev, ovOptolcivrlç te rcì éÀdttovoç'
taóq oôv lé1oryev. (246a2-6)t
Sørting from the premise that the soul is immortal,2 Socrates develops a
myttr to illustrate the soul's tripartite nature, and how each part works; he then
extends the myth to explain the concept of the madness of love, but also the
benefîts of love between a philosophical couple.
Reincarnation is closely linked to the context of the dialogue - the debate
on rhetoric between Lysias (represented by Phaedrus) and Socrates which
concludes'Ap' oôv or.¡ tò pèv öl,ov r1 þqtoprrrl öv eil téXvq rytloyruyía crç õtd
l.óyarv..; (26Ia7-8) Thus rhetoric is used not only in public but also private
spheres. The latter (rhetoric in private) forms the theme3 which is followed
throughout the dialogue and explained primarily in myth.
The perfect soul is depicted as a winged group comprised of a charioteer
and two well-controlled and well-behaved horses, fling up into the heavens for
rThat is, this is the easiest way to describe it: Crombie (7962) p.325. All translations in this
chapter taken from Rowe (1986b).
'On *or" specific arguments for inrmortality (which a¡e irrelevant here) see Robinson (1968)
pp.I2-I5. He notes the different approach to fumortâlity in Phaedrus, viz, empirical and




the express purpose of viewing the Forms.o These souls correspond to the gods
(given their Olympian names), who are immortal and rule the world, because their
wings are so perfect that they lift up the soul to the highest level of the heavens,5
where they lead around separate processions of all the other souls (246e6-247a9).
Zeus is prominent; he has an ordering and managing role (246e5). At feasting time
(247a9), the gods fly up to the top of the arch/vault of heaven and pass out onto
the outside of the heavens where they are carried around and view the Forms.6
The journey to the Forms is not easy for the souls (241b2-4); lesser souls have a
much more difficult time than the gods, and few make the complete journey.
The first point to make is that the winged gods/immortals of Phaedrus are
not seen as anthropomorphic.T 246c2-6 makes this quite clear: "mortals" are souls
who have lost their wings and taken on an earthly body.8 Beyond denial of
anthropomorphism, it is an attempt to describe the immateriality of souls; as
246a2-6 makes clear, there is no other way, apart from mytlr/analogy, to
communicate a picture of the soul. One can detect two layers of description: first,
o The idea of chariots in the heavens reappears in Timneus 41e. There, souls a¡e mounted on stars
and shown the Fonns. The celestial chariot is a common idea: for example, the chariot in
parmenides' proem (DK 2881). Stewart (1960) p.11 cites other comparative examples. Cf. the
cha¡iot image in the Bhagavadgita.
t 246d6ff,: the natural function of the wings.
6I tend to picture the heavens as a structure resembling the Pantheon in Rome, where the gods
would pass out through the oculus and go on top of the dome to view the Forms' Cf. Solnsen
(1982c) who asks whether in this dialogue Plato has deliberaæly set out to answer the question
"Where a¡e the Forms?"
t Rowe (1986a) p.173
t Note also 246c8-dl:..d1,¡"à nÀcttopev oüte iõóvteç oöte iravôç vor¡oovteç Oeóv, oOóvotóv
tr (Qov, ð2¿ov pèv VoXúv, ë¡¿ov õè oôpo, tòv qeì ôè 1póvov toôto oopneQuróto'
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a nebulous picture of the soul as a feathered but formless mass;' second, the
depiction of the tripartition of this shadowy soul as the winged chariot and the two
horses
The less perfect souls are characteized by the inherently (innately)l0 evil
left horse (or in the worst case, two badly controlled horses) which defies the
charioteer's control and thus drags down the soul. The three elements of the soul
roughly correspond to the three parts of the soul detailed at Republic 435e-444e:
the rational (tò Àoytocróv), spirited (tò 0upoerôr1ç), and the appetitive (tò
Ë.ærOupr1cróç).11
e In no other dialogue is the imnateriality of the soul so nearly reached; in comparison note the
corporeality of the souls of Republic 10 who appeff as "shades" with tablets attâched to them:
614b8 ff.
toMccibbon 09e) pp.56,61 notes that this view that passion is inherently evil is not found
elsewhere; the idea of the evil lower part of the soul is common in other dialogues (e.g. Timaeus
andRepublic).
tt As Peters (1967) p.170 has noted, a major problem for interpreters is that Plato does not hold
to a single concept of the soul; for example, the tripartite soul is posited on ethical grounds, but
in Phaedo, there is a unitary soul, based on epistemology Qbid). Therefore, it is dangerous to
assr¡me that this same tripartition is intended in Phaedrus - and thus doubly diff,tcult to explain
the ambivalence of the soul's parts: see Hackforth (1952) pp.107-108 on the problem of the
inherently evil part fleft horse] (which denies the soul a real harmony or equilibrium). As Ferrari
(1987) pp.l25-126 has noted, in Republic and Phaedo the pure, discarnate soul is incomposite,
while in Phaedrus tie discamate soul is immortal and composite. He would view this as a
development in thought (based on "contingency") which is reflected in lnws (id., pp.l26 &
129ff. on contingency). Other commentators are more sceptical about finding a logical
development in Platonic thought on the soul: for a brief sample cf. McGibbon (7964ù p.63; Bett
(1986) p.20; and Hackforth (1952) p.75 citing Wilamowiø. Rowe (1986a) p.171 sees the soul as
tripartite when discarnate, but with the two lower parts non-operational; however, I would argue
that, in the most perfect souls (gods) the lower parts seem to be exceptionally well-trained. For
example, af 247b2-4, they are eurlwoç ("obedient to the rein": LSI). Gerson (1987) pp.81ff.,93
postulates that the chariot and horses represent the incarnate divided self (i.e. good and evil?):
this is more probable - especially in light of the problem of reconciling the duality of the chariot
and right horse - but is made problematic because tripartition is so obviously represented both in
¡he discarnate and incarnate states. The situation in Republic - where the view of the soul in
Book 10 contradicts that at 435e-444e - is a prime example of this problem. Contra, see Hall
(1963) p.72 - Republic 6llb-612a - on the common th¡ead between all theories of the soul being
thetr dffirentiated unity.In this theory the duality of the rational part of the soul into reason (the
search for èætonlpîù and opinion (õó€q) explains the evident tripartition of Phaedrus. This is
t&
The right "horse" is of nobler breed, both in appeafance (253d2-4:
beautiful, white and clean-limbed) and nature (253d6-eL: lover of honour, sensible
to shame, easily controlled by words, not the whip); the left horse is the opposite
of these qualities - black, hubristic, deaf, requiring whip and goad, but ignoring
them both (253e1-5). Driving is naturally difficult for the charioteer, who
personifies rational thought.
These are the souls which follow the processions of the eleven Olympian
godst2 as they go on their procession around the heavens. The souls choose which
god they will follow, and this is an important determining factor in the
development of their incarnate character,l3 because souls assimilate the qualities
(positive and negative) of their chosen god.to Zeus and Ares are mentioned: Zeus
(246e4-6; 252c3) is the best god to follow to get the equipment (character) of the
lover of wisdom (the philosopher - the best incarnate life: 248d1); he is an orderly,
rational leader. Followers of Ares aro prone to belligerent behaviour.r5 We have
to guess at the characteristics of the other gods (252d1-5):16
appropriaæ to the sense at 248b5 (ttre "food of semblance" [Hackforth's (1952) translation] of
the fallen souls), but does not fomr a workable theory in other dialogues: differentiated unity
appeafs to be a convenient way of explaining anything.
12 Hestia stâys at home. For the various interpretâtions of this, see Hackforth (1952) pp.73-74.
t'In 
the first life at leâst: sen252dl-5, quoted below.
to The process of öpoíootç (253b1).
tt The exampte also applies to other aspects of life: cf .252d1-5.
tu 253b1-5 gives characteristics which followers of Hera and Apollo seek in their beloved: for the
forrner, regal nature.
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Koì oörol rs0' ërootov Oeóv, oô ërootoç flv 2¿opeucrfç, êreÎvov
n¡rôv te xqì. prpoópevoç eïç tò ôuvqtòv (î,.froç ôv f,
céróQ0opoç, rol nìv cfrôe rpcíltr¡v 1éveotv ptote{r¡..17
If one can only become the best type of philosopher by following Zeus,l8 is
there a way for the souls to determine which god to follow? ff it were known that
philosophy was the key to quicker release, then surely the procession following
Zeus would be the largest? One must presume that a soul's character determines
the choice, which implies that some sort of character is innate. This realizes four
influences upon the soul: innate character,le character as a result of following the
gods,2O knowledge from the type of vision of the Forms, and character developed
in earthly incarnation.2r
lt This proscription certainly raises an interesting question regarding the memory that we
presume these souls to have. It seems that the memory of the long vision of the gods does not last
as long as the much shorter, and only partiat, glimpse of the Fonns. What sort of "forgefulness"
is implied which differentaæs between the two memories? The implications for the next life are
profound; viz, inability to recognize the god in the beloved, and inability to shape the beloved
like the god and become like the god oneself. As these are both essential steps in the journey
towards acquisition of wisdom (essential to rise up to the status of philosopher), the soul would
appear to be stuck in a black-hole without any nexus to the previous experiences (because,
presumably, there will be no direct memory of the past life either, as in the post-Lethe
incarnations of Republic Book 10).
lt Dyson (1982) p.307 suggests that the only way to become a philosopher is to follow Zeus. This
is opposed by the idea that it is the view of the Forms which determines incarnation as a
philosopher: ibid. The other inportant point is that - as 248c illusftates - one cannot say that
followers of Zeus get a better look at the Forms than the other gods (ibid) or that the followers of
other gods have less hope for a successful pargrership with their beloved (id., p.309).
re Crombie (1962) p.328 suggests some sort of "congenital inferiority"'
'o These first two are linked, in that the character of the soul will determine which god it is
attracted to: presumably the chosen god reflects the soul's own chafacter.
" This variery of reasons can adequately solve the problem of Republic 414bc md 491ab, where
ail souls !¡/ere pfesumed to have an equal pre-natal lnowledge of the Forms, but for unlcrown
reasons were not able to access this memory to the same degree when incarnate: Morgan (1990)
pp.42,175, and my discussion on Republic.
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If we assume that the myth gives the picture of an original fall from the
heavens, then the souls can bring no past experience to bear on their choice. Of
course, the ability to change processions might be implied by 247a6-7: ..ënetat,ôè
ö oeì èOél,ov te roi ôuvúpevoç' Q0óvoç y<ìp Ë(o Oeíou lopoô iototot. That is,
is there a process of trial and error? This would depend on whether the time
required for the procession was long enough22 to give the souls the opportunity of
picking and choosing among the gods for the best option before the movement to
the feast.
At the time of the feast, the less perfect souls - handicapped by the left
horse refusing to obey the charioteer's control - struggle to follow the gods up to
the vault of heaven. The charioteer following the "best" procession (that of Tnas?)
may get high enough to poke his head out over the vault to see the Forms;
however, the distraction of his horse allows him only to get a partial view,
although he has his head out for the whole revolution. The next best group,
fighting to control their horses, bob up and down, and see only some of the Forms.
The remaining souls charge around beneath the vault and, being badly controlled,
crash together, losing their wings and dropping to earth. These souls (the
majority) do not get a view of the Forms at all: they are doomed not to be
incarnated as humans until they see the Forms.
ttSugges[ions have ranged from24 hours to 10,000 years or a nngnus annus: see HacKorth
(1952) p.80.
t67
One notes - considering the different lengths of time spent by each soul
viewing the Forms before their fall - that the souls will not fall simultaneously.
Thus, the human incarnation cycle will begin at a different time for each soul;
thus, the souls will presumably not return to the procession at the same time. I will
discuss the significance of this, below.
The importance of the Forms (viz, doxalepisteme) is expressed (in
allegory) 
^t 
248b6-8: the pastureland of the plain of truth where the Forms lie is
the best nourishment for the best part of the soul and the wings. Souls which do
not See the Forms feed only on "semblance" (248b5). The Forms represent the
universals, which are differentiated from the particulars2t 1Z+SAe-ce¡ by
conceptual thought (voûç), which animals do not possess. 249b6-c6 makes this
explicit:
õeî 1dp dv0pomov or¡vrévor rot' eiõoç À"eyópevov, åx æoll"ôv
ïòv aioOrloerov eiç Ë.v ì"opopQ ouvctpoó¡revov' toôto ô' éocr"v
ovrÍpv4orç è.reívcov ö, ror' etôev npôu rt V,rXù otpæopeoOeîoo
0eô xqi {meptôoOoo ö vôv eivoí Qopev, roì ovoróyaoc eiç tò
ôv övtorç.
Thus, souls which have had any view of the Forms are potentially rational.2a This
knowledge is perceived only by the intellect, and nourishes it.
23 In Crombie's words: (1962) p.328. The particulars as the "semblance" of the Forms is perhaps
a better expression of tiis: Hackforth (1952) p,82 on 248b5.
toRowe (1986a) p,166
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The description of the type of view is important because it is a contributing
factor to the first embodiment that befalls the souls:
After the revolution the gods return within the heavens. The fate of the
other souls depends both on their view of the Forms and their subsequent
behaviour (a result of their innate character). For example, the soul which saw any
part of the Forms will return to its procession and follow it unharmed until the next
trip to the Forms; if it again sees the Forms, it will be unharmed again, and so on.
The Forms provide the nourishment for the wings and the good part of the soul
which enables it to maintain the vision of the Forms when it returns to the
procession. That this is hinting towards a role for memory seems certain, and the
repercussions of this are illustrated at 248c6 ff., where a soul which once saw the
Forms cannot make it back to the vault for another look, and so undergoes the fall
into an earthly body. The failure is the result of "some mischance"25 (in the
allegory, this is presumably represented by the soul being held up or thrown off
course by the other badly-controlled souls) and is represented as "forgeffulness"
(ÀiOn - 248c1: forgefulness of the need to see the Forms and/or forgefulness of
the need to follow the god),26 and incompetence (roria - 248c7).21
25Bluck (1958a) p.158 believes that orvtu;¿ío does not refer to chance; he sees tltis as
contradicting "..Plato's undoubted belief both in divine providence and in free will and the
responsibilily of the individual for the conditions of his life.." (p.757,n.2).
tu Is the forgefulness a consequence of the battering that the wings get in the struggle with the
other souls? That is, tle damage to the wings destroys the nourishment which the wings have
gained from the view of the Forrns; thus the soul "forgets" the Fonns. This would be a literal
representation of the phenomenon of amnesia, often caused by a blow to the head (equivalent,
here, to a blow struck against reason?).
27 For the considerable debate on the interpretation of roría, see McGibbon (1964a) pp.56,n.1 &
60: roxío as the lack of skill of the charioteer in conrolling the inherently evil horse, contra
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The forgeffulness and the roría are both the result of the charioteer's
failure, rather than the horses' faaltper s¿. The charioteer - representing rational
thought - is clearly indicated as the member of the team responsible for controlling
and training the horses.28 The left horse is always bad, and always requires the
effort of the charioteer to control it. 254a3-255a1 illustrates this: the "trained"
left horse becomes out-of-control at the sight of the beloved, and requires to be
cowed by the strength2e of the charioteer in a continual learning/training process.'o
By analogy, the human soul requires the same training, so that it can turn itself
from the temptation of particulars (drinking, physical love, greed, imperfect
physical representations of the Forms, etc..) to the contemplation of the Forms per
s¿; this is accomplished by knowledge/wisdom.3l
Bluck (1958a) p.157: rcrricr as the result of bad training, rather thal the inherent evil of the
horse. Bluck would suggest (p.157) that the left horse cannot "..be suffering from bad training if
it has never been on earth and spoilt its nature there.."; he uses this to show lhaf Phaedrus does
not depict an original fall, because the horse could only have received its bad training as a "left-
over" from its previous earthly existence/s. Against this, I would argue that the left horse is evil
by birth rather than by training. It is the charioteer's continuous striving for conftol of the left
horse (and the group as a whole) which is reinforced tlroughout the dialogue. Even the well-
trained horse loses control and reverts to its innate cha¡acter when it sees the beloved: 254a3-
255a1.
" The exception, of course, is the team of the gods, which functions like well-oiled machinery.
This, however, has little epistemological purpose in the dialogue; ratler it seems only to provide
anecessarJ sytrmetry.
2e Note the great strength (indeed, cruelty) required by the charioteer to cow the left horse:254d8-
e5.
30The length and result of the t¡aining process is shown at254e5-255a1, where the left horse
eventually holds the beloved in reverence and awe.
tt As in other dialogues, wisdom is equated with knowledge (Èrtoc¡¡rq), which is lrrowledge of
the Forms gained through recollection; the sensible world equates with opinion (ôó(o). On the
acquisition of lcrowledgeper se, Morgan has noted that a soul's'educational capabilities and
capacity for knowledge of the Forms is a blend of "non-cognitive and cogniúve factors": Morgan
(1934) p.241,nJ. As I have already discussed, there are four influences on the soul's
development of consciousness of the pre-natal vision - viz, innate character, character as a result
of following the gods, linowledge from the type of vision of the Forms, and cha¡acter developed
in earthly incarnation. All of these influence recollection, which is the only way to gain true
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The forgeffulness of the soul is an ambiguous idea: why does the soul
"forget" when it appears to have done nothing except travel in procession with the
gods? It seems that the soul is affected by the traits of the god it follows; thus, if
it follows gods other than Zeus, it takes on their characteristics, and concerns and
interests, and forgets the over-riding concern to remember the Forms. The wrong
sort of knowledge will also be an attributing factor - although one might consider
the pursuit of ôó(o, rather than true knowledge, to be a greater problem on earth
than in the heavens.32
One might interpret "chance" in another way: because the souls do not fall
simuløneously, they cannot return to the heavens simultaneously (as they have to
live out the full amount of years in the cycle); if the procession of the gods is a
regular heavenly movement, as seems certain from their fixed feasting time, one
wonders if, after the return, some souls do not follow the procession for as long as
others (who arrived back earlier). Thus inexperience might also be a factor in the
soul's ability to follow the god up to the top of the heavens.33
}nowledge (of the Fonns). This process of acquisition of knowledge is likened to initiation into
mysteries (249c4-d3).
32Ferra¡i (p.13a) concludes that this combination of "fortune and fallibility" in the heavens is not.
ethically satisfying: it reduplicates the system on earth, and is indicative of a wealness in the
system - the element of luck lessens the soul's own guilt for its fall. Ferra¡i considers Phaedrus ro
be a dialogue of "contingency"; thus, he would see incarnation as a contingency (an accident) for
which one cannot feel guilt (p.135). Responsibility (replacing guilt) økes the form of coping
with the contingency. I would not consider this to answer the ethical question raised above; one
notes, however, that there is the similar dilemma in Republic, where souls choose thei¡ next lives
but a¡e given no apparatus (i.e. memory) to use these lives to thefu full potential.
" Of course, contra, one could argue that tle souls might have to wait for the procession to begin
again, so that they do all begin again, simultaneously.
17t
The mechanics of the first incarnation are simple but puzzling. The soul will
go into one of the nine categories of lives, and will be "planted" (248dI) into the
seed from which will grow a man (248dI-5), or will "settle down" and "take on"
(246c2-5) its appropriate human body. Central (allegorical?) to ttris fall is the total
loss of wings. The flrst life is not based on personal choice - unlike later
incarnations (249b1-3) - but is the "Iaw" (248c8), presumably based on the
ordinance of Necessity ('Aõpooreia: 248c2). The appearance of "Necessity"
removes the awkwardness of accounting for how the souls were divided up into
the nine groups of lives; that is, it removes the need for a formalized judgement.3a
The fullest development of this transposition of souls ("pigeon-holing") can be
seen at I-aws 903d ff., where the system has become fully automatic.
The soul which is "forgetfuf' or badly-trained, and does not see the Forms
at all, is incamated into an earthly body - more specifically, into a humnn body
(248c8-d2). There is a certain processual ambiguity in this, especially if one
compares 249b1-cl:. one might expect that souls which have had no view of the
Forms would enter animals, and would have to live out their ten lives as animals
(not being able to become humans without viewing the Forms). However this
logical stage of psychic development is side-stepped; therefore, even souls who
have not seen the Forms become humans in their fust incarnation (as do the souls
'o Of course, the apparatus for a judgement does exisc 249a5-6. Adrasteia (248c2): cf. the role of
Ananke in the Myth of Er (Republic 6l6bl-6l7dl).
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tn Tim^aeus 42b ff.), regardless of the fact that recollection will be impossible.3s
The reasoning is that animals have no grasp of conceptual thought (vo0ç: the result
of viewing the Forms).36 It would be incorrect to allow animals to become humans
who lack reason: this is what differentiates us from animals.3T Thus, the frst life
must be a human incarnation, and it will be into one of the nine classes of lives
listed at248dl-e3, regardless of how this contradicts 249b-c.38
There is an epistemological problem with incarnation as an animal; it
implies that the soul has the opportunity to see the Forms in its next discarnate
state, if it is to become a human in the second incarnation. This is not made explicit
by the evidence, although I have suggested a solution to this, below. Another,
more plausible, alternative is that the soul which does not see the Forms will spend
its entire 10,000 years (ten lives) in animal bodies, and it is only at the close of
10,000 years, when all of the souls have returned to the trains of the gods, that the
soul gets another opportunity to view the Forms. This, in turn, implies a continuing
cycle of incarnation;that is, after this cycle of 10,000 years, the cycle begins anew.
3s There is also the interpretation of some coÍunentators that the passage may mean that all souls
get some view of the Fonns: McGibbon (1964a) p.56,n.1; cf. Hackforth (1952) p,83. However,
McGibbon (l914a) p.57, n.5 concedes that tie evidence does seem to indicate that there was a
third category of souls, viz, those who had no vision of the Forms at all (in contrast to those who
had seen the Forms in the past, but had later been unable to recall them).
tu As 249V-c6 makes explicit. Hackforth (1952) p.91 notes that if a soul went from an arimal
(without voôç) to a human, the human voôç could not be accounted for. This seems to be a quite
logical explanation, based as it is on the explicit statement of the text at 249M. Scott (1987)
pp.348,360-365 would argue for a stronger link with the "all }rrowledge is recollection" thesis of
Meno.I think, however, that this is implicit in the dialogue, representedby 249Mff.
3TCrombie (1962)p.328
38 Cf. Tomin (1983) p.32
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There is a certain symmetry to this idea, particularly in the light of the regular
feasting of the gods.3e
These nine categories of lives are given in order of descending worth to
society.aO The point is made at 248e3-5 that the variations within these lives (that
is, goodlhappy/profitable lifestyle vs. bad/unhappy/unprofitable lifestyle) are a
direct consequence of the soul's way of life.al This produces a situation opposite
to that of Republic, where the life is chosen, but the fate is determined by destiny;
tn Phaedru.r the life is allotted, but the fate is self-deærmined, and based on
behaviour during life.
The specific life which the soul receives is determined by the degree of the
view of the Forms that the soul had before the fall; that is, the souls which had the
best view become philosophers, men devoted to the Muses, and lovers;42 the next
best view produces law-abiding kings, generals or leaders; third, business-men
(domestic and public) and civil servants;43 fourth, body trainers and doctors; fifth,
'nBven the gods have the tripartite soul, although it does not t¡ouble them. One might ask
whether other souls can achieve this perfection and so pass out of the vault in any permanent,
divine way: for example, become daimons?
ao Hackforth (1952) p.S3
ot Cf, the idea at Republic 496d5-497a5, where the life of a philosopher has less benefit (in terms
of personal development) in an unworthy society than in a worthy: Ferra¡i (1987) p.136.
a2The notion that lovers, along with philosophers, are entitled to the best lives fits with the
general theme of the dialogue.
a3 Hackforth's interpretation: (1952) p.83
t'74
seers or exponents of mystic riæs; sixth, mimetic activities (poetry); seventh,
craftsmen or farmers; eighth, sophists or demagogues; ninth, tyrants.a
One presumes that the soul which does not see the Forms becomes a
tyrant; this is a reasonable explanation of the philosophical ignorance (and rejection
of philosophy) of the tyrant, who relies on sophistry and seductive rhetoric to
.45
acneve tus atms. The scale of nine lives certainly makes the dichotomy between
politics and philosophy clear. The list can also be seen to express a scale of good
to evil lives. For Plato, the search for good, through philosophical thought
(acquisition of knowledge), is the raison d'être of life.
Theoretically, therefore, what happens to the tyrant after the flrst life? The
soul which did not see the Forms could advance, stay the same, or degenerate.
Although this soul did not see the Forms (and thus cannot recollect the pre-natal
vision), it chooses its next life for itself, so might choose a higher life (and live
badly in iu 248e3-5). The soul might also choose the same life again (or a
aa One notes that there is no category suitable - in te¡ns of contemporary Greek culture - for
incarnation as women. The souls, as usual, preserve gender neurality, and one would expect
gender to be determined by incarnation. The fact that the souls a¡e irunortal beings, and that they
fall into hunan bodies, may suggest that the human race is a distinctly different entity from these
heavenly souls; however, this would presume that human beings could live without being
ensouled, and this plainly contradicts the arguments for immortålily at 245c6 ff . - viz, that the
soul is the "mover" of the body. I do not intend to suggest that the omission of women is, or was,
a great problem. One notes, however, that this dialogue is oriented towards men to an extent not
found in other dialogues (even Timaeus grants women some importance in the evolutionary
cycle, even if they are only to be degenerate men).
as See the evils of this at 258b ff. ls Phaedrus intended as an attack on the tyrants of Syracuse
who kept calling on Plato, but rejecting his advice? The date of Phaedrus, a¡d the infomtation
supplied by the Seventh l¿tter, expressing Plato's dislike of the comrpting influence of political
power (325c5-326b4), might suggest that he was making a broader swipe. Cf. Rowe (1986b)
pp.3-6 for a discussion of this motif. Tomin (1988) pp.26-41, reviews the date of the dialogue.
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degeneration/improvement of it). The third option is that it chooses the life of an
animal. This is presumably a degeneration, and it is difficult to see how the soul
could reasonably be able to make the choice to return to a human hfe. It implies
continuity of memory between more than one life.au There is also a sense that the
ability to think rationally ís innate in humans, regardless of whether the Forms are
ssen, and thus that the soul in an animal (although not a rational being) is able to
draw on this innate reason to make the next choice of life.
The point is that the character of the soul which has had no view of the
Forms will influence its subsequent choice of life, and the way it lives its next life.
The soul which has not seen the Forms will not be able to live any of its lives in
the best possible way without the rational voñç acquired by vision of the Forms.
It is not like other souls which had a glimpse of the Forms, and thus have some
data within them to draw upon: these souls have no data to access and will
presumably live out their ten cycles without hope of early escape.
There has been much debate on the relative positions of, for example, body
trainers (trainers of athletes) and farmers, or seers and craftsmen;ot the positions of
these seem somewhat contradictory, especially if the lives are graduated on the
criteria of worth to society.at For example, one might consider farmers to be of
nuRowe (1986a) p.166 suggests, tentatively, that Plato is having itboth ways, namely implying
that animals are potentially rational although not rational per se .
a7 One might also think that poes rank more highly than their debased position in Republic
would suggest.
otGuthrie (1975)p.426,for example, sees thecatalogue of lives as apassing fancy'
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considerable worth to society (more so than civil servants!). Hackforth has
pointed out, however, that Plato is also listing the lives in terms of social worth,
based on his own beliefs of such: for example, at Inws 846d, manual crafts are
forbidden to citizens; atRepublic 495e, farmers are ranked with artisans as part of
the third class (politically repressed through economic necessity).ae Plato's
contempt for poets is well-known from Republic, as is his hatred of sophists and
tyrants.50
After this flrst life, there is a judgement of the sort of life which the soul
has led in the body.sl The soul cannot regrow its wings (and thus cannot return to
the heavens) until 10,000 years have elapsed.s2 This period is then broken down
into ten further periods of 1,000 years, corresponding to 10
embodimentsiincarnations.t' The truly philosophic soul is a special case: this soul
regains its wings after 3,000 years and returns to the heavens. The process of
regrowth of the wings is outlined in specific terms at 250dI-252c4ff., and is linked
to the memory of the Forms. There is no hint that the three lives have to be lived
ae Examples taken from Hackforth (1952) p.84.
soHackforth (1952) pp.83-84 provides appropriate references. I think that one might see the
dist¡ibution oflives as a "bell-shaped curve" - few of the best possible lives (philosophers), few of
the absolute worst lives (tyrants), and the majority in between.
5t Cf, the ruling on lifestyles at248e3-5.
52I do not see a problem with Bluck's (1958b) p.412,n.14 objection that to add up to 10,000 the
last life must be followed by a reward/punishment life. This seems a quiæ logical observation.
tt One presumes a 100 year life and a 900 year reward/punishment. The significance of Plato's
numbers (particularly nine and ten) has been discussed by Brumbaugh (1989) pp.83-86 among
others; for example, one might compare the nine year punishment owed to Persephone at Meno
81b-d (= Pindar fr.133); the nine lives of the souls in Phaedrus; the life of the philosopher as729
times (= 93) more pleasant than that of a tyrant at Republic 589e.
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sequentially; but, as the entire cycle is only 10,000, it would seem expedient for
these to be the first three lives (in sequence).
About the judgement: it is usual in eschatological myths for fear to play a
major role in the conversion of souls who lack understanding of their position. The
situation is different in this myttì, and I think this can be ascribed to the context:
Plato is preaching to the converted rather than - as rn Republic or Laws - setting
out a story which will scare the majority into submission through irrational belief.
For Phaedrus - who is of a higher intellectual level than the majority (note his
appearance tn Symposium) - there are none of the details of topography or terrible
punishments which one finds n Phaedo. The inter-corporeal stage is only
mentioned briefly:
ci ôè cíl"l.or, ötov tòv æpôtov píov teLeucqorootv, rpíoecoç
ëtu1ov, rpr0eîoar õè ai pèv eiç td utò yîç ôrrotorrr¡pro
Ëî,0oôoor ôírr1v Ërtivor-lotv, oi ô' ei"ç toopavo0 ttvo tóæov {mò
rflç Airnç rouQro0eîoor ôrdlouotv o(icoç oô Ëv ovgpcimou eiôer
éBíoroav þior. (249a5-b 1)
This has raised considerable debate, being considered somewhat superfluous to the
essential rationality of the system.sa Embodiment on earth is a punishment for the
soulper sø, in that the soul's natural environment is in the heavens.ss
toWhat one would like to anticipate at this point is an automatic system such as ¡hatof Laws.
s5 Note the description of the embodied soul at250c4-6:..xcOopoì övteç rcri crorlpcvtor toótou
ö vtrv õì¡ oôpo æeptQépovreç óvopó(opev, òotpéoo tpóæov ôeõeopeupévot.
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'Where is the region of heaven set aside for the reward of souls? Is the
region a paft of the original area where the souls followed the gods? Does the
reward consist of following the gods again, and receiving another view of the
Forms for the remainder of the 1,000 years before the next incarnation? This
would be a considerable reward. If the reward is in essence a purificatory
exercise,56 then the rewarded souls can maintain their memories of the god/s and
the Forms, which were diminished after the loss of the souls' original purity. This
would certainly aid the leading of a second (and third) philosophical life. However,
it seems that the view of the Forms is only given again after the 10,000 years of
incarnations. The passage is unfortunately vague.s?
Perhaps 249a9-bl refers to a more concrete reward, such as a period in an
Elysium.5s There is a parallel with the period of heavenly reward (and
punishment) discussed at Repubtic 6I4b8-616b1.se One significant difference
(between Phaedrus and other eschatological myths) is that there is no concept of
eternal punishment: it is cosmically determined that every soul will return to the
heavens after 10,0ü) years. This has the implication that whatever state the soul is
s6 One tends to see punishment in terms of forced catharsis; see tle discussion of Republic 614b8-
616b1, below.
tt Mccumber (1982) p.34 suggests that souls would be able to escape from the cycle more quickly
if they discussed each other's experiences in a "universal discourse". This implies a long
continuity of pre/post-natal memory,
5s As Bluck (195Sb) p.410 suggests; though he would restrict entrance to Elysium to
philosophical souls.
3n Vir, the just ascend to the right side of the sky; the unjust take the left-ha¡d passage down into
the earth. The returning souls discuss their experiences: the souls from heaven have been purified
and tell of happy experiences and visions of beaufy; tle other souls are dusty, thirsty and weeping
about the sufferings they have undergone and seen in the 1,000 year journey, where every crime
and good action is repaid tenfold.
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in after the ten incarnations, it will return to its natural environment whether it has
achieved the status of philosopher or not. It is this problem (viz, the aimlessness of
the cycle) which leads me to suggest that 10,000 years does not signly the
ultimate end of the cycle, and that the cycle will not end until all the souls have
achieved the status of the all-knowing philosopher, or have passed to some furttrer
position (perhaps among the gods ot as daim.ons?)'
'Where, to cafry this analogy further, does the soul of the philosopher -
which has escaped the cycle after 3,000 yeafs - go, and what does it do? There are
a number of possibilities: the philosophic souls could be apotheosized or become
daim.ons) à la Empedocles, and live with the Forms.60 They might stay in the
waiúng-place (an Elysium?)61 for the 7,000 years it takes for the other souls to
complete their l0lives, at which point alt of the souls could be dealt with together.
Perhaps when the cycle begins again, the philosophers are a special class of
followers of Zeus?
ff, as I believe, the cycle of lives in the myttr depicts an on-going cycle, it is
hard to see rhe point of living as a philosopher if it brings no tangible benefits (if
the cycle begins again, and the soul has to live three more philosophic lives). The
life of a philosopher is inevitably hard, and to achieve three lives in succession
must be exceptional, given the gradual loss of the frst memory which occurs after
uo Cf. the ultimate destiny of the philosopher at Phaedo 63b5-c4 and ll4c3-4.
6r Bluck's suggestion: (1958b) p.a10.
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the flrst ltfe (252d1-5). What seems a more appropriate middle-ground option
would be that in the next journey around the heavens behind the gods, the
philosophic soul has developed to the extent that it never falls (through chance,
weight etc..) again. This option is expressed at248c3-5: Oeopóç te 'Aôpaoteíoç
öõe;
fictç cìv Vo?ún OeQ otvonoôòç yevo¡rÉvq xacíôn ct tôv al.qOôv,
peXW re rRç etépoç rceptóôou elvot arci¡povo, röv óeì toûto
ôúvqtot rcoteîv, oeì opì,cpfr etvot'
This does not give the philosophic soul any tangible rewards,62 nor does it
represent a complete escape from the cycle. However, as no complete loss of
memory (comparable to that n Republic) occurs between lives/circuits, it must be
easier for the philosophic soul to maintain its position close to Zeus. It may
eventually be able to do this to the extent of reaching above the vault of the
heavens completely, and taking part in the revolution of feasting on the Forms.63
62Cf. Bluck (1958a) p.160, whonotes thatrewards are not considered important compared with
the importance of practising virtue. It might be better expressed that the rewards are in no way
commensurate with the hardship involved in living a life of virtue.
u3 That it is not literalty a banquet of the gods, but an allegorical feasting (24'7a6) is expressed by
the idea that the view of the Forms ls the nourishment for the viewer (the result is wing
growth/maintenance): 247d4,V17eA etc. Note the reference to the inadequate nature of the "food
of semblance" a1248b5. At24'7e2-7 one notes that the charioteer feeds on the view of the Forms
in the Heavens, but the horses are given more øngible supplies - mangers with nectar and
ambrosia (24'7e5-6) - when they retum below the heavens. This must reflect the dictum at241dl-
5 tiat nourishment is provided by the things most appropriate (akin). Necta¡ and ambrosi4
despite their divine nature, are viewed as øngible and material "food"; therefore, it is fitting that
the lower parts of the soul (those most linked with the corporeal) should feed in this way, despite
the immortal nature of the whole. The idea of two parts of the soul being detached from the other
part for feeding is ridiculous. Elsewhere it is stressed that the soul is an indivisible unity; this is
reflected by the gods maintaining having three soul parts, This is presumably the passage on
which Rowe (1986a) (p.171) based his judgement that the soul is tripartite when discarnate, but
with the two lower parts non-operational; of course, there is a good deal of difference between a
soul which is non-operational and one which is completely detached. I think this section can be
written off as the result of imagination: the fact that the inseparable feathered souVcharioteer and
horses can "go home" and separate seems to me to be merely an extension of the myttt to
complete the picture (of horses); it lends little credibility to the non-allegory, Of cou¡se, one
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To return to the inter-carnate period of the non-philosophic soul; the
punishment occurs in a specific "place of punishment" (õrrarcutrlpr"ov).s There is
no indication in the text of where the judgement occurs; it is certainly not
underground. An Underworld seÆms anomalous in this picture of the layered
celestial world. One might argue that the underground nature of the punishment
reflects the earthly nature of the crime - that is, the corporeality attached to the
soul. It seems more likely that there is a way-station between the two places (as in
Repubtic) where souls congregate and judgement occurs.6s Rowe's interpretation
of ôrrqrú)rnprov is insighful: the underworld is a "place of correction". This
reinforces the educatiy¿ function implicit in punishments, and also serves as a link
to the idea of acquisition of knowledge (through recollection), the maintenance of
which is so important for the upwardly-mobile philosopher.
This system does not represent a simultaneous or universal fall. A soul does
not fall until it does not see the Forms;66 some souls do not fall at all (248c3-5),
might postulate that the "home" (some sort of way-stalion between the heavens, the vault and
earth) is the Elysium where the gods and the thrice-lived philosophers dwell, and that the
procession a¡ound the heavens is not the natural ståte of the souls. It could be extended to
illustrate - as in Republic - that the soul is separable, and that only the upper part is inunortal.
This would make rubbish of the essential details of the myth, such as the necessity for unity, and
the importance of the choice of individual procession. I would suggest that this aspect (the
stabling of the horses) is nothing more than a ieu d' esprit.
6a Dehnition from LSJ. A later translation (2nd century AD) of this is "place of judgement".
6s It is difficult, given the traditionat trappings of the myth, to postulate an automatic judgement
of the type found in l¿ws.
uu This fact alone would put paid to the idea of each cycle being fixed in time and space as a
nngnus annus; if all souls fall at different times, there can be no predetermination of cycle
length.
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and there is no indication (rather the contrary) that every soul must fa[.67
Therefore the system cannot be seen to be one of necessaryr punishment for all
souls for an original sin. Indeed there are no strong, morally-based arguments of
this sort tn Phaedrus.
That is, the fall does not represent a burden of accumulated guilt (for
example, the Titanic crime) which has to be worked off before the soul can return
to the heavens
Nor does it represent the usual conditions of a moral crime. For example,
in Empedocles fr.115, the fall of the soul occurs because of the crime of eating
flesh (also through necessity), and the guilt, purificatory and punitive aspects of
this are greatly emphasized.6s In Empedocles fr.136, purification is partially
6TBluck (1958a) p.158 has suggested that the "weight" (248c7-9) which drags rtre soul down is
the weight of co¡poreality (as it is in Phaedo). In tle myth, however, it is the /oss of the wings
which drags the body down. The unity of soul and wings is compromised if the balance is upset
by the loss of wings: the soul has no way of keeping itself aloft, and thus falls. It is not the case
that the weight of the soul has increased beyond the weight which can be sustained by the wings.
Moreover, the idea that the fall is induced by the "weight" of forgefulness seems illogical: the
"food of semblance" (248b5) which the forgeful soul feeds on causes the wings to degenerate and
the soul to fall, ratìer than causing the soul to grow too heavy for the wings. At 246d9-e5 the
point is made that the wings are nou¡ished by things noble and good (in particular the divine),
and wasted by bad; that is, the immortal soul is nourished by things akin to it (divine, immortal:
the Forms). It is the eating of nourishing food (the recollection of the Fomrs) which produces the
regrowth of the wings. Surely the soul cannot eat so much of this vision that the wings drop off!
This is hardly logical. There is no mention of "physical", corporeal accretions such as the
barnacles on the süahre atRepublic 611e1 ff., or the earthly accretions which keep souls floating
close to ea¡th, above cemeteries, in Phaedo 81c11-d4: these souls are "impure" (81b1ff) and
heavy with "ingrained" (81c5), "heavy and earthy" (c9) corporea-tity (83d4-e3). The concept of
the weighed-down soul has influenced all of Bluck's subsequent arguments, so that he sees the
reincarnation process in tenns of a cycle of purif,rcation. I have already discussed the problem of
perceiving the Phaedrean soul in terms of traditional "purity". McGibbon (1964a) pp.56-57, p.60
also puts forward strong opposition to this view.
68 Purification: Empedocles fr.128 (defilement); punishment: fragments 118,I27,I24.
183
achieved by correct thought. ln Phaedrus, knowledge (of the Forms) is central;
however, there is little emphasis on the incarnations as a form of purification.
Another indication of this may be the absence of any idea of permanent banishment
from the heavens (eternal punishment in Hades, for example).6e
Contra the cycle as a fixed period of (necessary) purification, the evidence
implies that some (or nearþ all?) souls leave the cycle and return to the heavens in
an unpurified state. This would certainly defeat the purpose of a cycle which was
intended as a purificatory exercise.T0 I tend to doubt that purificationper s¿ is the
object of the Phaedrus cycle.?l Rather, although a loss of purity is implied
(250c3-4), rhe fall is described (despite the veil of myth and allegory) in strictty
rational terms: indeed it is a faII of reason. Not only is the pseudo-ancestral sin
motif absent, but the body is not the anathema that it is tn Phaedo.lz The remark
about the body as an oyster (250c4-6) is the only references to this view, and it i^s
not taken any further. Life in the body is not the best ltfe for the soul, but it is
hardly the burden that it ís n Phaedo, because escape appears to be guaranteed
after 10,000 years of incarnate life. Likewise, little emphasis is placed on the allure
ue Related to this, one might add, is the lack of references in Phaedrus to aspects of purif,tcation
such as the control of bodily desires. There is a brief reference to Socrates' desi¡e that tò õè
;¿puooô r¡frgoç eî1 pot öoov prlte $épew prlte ö1etv õóvqtto tí)"Àoç iì ó oóQpcov (279c1-3).
This is certainly not a rejection of materiality akin to that in Phaedo, or among the Pythagoreans
parodied in the comic poets. The only enforced control which seems important is that of sexual
ãppetite, cont¡olled by celibacy; this is the hardest test of the soul:250e3-256e2.
to cf. the forced catharsis (the penalty paid to Persephone) of Pinda¡ fr,l33.
t, Cf. Mccibbon (1964a) p.60. One might draw a parallel with the post-mortem punishments in
the Myth of Er, which are strictly punitive (punishment is paid out at the rate of ten times the
crime) and conüain no element of purihcation (unlike Phaedo),
72Rowe (1986a) p.173 discusses this.
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of the corporeal, except in the context of sexual attraction to the semblance to the
Forms.
One does note (as a comparison with the oôpo/o'flpo debate in Gorgias,
Phaedo and Cratylus) that the soul which sees the Forms (described as
"revelations" - Qdopata 250c4) while in the body (oô¡ro) is described as
aorlpavtoç ("un-entomb"d"); in the analogy with the oyster, the soul's normal
state is described as imprisoned (ôeôeopeupÉ.voç: 250c6). This is Plato's
predilection for word-play which is so prominent in other dialogues on the soul;
yet again it is impossible to reach a firm conclusion on whether the body is a prison
or a tomb. As I noted above, all that we can say is that embodiment is a change to
a less pleasant and less natural environment for the soul; but whether it is to be
seen as imprisonment or entombment is left deliberately ambiguous.
Regarding the question of whether the 10,000 years represents the total
period that the soul spends away from the heavens: it is certainly the minimum
time required for the (non-philosophic) soul to regrow its wings. This seems
anomalous with Plato's usual dictum that everyone must strive to be a philosopher,
and that there is no release by any other means. In Phaedrus, every soul will be
winged again after 10,000 years, regardless of its status.
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In Tim.øeus, the process of the cycle of incarnations can be likened to Ítrt
evolution of both species and moral character. The cycle is much looser in
Phaedrus, although equally self-deærmined. The only prohibition is that the soul
cannot embody a human until it has viewed the Forms'
Why does a human choose to become an animal? In the light of
Empedocles fr.117 (and fr.l46),73 one might argue that it is necessary to live as
every sort of creature to gain the fulI experience of the world necessary to escape
the constant cycle of incarnations. Here, however, escape is guaranteed after
10,000 years. It is noticeable that although there is no formal linking of the dual
senses of "recollection" (recollection of past lives; recollection of the prenatal view
of the Forms), one might presuppose that to live a second and third philosophic life
the soul would need to have some memory of the previous life to build upon.
However, the solution may instead look towañ Republic 565d-e (the cannibal
becomes a wolf), or forward to the flippancy of Timaeus 91d ff. (birds from
astronomers; snakes from the extremely stupid and corporeally attached.). The
next life is chosen by the soul (249b1-4), and this choice is determined by the
soul's character. Some sort of loss of memory is implied before the second
incarnation, because the soul has no access to memory of the gods which it
followed, except during its frst "pure" incarnation (252d3-5). The loss of memory
could be linked to the impurity of the soul, that is, the result of corporeal
ttcurhrie (1957) pp.235f. seæs Phaedrrr as an Empedoclean dialogue (using fr.115 in
particular).
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accretions (Z52dl-5). This memory loss is never made specific and does not have
the central position that it has in Republic'14
One might ask whether the acquisition of common knowledge (of the
Forms) implies a corïesponding loss of individuahty? Certainly, the intended aim of
all souls ought to be philosophy (uniformity?), but the dialogue also places a good
deal of emphasis on individuality. There is (it seems) no f,rnal absorption into a
greater soul mass, and souls are given the opportunity to choose their god and
develop their characters.T5
The best incarnate lives are those of men devoted to the Muses,
philosophers (lovers of wisdom) and lovers per se (248d ff.). These lives are the
result of following the right god (Zeus), and receiving a good view of the Forms.
The consequencos of these two events influence, but do not control, the incarnate
soul - its incarnate life and behaviour are self-determined. Thus, lile as a
philosopher is given to the soul, but the choice of how to live in this life is an
autonomous decision.
There may be "environmental" limitations on practising the best sort of
life;7u for example, the soul in the lowest type of tife (the tyrant) is handicapped
to There is no "physical" representation of this process (e,g. a drinking at Lethe).
tt Can we r"" the Fonns as a yardstick of comparison to determine whether souls have the right
knowledge? - similar to, for example, an IQ test).
76 Bluck (195Sb) pp.4l21f .
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from being a philosopher (i.e. from being virtuous) by his environment and the
expectations of his environment. One might consider Plato's problems with the
tyrants of Syracuse in this context (although one might ttrink that, beyond all other
lives, a tyrant would be most free to pursue the life that he desired); a better
analogy (although Plato does not mention women in this dialogue)77 might be that
of a high born female in the Greek world - few of the environmental options which
make the philosopher able to pursue philosophic virtue are open to these women.tt
A final handicap is, of course, the life one led before this one, which may affect the
soul's character.Te
This "best' sort of life, carried out by the soul incamated as a philosopher,
is that life which is viewed by other embodied souls (who are ignoranlforgeful of
the Forms) as the life of a crazy man - a life of madness. This judgement is purely
subjective, and based on the ignorance of the other souls. The philosopher, in
touch with his recollection of the Forms (249b6-c4), ignores the sensible and
material, and strives to ðpvrOoç ôírqv pl"érrov civro, tôv rcóto ôè opel"ôv, oitiov
77See the articles by duBois (1985) and Wender (1973) on this issue of Plato's presumed
misogyny. I have elsewhere cornmented on duBois' views on women nTimaeus (ql.).
tt duBois (1985) is synpathetic to Plato; she describes the dialogue in tenns of "Socratic
transvestism" (p.96), sexual contradictories (pp.95ff.), collection/connection and division (p.96)
where male and female roles become reversed (contradict). "Reproduction is..ascribed exclusively
to men; they will inseminate each other with philosophy, in a sexual act in which women have no
part." - despite this fact, duBois believes that Socrates breaks down the barriers of misogyny in
Greek cultu¡e (p.96) by becoming an androgyne (p.91), and thus seducing the reader/Phaedrus
with the forbidden. Unforhrnately, in practical, doct¡inal tenns, there is no mention at all of the
role of women in the reincarnation cycle, or in philosophy, in Phaedrus; in the most simple terms
¡his would point to what duBois is attempting to deny: "..homoerotics based on absolute rejecúon
of women from intercourse with men, on the practice of philosophy which also exiles women."
7e Bluck (195Sb) pp.472-41.4
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ë.1er éç powrôç ôroreípevoç. (249d7-e1). The best philosopher (there are
grades in this life too, depending on one's behaviour) looks only to the universals
(249b6-cl), and is considered tobe uazy by his fellow men (249d8-e1):80
é(r"otrÍpevoç ôè tôv ovOpo:æivorv onouôoopdtcov roì rpòç tô
0eírp ltyvópevoç, vouOeteîtsr pèv urcò tôv ¡ol'Àôv éç
rcoparrvôv, êv0ooorrÍ(rov õè Àsþ0ev toòç æoÀLoóç. (249c8-d3)
Thus, Phaedrus can also be seen to explain the peculiar behaviour of the
philosopher (the lover) who neglects the material and corporeal in his search for
the divine.sr
The philosophic soul is also attacked by a madness which is induced by
beauty and equated with love." The explanation is clever and allegorical,
80 One might argue that all philosophers are regarded as mad (in varying degrees) by those who
cannot or do not understand thei¡ motivation/s. The non-conforming nature of the philosopher is
a major aspect of this mind-set; one might consider, for example, Diogenes, who lived in a
barrel, masturbaæd in public, and died attempting to cure his dropsy by burying himself in
animal dung. One commentator has poinæd out that his cure can be seen as a rational attempt to
raise his temperature - thus illustrating the different perspectives with which we approach the
"eccentricities" of the philosophers.
tt Cf. Socrates' rejection of Alcibiades, and his explanation in terms of "love" aT Symposium
2l8b-219e: there is a higher and t¡uer love beyond the physical (which is all that Alcibiades'
seeks).
t2This is a major "erotic" theme of Phaedrus - the explanation/justificaúon in rational and
philosophical tenns of the pursuit, "adoption" and education of att¡active youths by older men for
various kinds of relationships. Commentators are coy about seeing the dialogue as a Socratic
seduction. Ferrari (1987), for example, is explicit tiat the imagery of the prickling of the feathers
tips, the sweat softening the sealed lips, the swelling of the quills, etc. (p.154) is sexual (albeit
disembodied), but he does not make any explicit connection between this and the personnel of
the dialogue. Dyson (1982) p.309 would see a series of "invitations" to courtship. It seems to me
that not only is the dialogue set in a context unfamilia¡ to the philosopher, but that there is a
seduction of sorts occurring within the dialogue. Socrates attempts to lure Phaedrus away from
Lysias to his own fonn of love, viz the non-physical. There could not be a greater dichotomy
between this "natural" seduction in a natural setting, and Alcibiades' attempted (physical)
seduction of Socrates in the sophisticated and "cultured" context of Symposium2lSb-219e (where
Phaedrus was also present). Socrates' rejection of Alcibiades and his seducúon of Phaedrus a¡e
grounded in this same belief that there is a higher and truer love. That Phaedrus inmediately
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based on the central tenets of Socrates' myth, viz, tlte soul as chariot and horses,
the procession of gods, the Forms, and reincarnation. It also has links with the
earlier themes of Phaedrus - the function of rhetoric, and the education of the soul
(yqoyrrryio/æor ô olruyi o).
The arguments are similar to those of Meno 81d6, where Socrates,
attempting to define virtue, argues that learning/arowledge is wholly recollection.
In Phaedrus, this idea has become more sophisticated and less open to refutation,
the result of using a better example to illustrate how and why recollection occurs.
The problem inherent in using an abstract concept to illustrate a process of thought
in physical terms is self-evident. This was the problem with illustrating the
recollection of "virtue" in Meno.83
In Phaedrus Socrates chooses the least abstract of all these personified
concepts (Justice, Virtue, Goodness, Beauty etc..), one which can be visualized in
purely physical terms,84 and which is obvious to every person (although they
follows Symposium - according to Guthrie's (1975) order - lends credence to the idea of a
deliberate juxtâposition. And the aim of this? The truly philosophic soul occasionally lapses
(256c-d) and the punishment is minor (felicity is maintained). I hnd this signihcant, because the
philosopher should be the last to lapse: one would think that he had tot¿l self-control, and too
much to lose (i.e. his escape in th¡ee lives). Compare also Alcibiades' drunken slander of
Socrates' alleged affairs with other youths at Symposium 222b71f., which seem to build up a
picture of a most unusual seduction technique based on a sexually-charged anti-seduction and the
mutual benef,rts of philosophy. The other side of the coin is that Socrates is giving Phaedrus the
same message as he gave Alcibiades in an attempt to defuse a potenlial misunderstanding of the
situation and relationship.
t'The ridiculous mathematical "proofl' that all lnowledge is recollection further demonstrates
this problem of dealing with abstracts: Meno 82b tr.
taPrior (p.122) would argue that none of these concepß has an appropriaæ visual image.
Phaedrus would show that this view is incorrect.
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perceive its significance in different ways): viz, "Bealut'y". Beauty is the only
physical reference point from which the embodied soul can recollect the Forms.
Only Beauty can be seen and understood with any ease:*t
l,firp póvov cÍÀÀql õè ouôevì ooQôç ôeirvotor, toútrov ôè ëvero
¡róvt' è.otì td vOv À"eyó¡reva. (Politicus 285e-286a)
This is very convenient, in the context of the argument, for explaining and
j ustifyin g phys ic al attraction without c ons um m ation.
The model for recollection is that the embodied soul sees a sensible (a
beautiful youth),86 which brings about varying degrees of recollection of the
prenatal view of the Form of Beauty, and of the beauty of the procession of the
gods. Logically, the philosopher (the follower of Zeus) is most able to make the
connection between his reaction to the beautiful youth (desire, arousal, loss of
faculties etc..) and the Form of Beauty. The philosopher is also most able to deal
with these reactions in the best way, and it is this best ^pproach 
to beauty in the
flesh which forms the crux of Socrates' discussion'
tt Mccumber (1982) p.35f, suggests that the "beauty" in question is not specifically a likeness to
the Forrr of Beauty, but the beauty of the Forms as a whole.
'u 
phoedrus makes no reference to the beauty of women: one wonders whetler beauLiful women
also bring recollection of the Forms? The context (Phaednrs' presence) demands that only youths
are mentioned.
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The intended purpose of the beautiful sight is to trigger the soul into
recollection of the pre-natal view and its significance. The degree to which this is
carried forward depends on how the significance of the reaction is analysed and
self-related by the soul. The vision should re-awaken the soul to its desire for
increased knowledge of these partially-recollected visions. Further knowledge is
achieved through further recollection, and the degree to which this occurs depends
on the four points influencing the soul: innate character, character as a result of
following the gods, knowledge from the type of vision of the Forms, and character
developed in earthly incarnation.tT The ultimate aim is regrowth of the wings,
quicker escape from the cycle of reincarnation, and return to the heavenly
procession.
The reaction to beauty is described both in terms of the "feathery" soul,
and the soul as charioteer and horses. The embodied soul is one which has lost its
wings and dropped to earth. Recollection of the Forms makes the wings grow
again. This regrowth/recollection is súmulated by the sight of sensibles which
resemble (are the semblance of) the Forms, with the result that the soul falls in love
with the sensibles.ss The degree to which the soul reacts to sensible beauty
depends on the type of view it received in the heavenly procession, the particular
procession it followed, and, finally, the time/lives elapsed since the procession and
87 Discussed above.
88If we could see wisdom, õetvoùç yop <ìv nap€tyev Ëportoç. (250d4-5).
192
viewing. The soul's reaction to beauty (in this example), based on these factors,
determines its destiny in the next life.
The physical reaction to beauty is described in graphic terms: the soul
"sees" a beautiful youth and is consumed by the madness (251d8-el) of love. The
atlegorical-cum-physical result is that, while the object of beauty is seen, the
closed, dried up feather follicles of the soul are re-moistened by the "effluence" of
beauty, and feathers begin to sprout again. While the soul sees the source of
beauty, this is a detghful sensation; however, when the beautiful youth moves out
of sight, the soul begins to dry again, and the process is quite painful (an itching).
In an attempt to assuage this pain, the soul desires to be constantly in sight of the
object of beauty. The description is that of desire and arousal, and well describes
the madness and pain - yet sweetness (251e5) - of love. The sensations felt by the
soul are also akin to those of initiates into mystery religions: toÎç ôè ôr1 toroótorç
ovAp uruopvnpdorv óp0ôç 1pópevoç, teÀéouç aei teì.etdç tel,oú¡revoç, tél"eoç
övtcoç póvoç 1í1vetor. (249c6-8).8e
tn The language of the mysteries is a constant feature of Phaedrus, and has led many
commentators to attempt to identify the dialogue's religious background. For example, Morgan
(1990) p.172 thinks that the terms afe especially reminiscent of Eleusinian tenninology. He cites
250b8-c1: ..eì.ôóv re roi Ètel.oîrvto rôv æLetôv ïiv OÉptç l.é1erv pcrropt<otoc4v..; the use of
"mystes" and"epopteía" (250c4); also 253c3 on initiationslteletai. Morgan (p.199,n.50) would
however, after Graf, see Phaedrus as an Orphic version of an Eleusinian mystery religion - which
the similarity of Pindar fr.137 might reinforce. Morgan's statement that Pinda¡ was sympathetic
and familiar with Orphic teachings and texts - based on O1y.2.68-'7'7 (q.v.), Pyth.4.l75-171 and
fr. 133 - can hardly be shown with any degree of certainty, as I hope that I have already
demonstrated. However, the specihc problem with Morgan's theory is that we have absolutely no
definite evidence to back up his claim that "Plato is of course our best source for Orphic materials
before the Hellenistic period." (p.206,n.44). What Morgan has demonstrated is the danger of
using "Orphic" as a generic term. One might - considering the work of Cole (1980) - equally well
use the tenn "Bacchic". The connection of Plato with Southern Italy is little help in this regard. I
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In terms of reincarnation, the re-sprouting of the wings is the first step in
the return of the soul to the heavenly procession. However, because the soul is
rooted in the body, this causes the strange behaviour of the philosopher who shuns
maæriality - his soul attempts to take departure of the corporeal. The recognition
of beauty in terms of its resemblance to the divine (gods and Forms), and thus the
decision to worship, and work towa¡ds elevating the youth to greater resemblance
of the divine (époicootç),'o brings corresponding virtue to the philosopher's soul.
This leads to a better judgement, and thus a quicker end to the reincarnation cycle.
Souls which have had recent or prolonged contact with the Forms, and
have an understanding of the heavenly procession, Íeact differently to this stimulus
than those distant to the process, or corrupt (250eI-251a1). These latter, when in
the presence of the beautiful boy, desire saúsfaction through physical "love". The
philosopher (as the highest class of human life) sees beyond the physical; for him,
the sight of beauty brings recollection of the Forms and the heavenly procession:
"..activated by pure love, with the help of philosophic discourse.."el
The result is that while the philosopher defines his subsequent relationship
with the youth in terms of "lover" and "beloved", his intention for the relationship
have discussed these problems more specihcally in Appendix B on Orphism. Stewart (1960)
pp.15-16 also comments on the link with Eleusis.
no Cf.279b9: õoir¡té por rcþ 1evéoOot rövôo0ev'
el Tomin (1988) p.34
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is "Platonic" - that is, the philosopher constructs a relationship on a purely spiritual
level. This is the optimum relationship for the philosopher (and, presumabiy, the
youth) in terms of the post-mortem judgement and allocaúon of the next/final life.
The basis of the relaúonship appears to be educative, based on yuloy,ryíc. The
philosopher sees and further shapes the youth in the mould of the god whose
procession he had followed.
It is also the influence of this god which affects the way a soul "deals" with
love. For example, followers of Ares think they have been wronged, and kill
themselves or ttreir beloved; followers of Z,eus are most able to cope calmly with
love. The recollection (subconscious) of the god also influences the beloved
chosen by the soul. Like attracts like: the philosopher seeks a iove most like Zeus
(that is, a youth who displays an interest in philosophy and ieadership: 252e2-3).e2
It also seems that a potential philosopher is attracted to another potential
philosopher in this way (252e5-7); n both cases, the lover and the beloved set out
on a mutual path to self-fulfilment through learning. The training seems to involve
some sort of mutual homoiosis with the god - making the beloved like the god.
Thus the philosopher acts as the youth's mentor, shaping the youth into a
philosopher.
e2 One might even see in Phaedrus the beginning of what has become a popular form of
psychoanalysis, that of (Jung's) "alchetypes". This is an interesling point in the comparison of
phaedrus' and Alcibiades' (clianging) attitudes to love. Phaedrus is flattered by Socrates
implicitly comparing him - bec¿use of his interest in thought and his close connection rvitl a
philosopher - witli Zeus; for his part, Socrates is steering Phaedrus away from Lysias' seductive
tut ropnirû. rhetoric, turning him towards a more dehnite involvement in philosophy. Orr
flattery: Dyson (1982) pp.308ff. Regarding Alcibiades, see note 82, above.
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A philosopher can be deirned as a soul, formerþ in the procession of Zeus,
who had an exceptionally good view of the Forms, but who fell by some
mischance, into the best type of human life, and who, by pursuing philosophic
values will regrow its wings in three lives, providing it sustains an exceptional
recollection of the Forms and the procession.
This is an important consideration regarding the reincarnation cycle: the
best type of life is that of physical and mental hardship (as a philosopher), and early
(perhaps permanent) escape from the cycle is only possible for the philosopher;
thus, by training philosophers, setting youths on the right path to learning, and
making philosophy attractive and respectable, the philosopher has a philanthropic
role in society. In terms of the myth, he is re-introducing souls to the divine sights
through philosophy.e3 Are these souls familiar because they were once in the
procession behind the god they resemble (i.e. Zeus) but, having already lived one
life, have forgotten their view of the procession and the Forms? Perhaps this is
how souls who have "forgotten" are able to work their way out of the cycle and
stay out: the philosopher, who has the necessary knowledge from recollection
shows the way. This is problematic, particularly if there is no retention of pasrlife
experience: there is no guarantee that trainee philosophers will retain this training
n'This may equate with McCumber's (1982) p.34 suggestion regarding "universal discourse" as a
way to speed through the cycle of incarnations.
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into the next life.ea Socrates is specifîc that only the philosopher attains sustainable
wing regrowth
õrò ôù ôrxaio4 póvr1 rtepoôtot 11 toO QrlooóQoo ôt<Ívoro' æpòç
ydp Ë.reívotç oeí èocv pvnpn rotd ôóvoprv, rcpòç otonep 0eòç
ôv 0eîóç éoctv. (249c4-6)
The training of the youth is obviously mutually beneficial, but more so tor
the philosopher. It does this through the "recollection" engendered in training the
youth; in terms of the myth, this contact keeps the feathers well-nourished,
enabling the disembodied soul to soar to the heavens again. In "practical" terms, it
ensures that the philosophical soul is incamated for its second stint as a'
philosopher again. If this can be repeated a third time, the philosophic soul is free
of the cycle of incarnation.
The process and challenge of philosophical versus physical love is more
clearly explained in terms of the chariot and horses (253c7 ff.). The soul perceives
the beautiful youth, the good horse remains controlled by the charioteer, but the
evil horse leaps towards the youth and suggests sexual pleasures to the soul.es
The charioteer is willing, but when close to the youth it recollects from the youth's
appearance the reverence owed to the god and, ashamed, pulls the horses violently
back. The evil horse still desires intercourse, and because of this has to be trained
again and again, until this physical desire is controlled, and the soul can follow the
no Will the soul receive a better life on judgement?
ns This sort of passion is inherently evil: cf. McGibbon (1964a) p'56)'
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youth in reverence and awe (for the godlike nature of the youth's beauty: 254e8-
255aL) without this desire intruding. Thus the youth is eventually won over
(despite all that he might have heard about such relationships)e6 by reason of his
age, affection, and necessity (lpecùv: 255a7), and keeps company with the lover in
the gymnasium and elsewhere. This leads to the beloved "loving" the lover:
receiving the same confused emotions (equating with the regrorù/th of feathers) as
the lover had, and eventually misconstruing this and desiring a physical relationship
with the lover.
This is the lover's hardest choice. Physical love is bad for the soul, and
brings no benefit to either party; philosophical (Platonic) love is the best sort of
love and brings wisdom.eT Wisdom is thus the ultimate aim of the philosopher,
and the key to escape from the reincarnation cycle. 'Wisdom is achieved through
correct psychagogy - the leading of the soul back to the winged state, which is
achieved through Socrates' definition of rhetoric at 26Ial-8.e8 Love is the
catalyst - the "psychagogos" for this return.ee The opposite is the rhetoric of
Lysias by which Phaedrus was initially seduced.
eu Alcibiades' claim about Socrates' (sexual) relationships with youths comes to mind:
Symposium222bTff.
nt Mutual love produces the indivisible unit (the "universal eros") that the universe is built upon?
- cf. McCumber (1982) p.36.
esTranslated by Rowe (1986b): "..the science of rhetoric..[is]..a kind of leading of the soul
(psychagogy) by means of things said.."
nn Wyller (1991) p.55
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The degree to which the soul pursues and loves wisdom determines the
soul's destiny in the reincarnation cycle:
ådv pèv ôf, oôv eiç tetolpérn¡v te ôíorrov xaì Qrl.oooQíov
wrrio¡ ttì peldol cfrç ôrovoíaç oycyóvto, pordprov pèv roì
ópovorlcròv ròv evOrÍðe piov ôtrÍyouorv, Ëyrpateîç outôv xaì"
róo¡nor övteç, ôoul.rr>odpevor pèv Q rorio VoIîç évelilveto,
ål"euOepóoovreç ôè Q <ipecrl' tel"euc4oovreç ôÈ ôi {mórctepor
roi åÀoQpol yeyovóteç tôv tprôv naLatap"au¡v tôv éç aþeôç
'Ol,upnr,orôv äv vevrrr1rcorv, oô peî(ov a1o0òv oöte
ocoQpooóv4 óvOporcívr¡ oöte Oeía ¡rovío ôovoa1 æopíoot
avOp círccp. (25 6a7 -b7 )
By comparison, souls with some latent philosophical tendencies, but ruled by a
code of honour, tend to get swept away in the heat of the moment and
consummate their friendship. They remain friends (believing they are thus pledged)
and continue their sexual relationship, but infrequently (256c6), because they know
that it is not right. In terms of reincarnation,
Ë.v ôè în teÀ¿urñ cÍætepot pév, ôppqxóteç ôè rctepoôoOct
årpoívouot toô oópotoç, cüore ou oprrpòv ,&0l,ov cflç éprunrfrç
¡ravíoç Qépovtou eiç ldp orótov roi qv u¡ò yîç æopeícv oo
vópoç Ëodv ëfl èÀOeîv toîç rcn'¡pypévorç riôn dç uæoupovíon
æopeíoç, ol"ld Qavòv píov ôrdyovtoç eúôorpoveîv per' al,ÀrriÀrov
rcopeuopévooç, xcì ôpoætÉporç ëprutoç 1çapw, ötav yévcovtor,
yevéoOor". (256d3-eZ)
This passage raises a number of interesting questions: first, how does one translate
the "impulse to gain [wings]" in practical terms of the cycle? This seems to imply
that the soul retains some memory of this previous life, which contradicts Plato's
usual use of recollection only in the context of the pre-natal visions, not of
previous earthly lives. It is hard to imagine what the "impulse" might consist of in
199
these terms. For the soul not to repeat its mistake/s again, one would need a full
recollection of the previous life.
Is this memory quantitative? That is, if an imperfect soul retains some
memory, then will the most perfect soul (the philosopher) have even more memory
to draw upon? How is this memory accessed? I wonder if the "impulse" is
associated with the character/nature of the soul which the soul takes with it to each
new life. This is also a problem, because it appears to contradict the previous rule
that a soul only retains memory of the pre-natal vision if it lives a perfect flrst life.
However, this may be the key to the problem - that the "impulse" which the soul
gets ,s a further retention of memory of the pre-natal vision, rather than of the last
life.too It is constant recollection that makes a philosopher.l0l The acquisition of
a good "class" of life in the next incarnation will also aid the soul in living a more
philosophical life next time.
The second question that the passage raises concerns the period of
reward/punishment: the nearly perfect soul seems to reap the same reward as the
perfect, philosopher's soul. The only difference between the two is that the
philosophical soul has achieved wing regrowth (to some extent) while the less
100 Although - because there is no mention of forced loss of memory (for example, a drinking at
Lethe) - one wonders whether memory is still available to the soul, and simply has to be tapped
into by becoming a philosopher. The semantics a¡e a problem - to tåp into the memory is to
become a philosopher, but one needs to be a philosopher to do this.
tot Cf. Dyson (1982) p.301
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perfect soul has not.102 That is to say, the less-perfect soul will not count this life
as one ofthe three lives needed to escape from the cycle before 10,000 years - that
is the reward only of the philosopher. The soul which nearly made it seems to be
given its fair reward (oó optrpòv &0Àov: 256d5): it does not have to go eiç td
uæò yfç ðtrar"rutrlprs å¡,0oOoot ôirr¡v ércfvouotv (249a6-1). One presumes,
from 256d8 -e2 thatthese two souls,to'
..eiç toúpovoô ttvo tónov unò crlç Aírr1ç rouQro0eîoot
ôrólouorv c(troç oô É.v ovOpcítnou eiôet êpirooov þiov. (249a7-
b1)
To get this reward, the souls must have had a favourable judgement. This
illustrates, first, that there are grades of good/evil and grades of punishment for
both; secondly, it gives us the important information that not all souls have to pay
the penalty because of necessity. As I argued, above, there does not appear to be
any idea of an ancestral sin necessitating requital from all souls. I have already
discussed the possibility that these rewarded souls rejoin the procession of gods.
This does not seem to be indicated here; rather, the reward seems to be depicted as
an Elysium-like period of existencet* in a place removed from the judgement
place and the area of the procession of the gods.
totls Plato/Socrates admitting fhat sexual abstinence is impossible except for a very few souls
(the philosophers)? Certainly it is impossible to lmow the extent of abstinence without references
to the worth of heterosexu¿l liaisons.
to'The idea of the two souls with matching plumage is whimsical, and a play on the like-
attractinglike motif. For the idea, one is reminded of lliad 2390-91 and Odyssey 24.13-19
where the ashes of Achilles and Patroclus (two men seeking honour rather than pure philosophy)
are buried in the same tun as a mark of their close relationship.
too Which obviously does not require wings to suslain the souls in the heavens!
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The fate of the absolutely non-philosophical soul is not made specific; but
one presumes that these souls must live through ten cycles of reincarnation before
they return to the heavens, where, I would suggest, the procession begins again for
these souls, with the attempt to view the Forms, and, if they fail, the fall into
human bodies and the next cycle of incamations.
What is the purpose of reincarnation in Phaedrus? It is deeply embedded in
myth but, on the most basic level, reincarnation is the reason why hum"ans must be
philosophers. Phaedrøs justifies the existence of the philosopher as the best
possible way of life. In thís, Phaedrøs has much in common with other Platonic
dialogues: an unusual and unrewarding picture of life has been humanized for the
benefit of souls who might not otherwise have any motivation towards a
philosophical life. Thus, Phaedrus is part of a common tradition (Empedocles er
aI) - the demonstration of how a particular way of life, which is despised by the
multitude, can in fact be justified as the best. That is, Socrates is turning Phaedrus
away from the attractive and fashionable company of Lysias, and justifying the
attractiveness of his own way of life. In this sense, as Rowe notes,
reincarnation/recollection "..is a logical solution to a problem."lo5
tosRowe (1986a) p.61. Rowe thinks that reincarnation and recollection a¡e serious beliefs of
Plato.I cannot judge this; however, their fluidity and changing appearance in different dialogues
would suggest to me that they are very convenient tools to get a message across in an easily
comprehended manner - viz,by mytl or stories.
*
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Both recollection and reincarnation receive one of their most serious and
prolonged treatments of all in this dialogue, but it is still, nevertheless, in mythic
form. Reincarnation brings the dialogue to the point where Socrates has firm
(although mythic) ground on which to build in his return to discussing the original
themes of the dialogue, viz, rhetoric and sophistry (257d8). Just as the venture
into myth (and reincarnation) tn Meno enabled Socrates to give Meno a glib
answer and then return to the true subject, so too tn Phaedrus, the remainder of
the task of persuading Phaedrus can be accomplished from a fixed ground:
..êri QrÀoooQíav ôé, räonep oôel"Qòç autoô lloÀÉpop1oç
rêrpanran, tpéryov [Lysias], ivo rai ô epoonlç öôe oótoô pqráct
éro¡rQotepí(n xoO<Ílrep vOv, o¡,¡,' orl,ôç æpòç "Epcrrtc ¡retd
QrÀooóQorv l.ó1cov tòv píov norfrat. (257b3-6)
Mortals have a gift from the gods and Muses - the ability to speak - but we are
obliged to use this gift for the best reasons. It is important to use knowledge for
good ends. This is the raison d'être of philosophy; it is also how sophists and
rhetoricians go wrong - they use their ability to speak "well" (plausibly) for the
wrong motivations. They are corruptible and corrupting because of their ability to
"lead the soul" (ryu1a1oryío: 26Ia8;27Idl); and people are corrupted by their
ignorance of the difference between the universals and the particulars (262a5ff),
viz, their inability to know the truth:106 ou ydp èreîvo póvov orcorceîç, eîte oötcoç
eire dÀ¡.coç ëyet (275c2). Thus the whole picture of the soul and the Forms
connects to the main theme of the dialogue:
touAs Mccibbon (1964a) p.60,n.3 points out, "..for Plato the moral and intellectual aspects are
one."
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..CIÀld î0 övrt oótôv toùç peì"dotouç [speeches] eiôótr¡v
{mó¡rvqor"v yeyovévar, èv ôè toîç õtôoorcopévorç rai pc0t¡oeroç
1çpw l"e.yopévorç roì tQ ðvcr ypoQo¡révorç åv VùXf ztepì
ôtraíc¡v te roi rol.ôv roi oyoOôv [év] póvotç r11oópevoç tó te
evopyèç etvst roi tél¿ov rqi d(rov oæouôflç' ôeîv ôè cor)ç
totoótooç Àóyouç sotoô l.éyeoOat otov öeîç 1vr'¡oíouç etvot,
rcpôrov ¡rèv tòv êv oot@, êdv etpeOeìç Èvfr, ënewa ei ctveç
roótou ëryovoí te roì" oôeÀQoì cÍpo åv ctl"l"atotv öl.l.r¡v yu2¿oîç
rot' o(icv évéQuoov' toòç ôè cÍl,l,ouç lcipetv èôv - oôtoç ôè é
totoûtoç ovr\p ruvôuveóet, ô @oîôpe, eivar oÎov e1ó te roi où
eó(oipeO'öv oÉ te roì" epè 1evéo9au (277e9-278b4)
This is the philosopher (278d4); and the necessity to avoid the opposite s




Reincarnation is essential to the myth of creation tn Timneus. It explains
how human souls (created by the Demiurge from a deteriorated form of the World
Soul mixture, and therefore divine: 4ld4ff.) came to be on earth. There are a fixed
number of souls (as many as the stars), and each soul is allotted to a "consort"
star. The souls were mounted on their stars roì" É.pptpcÍoaç óç êç öXnpa tqv to0
novtòç Qóorv ë.ôet(ev, vópouç te toòç eïpappévotç eÎnev autoîç (41e1-3). All
souls saw and heard the same, to ensure that they all started equally ranked. The
newly made souls were then given male human bodies by the lower gods, then
incamated e( ovó1rqç (that is, souls were designed to be placed in bodies) on
earth and the other ópyovo 1póvou (planets).1 The first generation is only male,2
and if these men live without breaking any of the celestial laws, the souls return to
their consort stars forever.3 The souls of those who err suffer further incarnations,
and their souls also deteriorate into the lesser forms of creatures - women, animals
and fish.
Was the time of the flust incarnation a "Golden Age"? Did it last only one
generation (until women/alrimals appeared?) or more than one - until, for example,
t This is an interesting idea, mentioned twice (42d; 4le), viz,life on other planets.
tThe implications for procreation are interesting; the ramifications for feminists a¡e
immeasurable - see below!
'Rankin $96/) p.27,n.3 would argue that both sexes appeared in the hrst incarnation, although
the text belies this; Guthrie (1978) p.307 finds ttris suggested at 42a. The other possibility is that
the frst generation is a double creature (an Urmznsclz; cf. Empedocles' conjoined primordial
creatures: Rankin (1964) p,79) as in Symposium 196b7 .
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a disaster of the sort seen in Hesiod and Empedocles?a The idea of a golden age
is inseparable from Greek cosmogonicaVtheogonical thought; however, I do not
think that it is present tn Tím"øeus because, for all souls, any lrte on earth will be
inferior to the life in heaven.s
If all of the souls start out with equal knowledge of what they can and
cannot do, why do they degenerate? In a sense it seems that "human nature"
predestines the "fall": viz. it is innate that some incarnate souls will turn to evil,
others to good and etc. Beyond this, it seems that the souls are inherently wicked:
ôroOeo¡roOen1ooç ôè æóvta aótoîç Íoôtc, iva cflç ënetra eiq rcoríaç éróotorv
ovoínoç.. (42d2-Ð.6
The solution, from 43-44, is that when the soul was bound into the body,
the soul's natural orbit was damaged, causing distortions which affected its
judgement, and, aligned with the influence of external stimulation on the senses
(42a-b), the soul was overpowered and lost its ability to reason. The sensations
themselves are a result of the soul's violent movements in the body (43c).?
aln Empedocles' system, the golden age ended when the divne daimo¿s f,r¡st consumed meat -
fragment 128.
s Phaedrus makes this very clear (q.v,).
u Ct. +Z¡5-e+: tò 8è petù tòv oæópov toîç vÉorç nopéôroxev Oeoîç oóporu n^ntterv 0r1ró, tó
t' êæil"otæov, öoov Ëtt frv VuIîç ovOpoinív4ç ôéov npoayevéoOqt, toôro roi æóv0' öoo
clról"ou0o èreívorç onepyaoopévouç cÍp1erv, roì roto õúv<rprv ött ról,l"lotq roi cÍproto tò
Ovqtòv ôtcrruBepvôv (Qov, ött pr¡ xorôv outò eoutQ 1ílvorro qitrov.t The distorted shapes of our bodies are the result of the wild convulsions of the soul in the once-
globular body mass - 44d; as 44d-e illust¡ates, the immortal soul part is housed in the head, but
we are given a body to stop the head from rolling around on the ground (and also as the vehicle
for the soul). That this is aTer d'esprit - Guthrie (1978) p.307 - is reasonably clear.
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The effect is worse in growing children because of the extemal demands on
the container (nourishment, etc..):8
ötov ôè tò dç oöEqç rcoì tpoffiç ëÀattov éæí1¡ þeôpo, ndl"tv ôè
oi nepíoõor l,oppovópevor yolúvnç erlv éourôv éôòv iort roì
ra0rorôvtor ¡rû}.î,ov éæróvtoç toô 1póvot, tóte fiôq npòç tò
rotd Qóotv ióvrorv o1îpd êróotcov tôv rór),r¡v oï æeprQopaì
rarer¡Ouvópevor, ro æ 9arepov raì tò tattòv fi poooTopeóor¡oot
rot' öp0óv, ë¡rQpovo tòv ëlovto outdç yr"yvópevov o¡oteÀoôotv.
ôv pèv oôv ôi xqì" ouveætl"oppdvrltaí ctç ópei rpoQrt
rcolôeúoer,:ç, é},órlr¡poç ui'.úç re novtel"ôç, cnv pelíoeqv
oæoQulôv vóoov, liyvetcu rotopeÀr1ooç ôé, 1roì,r1v toô Bíou
ôraæopeuOeì"ç (orúu, cæÀ{ç rai avór¡toç eiç "Arôou rcó}"rv
ëpyerat. (44b1-c4)
The second point is that the new mortal parts of the soule influence the rational,
immortal soul, so that it is distracted from its purpose. The new parts are
separated in the body: emotion (passion, ambition, courage) is housed in the
breaslheart, and appetite in the stomach (69d6-70a2). These elements produce
the ôervd xoi avolraîa..æa0{pota (69c8-d3) - desire, pain, pleasure, fear,
confidence, etc.: ôv ei ¡rèv rpaniootev, ôírq¡ próoor.vto, rpacrl0évteç ôè côrrío
(42b2). The separation is to ensure minimal contact between the parts (the neck is
an io0¡róç, 69e1) and, just as n Phaedrus, the "emotion" part can act with the
"rational" part to control the "appetitive" part.
' Cf . Lows 808d on children as fle most intractable of all "wild creatures".
n Cf.42e1(n.6, above).
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There is no mention made of recollection, nor indeed of any use of
memories of past lives to corroct the present. Indeed, there is very little emphasis
on reincarnation as punishment for moral offences; rather, emphasis is on the
pursuit of philosophic wisdom, and the denial of evidence of the senses,to as well
as obedience to the divine laws.
..raì" vôv <oç ôrd Bpalotótrov þr¡téov öct tò pèv cócôv èv úpyíg
ôtrÍyov roì" tôv è.auto0 rtuioecov r1oulíav dyov aoOevÉotqtov
ovcÍ1rr¡ yiyveoOor, tò ô' Ëv yupvooíotç åppolpevéototov' ôrò
Qrl,artéov örcroç cìv ë.1ororv tdç nvrioerç lrpòç dì,}.r¡Ào
ouppérpouç. tò ôè ôr1 tepi toO ruptcrrtótoo zrop' llpîv \ru1frç
eiôouç ôrovoeîo0ar ôeî cfrôe, ôç dpo outò ôoipova 0eòç é.rcÍo'tç
ôéðo¡rev, toûto ö ôq Qo¡rev oireîv pèv r1¡rôv èæ' örpor tô
oóparu, æpòç ôè qv åv oupcvô ouyyéver"ov orrò yîç npûç oiperv
c,rç övtaç Qotòv oör ëryetov ol),d oupcivtov, óp0ótoto Àélovteç'
éreî0ev 1óp, öOev n æpó'¡n cîç VuXfrç 1éveotç ëqu, tò Oeîov c1v
reQoÀr1v roi þí(cv npôu ovarpepowòv ôpOoî æûv tò oôpc. tô
pèv oôv nepi tdç eær0upioç fi æepì QtÀovucíoç te'ceotcróq" roì"
ta0to ôlsæovoûvo oQóôpa navta td ôólpcto ovdyrq 0v4td
Ëyyeyóvevor, roì navtanaow ro0'öoov pól,roto ôuvatòv 0r4tô
1íyveoOor, toótor¡ pqõè oprrpòv Ël,l^eífietv, öte tò tor"oôtov
r1ö(nrótt' t@ ðè nepi Qtì.o¡ro0ícv roì" nepì tdç olr10eîç
Qpov¡oerç é.oæouôoróc roì" tqôto pól,roto tôv outoû
Te1opvCIotlévcp Qpoveîv pèv oOóvota xaì 0eîo, dvrcep oÀr'¡Oeíoç
èQ<Írtr¡tor", nôoc avrÍyrr¡ 7roù, ro0' öoov ô' oô petooleîv
avOpomivn Qúoer aOovooiaç Ëvôé1etor", toútou pqôèv pépoç
onol,eínerv, öte ôè oeì Oeponeóovto tò 0eîov ë"trovra te aótòv
eô xeroopqpÉvov tòv ôcípovo oúvolrcov éattQ, öroQepóvtcrrç
eôôci¡r"ovo etvor. (89e6-90c6)
It seems that if one follows philosophical inquiry, then none of the laws of
destiny will be broken. This still begs the question of how the soul knows that it is
to pursue philosophy. Tim.aeus 90c6-7 tells us that the correct "food" for the soul
is the study of things akin to the divine in us - namely, the thoughts and revolutions
t0 Note the fate of ttle astronomical "observer" at 91d.
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of the universe. Studying the harmonious circuits of the universe helps repair the
circuits in our heads which were distorted by our incarnation.
Therefore, it is not a simple matter of recollecting the divine laws: if the
souls remembered their divine lessons, then one would expect the whole first
generation to live only one incarnate life on earth, then return immediatd to their
consort stars. If it is somehow innate that they do not keep the ordinances in
mind, then it is a nasty trick of the Demiurge/gods, and souls wú7 inevitably err
because they are ignorant of any laws of the gods. This is the intention here: there
is an escape to heaven, but it must be earned.ll The soul, because it is essentially
rational, must have the innate knowledge that philosophy is the correct path. Their
ability to achieve it depends on the two factors described above (damage to the
orbits of the soul, and influence of the two mortal attachments). The result is
analogous to Phaedrus: every soul has a different capacity for recalling their pre-
natal experience; or, as tn Republic (474b-c;49La-b), all souls have a different
cap acity for learning. 12
Tim.aeus 51ff. adds a little to this: it discusses (briefly) the argument about
how we can know whether Forms (ultimate realities) exist - viz, they are only
rL Ct. Republic 7l7e ff (on nasty tricks): the soul chooses its new life and sees its destiny in that
life, but then has to drink from Lethe and thus forgets what it has seen - and so, cannot use that
knowledge to circumvent the evils that it will face in life.
12 Morgan (1990) p.142; Gulley (195a) p.202 tlinks that 41e implies recollection, although there
is little to support this. He bases his assumption of the similarity of the chariot images in 41e and
Phaedrus (q.v.).
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realized by inælligence (thought), not opinion (senses): xoì toû pèv ædvto civôpa
peté1erv Qotéov, voû õè Oeoóç, av0pcfurov ôè 1évoç ÞpoXó ct (51e5-6). There
is no explicit or implicit mention of any role that recollection could take in this
process. Moreover, when the souls are travelling the universe, they are not shown
the Forms, because it appears that the Forms do not exist in Space.t3 Again, the
only way of acquiring the necessary knowledge to get out of the cycle is by
thought - but the actual impetus ro thought remains unknown.
After the flrst generation of men, souls that do manage to keep the laws
perfectly are returned to their consort star, and live happily there, forever.la They
have escaped further incarnations. Those who do not, face a destiny fixed on three
points ofreference:
(1) In the second incarnation they become women (42b;90e-9ld): as duBois has
remarked, "..women are the result of men's inability to behave philosophically."ls
This (particularly the passage on hysteria, 91c) has been seen as uncharacteristic
13See the complex discussion of the th¡ee realities, being, space and becoming:48a ff. Peters
(1967) p.17-18 would see anamnesis as implicit at4le-42b.
14 "Death" is the departure of the soul:
réÀoç ôé, è¡rerôùv tôv æepi ròv pue?'.òv tptyóvcov ol ouvcppoo0évteç pr¡rétt
ovté2¿orotv ôeo¡roì. rQ nóvqr [of trying to cut food and drink into triangle
likenessesl ôttotópevot, pe0tôotv toùç fç Vùldç oô ôeopoóç, r¡ õè l.o0eîoo
roto Qúow peO'nõovnç è\êrtoro'nûv yop tò ¡rèv æopo Qóorv aþetvóv, tò ô'
f néQurev yr"yvópevov r1ôó, rcrì 0úvoroç ôr\ rotù toritq ô pèv rcrtd vóootç
raì {mò rpaupdrrov 1t1vópevoç ol,letvòç roi pi"otoç, ô õè petù "¡rìpoç ïôv
Èri té).oç rorò Qóorv cræovótatoç rôv Oqvatorv roì pôl"l"ov peO' nõovnç
yrlvópevoç rì lózçnç. (81d4-e5)
ttGuthrie (1973) p.307: that is, women originate from morally defective souls. duBois (1985)
p.93 goes on to analyse the dialogue - logocentric and phallocent¡ic - as an attempt by Plato "to
appropriate maternity to the male philosopher" (p.92).
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misogyny on Plato's part, although it seems more likely to be simply representative
of a wide-spread and widely acknowledged view of womsn's natural
(physicaVbiological) inferiority to men. 16
It has been suggested by those who believe that Plato held an emancipated
view of women,tt that the particular misogyny of the second incarnation is a
Pythagorean feature. Timaeus is a Pythagorean from Lokri,18 and in the
Pythagorean table of opposites, men:women (in opposition), just as righlleft,
good:evil, light:dark, limited:unlimited, and etc.le Unfortunately this does not
explain evidence for the equal status of men and women in Pythagorean groups.'o
Secondary to the creation of women is the appearance of sexual relations.
Reincarnation as a means of downgrading the role of (female) sexual relations
would be an interesting study, except that the gods supply men and women with
the genitals which have a "desire for sexual reproduction" (9Ib4)21- an intended
tuRankin (1964) p.98; Rankin cites comparisons with Republic 469d,579a; Alcibiades I l26e;
Epistle VIII355c; Laws 790a.ttln the light of Republic, where men and women have equal roles in the running of the city
(45le-452a;540c-d); also lnws 690 and 806. For the other side of the coin, sæ, Republic 469d
on "feminine smallmindedness" (Lee's translation - Plato: The Republic
Penguin,Harmondsworth). Also, Phaedo 60a2-7. Many other examples are to be found in
D.Wender "Plato: misogynist, paedophile, and feminist" Arethusa 6 (1973) 75-90. Guthrie
(1978) p.307 notes that women a¡e dealt with only briefly because Timaeus has promised to take
the story only as fu as mankind.
tt There is no evidence to suggest that any such figure existed, although it has been suggested
that he was modelled on Archytas of Tarentum, the philosopher whom Plato met c.338BC in
Sicily. Cf. DK 4441 (D,L. 8.84) on the tradition that Plato copied Timaeus from the
Pythagorean books of Philolaus: KR p.307ff.
tn Guthrie (197S) p.307; cf. Guthrie (1975) on the Pythagoreans, including the table of opposites.
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See Chapter I.
2r Translation from Lee,D. (1971) Plato: Tiruteus and Critias Penguin,Harmondsworth
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function. Because the organs are near the appetitive part of the soul, they are
uncontrollable (naturally disobedient and self-willed, and compared at 91b6 to a
wild creature, intractable to reason), and demand more intercourse than is
necessary for reproduction alone, and so require to be controlled: it is all part of
the denial of all but the immortal part of the soul.
Can it be that sexual relations are only needed when women are created
because, (a) they are functionless without it, or (b) they are uncontrollable without
it (if so, why create women anyway?)? Rather, it seems that (c) natural
reproduction cannot be replaced by reincarnation; reproduction is required to
create the next generations of species - that is, the gods create the flust generations
and supply the means for the following generation to be produced from these.
Combating sexual desire remains also a further test of the soul.
(2) pù æcuópevóç te èv toótorç ë.tt roríaç (42cI-2), in its next (third)
incarnation the soul became the animal most suited to its particular crime/character
(42c;9ld-92a).
The process seems more akin to metamorphosis/transformation than
metempsychosis. For example, after describing the physical means of forming the
human body and the function of hair, nails etc.., Timaeus comments,
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éç ycÍp æote ê( avôpôv lovoîreç roì" tôÀl,a Or¡pío yevr¡ootvto,
rlniotavro oi ouvtotrÍvteç qpôç, roi ôÌ¡ rai tflç tôv övó2¿rov
"1peíaç öcr, rcoÀl.d tôv Opeppdto¡v roì enì noî.}.d ôerlootto
rjõeoov, öOev év cvOpcíræotç eoOòç ytyvo¡révotç {meturóoovro
n1v tôv óvú1cov yéveorv. toórcp ôi tQ l"óyp raì toîç æpoQtioeotv
toótorç ôéppo rpi^1aç övu1dç te ën' cirpotç toîç ról.orç ËQooov.
(76d8-e6)
However, it is clear from the text that animals are produced with the third
incarnation:22 birds from harmless, empty-headed men interested in the heavens,
but silly enough to think that visible evidence is all the foundation that astronomy
needs; land animals from non-philosophers who did not use the circles in the head,
and were controlled by the part of the soul housed in the breast. Their affinity with
the earth resulted in their becoming closer to it (as quadrupeds), and their
elongated skulls were the result of crushing their circles through lack of use.
Moreover, the more stupid a soul, the more legs he received (touching the
ground); thus, the lowest of the land animals are snakes who have no feet at all.
(9ld-92a)23
(3) the fourth incarnation provides for the most stupid of all the souls -
water cfeatures
..oöç ouô' ovorcvofç ro0opûç ëfl rl(íooov oì" ¡retonldttoveç, éç
eqv ryu1t'¡v unò rlrlppel"eíoç ædonç oro0óptroç é26óvtov, ù?"L'
22 On metamorphosis as derived from metempsychosic thought (and having taken its place), see
Stewa¡t (1960) pp.271,279: also cf. resurrection in Politicus' aetiological myth - the åody serves
more than one life, but eventually wear oul Stewart (1960) pp.l94-796. (See Appendix E)
t'The human to animal incarnations are reminiscent of Republic 565d-e (the t¡ansformation of
the allelophagos into a wolf). Note Ophir (1991) p.35 on metamorphosis, and man's
intermediate position between gods and animals, Also, Phaedo 8le-82a (and cf. Republic 620a
ff. on the appropriate a¡imal hves chosen by souls). Rankin (I9&) p.52 noæs that the Timneus
develops a "reverse evolution".
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ovtì Leæcflç xoì roOapôç óvonvoflç oÉpoç eiç öôotoç Ool^epdv
raì poOeîov ëorosv ovdrcveootv' öOev i2gOúolv ëOvoç raì" rò tôv
óotpÉov ouvoncivrov te öoo Ëvuôpo yéyovev, õírr¡v opoOí"oç
èo1rÍtr1ç è.a1çraç oirrioetç eiÀr"¡1ótorv . (92b2- cI)
One wonders, since these souls are evidently so stupid, how they can redeem
themselves and return to their consort stars? For redemption consists of gaining
understanding: rai roro toôto ôr¡ ncivto tóte raì vOv ôr"opeíBetot td (@o eiç
oÀl.r11"o, vo0 roì ovoíoç oæoBoffi xoì rcrloer ¡retcpal"Iópeva (92cI-3). What is
there for a fîsh to gain understanding of?24 The escape clause is quite clear: there
is no end to the process rpìv cfr routoô raì öpoíou æeptóõrp d ev oötQ
ouvernoruópevoç tòv rol,òv ö1l.ov xol 'üotepov rcpooQúvts ér nupòç roì öôatoç
xoì, oÉpoç roì" yflç, Oopupóõq roì" cil.oyov övtc, l"firp rpocrlooç eiç tò cîç
æpcírcnç roì opíocr1ç oQi"rotto etôoç ë(ecoç (42c4-d2). The "first and best form"
is ambiguous: does it refer to the first incarnation as mnn (.õwÀûç ôè oöo'qç îRç
av0pomívqç Qóoe<oç, tò rpeîttov toroôtov eil yévoç ö raì" ëx¿wa rerÀ,r1oorto
ovnp: 42aL-3) or to the return to discarnate state with the consort star? A return
to the former would allow a wholly good life to be led not as a reward life (cf.
Empedocles fr. 146), but as a final test. A return to the latter would, of course, be
preferable.
There seems to be no limit to the number of incarnations, nor any
limitations on changing creatures. It seems that a snake could become another
2aCf. Hesiod Works and Days 267-8 on bi¡ds, beass and fish - they eat each other because they
do not possess justice; Ophir (1991) pp.36-37 on the political significance of such.
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animal if it changed its crime/character, and vice-versa. Unlike Phaedrus, no time
limit is mentioned, and the cosmos seems to have been created to exist etemally.2s
There are none of the eschatological details supplied in the other dialogues; for
example, there is no mention of a judgement between each life.
Howevor, Timneus 44c might indicate that the soul has a stint in Hades
prior to its next incarnation. From the context, one would assume that Hades was
a place of punishment, although this is not mentioned. It may be that Hades is the
waiting-place for the next incamation: compare Anchises' tale of the souls lined
up for incarnation at Lethe n Aeneid 6.703ff. (however, the location is not strictly
in Hades), or the Myth of Er in Republic X (q.v.), where souls wait for their turn
to choose the next hfe after their punishmenlreward. There is no suggestion of
retributive punishment tn Timneus. The language used seems to suggest that this
is not the soul's fust time in Hades, but there is no evidence that the soul began its
flrst incarnate life from Hades; rather, the evidence points to the incarnations
occurring directly from heaven, where the soul first was joined to the body
Logically, this system would appear to require a fifth incarnation, into
plants. However, they are specifically classed as having mortal souls, and created
for the first generation to eat;26
"Cf. the myth in Politicus, where the cosmos is destroyed every 10,000 years - one "Great
Year". For the deøils see Gutìrie (1978) pp.l93-796; cf, Appendix E on reincarnation and
eternal recurrence in both ¡he Politicus myth and the Empedoclean cosmos.
'u Thus unwittingly solving the problem of what can b eaten, if ensouled humans, animals or
plants are off the menu,
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cîç ydp ov0porcívqç oq'Tevî Qóoeo4 Qóotv aL?raq i"ôéorç xoì
aïo0r1oeor"v repowúvteç, öo0' ëtepov (Çlov eÎvot, Quteúouorv'
cì ô{ vôv ripepa õévôpo roi Qrnd xcì" oæéppots æatôeuOévtc urò
yeorplíoç cOooôç æpòç rlpôç ëo1ev, æpìv ôè frv póvo tù tôv
opyío:v Tévn, æpeopótepo tôv rlpéprov övta. ruôv ydp oôv öonep
öv petóo26q toô (frv, (Çrcv pèv ôv év ôíq Àé1otto ópOótota'
perê"¡a Te pÌlv to0ro ö vôv Àéyo¡rev to0 tpítou Vù?úîç eiôouç, ö
peto(ù gpevôv ópþoloô 'ce ïôpôoOar Àóyoç, ô ôóErrç pèv
l,oyto¡roû € roi vo0 péteonv tò ¡rqôév, oioOrloeoç ôè r1ôeíaç
rcì aÀyervfrç perd É.ætOuprôv. nacyov ydp ôrote\.eî" navru,
otpoQévc ô' oötQ év Ëout@ repì éoutó, eÈ¡v pèv Ë(roOev
anoropévrp rívqorv, rn ô' oireig 2¿pqoapévro, tôv arxoô tr"
l"oyfoooOor roctôóvtt Qóoer ou æopoôéôcorev r1 1éveorç. ôrò ôfl
En pèv Ëortv 'cE ou1 ëtepov (6oo, póvt¡rov ôè rqì
roteppr(olpévov rcércr1lev ôro tò cñç öQ' éoutoô rrvrloecoç
eotepfro0or. roûta ôî¡ td 1Éu1 róvto Qrteóoovteç oi rpeíttorç
toîç fittoorv r1pîv tpoQr1v.. (lla3-cl)21
The implications of the ihis passage (for reincarnation) are as follows
(i) plants are mortal (lack the uppermost, immortal soul part of humans, made from
the World Soul mixture);
(ü) plants therefore cannot experience transmigration, as it is the upper part that
transmigrates;28
(iü) as a consequence it is permissible to eat plants.2e
However, Plato gives few specific dietary restrictions, unlike his ascetic
predecessors. His dictum is to use wisdom in everything, including eating wisely
27 Cf Empedocles' fragment 110.10: æúvto "yop îo0r Qpóvqorv ë.1erv roì. vóporoç qìoqv.tt It is Plotinus who int¡oduces transmigration into plants into Platonism: cl. Ennead
III,6.6;2.13 ;4.2 ; IY,7 ;3 .13 ; VI, 7. 6. S ee Armstro ng (19'7'7 ) p.24.
2e Although this is little mentioned in Plato, it was obviously parts of Empedocles' thought - see




and sparingly: nothing in excess. Timaeus 72e3-a8 makes it clear that man was
not created with eating as his first priority:
erlv êoo¡rérn1v ev r1pîv æotôv raì éôeotôv arol,aoisv fiõeoav oi
ouvo0évteç npôv tò yévoç, roì ört toô petpioo roi ovolroioo
ôrd ¡ropyócrlto æol.l.Q lpt1ooípeOo æÀéovt' iv' oôv pr1 Q0op<ì ôttì
vóoouç ó(eîo yíyvorto rsì otelÈç tò yévoç eö0òç tò 0v4tòv
tel.eutQ, toôro æpoopó¡revot tfl toû fiept1evqoo¡révou tccip"a'coç
åôéo¡rotóç æ Ë(er c4v óvopo(opévrlv rríto xorl,íov {rcoôo2¿qv
ëOeoov, eiî,t(dv re nêpt\ tr1v rôv èvtéprov 1éveouv, öæroç pî
tc1ò ôteræepôoo n tpoQn rayìonaT"w tpoQfrç ètépoç ôeÎoOot tò
oô¡ro ovo6ó(ot, rci æopéIoüoo onþodov, ôtd yaotprpcpyíov
oQtl,óooQov roì" öpouoov rcôv oæot¿l"oî tò 1Évoç, avuærlroov toô
0etotcÍtou tôv æop' rlpîv.
There appear to be no prohibitions on killing/eating animals (or for that
matter, men), although one can easily guess the consequences to the soul. These
prohibitions on murder, diet etc., would go beyond Timaeus' subject range
(cosmogony, theology, teleology), and we must assume that this dialogue lacks
eschatological references (common to the myths of Republic, Phaedo and
Phaedrus etc..) for the same reason.
There are a few other questions; first, does the fixed number of souls (41d-
e) impty that all of the souls will eventually again dwell with their consort stars,
and the earth (and the other planets) will be uninhabited?3O Certainly, Timneus is a
creation myth where life as a human being is of little import, despite souls being
created specifically to dwell on earth.31
'o The same situation a¡ises in Phaedo.
3l Souls are incarnated by necessity: is this simply to establish a genus? cf. Crombie (1962)
pp.333-335.
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Second, is return to the consort star possible for all souls? Return to the
stars was, presumably, allowed for by "necessity" for all souls - but was it
inevitable? Or, was return possible only for some (for example, those who fulfilled
the philosophical conditions within a specified time)? This is not clear because,
unlike Empedocles fr.115, the soul did not strictly "fall" (through some fault of its
own),32 nor was it once (semi-)divine or a daimon. If every soul has the
opportunity to escape, then the time taken will obviously be long, if not endless,
for philosophy (the study of dying: Phaedo 64a) is not â popular pursuit for the
living.
32Although even in Empedocles fr.115 the sin was caused by necessity - that is, it was
unavoidable. On the necessary fall in Timneus - Bluck (1958b) p.1ó3. Guthrie (1978) p.309
suggests that the inevitable flaw in the soul is the result of its deteriorated mixtu¡e, and that
Ananke is symbolic of the element of imperfection in things,
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CHAPTER 70: LAWS
The occurrence of reincarnation tn Laws is one of the most interesting in
the Platonic corpus, because it is connected intimately with passages of important
ethical and moral thought. Moreover, the instances appear in an unusually pared
down eschatology: almost, as Saunders has described it, in a "scientific
eschatology".l The major appearances of reincarnation are at 870de, 872de and
903d-905e, and culminate a series of pictures illustrating aspects of the declining
faith and morality which the law-maker has to understand and combat. It is an
attempt to build up laws which tackle every moral, politicat and social issuey'which
could affect the smooth running of the successful city.2
The occurrences form two sides of the same belief: 870d ff. gives a mythic
prelude to the law; indeed it acts as the lrst stage in crime prevention, and the
actual law is given only for the benefit of the truly hardened who will defy such a
"believed" story:
toótorv ôÌ¡ nóvtrov zcépt rcpooipro pèv eipr¡pévc toôt' ëotor, rCIì"
æpòç roótorç, öv raì- æol,l,oì l.óyov tôv év taîç teÀ.etoîç3 æepì-
td toraôra éorcouôarótcov sroóovteç oQóôpo rceí0ovtst, tò tôv
totoórov dorv év "Arôou yiyveoOot, rai rcdhv cQrropÉvotç
ôeûpo óvoyroîov elvot c1v rotd Qóotv ôírrlv årteîoct, crlv toô
noOóvtoç ünep autòç ë.ôpooev, un' dì,)"ou totoót¡ poípq
reÀ^eocfloot tòv rore piov. nerOopévrp pÈv ôi xoì æcívtcoç
Qopoupévrp é( outoô to0 æpoorpíou qv toroócqv ôírqv or¡ôèv
ôeî tòv éri toútrp vópov ópveîv, onetOoôvfl ôè vópoç öôe
eiærio0ro cî ypoQn..
t Saunders (1973) p.234. This "scientific eschatology" seems to be the logical conclusion to the
process of rationalisation that one can trace in the series through Politicus, Timneus (particularly
so), and Critias to Laws: an interest in cause and effect.
2 "Magnesia" in Crete.




It seems to be a particularly vicious and vengeful system, and a never-
ending one: body/soul A kills body/soul B by method X; in the next life bodyisoul
A is killed by method X by some other soul; this new soul will then be killed by
method X in its next incarnation, and so the cycle of punishment goes on:a there
seems to be no benefit obtainable for the avenger at all in terms of increased
virtue. Rather, the avenger, who is only doing what is right and necessary by
divine law (destiny), will be punished in turn in the next life. The system cannot
even be defended in terms of the preservation of the blood-kinship relationship,
because there is no indication that one will return to the same family in the next
life.5 Rather, itis the divine supervisor of the system who (at 872d) is glorified as
11 tôv oulyevôv oipdtorv tpolpòç ôírq. Such a system relies on total and
unquestioning faith in the divine.
It is a tenible dilemma: if it is predestined that a soul will kill another soul
to avenge a previous crime, there seems little point in the soul striving for virtue.
It is possible to explain the mixed messages that the myttr gives (the necessity for
both killing and virtue). One could see the dichotomy as the link between myttr
and reality: despite the myth's insistence on destiny (necessity), the situation is not
entirely hopeless if one heeds the warning. Is this a loop-hole enabling escape for
nDoes one presune from this that multiple mu¡derers will be mu¡dered in every life by the
various methods they used on their victims until all of the crimes are atoned for?
5 i.e. can one postulate this vengeance to explain such inter-generation tragedy as in the house of
At¡eus?
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the virtuous soul from predestination? That is, one soul will kill another, but the
avenging soul is not specified, or predestined, and thus the necessary act (872e)
can be circumvented by virtuous souls and canied out by non-virtuous souls. It
still seems an unnecessarily cruel system.6
One of the implications of this system is that, according to divine law, there
are going to be murders and the like.7 That crimes do still occur is a reflection of
the mutable nature of human beings - the result of the body-soul union. As in other
dialogues, rotvorvío ydp Vuff roi oóparu ôrol,óoecoç our ëoov fr rpeîttov, roç
eyò Qaír1v cìv orcouôf léyarv (828d4-5). This is the familiar idea of the influence
of the corporeal on the soul, a factor which cannot be controlled by the divine, and
which is difficult for the soul to manage despite its own element of divine.s
This is where civic law steps in and reinforces divine law (and stops killing
on trumped up "moral" grounds). At 880e ff. the problem arises that although
injustices are destined to be punished after death, there is still the question of what
6 Comparable to the quixotic idea in Republic of souls choosing thei¡ next lives but being unable
to base their choice on memory of the last life, and being unable to change events of the new life.
It can be likened to the system of Phaedo carried to the ultimate extreme of vindictiveness: that
is, at Phaedo l73aff., souls in the underwodd had to beg forgiveness from those they had sinned
against before being incarnated anew.
7 A point reinforced by the predisposition of humans to evil (lack of virnre etc.). Cf. the Ring of
Gyges story atRep. 672b2-5: we desire to do evil (be unjust) and go unpunished. Moreover (lzws
780e-781d) women have a lesser potential for virtue than men by reason of their secluded
(unordered) position in society. The Athenian's solution for this is to make men and \'/omen
equal in status, but - even in a utopian city - he rates this as only an outside possibility because of
the objections of both men a¡rd women.
sFor example, 904b ff.
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to do with grievous offenders during life. The problem is not just ethical,e but
also practical - the community must be protected, and the offenders severely
punished while they live, as well as after death:10
notpòç yrìp rì pntpòç ri toótrov ëo æpoyóvcov öotç toî,pqoer
örycoOoi æote Bta(ópevoç oirig rtví, prite tôv övo ôeíooç Oeôv
pfrvrv ¡r1te tôv unò 1fç cpcoptôv Lelo¡révrov, d¡"¡"d olç eiôòç cÌ
pr¡ôopôç oTôev, ratcQpovôv tôv ¡cal"orôv roi ùrcò æóvtr¡v
eipqpávrov, Tropovopeî, toótcp ôeî cvoç onotporrfrç eo2¿óqç.
Oóvotoç ¡rèv oôv oúr ëottv ëolotov, oi ôè êv "Ar"ôou toótotot
À.e1ópevor æóvor ërt r¿ toútorv eioì pôÀl"ov åv Ë.o1ótotç, roì
ol,r10éotota Àéyovteç ouôèv ovótouotv taîç toroótorç yuloîç
ozrotporfrç - oó ydp dv éyípovro nore pqtpoÀoîof te raì" tôv
cíl,l.olv 1ewr1tópcrrv avóotot æXr¡1ôv tóÀpot - ôeî ôi tdç évOóôe
rolcioerç æepì td toroôto toútorot tcç Ëv tQ (îv pr1ôèv tôv év
"Arôou l¿íæeo0or raro õóvoprv. (880e6-881b2 )11
One notes from this that - despite all the interdictions - killing was not
forbidden, but fficially sanctíoned by the law in a number of situations.l2
Murderers âre executed, cast out, stoned and left unburied (873b);13 animals
which deliberately murder humans are tried and executed (873e), and inanimate
objectsla with murderous intent are cast out (873e-874a).rs That these killings are
sanctioned by the law implies that they are also sanctioned by the divine.
n 903U-9OS¡ provides a clear ruling on ethical and moral issues.
to This is also st¡essed at728c, where the evil soul is destroyed to save the others.
rrThe punishments in question are banishment, scourging, alienaúon from community and,
furally, death. This appears to contradict the statement, above, about death not being a severe
penalty; however, I presume that for one not believing in any afterlife etc., death is the most
severe punishment.
12 That is, it is wrong to see lnws as an "Orphic"/Pythagorean dialogue because it obeys none of
the tenets ascribed to these movements (q.v.).
ttThere are none of the ethical debates about suicide (from cowardice, not necessity) as in
Phaedo 61b9ff: suicides are simply buried away from others, without na:ne.
toThere isanon sequitur regarding the prosecution of inanimate (öyuloç) objects: at 870d and
812e-8'73a the idea is raised that murderers will themselves be mu¡dered in their next incarnation
by the same method with which they dispensed with their victims of this life. However, an objecr
without yo1rì will not undergo reincamation, so can never be dealt with in the same way as one
ensouled (ëpyul¿oç).
))1
What one would expect to find is a system of punishments or controls
which are remedial or educative,l6 rather than vindictive. Moreover, one might
expect that killing ought not to be necessary in the properþ functioning state,
particularly in view of the divine laws. These cannot be passed over as simply
myth, for they form the foundation of the city's moral and ethical laws.
For example, it is in myth that one of the greatest ethical dilemmas is
(implicrtty) resolved: that is, the problem of why, if the gods have our interests at
heart, there is so much injustice done in the world. In comparative religions (cf
the karmic laws) reincarnation explains such seemingly tragic events as birth
defects, injustices, unkind events, sudden deaths, crimes against humanity and etc.,
by reference to the evil life that the soul lived in its previous incarnation. As 872e
illustrates, a matricide will be incarnated as a mother and killed by "her" offspring -
the past life circumstances explain the seemingly inexplicable tragedy of the next
life. This is further illustrated at 870a and 906b-c where greed is held up by the
evil as permissible ("why shouldn't we?") and appears to go unpunished by the
gods, when, in fact, justice will catch up with the unjust in the next world if not in
this.rT
1s Except lightning or acts of God/s,
tu As the cruel punishments in Phaedo and Repubtic are at least intended to be
r7 Greed is injustice: 906c.
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This is a point that Doddsls stresses: he believes that rebirth (as he defines
reincarnation) in Greece becomes a satisfactory explanation for the problem of (a)
why there is so much human suffering (899e-900a asks this question), and (b) why
the gods appear to take no interest in this suffering. However, apart from the
evidence here in Lnws, one can hardly argue for an explicit acceptance of
reincamation on these grounds: it was not a belief that gained a great hold on the
imagination of the majority, as Dodds implies. ff Dodds' "Guilt-Culture"
phenomenon is wide-spread, for the reasons given, one might expect a more
explicit theodical movement, and a much wider appearance of reincarnation
beliefs.le I have discussed Plato's perception of the educative experience in
reincarnation, below
What ttris all boils down to is a city running on fear: fear of punishment in
this life (the rules are strict and all-embracing), and fear of the afterlife. Fear is a
very effictive deterrent.
The gods are not to be feared,2o for they look after our interests with
justice. This is part of the central argument of Book l0 of lnws: the refutation of
the claims of the atheists that, (a) there are no gods; (b) if there are, they do not
care about us (and so the evil prosper and tragedies occur to the seemingly just);
tt Dodds (1951) pp.150-152
le Instead of single appearances once or twice in an era, unsually in a poetic/mythic rather than
didactic context.
'o Even Pluto, god of the dead, is not to be fea¡ed - 828d. Death per se is good: 72lb; 828d.
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and (c) if they do take an interest in us, it is because they can be bribed to do so.
These claims are refuted, and the onus put on the law-maker to punish atheists,2l
because all of the moral laws rest on the premise that the gods take a just and
impartial interest in human aftairs.
The charge of atheism is tendered in a manner strongly reminiscent of the
treatment of Galileo: at 886de and 966d-967d, for example, the quasi-scientific
thought of the philosophers, and others, is attacked and equated with atheism.
There must be no rationalization of the physical processes of the universe (for
example, postulating that the stars are not divine but merely stones).22 This is a
situation where nothing is allowed to undermine faith in the divine - because this
faith is the foundation upon which the entire utopia is built. It is the link between
all parts of the society's structure - legal, social, moral and ethical.23
812e-873a shows how earthly law is considered a back-up (almost a final
resort) to divine law (Justice) for dealing with a minority of society (the truly evil).
That it is so considered, illustrates that those who sin do so against heaven. This,
in turn, implies that they pay scant attention to heaven, and is a natural lead in to
the discussion of the evils of atheism and questioning the divine.
21For the punishments (by law) see 907d-910d.
tt The divine nature of the cosmos is proven by the loowledge that (a) the soul is older than
anything else and immortal, and (b) the order of the universe proves its divine influence on it.
23 Illust¡ated by the necessity of having Guardians of the Law with a strong background in
theology, or, preferably, divine themselves - 866d.
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ei" ßo'ré.pd onéxtetvév norê flÇ, aútòv îoôto t)fiò táKvo>v
tolpfoor Þíq rccio26ovro ëv rlor 1póvotç, rcìv ei pqtépo,
yevéo0ot te aötòv Onl€íaç peraoyovra Qóoeroç cvoyroîov,
1evópevóv re {mò tôv yerrvqOévtcov }"tæeîv tòv pi.ov év 2¿póvotç
uotéporç' toû ydp rorvoû prav0éwoç oipatoç oór elvqt
rcÍOopotv dl,l.qv, oúôè ërrcÀocov å0él"erv yíyveoOot tò ptav0èv
æpìv Qóvov Qóvrp époirp öporov r¡ ôpdoooo VÐl,i teio¡ roì
ndonç cflç ouyleveíaç tòv Otpòv oQtlooopéw¡ rot¡río¡. taôto
ôr\ ropd Oeôv pÉv trvo QoBoóp€vov tdç tporpíaç eipleoOct XpTì
tdç totoótoç' ei õÉ rtvoç oöto4 ti0Àío ou¡rQopù rotal.rÍpor,
öote rotpòç fi pnrpòç 1ì oôeÀQôv fi térvc¡v é.x npovoíoç
é.rouoiroç Vo?(Tìv tolpfoot oruootepeîv oópatoç, ö rcopd toô
Orn1toô vopoOétoo vópoç ôôe æepì, tôv toroútorv vopo0eteî..
(872e5-873b1)
One can see a multi-layered picture building up, where the long defence of
the gods, the cause célèbre of Book 10, is one level of the argument for strict
control of thought and actions: that is, if atheism exists, there will be no fear of
the divine law (Justice), and this will lead to injustice. It is necessary to minimize
injustice in both believers and non-believers (if one cannot compleûely remove
atheists); therefore, for the fust group there is the warning by myttr/story (which
inspires enough dread for the believers), and for the second group there are the
laws. Both myth and law back each other up to form a system which deals with all
aspects of society - and religion, and reverence for the divine, are tools for
ordering society.2a
For example, 880de
toFor example, compulsory monthly processions when only sacred songs will be sung to reinforce
the role of the divine: 829be.
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Nópor ôÉ, óç ëorrev, oi pèv tôv lpqotôv avOpcômo:v ëvero
yíyvovtar, õrôo2¿flç yapw toô dvs tpórcov éprl.oOvteç aÀXr1î,orç
cìv Qtl.o$póvorç oiroîev, oi ôè tôv crlv norôeiav ôr"oQrryóvtarv,
atepdpovr" lpcopévov cvì Qúoet roì" pqôèv te110Évtorv öore pr\
eæi æôoav iévot xrixrlv. oôtot roòç pél.l.ovtoç l,óyooç
þr10r1oeo0ot nerorqróteç cùv etev' otç ôt toòç vópouç éB
avdlrrlç ó vopoOéc¡ç ôv vopoOetoî, Boul.ó¡revoç autôv
pr1ôérote lpeíov yiyveo0or.
I tend to agree with Saunders that Inws represents a radical penology,
where the most important thing (beyond human life and liberties) is the well-being
of the city and, beyond that, the well-being of the universe (903c), both of which
are interconnected and dependent. The dialogue functions on these two levels of
civic and cosmic, and ever¡hing is incidental and sublimaæd to the well-being of
the two.25
Cosmic law controls the order of the heavens, and this is founded on
constant, even movement following the divine laws.26 Earthly law does the same
on a smaller scale.2? Just as evil intent is controlled in the cosmos, so too on earth
it must not be simply balanced with or subordinated to good, but removed
25 Also 903c. The idea may be analogous to a forced "attunement''?
26 Although, even in the divinely controlled heavens there can be problems with good and evil, as
the introduction of the concept of the good and evil "World Soul" illustrates (89óe). It is the task
of the ultimate cont¡oller to overcome these conflicts by developing a system which can deal with
it. Details of this supervisor are never made compleæly clear. He is "King" (paorLeóç) and
"draughts-player" (netteud¡ç); however, the Olympian gods still exist (904b1). The actual role of
the good and evil Wodd Souls is ambiguous. One presumes that they are analogous to tlìe
good/evil desires affecting the embodied soul, requiring similar control. This is one of the major
parallels between the cosmos and the city: I have discussed this fu¡ther, below.
27 A parallel macrocosn/microcosm is suggested.
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altogether. Thus the laws prescribe the greatest extremes of punishment or control
needed to control the mutable forces in society.
The message appears to be that, in a properþ controlled society, fear based
on faith (or even superstition) ought to be enough to deter the majority from evil.
This is illustrated at 870e5-871al and again at8l2dff.:
...Lé1erv pèv ôr\ lpeòv oô r¡cÍÀtv tòv ëpæpooOe oprrpQ þr1Oévta
Àó1ov, öv öpa ctç oroócov npôv oÎoç otooléoOot 1évrltot
pûÀl"ov Ërròv ôrd td totaôto Qóvcov tôv rcrívt¡ ovootovrútrov. é
yùp õi ¡r00oç ti Ió1oç, tì ött 1pr\ npoooyopeóetv aùtóv, år
æol.atôv iepérov28 eîpr¡tot oaQôç, éç 11 tôv ou11evôv aïpcítotv
crpcopòç ôírq érioronoç vópcp 2¿pfltot tQ vovôî¡ À.e10évo rcì
ëto(ev cípa ôpcÍoavrí c totoôtov æoOeîv toutd avolroícoç öæep
ëôpooev' (872d4-e5)
Despite its totalitarian aspects, it is a sound expression of the way that a
city can be saved from declining moral standards and crimes by radical
punishments and punishment beliefs.2e However, it is a far from utopian picture,
characterized by the hard line approach to civil liberties; that is, there is to be no
expression of anything likely to disrupt the equilibrium of the city. 701b makes
this clearer, expressing the problem of too much freedom and not enough control
in terms of society's moral decay:
ztThis is a conveniently vague expression: cf. my discussion of this featu¡e in the Meno. As in
Meno, there is little information to be derived from such an unspecific source. The only hint may
be supplied at 782c: in the context of the mutability of tastes, politics, society and etc., it is noted
that in a sort of early Golden Age, men abstained from killing and meat-eating, and this was
what it now described as an 'OpQtròç Þíoç (782c7). This is too tenuous a link with the "ancient
priests" of 872e7-2, It is more relevant as evidence that there was a life-style peculiar to the
Orphics (presumably) contemporary with Plato (q.v.).
'n It is also quite simple: being evil -+ receiving a worse incarnalion. Cf. the retrogression of
Republic 619b-c.
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'EQeEîç ôr\ toóq¡ tfl êl"eu0epíq rt toô ¡r¡ e0é}.erv toîç öplouor
ôor¡l¿úerv yíyvort' cÍv, rqi éropér4 toúc¡ Qeúryerv rcarpòç roì"
pnrpòç raì æpeoprtépolv ôorÀ¿iav rsì vou0énìflV, roi éryòç
toô téIouç oôorv vóprov (r¡teîv ¡rì o?cnróorç eÎvct, æpòç oot@ ôè
t'iõq t0 téÀ.er öprrov xoì. níotecov raì. rò napanav Oeôv pr1
Qpovd(erv .. (7 0 Ib5 - c2)30
The actual mechanics of the reincarnation process are developed at
903d ff., but not in the form familiar in the other Platonic eschatological myths.
All of the post-mortem processes of the other myths (ourneys, judgement,
topographical descriptions etc.) are replaced by the automatic movements of the
necteuciç (903d3-e1) :31
eæeì" õÈ oeì yulr1 oovreroTpévq oópoo totè pèv öÀLco, totè ôè
dll"rp, petoBól.l^er æovtoicç petoBol"dç ôr' éaucrlv fi õr' erépov
VUXiv, ouôèv cÍIl"o épyov tQ æerteurfl },:ín¿rat æÀr1v
petooOévor tò pèv öpervov ltyvó¡revov r]0oç eiç BeÀcíro tóæov,
1eîpov ôè eiç tòv leipovo, rotd tò æpércov aútôv ërootov, ivo
tfl ç æpoo'r1roóo1ç poípoç l"oylcÍv¡.
And, at 904c9-e2:
optrpótepo pèv tôv r10ôv perrÍpal.l.ovtq ål.dtto roto tò cflç
Xri¡pc,ç årcírceôov petonopeóetor, n]r.etco ôè rai oôrrótepo
petoneoóvta, etç prÍ0oç ra te rdtco ìe.yó¡reva tôv rónov, öoc
"Arõr1v te roi tù toótr¡v å1ópevo rôv óvopótorv ércovopó(ovteç
oQóôpo Qopo0vtor raì" överporcoÀo0orv (ôvteç ôrol,u0évceç te
rôv oorpritcov. peí.(o ôè ôrì VoXù rariaç {ì opecîç onótov
petaÀcÍpq ôrd cqv or¡eîç Boúl,qoív te raì" óprl"íov yevo¡révqv
iolupriv, órcótsv pèv oprcî Oeig npoopeí(coa yíyv4tat
30 The speaker goes on to compare the actions of these sinners with the crime of the Tit¿ns
against Cronos' authority.
" 903e-904a: Saunders (1973) p.241 would see this strange passage as an attâck on Heraclitus'
confused system of inter-element transfer, a system which would produce an enonnous confusion
of mixed elements within three tranformations (incarnations). To this is juxtaposed the picture
of the divine system of total, simple and automated order. The fact that Heraclitus saw the
universe in terrns of opposites cont¡olled by Justice is also analogous to the picture of the universe
(¡vo World Souls) in lzws.
*
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õraQepóvtcoç toroórr¡, ôtoQÉpovta xoi petÉpoÀ.ev tórcov cÍytov
öl.ov, lreroKopro0eîoo eiç apeívol ctvd tórcov ëtepov'
The process of movement has been systemiznd by the netteuqç: it seems to be
analogous to a gigantic system of pigeon-holes, where the 'Judgement" of the soul
is based on the balance of virtue (good) and evil in the soul at the time of death,
rather than determined by a list of the good and bad deeds of the soul during life or
by the subjective judgement of individual assessors, and thus open to abuse.32
This system is an equalizer: no-one has any advantage over anyone else, and
"human" emotions such as pity, anger, fear etc. do not affect what appears to be a
mathematical judgment. For example, one presumes that if a soul is IIVo evil and
90Vo virtuous, it goes to a certain, fixed position. This explains the unusual
description of souls which have changed little except for moving slightly sideways:
the balance of good and evil has changed little, so the subsequent position is not
altered.
One notes the recurrence of the microcosm-macrocosm duality: the
disposition of the souls both reflects and influences the wider arrangement of the
universe, and is intended for its benefit.33
32Cf. the affixed tablets of Republic 614b8-616b1. On the judgment by "earthly" judges, cf. the
comments on their shortcomings at Gorgias 523b5-524a8. Even tle Last Judgement is based on
the acts of one's life recorded in the book of life: Revelations 20.12.
33 Not so much the balance of good and evil as the neutralization of evil by good. Cf. 875a ff.,
where this is expressed in terms of the microcosm (the stâte) vs. the individual.
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The passage at 904d also rationalizes the concept of "Hades", or the
Underworld. The a¡eas still exist, but they are used to illustrate an essenúally
immaterial system. Rather than strictly a topographical afea (as in other
eschatological myths), Hades is the representation in the human mind of the soul's
demotion (and, as such, punishment) to a worse life, which cannot be described in
immaterial terms.3a
At 905b, there is reference to the soul not being able to avoid paying the
penalty for its crimes on earth or after, in Hades, or a worse place (presumably
Tartarus).3t This does imply retention of belief in the topography of the traditional
Underworld, which is confusing in the context of punishment by reincarnation, and
is made more so by the reference at 904d to Hades in the sense that it is "so-
called" - that is, men believe in a lower region and call it Hades, but in fact it is a
symbolic representation of the indescribable movements of the soul by the
netteucr¡ç.36 That reincamation is the main punishment is made clear by 903d3-
e1 (quoted above).
34 At727d the soul is told that Hades may be a blessing rather than an evil.
35 I do not see this as a reference to a "punishment life": the concept of rewa¡d and punishment
lives appears to be absent from this system; rather, it is the next life which will be a reward or
punishment for the previous life.
'ucf. t¡e situation in Politicus, where souls are incamated from the earth, withoutmention of
any underworld mythology : 269 c-27 4e.
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904e4-905a4 seems to illustrate that this is how the next life is viewed:
souls with evil inclination fall into the company of other evil souls (904e: and
presumably get worse):
Aöq tor. ôírr'¡ åotì Oeôv oi "Olu¡urov ë1oootv,
ô æoî rai veovíorce opel"e.îo0ar ôorôv {rcò Oeôv, roríco pèv
yryvópevov æpòç tdç roríouç yu2¿cÍç, o¡reívco ôè npòç tdç
o¡reívouç nopeuópevov, ëv € (cun roi åv ruôot 0svótorç æóo26erv
te ö æpoofrrov ôpôv Ëocr roîç æpooQepÉot coòç rpooQepeîç roì
æoreîv. raúc4ç tfrç ôírqç oöte or) prl rote oöte ei ö1"),oç otu1flç
yevó¡revoç åæeóÇr1tor nepryevéo0ot Oeôv' {iv æcoôv ôrrôv
ôtoQepóvta4 ëto(óv te oi" td(ovæç lpeóv te e(eul,opeîoOor tò
napano'v.
This is viewed as part of the punishment (the "greatest judgemenf':728b) - that is,
the innate demarcation of the evil man from the influence of the good.tt Virtuous
souls collect with other virtuous souls and so advance. The point being made is
that in each life, one has to wage a personai fight against vice, because one's
destiny depends directly on behaviour during life:
YuXîç oôv ovOpcímc.ù Krîpo our ëottv eöQuéotepov ei"ç tò
Quleîv pèv tò roróv, ilveûoor ôè roì" el¿îv tò ædvtorv dptotov,
raì- ËÀóvtq oô rcorvfr or¡vorreîv tòv Ë.ríl,otnov Bíov' (728c-d)38
This raises the question of the ultimate goal towards which the souls are
aiming with their virtuous behaviour. No end to the system is proposed, but the
souls scoring 1007o virtue are placed in a higher and better region, reached by a
sacred road. This could hint at either a final transcendence in discarnate form,
t''728]r,c,
tt 726-12l makes the dichotomy quite clea¡: the human soul must be honoured second only to the
gods (727a,'727b); it is honoured not by flanery and gifs, but through the pursuit and atcainment
of virtue.
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perhaps as a quasi-divine fîgure (which 966d suggests as a requirement for the
vopo0Écr¡ç), or else - if no defînite end is posited - in the highest form of earthly
life possible.3e At72lb-c (for example) one notes the similarity to the argument
n Symposium, that humans achieve immortality by means of offspring and fame,
rather than by apotheosis.
The impersonal aim of the system is clear: to promote virtue, and rid the
cityluniverse of vice (904b). This can provide a theoretical end to the incarnations:
that is, when every soul achieves complete virtue there is no further need for
reincarnation. That this is unlikely to occur is suggested by the embodied soul's
inherent predisposition for evil:'o the virtuous souls may not remain virtuous, and
so the system must continue.
The pursuit of virtue is somewhat enigmatic: what is "virtue"? It is care of
the soul. At 959a ff. the Athenian stresses that the soul is superior to the body
(and is the life-force) and, therefore, burial rites should not be extravagant because
the body means nothing; it is merely the semblance of the soul:41
..pori0erriv te outô prlrlva peyriÀ,r'¡v elvot tetel,eotlróc' (ôvcu
yùp ëôer por1Oeîv navraç toùç æpoo{rovtoç, öro4 öcr
'nln Plato, tlis is usually as philosopher: cf. Empedocles fr.146 for his top earthly lives, a¡d
fr.l46 for the hnal translation to a place among the immortals.
no At 906a, the point is made that there are many more evil souls than virtuous souls.
aræeiOeoOcrr õ' Ëotï tQ vopoOér¡ ¡¿peôv rct æ üLì'a roi lé1ovtr VDXrlv oópatoç elvot tò r¡ôv
õraQépotoov, Év autQ te tQ pírp tò æcpe2¿ópevov d¡pôv ËKqotov toôt'etvot pqôàv a¡.1.'iì rqv
VoXúv, tò ôè oôpa ivôoiulópevov f¡pôv Ë.róorotç ËzteoOot, roì tel.eou¡oóvtcov l.ÉyeoOot
rol,ôç eiôor),o eìvcn rù tôv verpôv oó¡rcto, ròv õè övto d¡polv ërqotov övtroç, oOóvotov
etvclt yq¿ì¡v Ènovopcl(ópevov, æopa Oeoòç öl,Louç onrÉvat ôóoovto Àó"¡,ov, ro0ónep ô vópoç
ó æótptoç Àé1er - tQ pèv lcrp o1a0Q 0cppcrLÉov, tQ ôè rorc@ pó)"c Qopepóv.. (959a4-b6)
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ôrrarótotoç röv roì" öorócatoç Ë(r¡ te (côv raì" teÀ^e.ucrfooç
cnpópr1toç cùv rarôv o¡ropqpcitolv È1íyveto tòv petd tòv
evOóôe píov. é.r ôè toótorv oöto4 é1óvtrov ouôércote
oiroQ0opeîv ?úpú, ôtoQepóvtcoç vopí(ovto tòv or¡toô toûtov
etvor ròv tôv ooprôv öyrov 0ontópevov, ol"À'åxeîvov tòv uòv ri
aôel.Qóv, ri övcvd ctç prilro0'r1yeîror æoOôv Ocircterv, oileo0or"
ruepoivovto roì" êpær"pæ},óvto crjv oötoô poîpov, tò ôè æopòv
ôeîv eô roteîv, td pétpto ovoì"íorovta ôç eiç ciryolov 1Oovírov
pcopóv' (959b6-dl)
By implication, therefore, care of the body is not a priority for the virtuous man,ot
although this is never taken to the extreme of bodily denouncement. One can
perhaps see an acceptance and striving for balance between the desires of the soul
and those of the corporeal: the dialogue certainly lacls the rigid "puritanism" of,
for example, Phaedo.a3
The relentless nature of "Justice" is stressed: there is no escape from the
judgement, and one's sins cannot be hidden anywhere (905a). Moreover, there is
no valid excuse for one's evil behaviour, nor any escape (905b). This point brings
the dialogue both back to the atheist debate of 884a ff. (Book X), and forward
towards a definition of law which integrates all of the discussion of Books IX and
X. At 880de the point is made that laws are necessary to guide the uneducated
(the ignorant).44 This idea was carried to its logical conclusion at 875a ff.:
éç cÍpo vó¡rouç avOpcirnor,ç ovoyraîov cf0eo0or...r1 ôè uirLa
toótorv fiôe, öc Qóorç ovOpcírccov ouõevòç irovr¡ Qóetot cóote
yvôvoí. te ra oupQépovto ov0pcírcorç eiç æol,tteiav roi yvoOoo,
o'This would certainly fit with the pictures drawn in other dialogues of the ideal ascetic
philosopher.
o'At Laws'728ethe best sort of body is the one at the middle of all the extremes of body fypes:
the temperate and søble body.
on Th"y also act as reminders for the virtuous (the educated).
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rò Bél.rrotov oei ôóvao0aí te roì éOéÀ.etv nparrew. yvôvcr
pèv 1dp æpôrov 1al"eæòv öc noÀrcr.rf raì oÀr10eî ÉXvrl ou tò
íôrov all,rì tò rorvòv óvd6r1 péÀ"e.rv - tò pèv ydp rorvòv ouvõeî,
rò ôè iôrov ôroolrQ rdç ról"etç - roi ört oupQÉper tQ rorv@ te
roì" i"ôirp, toîv opQoîv, tiv rò rotvòv o"0fltot ral,ôç pôl,l,ov fi tò
iõrov' õeótepov ôé, èdv cÍpa xoì" tò yvôvoí cç öcr" toOto o'ljtco
néSurev ì"cÍBq iravôç év rêXv\, petd ôè toOto óvuneúOuvóç æ
rai outorprÍtolp cÍp(n róÀ"eroç, our dv æote ðóvstto é¡rpeîvor
coórq cQ ôóypoc rci ôraBrôvot tò pèv rotvòv rlyoúpevov
cpéQorv åv cfl xo?,.at, tò ôè iôrov ènópevov tQ rotvQ, all,' êæi
æÀ.eove(íov xaì iôtorpoyiov i evn'un Qóotç sùtòv ép¡n"¡oet oei,
Qeóyouoo pèv alfuroç crlv Xótunv, õrórouoo ôè crlv r1ôovriv, toû
öÈ ôrrarotépou te rai apeívovoç êæinpooOev cÍpQo toótro
npoocrioetcr, rci orótoç orepyo(opévr1 êv curfl æóvtcov rcrôv
é¡rrÀ(oer" æpòç tò rÉIoç oocr¡v te roì" r4v nóItv öî.t1v. Ëæeì
roOta ei norê. crç ovOpcímrov Qóoet irovòç 0efg poí"pg yewqOeìç
æopoÀoBeîv ôovotòç eiq, vóprov ouôèv ôv ôéorto tôv op(óvtcov
Éouto0' ålcroo'¡pqç ydp oöte vópoç oöte m\tç oúôepío
rpeittcov, ouôè 0é¡nç åodv vo0v ouôevòç uæ(roov ouôè ôo0î,ov
q¡"Àd nóvtrrrv dplovto eIvcr, èdvrcep cÀqOtvòç él^eóOepóç te
övtorç fl rotd Qúorv. vôv ôè ou ltip åottv ouôopoô oöôopôç, óÀÀ'
fi roto ÞpaXó' ôrò ô{ rò ôeótepov oipetéov, ro,\w te roì vópov,
rì ôq tò pèv coç Ëæì tò æol"ò ópQ roì" BÀéæer, tò ô' èæì æôv
oôuvoteî. (874e8-875d5)
This expresses an idea central to Socratic ethical thought: viz, that vice comes
about through ignorance, and that virtue is a result of knowledge. Thus it is
through understanding (knowledge) that the soul realizes virtue, and so advances
up the scale of lives. In terms of the conduct of the soul, one can see that the laws
supply the necessary knowledge to the evil (ignorant) to enable them to grow
towards virtue. However, it is the soul itself which must determine which way it
will go.as
ot lt is interesting to note that although there is no reference to the soul as tripartite or the like, at
906b the greedy (unjust) soul is described as bestial hptóõIç: this links with the concepúon in,
for example, Phaedrus, that the parts of the soul a¡e like untrained animals.
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Thus it is a system based on two levels of change: (automated) change
determined by divine law, and change within the soul brought about by personal
effort - the second deærmining the first. Unlike Republic, where the events of
one's chosen life are fixed and immutable, the soul tn Laws is able to improve (and
worsen) its life (and thus its prospects for the next life) through its own self-
determination.a6
I would argue that Plato is the flrst thinker to develop fully the ethical
aspects of reincarnation.ot The beginnings of ethical thought can be seen in
Empedocles' poetry, but it is Plato who flust makes clear the connection between
reincarnation and education. For Plato, it is the educative experience which is
important for the soul's development: "correct" education leads to virtue, and a
"bad" education leads to vice.
Educaúon is engenderedby rcahzation of the soul's "plight" or "position",
but gained by acting on this realization. For example, one major decision for the
soul concerns the compariy it frequents. As 904e illustrates - and as I have
developed above - it is part of the soul's destiny that like attracts and influences
like: therefore, for example, to break away from bad company would be one
major, practical step to'wards vhtue.48 Another way of attaining virtue, related to
ou This is considerably fairer than the system detailed at Republic 619b2-627bi (q.v.).
otDodds (1951) pp.150f. seems to be arguing along these lines, but dating the realization much
earlier,
o'Cf.9Mc2-4: öq "¡op öv ÈærOopfr roì énoîóç trç öv trlv yulrlv, roóq1 o1eðòv Ércúotore roì-
totoôtoç yi^¡veru cÍnoç f¡pôv óç tò rol"ó. It is a "you are what you eat" situation.
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this, is by imitating the behaviour of the divine, and by following the guidance and
rational ordering of the immortal part within us. This is law (7I3e-7I4a), and an
example of allowing the superior to rule over the inferior (as shepherds over
sheep, etc.): 7 l3d ff.ae
A further step towards virtue - especially in the light of 906b1
(orr:$pooóvr¡) - is the control of one's desire/greed for food, drink, sex, etc. l82e-
783a describes the soul as having an "instinctive lust", or craving, for food a¡rd
drink which is nearþ impossible to overcome, and which is only surpassed by
sexual desire (lust). These evils are controlled tproì" pè.v toîç pelíototç...0óÞc.D
roi vó¡rcp roì. tô ol.r¡0eî Xóyqù.. (783a5-7)so
That the soul is capable of making these decisions is illustrated by 904b and
904d:
cnç ôè yevéoeorç roô ¡oiou crvòç óQfrre tcîç BouÀrloeorv
èróotorv npôu toç oidoç. (904b8-c2)
pei(ro ôè ôi VUf,q roríoç ì operîç ônótov petokiBrl ôtd c4v
qórflç poóÀqoiv te xoì öptÀíov levo¡révqv iolupciv.. (904d4-6)
"Education" is a blanket term to describe all of the ways in which the soul
learns from, and reacts to, its environment. How this self-determination begins is
on Cf. 906b and 906c-d for examples of the abuse of this relationship in the context of atheism.
s0 Cf . Phaedo 64c10-e2, 67c5-dl and 83b6-7. At ltws 727a ff. all the evils that man confers on
the soul by flattery, cowardice, greed, evil etc,. are detailed. For an analogy, cf. the point made at
909d-e: private shrines are forbidden as they are part of an attempt to bribe the gods with flattery
(for the defence see 906c ff). To honour the soul one should: bequeath modesty, not money, to the
next generation (729b); set a good example; reverence kin and gods and laws (729c ff.) and etc.
Moderation is the key.
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not described. There is, for example, no reference to anamn¿sis. Instead, at 906a
we read that humans have some sort of innate knowledge, a knowledge which is
also shared by the gods, but in greater measuro.tt This is obviously similar to the
idea expressed elsewhere, that we have a spark of the divine within us (our
souls),52 or that our souls are somehow akin to the divine.s3
Obviously, the flrst task for the soul is to acknowledge or realize the
system of which it is a part: this assumes that there is some way for the soul to
arrive at this realization. From the picture drawn (in the context of a civic code of
religion and morality), the soul's existence in the body appears framed within
unwritten law, and thus does not require this self-discovery; therefore, one might
expect reincarnation to be an integral part of state religion
To believe this is to take Plato's example too far, and to forget the context
in which reincarnation appears. I would argue that Inws represents a style of
argument familiar tn Meno and Phaedo: the speaker takes a topic which is
generally unbelieved or unproved,sa and sets out to make it believed/proved, using
- as in Meno in particular - whatever arguments will do the job. In lttws,
reincarnation is essential to the argument against atheism, and it is only by means
sl ..Errqtooórn1 rcrì oo$pooóvr1 ¡retc Qpovrloeo4, év toiç tôv Oeôv è¡ryó2¿otç oiroôocr
õuvópeorv, ppo2¿ù ôé r xoi rflôe cÍv ttç tôv toroótcov Èvotroûv f¡pîv oo$Èç iôor.
szTimneus 41d-e develops the idea that human souls and the divine V/orld Soul a¡e both made
from the same mixture. Cf. Republic 590cd, where wisdom and control come from the divine
within.
"For example, Phaedo 81b ff.; Republic 611e1.tr.
to Fo. e^ample, immortali ty at M e no 8 la ff. and, P hae do 7 0c4-d5 ff .
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of a doctrine of reincamation that the speaker can "prove" that the gods exist and
look after us. The result, however, is more than a reply to the atheists: the speaker
has provided an answer to the great ethical problem of why the evil appear to
prosper, and the innocent suffer
As tn Meno and Phaedo, it is ironic that his arguments are based on an idea
(reincarnation) which does not seem to have had widespread acceptance in Greek
popular thought: the Pythagorean movement did not survive into the fourth
century, and the Orphics appeared to be only a minority group. Neither group
rcalized their potential to the same degree as the popular Eleusinian mysteries (for
example), yet, in turn, the cult at Eleusis never realízed its full ethical potential in
the way that Plato realized it with reincarnati on in Inws.s5
Reincarnation is used (and is necessary) to create a workable sysûem of
ethics for the stâte - by providing a suiøble backup for human/earthty justice which
is ultimately fair for all. This divine fail-safe is at the heart of the combination of
cosmic law (represented through myth), and civic law, and forms a unique picture
of an automated justice system which is infallible and just: and Justice is the raison
d'être of Inws:s6
Q0eí.pet ôè ltpôç aôrria rai öpprç perd oQpooóulç, oó(er ôè
ôtrorooúvr1 roì" ocoQpooóvr1 peto Qp ovrl oeoç.. (906a7 -b 1 )
t'See my Int¡oduction for the Eleusinian Mysteries; cf. Appendix B on the Orphics.
tu Cf. also 904b, 905ab.
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REINCARNATION IN EARLY GREEK THOUGHT:
SOME CONCLUSIONS
I do not have all the answers to my questions about reincarnation. I can,
however, make a number of suggestions and tender some opinions, which I hope
will serve as an adequate conclusion to this topic:
(1) There is no one coherent doctrine of reincarnation, which can be seen to
develop either ideologically, or chronologically, in early Greek thought. Although
this thesis traces the appearance of reincamation from its religio-mystic origins to
its climax in philosophy, it is difficult to view a development. Even in the Platonic
dialogues, it appears in myth, as an anonymous, and often slightly less than
respectable doctrine, and its own ethical dimensions are rarely stressed, even when
it forms the background, or proof, upon which Plato founds his own system of
ethics. Reincarnation begins in the mystic movements, and never entirely breaks
free from them.
(2) AnV attempt to cross-reference the doctrines present in the sources will
ineviøbly fail. The doctrines present in þthagorean, Pindaric, Empedoclean, and
Platonic (and even Orphic) thought are all similar, but not quite similar enough; it
is not satisfactory to link them on the premise that reincarnation is the umfying
common feature.
u0
Implicit in this, (3) the traditional view is that Empedocles, Pindar and Plato were
using "Orphic-Pythagorean" concepts; yet the unreliable nature of our knowledge
of Orphism and Pythagoreanism, and the reluctånce of later authors to give their
sources, makes this far from certain.l
(4) Reincarnation was never a major religious movement; it seemed to exist more
as a (pseudo-)philosophical tenet, rather than as the basis for widespread cult
practices. It never broke away from traditional eschatology, and, in most
appearances, appears slotted in to a traditional, eschatological framework. This
sometimes leads to superfluity, as we see in Phaedo. In Pindar's Olympian 2, for
example, reincarnation rests uneasily within a very Homeric framework of
t¡aditional mythology. The so-called Orphic myth of Dionysus and the Titans,
while unusual, is hardly a complete break with anthropogonical tradition, and the
Orphic poems have many similarities with Hesiod (if they are to be associated with
reincarnation at all). Empedocles is the only candidate for a radical break with
tradition, but he not only retains the traditional theology, but also the Greek
emphasis on purifications. Moreover, the nature of the fragments makes it difficult
to verify that Empedocles is illustrating reincarnation set in the cosmic regions.
(5) However, this is not to suggest that reincarnation was not a belief among a
number of individuals and groups: it certainly appears to be a belief attributable to
1 Pinda¡ fr. 133, quoted in Meno, appears to be a rare exception; but the provenance of the beliefs
in this fragmenl are fa¡ from ascerlainable.
247
Theron of Akragas, for example. But, as I have already noted, while it was
evident in group movements, these tended to be small, situated away from the
centre of the Greek world, and holding no doctrines entirely consistent with other
small enclaves. I would suggest that the only author who held reincarnation as an
personal belief was Empedocles; yet, then again, we have the problem of how his
Katharmoi fit \with The Physics.
(6) If I had to suggest a general picture of reincarnaúon in the early Greek worid, I
would speculate that it did not make its flrst appearance on the Greek mainland.
Southern Italy was, as Woodbury remarks,2 a "hot-house culture" of semi-
mystical cults, and indeed it seems that Magna Graecia was particularly susceptible
to chthonic and eschatological beliefs.3 Certainly it coincides with the regionality
of the sources: Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, Pinda¡ and Empedocles have
firmly established connections with Magna Graecia; Plato's connection with Sicily
is equally well known, although, as a direct influence, it is rather more problematic
(particularly if it post-dates his most metempsychosic dialogue).
The "big picture" seems to be that reincarnation was a nebulous concept
even in contemporary Greece. Its arrival cannot be ascertained with any degree of
certainty; its appearance is almost impossible to verify before the time of
2 V/oodbury (1966) p,598
'The distribution of the gold leaves is indicative of this. I have discussed the Magna Graecian
connection most fully in Appendix B.
*
u2
Xenophanes (mid-sixth century); there is no evidence that it was ever a canonical
tenet of a large organization; and, although it may appear to be a widespread
belief, this is in fact an optical illusion - it ¿s found on many boundaries and
marginal areas of the Greek world, but these groups appear small, often
endangered because of their odd beliefs, and reincarnation is never clearly attested
in Attica.
What appears most surprising to me is that reincarnation never succeeded
in Greece, despite appearing at a time when desire for continuity of individuality
was most prominent, and in a period which is one of the richest in terms of
introduced soæriological rites. It seems that the Greek desire for personal
immortality (in all of its varied senses) continued to follow a very traditional
eschatology. The failure of reincarnation in earþ Western thought - unlike in the
East where metempsychosic beliefs continued to exist and grow - is almost
unfathomable. Does the solution lie in the failure to integrate traditional belief
with innovative religiosity without en genderin g superfluity ?a
o As, for example, in Plato's Phaedo, where there was little need for rwo eschatological systems
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APPENDIX A: PHERECYDES OF SYROS
The work of Pherecydes of Syros (floruit 540 BC) has been described by
modern commentators as "wilfully bizarre.. infantilism", "primitive",l
"inexplicabld',2 a "literary curiosity",3 and of no importance whatsoever in the
history of Greek thought.a For Aristotle (Metaphys¿cs 1091b8), however, he was a
"mixed theologian",5 one of those "who do not say everything in mythical form";
as such he seems to stand on the border between pure theogonic myth/story (for
example, Hesiod's Theogony), and the work of the flrst Milesian thinkers, in
particular, Ana¡<imander, with whom Pherecydes vies (unsuccessfully, I would
thiok)u for the title of first Greek prose writer.
The issue in my discussion of Pherecydes is whether his writing included,
or was likely to have included, any reference to reincarnation or transmigration.
The sources for this are, inevitably, problematic. They are,
(1) surviving fragments of Pherecydes;
(2) accounts and interpretations of Pherecydes' (supposed) subject matter
t Frankel (197 5) pp.241,243
2Burnet (1952) p.3
'Barnes (1919)I,p.l2
o Hussey (1972) p.31: "To put it more sharply, in the history of the human mind the Milesians are
of ca¡dinal importance, and Alcman and Pherecydes not at all".
5 One of the pe¡n1pévor.
6 Discussed below.
245
It can be readily seen from the fragmentsT that there is no real, or implied,
reference to reincarnation. However, there are also very few fragments on which
to base this sweeping judgement.
As for (2), the relevant comments are as follows:8
Suda, s.v. (Þepexóôqç (DK7A2) (2 Schibli)
ôrôo2¿0fvor ðè ur' oútoô llu0oyópov l"ó1oç, sútòv ôè oor
éo1r1révor" roOr¡y1tt1v, ù?,"),"' Ëoutòv aorcf oot rcqodpevov td
@otvírc¡v aæórpuQc BrB),ía. æpôcov ôè ouyypaQf,v è(eveyreîv
æe(ô l,óyrp cvèç iotopoôor.v, êtépotv toôto eiç Kriôpov ròv
Mtl.rlorov Qepóvtrov, raì npôrov tòv æepi cflç pecepryr4¿óoecoç
î.óyov eiorlyri ooo0or.
Cicero, Tusculanae disputation¿s, I. 16.38 (DK7A5) (7 Schibli)
magni auûem est ingenü sevocare mentem a sensibus et
cogitaúonem ab consuetudine abducere. itaque credo equidem
etaim alios tot saeculis, sed quod litteris exstet, Pherecydes Syrius
primum dixit animos esse hominum sempiternos, antiquus sane; fuit
enim meo regnante gentili. hanc opinionem discipulus eius
Pythagoras maxime confirmavit..
Maximus Tyrius Philo s ophumena, 7 .4.9 -13 (36 Schibli)
éç @eperúôr1ç unepeQpóver [cfrç vóoor] év Iópql xeípevoç, tôv
pèv oaprôv ourô Q0erpopé.vrov, ,rnç õè Vof,îç eotcírqç óp0îç,
roì" rapoôoroúoqç TRv azoÀî"ayr\v toû ôoo1pr'¡otou toótou
æeprplrl¡rotoç.
Aurelius Augustinus Contra Academicos 3.I1.37 (48 Schibli)
Pythagoras autem Graeca philosophia non contentus, quae tunc aut
paene nulla erat aut certe occultissima, postquam commofus
Pherecydae cuiusdam Syri disputationibus immortalem esse animum
credidit, multos sapientes etiam longe lateque perigrinatus audierat.
7 vid¿ Schibli (1990) and DK 7 B.
8Text and any translations are taken from Schibli (1990). DK concordance numbers
(A=testimonia; B=fragments) are also given, where they exist.
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Tatian Oratio ad Graecos 3 (51a Schibli)
1el"ô roi tr1v @eperóôouç ypcoÀoyíov rai toô llu0oyópou cr¡v
repì" tò ôóy¡ro rl.r'¡povopíov raì toô flldtr¡voç, rciv ttveç pr1
0él,r¡or", tr1v repì roútou pí¡rr¡otv.
Tatian Oratio ad Graecos 25 (slb Schibli)
llu0cyópoç E{iQoppoç yelovévor Qqoì roì toO @eperúôooç
ôó1potoç rl.r'¡povó¡roç Ëonv' ô ôè 'AprototéXr¡ç cqç VùXîç
õropdl,l"er" crlv a0ovaoíov.
Lactantius Divinae instintiones 7.1.I2 (85a Schibli)
immortales esse animas Pherecydes et Plato disputaverunt: haec
vero propria est in nostra religione doctrina.
Lactantius Divinae institutiones 7.8.7 (85b Schibli)
in eadem sententia fuit etiam Pythagoras antea, eiusque praeceptor
Pherecydes, quem Cicero [see 7 Schibli, above] tradidit primum de
aeternitate animarum disputavisse.
Apponius In Canticum Canticorum3.5 (DK7A5) (86b Schibli)
Ferecides autem vocabulo, animam hominis prior omnibus
immortalem auditoribus suis tradidisse docetur, et eam esse vitam
corporis, et unum nobis de caelo spiritum; alterum credidit terrenis
seminibus comparatum. deorum vero naturam et originem ante
omnes descripsit: quod opus multum religioni nostrae conferre
probatur, ut noverit turpiter natos turpioremque vitam duxisse,
dedecorosius mortuos, quos idolatriae cultor deos adfirmat.
Porphyry llpòç fcôpov rcepì to0 nôç épyulo0tor rù ë¡tþpoa 2.2
(DK7B7) (87 Schibli)
..to0 pèv ötav rotopþOf tò oruéppo tòv rorpòv ro0tov [sc. rîç
eiorcpfoeroç cîç VuXîçl arcoôtôóvtoç ôç öv pr¡õ' oiou te ðvtoç êv
q pútpq yovíproç rpotrl0fvot pr1 n ye VUX,îç ë(oÉev tñ
eiorpíoer éoo{ç c4v oúpQuotv oæepyooopévr'¡ç - xovtoû0o
rcol"ùç ô Nooprlwoç rsì oi tdç llu0oyópou öæovoíoç
È(r11oó¡revor roì ròv napd pèv tQ llì,ót<ovr æotopòv 'A¡rél.qra,
æapd ôè tQ 'Horóôrp roi toîç 'OpQrroîç cr¡v Ðtuyo, ropd ôè tQ
@epexóõn crlv èrpoî¡v Èri to0 oæéppotoç érôe1ópevot..
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Po¡phyry De antro nympharum 31 (DK7B6) (88 Schibli)
..roì roô Eupíou @eperóõou pu26oùç rai Bó0pouç raì dvtpo roì
Oópoç roì nóÀaç lÉyovtoç raì õrd toútr¡v aiwtropévou tdç tôv
yu1ôv levéoerç ral cæoyevéoetç.
A number of features stand out from these accounts, and I shall discuss these
individually:
(i) none of the sources are even closely contemporary with Pherecydes (or
Pythagoras). The most influential of the sources is undoubtedly Cicero, and one
wonders what his source was.' He seemed to have had a certain amount of interest
in aspects of þthagorean/Orphic doctrine (cf. his comments at De Senectute, 20
Somnium Scipionis, 3.10 (= De Re Publica 6.15); De Re Publica 6.14; De
Amicitia 14; and Tusc.Disp. I.l4).ro A possible link is thus suggested through
Pythagoras as Pherecydes' pupil.
(ü) the majority of sources link Pherecydes to Pythagoras in a teacher-pupil
relationship, and, (üi) inherent in this is the idea that Pythagoras received his
special ideas on the soul (viz. transmigration) from Pherecydes. A number of
points can be made about this supposed relationship:
(a) We have no evidence (apart from late doxography) that Pherecydes
was a teacher. By the time of Aelian, for example, Pherecydes was regarded as a
dangerous, Socratic figure:
n Schibli (1990) (p.lOa) suggests Poseidonios.
10 Note my comments on this in the chapter on Plato's Phaedo ,
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raOrlpevov ydp év AiÀqù pecd tôv po0r¡tôv cÍl.l.a te rol,l"ri Qoou
tfrç Ë.outoô ooQíaç eirceîv roi ôr¡ xoi toôto, pr¡ôevì tôv Oeôv
00oor, xaì. öproç ouôèv frttov r¡ôéo4 peBrorévcr xoì ql,únoç, oó
peîov tôv êrotópBaç rora0uóvtrov. óæèp taóqç oôv cîç
rouQol.oyioç Boputderlv (r1píov å(écoev. (Aelian Varia historia
4.28;37a Schibli)
(b) It seems that the doctrinal link of Pherecydes and þthagoras can be
traced back to the famous epigram to Pherecydes by Ion of Chios, reported in D.L.
1.120 (56 Schibli).11 The epigram is ambiguous:
éç ö ¡rèv r¡vopéq re KeKoopévoç 11ôè roì" oiôoî
roi Q0ipevoç VoXî teprcvòv ë.1er piotov,
eirep llu0o1ópr1ç etúpoç ooQóç, öç nepì" ncÍvto¡v
ovOpcímorv Tvópoç eiôe roi è(époOev.
As Kirk and Raven have pointed out, the epigram could be interpreted to mean
that Pythagoras "learned" about the soul from Pherecydes; or, it could simply refer
to Pythagoras' learning and knowledge, quite independent of Pherecydes.l2 The
link is therefore somewhat tenuous. The tradition, however, is very strong.13
The quotation from Maximus Tyrius (c. AD 125-185) offers another
example of the bluning of traditions that surrounds the early Greek writers. The
idea of the "bothersome garment' is reminiscent of Empedocles' doctrine of
reincarnation (viz. fr. 126 DK "..clothing [sc. the daimon?f in an unfami]iar
tt Cf. t¡e epigram of Dou¡is (57 Schibli),
12 KR p.51, based on Gomperz WS 47 (1929) p.14,n.3
"cf.27,28,29a,29b,29c,30a,30b,2r,3ib,42,43,44a,44b,Mc,45a,45b,46a,46b,49,50a,
50b, 5lb, 52,53b,54a,55,84 Schibli; Tatian is perhaps ttre only scepúc (5la),
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garment of flesh"). However, it is perfectly possible to see the "bothersome
garment'' as referring to Pherecydes' irritating skin condition (phttreiriasis)
mentioned by a number of sources: cf. 26, 27, 33, 34a,34b, 3Ja,37b Schibli on
Pherecydes' dying "devoured by lice"; also 29b, 30a, 30b, 32 Schibli more
specifically on phtheiriasis.ra The "deliverance" could therefore be simply the
eagerness with which he awaited escape from an irritating disease. The ambiguity
of the passage leaves it wide open to interpretations of both sorts. To add to the
confusion, a separate tradition linlçs Pherecydes' death with a prophecy which he
gave prior to the MagnesianÆphesian war (cf. D.L. I.117-18; DK7A1). The
unusual (usually horrid and/or mad) ends of the early Greek thinkers are legendary
and various.ls
(c) Another late source (Porphyry apud Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica,
10.3.6-9; 22 Schibli; DK7A6) discusses the (deliberate?) blurring of the traditions
of Pherecydes and Pythagoras, as illustrated by Andron and (contra) Theopompus.
The former ascribed a series of miraculous events and prophecies to Pythagoras;
the latter, according to Porphyry, deliberately ascribed these same events to
Pherecydes. It certainly appears that the miracles ascribed to Pherecydes do belong
to Pythagoras, who had innumerable such events associated with him.16 Also,
compare Diogenes Laertius' comment on the miracles: ëwot ôè llo0c"yópg
'o 35 Schibli (Pliny NH 7 .7-/2) also mentions \ryonns creeping out of Pherecydes' body.
15Cf. Empedocles on Etna; Diogenes covering himself with dung and etc.. There a¡e usually a
number of legends associated with the deaths of such people.
tu Cf. Burkert (1972) pp.7M,l41
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nsplóTcrooot td0tq (I.116; DK7A1; 16 Schibli). For the miraculous stories, see
17 -22, 24, 26 Schibli. 17
(d) Finalty, it is common to find, among the doxographers (who have, as
Schibli has pointed out, a horror vacui), a persistent tradition of "teacher-pupil"
relationships among the Greek thinkers, which can often take the form of a father-
son bond.lt It may be this horuor vacui that ascribed Pherecydes' leaming to
'?hoenician books" (Suda) when no suiøble teacher could be found.le It seems
an unlikely tradition.2o
In the face of such wild theories, I would follow Kirk and Raven's sensible
suggestion that what has occurred is, as the evidence suggests, that the better
known tradition surrounding Pythagoras has been transferred back to his alleged
teacher Pherecydes, and that part of this tradition is Pythagorean belief in
transmigration.2l
" Cf. KR pp,50-51; Rohde (1925) pp.300ff.
tt 
de Vogel (1966) p.240 sees this phenomenon particularly in rhe 4th century.
te Cf. 46a Schibli. The idea of secret books is not restricted to Pherecydes: a similar radition is
associated with Empedocles.
toBut, see Walcot (1965) p.79 on comparative oriental motifs in Pherecydes; also West (1971)
and (1963). It is noted that Tzetzes (53a Schibli) makes Thales, as well as Pythagoras, a pupil of
"the Assyrian Pherekydes". On the oriental learning of Pherecydes (especially in Egypt) cf. 38,
39, 40,41 Schibli. The authorities are all very late. Moreover, lnowledge which cannot be
ascribed to Greek originality is often ascribed to the orient, and specihcally Egypt; cf. the
doxographic tradition in the Suda (2 Schibli; also Philo: 80 Schibli).
21KR p.60,n.1; Long (1948) pp.l3ff. also agrees. schibli (1990) p.77,n.24 notes rhar rhe
influence of Pherecydes on Pythagoras was assumed to be proved among Neopythagoreans and
Neoplatonists.
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(iv) a number of influential sources (for example, Porphyry) are Neoplatonists
This has caused a number of problems, not least due to their date being so far
removed from Pherecydes, but mainly because of their tendency to allegorise. I
will begin by discussing how Schibli has, to my mind, wrongly interpreted the
evidence of the Neoplatonists with regard to Pherecydes' supposed transmigration
beliefs.
Schibli restores to Pherecydes a near-complete, complex picture of
transmigration: immortal souls "passing away" through Porphyry's nooks and
caves (88 Schibli: De antro nympharum 31) and being born (again) at underworld
rivers.22 Moreover, he linls the rivers with semen by means of fragments 86 and
87, extending the fragments' analogies to include the transmigration of souls by
dissemination of seeds (semen), an idea taken partly, no doubt, from fr.60 where
Chronos puts [eggs smeared with] semen into the five nooks (one presumes - it is
rather fragmentary).23 The semen link is continued in the evidence of the
Neoplatonists: cf. the allegories of Numenius (fr.87) et al, which link rivers,
symbolically, with semen (cf. Plato's Ameles of Republic X and the
Hesiodic/Orphic Styx). Transmigration/reincarnation is therefore seen as
analogous to the insemination process: the body is ensouled by the entry of seed.
He then goes on to restore the topography of Pherecydes' underworld by reference
2z Contra, D.L.I.24 gives the tradition that Thales was the frst to say that souls were irnmortal:
Schibli (1990) p. 105,n.4.
23Pherecydes'book is called either "Pentemuchos" or "Heptamuchls"i see \Vest (1963) and
Walcot (1965) for tie arguments; also 'Pherekydes' RE xix2025-2033 (1938).
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to Platonic myth (particularly the Phaedo)," ¿s well as the framework for a
katabatic journey, and finally restores to Pherecydes a complete, ethical bios aTong
þthagorean lines, based on fr.90. The result is that Schibli can attest that
"..Pherekydes wrote with some deliberation about metempsychosis and thus
bestowed upon the soul itseH more significance than any (known) Greek author
before hfun."25
Schibli can restore all of this from only four fragments (86, 87, 88 and 90
Schibli), all of which post-date Pherecydes by at least 800 years.26
It seems to me to be inherently dangerous to put too much emphasis on the
works of the Neoplatonic allegorists (Numenius, Porphyry, Celsus and Origen) in
this regard; for example, Schibli's claim that Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean
assumptions need to be reduced to the minimal claim that Pherecydes wrote of the
experiences of souls in a context of metempsychosis. However, even if they are,
there is no reason to assume that Pherecydes did anything of the sort.
Numenius (whom Edwards sees as the foremost figure in a 2nd century
school of allegorical commentary on the ancient theologians¡,z] for example, could
'o Schibti (1990) p.120,n.36; cf. Wesr (1971) p.25 who agrees.
" schibli (1990) p.125
'u schibli (1990) p.1oB
2? Edwards (1990) p.25S
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combine Plato's "Myth of Er" (Repubtic X) with Odysseus' return to lthaca.28
Moreover, as Edwards has pointed out, among the fragments of the other
Pherecydes (of Athens; c.450BC) is a fragment about a Cave of the Nymphs which
comes from the scholiast on Apollonius Rhodes (4.1936) who does not mention
that there were two Pherecydes. The doxographic tradition is silent on the second
Pherecydes' influence (cf. Edwards' comments on Porphyry in the Suda: it does
not indicate whether Porphyry realised that there were two Pherecydes).2e
I would suggest, therefore, that because of their allegorising, their great
temporal and psychological distance from Pherecydes, and their dubious source
material, that the testimonia of the Neoplatonists cannot be relied upon to restore a
picture of Pherecydes' work.
The problems in Schibli's theory go beyond this. He has attempted to
restore what is obviously an anachronistic hotchpotch of later belief to a writer
2sRlwards (1990) p.258 gives a further demonst¡ation with the allegorizing of the fable of
Atlantis inTimneus by Origen, Numenius and Porphyry;cf. Pepin (1958) on Celsus' allegories of
battles nthe lliad, a¡d the battle at Pherecydes 78 Schibli (DK7Ba); cf. also 79 and 83,
2eEdwards (1990) p.260,n.11. This is a contentious issue: Wilamowitz had postulated that
"Pherecydes" was a generic label for the early Ionic theologians (just as "Hippocrates" is for the
medical corpus), He arrived at this conclusion because of the confusion of the two Pherecydes.
The separate identities of the two Pherecydes has since been established: see Jacoby (1947)
pp.l3ff.; for a surunary of the contention, cf. von Fritz RE s.v.'Pherekydes' xix 2025-2033
(1938); also Rohde (1925) p.399,n.xi,51. As Edwards (1990) notes, however, the nature of
Porphyry's sources is still at issue. On the allegorizing of Pherecydes (and Heraclitus) by the
Neoplatonists, see Pepin (1958) p.449 (on Celsus and Origen); Edwards (1990) p.261; KR p.60;
Schroder (1939) pp.110ff.; von Fritz (1938) co1.2028. Jacoby (194'7) pp.13-15 has commented
that von Friø remains influenced by Wilaurowitz's idea: cf. col.203l; also "..spekulativ-
allegorischen Elementes dem gesamten Werk ist das zenlrale Probleme ftir das Verstandnis der
Schrift und ihrer Stellung in der griechischen Literatur." (co1.2028). Freeman (1975) p.37 would
see the fragments as part of an "allegory of creation",
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considered by many to be fa¡ less talented than his immediate predecessor (Hesiod)
or his immediate successor (Anaximander). Schibli actually points out many of the
flaws in his own argument. For example, the fact that fr.60 refers to the generation
of the gods from Chronos' seed, not the generation of humans. This is a common
motif in theogonies. He also ciæs the Neoplatonic love of the flux and instability of
rivers etc.., and Numenius' allegory of Odysseus' final resting place representing
the soul which, having passed through repeated incarnations, is finally free.'o
The system of belief (or myth?) which Schibli attempts to restore is
extensively cross-referenced with Pythagoras' "beliefs", and those of early
Pythagoreanism. The well known problem of lack of early written evidence (and
total lack of Pythagoras' own writings) is ignored, despite Schibli quoting
Burkert's well-known coveat on speaking of a Pythagorean "doctrine".31
Furthermore, detail is restored, for example, from what appears (as Schibli admits)
to be a piece of gross hyperbole (90 Schibli).32
It seems to me that Schibli was mistaken in extrapolating the one piece of
evidence from Porphyry (88 Schibli) which specifies the topographical details
which might have occurred in Pherecydes' poem. He has taken caves and nooks
and added rivers and katabatic journeys, adapted for the most part, from Platonic
myth. Drinking at the Ameles has obviously been allegorised, and has become the
'o schibli (1990) p.tt6,n.28
" schibli (1990) p.119,n.35: Burkert (1972) p.735
"schibli (1990) p.123
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transfer of souls through semen." This is an anachronistic line of thought even for
the fifth century, and is most certainly out of place in the sixth.
The essential problem appears to be an acceptance of all sources as being
of equal value. The problem, detailed above, of the two Pherecydes and the "Cave
of the Nymphs" is not developed. Yet, as Edwards has commented, Polphyry in
De antro nympharum is writing of reincarnation as an accepted theory þased, in
this case, on the Zodiac):34 thus Porphyry is hardly a balanced or neutral
wrtness.
35
Zunfz has remarked on the early Greek disinterest ìn caves,36 and has
commented that two sources have influenced scholars to view caves in early Greek
thought with more interest than contemporary evidence may wilrant: the first
source is, of course, the Neoplatonic speculations (especially Porphyry's De
antro); the second is the Platonic myths of the underworld.3T
"For example, Schibli (1990) p.I20,n.36 sees the myth in Phaedo as peculiar and without
precedent, and suggests a link, through this very oddness, to Pherecydes. Vy'est (1971) pp.25-26
notes that the introduction of semen is a feature of later allegorizing.
3aRlwards (1990) p.259
'5 Cf. the views of KR on the Neoplatonisß (p.60).
36 Zuntz (1971) p.255,n.2
37 Zuntz (1971) p,255,n.1; asZuntznotes, the exception may be Empedocles (p.255); he also sees
Pherecydes as "foreign" to the Greek tradition.
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Finally, Schibli uses the very fact that Pherecydes is writing in a traditional
form (viz. theogony/cosmogony) to justify the fact that, due to the constraints of
the literary form, sometimes it was not possible to say what he could have said.38
I believe that it is possible to establish a more conservative, less
anachronistic, framework in which to set Pherecydes' work, and supposed
metempsychosic beliefs. I summariso this as follows
(a) the fragments formed part of a theogony/cosmogony which developed along
traditional lines, and was closer to the mythical theogony/cosmogony of Hesiod
than the proto-science of the early Milesian cosmologists. Note Aristotle's
commonts on Pherecydes in this regard.3e
(b) despite the legendary place of Pherecydes as the earliest prose writer, his work
betrays the influence of the early Milesians (for example, in the ex nihilo
creation),4O most obviously Anaximander, and thus is probably either
contemporary with (and looking to) Anaximander, or slightly after Anaximander
"schibli (1990) p.124; moreover, he makes the point (p.105) that as there is no evidence to the
contrary, we should accept certain stâtements without too much scepticism. It is unfortunate that
the testimonia do not back up this neat idea.
3e Aristotle is the nearest contemporary source to Pherecydes; moreover, he is imnune to




(noting that Anaximander was evidently thirty years older than Pherecydes).4l The
fact that Anaximander is the other candidate for frst prose writer makes the
influence of the new style on Pherecydes seem logical. The appearance of
"Chronos" (= Time) in Pherecydes is also suggestive of more abstract thought
(there is, of course, the real danger that Chronos is simply a fancy spelling of
,42uronos).
(c) It is correct to ask what Pherecydes' influences may have been. The pecuhar
etymology, and the rather bizane elements of the cosmogony (viz, the robe on the
tree: fr.73,76 Schibli), have suggested an oriental influence to many
commentators.a3 There seems to be little in the fragments to suggest a link
(mythic or otherwise) with either "Orphism" or early Pythagorean thought.a It has
been suggested that Pherecydes' work can be lixked with the Orphic Rhapsodic
Theogony; however, this is based on common style rather than subject matter, and
the Rhapsodic Theogony post-dates Pherecydes.as Moreover, West's tentative
suggestion that the "ouflow" can be linked with the Orphic "Spring of Memory" is
nt Kahn (1960)
a2KR pp.55ff; Zeller (1881) p,91,,n.2. On Anaximander, see Kahn (1960); for different overviews
of the subsequent situation for the "theologians", see Gigon (1954), Jaeger (1947), and Vlastos
(1970). On the "kosmos", see Peters (1967) pp.108-109.
a3Mostparticularly, West (1971) & (1963). He notes (1971, p.68) that we can assume oriental
(ANE) motifs in Pherecydes, but this "does not, unfortunately, help us to reconstruct the detâils
of his eschatology"; cf. Walcot (1965) p.79; I think that Burnet's speculation that Pherecydes
preserves fragmentsof "Minoan"belief maybenegated: (1914) p.4. Hussey (1972) pp.30ff.; KR
pp.9,71 "..practically no indication of special neat-eastern influence.."
aaThe exception - cf. Schwabl (1958) co1.1460 - may be the name Kronos/Ch¡onos; however this
only appears in later Orphic poetry. von Fritz (1938) col.2029 gives the references; at col.203l
he notes that Pherecydes appears between Hesiod and the Orphic fragments.
o5Rohde (1925)p.597
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tenuous in the extreme.a6 As Kirk and Raven have pointed out, there is little of
the magician or shaman to be resurrected from the fragments.aT Vlastos'
suggestion that Pherecydes may have been writing a mystical handbook to certain
rites is somewhat undermined by the apparent lack of a cult which is relevant to
the figures in the theology.as
(d) there is no reliable contemporary evidence to suggest that Pherecydes knew of,
or wrote about, reincarnation or transmigration, or that he was influenced by
eschatological thought. The slight evidence to the contrary (Cicero and the Suda)
is late and, in the case of the latter, no doubt influenced by Neoplatonic/Chrisúan
speculation and allegory
To take the extreme point of view (as K-R have done), not only is there no
reliable and retrievable hint of metempsychosis in the work, but "..There is no
good evidence for attributing any special interest in the soul to Pherecydes".ae
(e) Pherecydes has, it seems, taken the traditional form of the
theogony/cosmogony, and has added (i) his own peculiar etymologies;so (ü)
a6'West (1963) p.171; Gomperz (1907) p.86 writes that Pherecydes founded an Orphic
community; however, he gives no source, and I can f,tnd no reference to it.
n KR p.51
ot Vlastos (1970) pp,103ff.,107
on KR p.6o
5oThis has parallels in later philosophy: cf. Socrates' use of this in Cratylus; also Herodian (62
Schibli) on the peculiarity of Pherecydes' etymologies; Brandon (1963) p.186.
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primitive Mlesian cosmological speculationsl blended with (?) oriental and local
myth; (üi) his own prose style: "a wonderful mixture of a little science...and a lump
of mythology" (Gomp eru).sz
tt Which may have influenced the corunentators to see a link with the simila¡ motions of a
reincamation cycle?
tt Gomperz (1901) p,87. As KR put it (p.71), a mixture of crude myth and originality.
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APPENDIX B : ..ORPHISM,,
Popular tradition, both ancient Greek and schola¡ly, traces the entry, or
frst appearance, of reincarnation in Greece back to "Orphics" and,/or
Pythagoreans.t As I have discussed, reincamation belief among followers of
Pythagoras is reasonably well attested (See Chapter One). The Orphic tradition
poses a far greater problem, indeed, a number of problems, not the least of
which is that the majority of evidence is of unparalleled variety, ambiguity,
unreliability and obscurity - to the extent that the group is rarely referred to by
name. Indeed, for many years, it was assumed that no such group existed.
Histories of reincarnation often omit the entire corpus of nebulous,2 yet
relevant, evidence which goes under the generic title of "Orphic", on the
grounds that there was no such group.3
l 
See Burkert (19'72) p.128 for a sunmary of the problem. Note Henrichs' more than accurate
summing up in Burket (1977) p.21: "Trying to reconstruct a coherent body of Orphic lore,
beliefs a¡d behaviour for the archaic, classical or Hellenistic period is like doing a
sophisticated and large-scale jigsaw puzzle with an incomplete set that lacks most pieces and
has no picture on its front cover. Methodologically this is one of the most difficult,
inconclusive and subjective pursuits in classical scholarship." Cf. Nilsson (1935) p.181:
"Orphism is more famous, more debated than any other phenomenon of Greek religion."
'Nilsson (1935) p.206; Linforth (1941) p.x
'H.S. Long's (1948) dissertation on metempsychosis is the prime example. Long writes:
"There is absolutely no early evidence connecting the doctrine of metempsychosis with the
name of Orpheus"; and, because there is no link between Orpheus and Orphism, therefore
there was no metempsychosis in Orphism. (Long, Appendix II, pp.90f.) Long follows
Linforth (7941), who in turn follows Wilamowitz's famous statement, "Eine orphische
Seelenlehre soll erst einer nachweisen..": Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1932), vol.ii, p.194.
Methodologically, this means using only evidence mentioning Orpheus by name - very
problematic if Orpheus and Orphics/Orphism are not related! Moulinier (1955) also follows
this ultra-rationalist approach. They are balanced by Guthrie's composite view, but most
particularly, by the numerous works of Walter Burkerq viz,1968,1915,1917,1980, 1982,
1985, and 1993 (see Bibliography).
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I do not intend to argue the cases for and against the existence of
Orphics. One of the bone tablets from Olbia has shown that in the fifth century
BC there was a group of people calling themselves "Orphikoi", who were
presumably attached to a larger Dionysiac or Bacchic group/culta at Olbia.
Rather, I would like to appraise some of the evidence which is labelled
"Orphic", because it is very relevant not only to the notions of reincarnation
found in Pindar and Plato, but also to the eschatological mood of the sixth and
fifth centuries BC.
The origin of Plato's eschatological ideas has always been an enigma,
because direct references to any known doctrine, or beliefs, are always
(presumably intentionally) oblique. In the past, these have been called Orphic
and./or Pythagorean, with the implication or assumption that there rs an Orphic
system of belief.5
The fact is that we need an Orphic system of beliefs to explain
references in Plato and others. For example, Plato himself mentions (perhaps
aThe other bone tablets have inscriptions referring to Dionysus: Burkert (1982) p.12. The
connection of Dionysiac and Bacchic is made in Aeschylus' fragmentary Edonians: Cole
(1980) p.227 cites fr.76 Mette; cf. Bu¡kert (1977) p.4 contra Linforth (1947) pp.53f. Note
Cole's remarks that "a worshipper can be cnlleÃ, bakchos, but a worshipper is never called
Dionysos": (1980) p.229,n.21.
tReferences in Plato's dialogues to Orpheus/(Musaeus)/Orphic things: Republic 363d,3&b-
365a, 620a: Phaedo 69c; Symposium 179d; Ion 533b, 536b; Lows 701b,782c, 829d;
Proîagoras 316d; Philebus 66c; Cratylus 402b,400c: seeZiegler (1942) cols,1373ff., and OF
Index IL
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facetiously) an Orphic doctrine of the soul at Cratylus 400c. If we compare
Pindar's fragment 133, it is obvious that the only way that it can be interpreted
(with our available knowledge) is by way of reference to the myth of the murder
of Dionysus by the Titans.6 Even Linforth agrees that this interpretation has "a
high degree of probability".t This is the Orphic myth par excellence. To return
to Plato, compare the nonchalant reference to the "Titanic nature of man"
(I^aws TOIc: Tltowrrl Qúo.rç).t
That is, despite all attempts to deny any concrete reality to Orphism,
there are a number of references which cannot be explained in any other way,
other than by reference to Orphifra (Orphic things) and the corpus of material
called Orphic.
The root of the paradox lies in how we define "Orphic": it is a generic
term. There is no evidence that Orphe\s per s¿ is linked with the religious
movement named in his honour.e Apart from the scanty evidence from Olbia,
6 
See Rose (1936) nd (1943). For the sources (all late): OF 207 -208,210,21,4,216c,220,34,
35, 210b, 140, 224. Dionysus is also called Dionysus-Zagreus: see Fauth "Zagreus" ÀE IX
A,2 (1969); Nilsson (1935) p.222. There was cerlainly no Dionysus-Zagreus cult in the
classical period: Moulinier (1955) p.66.
t Linforth (1941) p.350. See Rose's response to Linforth's criticisms: Rose (1943).
sThis is - despite how glibly it is used - presumably, a well-lrnown adage/proverb: Nilsson
(t935) p.202.
e It is certainly diff,rcult to connect Orpheus with a religious movement dealing with
reincarnation or salvation: his record contains fa¡ too many failures for his promotion as a
messianic figure! He failed to bring Eurydice back from Hades, and even, if he succeeded (as
Alcestis 357 hints), this is NOT reincarnation, but resurrection of the body - restoration of the
intact body and soul unit. This is just what happens to Alcestis in Heracles' kntabasis in
Euripides' play, and the fact that Orpheus is hinted to succeed in Alcestis should make us
immediately suspicious. Cf. Isocrates Busiris 11.8 about Orpheus bringing back the dead: see
Bowra (1952) for a discussion of Alcestís and Eurydice myth in general. The other aspects of
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there is no proof that the Orphics were ever a large and organized group,
movement, or sect.lo I am inclined to agnee with Alderinkll that the terms
OrphiciOrphisml2 describe a mood, or spirit, of eschatological thought.l3 The
best example of a generic use is undoubtedly the term "Puritan":
the Orpheus myths are equally inconsistent: the concept of the singing head points more to an
oracular than soteriological connection; the details of his death actually indicate hostility
towards DionysiacÆacchic rituals (confusing, given the clea¡ evidence from Olbia of Orphic
Bacchics); his presence on a large number of Apulian vase-paintings of death and tle
Underworld is more prorrising, but similarly ambiguous - he may be in Hades attempting to
charrn the rulers into releasing Eurydice. Likewise, the terra-cotta group, from a tomb, of
Orpheus and Sirens may have an eschatological significance (what?), but it could also be
considered an Argonautic reference: on the Argonautic journey see esp. Szeliga (1986);
Schwartz (19S5b) p.241 Graf (1990) p.96 Ziegler (1942) cols. 1333ff.; Graf (1990) pP.95ff.;
Bremmer (1994) p.68,n.47 (on archaic Argonautic poetry); and, of course, the Orphic
Argonautica. On the terra-cottas (in the J. Paul Getty Museum, Malibu) see Burkert (1980)
pp.39f. (linking them with the cosmology in the myth of Er at Republic 677b): they are
illusrrated in West (1983) pl.a. Eschatological symbolism is diffrcult to identify: as West
(1983) pp.24f. has noted, "At one particular centre, Tarentum, Orpheus is a recurrent fitgure,
often just a celebrity in Hades." On the character of Orpheus: Linforth (1941) pp.2-38:
Montegu (1958) pp.3-11. On the prestige of ascribing \'/orks to an old and respectable name:
Burkert (19'77) p.38. For Orpheus as shaman - see Appendix D.
toThat is, if one applies the criteria for calling an organisation a "sect'', then, based on the
curent state of our evidence, the "Orphics" were not a sect: Nilsson (1935) p.221 agrees.
W.Burkert (1982) p.3 notes the characteristics of a sect:
A sect is a minority protest group with (1) an altemative lifestyle, (2) an
organisation providing (2.1) regular group meetings and (2.2) some sort of
courmunal or co-operative property, and (3) a high level of spiritual
integration, agreement on beliefs and practices, (3.1) based on authority, be
it a charismatic leader or a sacred scripture with special interpretation, (3.2)
making the distinction of '\rye' versus 'they' the primary reference system,
and (3.3) taking action on apostates, The historian will add (4.1) the
perspective of diachronic stâbility (some religious sects have survived for
more than two thousand years) and (4.2) local mobility (many secørian
groups have been migrating through continents without losing their
identity). It is evidently the integration of family reproduction into the
secta¡ian life, with the resulting indoctrination of the infants according to
the rules of the group that makes such organisations vi¡tually indestructible.
A "church" differs only quantitatively; and a sect can survive within a religion. Individuals
can exist within a sect: this is what Langmuir (1990, pp.140 & 1,63) calls "religiosity":
maintaining one's identity whilst still confonning to the overall expectations of the
movement.
tt Alderink (1981) pp.5,14,19 etc.
12 Wilamowitz and Linforth both pointed out that, although tlere is a sizeable amount of
poetry attributed to one "Orpheus", which is thus called "Orphic poetry", "Orphics" are not
referred to in the sense of a group of people, or a sect, and "Orphism" is a term that is never
used in antiquity. As Burkert (7977, pp.Sf,) notes, an "-ism" implies a "patcel, well tied up,
2&
lest it should spill is contents anywhere but along well-channelled 'influences"': that is, a
closed system - an idea incompatible with ancient mystery religions. Cf. Linforth (1941) p.ix.
13 Alderink (1981, pp.17-18) provides a useful list of phenomena tlat can be called "Orphid'.
For example, it can mean the members of a group, or community, following the (ascetic)
Orphic way of hfe (Orphikos bios), based on the texts ascribed to Orpheus. Or it can refer to
the writers of the so-called Orphic poems and Hymns. Crarylus 400c appears to attest to tlis
use, which may be a way of conferring authority and antiquity on a text: Linforth (1941,
p.295) and West (1983, p.3). The Hymns are attributed to Orpheus, but vary in date from the
sixth century BC to the fourth century AD: see Athanassakis (7977); Linforth (1941) pp.l79-
198; Taylor (1896); West (1968); Moulinier (1955) p.100; Burkert (7977) p.8 (they may have
been collected in Pergamum in the second century AD); Zlegler (1942) cols.1323ff. A third
sense is that "Orphic" can refer to the practitioner of certain rites and teachings - the itinerant
OpQeotel,eocnç ("Orphic initiator": Theophrastus Characters XVI; cf. P\ato Republic 3&b-
e). As Rose poinæd out, "The word 'Orphic' is utterly lacking in precision..": review of
Linforth (1941) in CR 57 (1943) 33-34. West (1983, p.3) makes an important distinction:
"We must never say tlat 'the Orphics' believed this or did that, and anyone who does say it
must be asked sharply'rilhich Orphics?',,It is legitimate to talk about these Olbian or
Tarentine Orphics, or any other specif,rc group of Orphics that we can identify, but not to talk
about 'the Orphics' in general. As for 'Orphism', the only definite meaning that can be given
to the term is 'the fashion for claiming Orpheus as an authority'. The history of Orphism is
the history of that fashion." For exarnple, Dodds (1968, p.148) wrote that he used Ío lcrow a
lot about Orphism, but now it all appeared to be "a house of dreams". To summarize, at the
turn of this century, Orphism was considered to be the strongest cult in the Hellenic woild in
the sixth and hfth centuries, It had a complex antlropogony and theogony, numerous
religious texts, a doctrine of transmigration of the soul (and, therefore, by inference, a
doctrine of reincarnation/metempsychosis), and a "way of life" (Orphikos áios) involving
asceúcism (including vegetarianism) and purihcation, The aim of this life was to free the
(divine) soul from its prison, or tomb-like body and, through numerous transmigraúons, make
it divine again, along the lines of the (Orphic) myth of the dismemberment of Dionysus-
Zagreus. The gold plates were considered Orphic, as was the cosmogony parodied in
Aristophanes' Birds, and Hippol¡us w¿rs an Orphic. Moreover, for some commentators,
Orphism was "a drop of alien blood in the veins of the Greeks": Rohde, quoted by Dodds
(1968, p.139). It was something to be despised - a sad flaw in the facade of pure Hellenism. In
line with this was the idea that it must only have been the lowest, most gullible, least educated
class of people who turned to foreign (Orphic) religions - those who lacked "vigorous self-
confidence", the opposite of those rational and "lnightly" figures who pursued
"Pythagorism": Gomperz (190I, p.123) on "Orphicism" [sic]. But, cf. Farnell (1912) p.5 on
"..the Orphic-Pythagorean sectaries who were the fust missionaries..of higher thought." For
others, Orpheus was the precursor of Christ, linked through the rites of omophagy and the
Dionysiac connection, to the Holy Communion: Macchioro (1930) pp.78-80 on mimeúc
conmrunion; cf. Detienne (1975) p,50. This interpretation owes not a little to the
representation of Christ as the Orphic singer in Clement Protrep.I,5-6: V/yller (1991, p.63).
These grand schemes have since been reduced to a few scattered groups on the margins of the
Greek wodd, calling themselves "Orphics", but probably attached to a Dionysiac group. Far
from being a religion of the poor, evidence such as buriaVentombment with gold lamellae,
vases, papyri and examples of rich, Dionysiac ash urns, such as the gilded crater found in
another tomb at Derveni - Bu¡kert (1977, p.4) - as well as the evidence for payment of
iniúators, point more towards an exclusive, marginalized and esoteric group: Bremmer
(1994) pp.72 &.88. Cf, Graf (1993), pp.255ff. for a social/economic study of the burials
associated with the gold lamellae. Graf concludes that the Bacchic cults had a particular
attraction for powerful and wealthy women, as in the example of Olympias, mother of
Alexander the Great - Pluta¡ch Ltfe of Alexan"der 2-3: [de Olympiade Alexandri matre]
Ëtepoç ôè æepì toót<ov èoti ló1oç, óç nôoot pèv oi cfrtõe "yuvoîreç ëvo2¿ot toîç'OpQtroiç
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..there has never been a church called Puritan, simpliciter, as
there üo, o.9., Anglican and Presbyûerian churches; yet
'Puritan', 'Puritanism' meant something in the religious history
of Great Britain and the U.S.4.14
That is, it can be a generic term, often pejorative, for anyone holding views akin
to the Puritans.
However, I would suggest that "Orphic", as a generic term, refers to
slightly more than simply a spirit in Greek thought. If one can group together
the characteristics which generally earn the title of "Orphic", without implying
that these characteristics are all part of a movement, then it solves a number of
the above problems.
Euripides' Hippolyns best illustraæs this conceptualization of "Orphic"
As I have noted above, "puritan" can be a pejorative term; by analogy, this is
how Theseus uses "Orphic things" ('OpQéo: L952) in his tirade against
Hippolytus:
riôr'¡ vOv oö1er roi ôt'oyó1ol Þopôç
oitotç ronril"eu', 'OpQéo t' dvort' ëyrcr.v
pór1eue noÀ},ôv lpoppórrov ctpôv rorcvoóç'
(Hippolyns 952-4)ts
ot¡oot roì toîç æepi tòv Átóvuoov opltoopoîç,. (OF p.59, test.206); Moulinier (1955) p.68;
Burkert (1993) p.261.
toRose i09aÐp3a
tsThis passage is also important in tlat it illust¡ates that Bacchic terms (por;¿euew) were
used of Orphic rites in the fifth century: Bremmer (1994) p.86; Moulinier (1955) p.17.
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Theseus isnot saying that Hippolytus is an Orphic; rather, he is using "Orphic
things" as a generic and pejorative term, covering all the odd ideas which
Hippolytus follows (vegetarianism and the various - predominantly sexual -
abstinences), and the private nature of Hippolytus' worship, all of which
Theseus does not understand: Hippolytus ís like an Orphic.r6 In fact,
Hippolytus - who has just returned from the Eleusinian Mysteries - is not a
typical "Orphic", because he is a hunter:l7 this is incompatible with any belief in
reincarnation, transmigration, or kinship of living things, all of which we can
number as part of the nebulous notion of "Orphic things". Thus, we hear in
Aristophanes' Frogs 1032-1033 that 'OpQeòç ¡rèv 1op re?,lcro,ç 0' titttv
xotéôer(e Qóvrov r' anê"treoOor, Mouooîoç ô' Ë.(oréoetç te vóoc¡v roì"
.18
xpnopoùç.
A survey of references would suggest that the following ideas/doctrines
fi.t into this generic category as part of an Orphic way of thinking: an ascetic
lifestyle (the 'Opqrròç píoç);le vegetarianism;'o a belief in the pre-existence of
the soul;21 a belief in the soul imprisoned, or entombed, in the body;zz a
16 Monregu (1958) p.89,n.59. Cole (1980) p.228: cf. the derision of Demosthenes (De corona
18.259f.; OF p.59, test. 205) towa¡ds Aeschines, who helps his mother in private initiations.
On Hippolytus, see also Linforth (1941) pp.5lff.; Burkert (1982) pp.ll-12.
17 Montegu (1958) p.89,n.57
tt This, referring as it presumably does, to the Eleusinian Mysæries, may not necessarily
forbid mu¡der because of the repercussions for reincarnation, but could refer to the condition
of the Eleusinian Mysteries that initiands be free of blood-guilt.
tn Plato ktws 782c
'o Euripides Hippolytus 952ff. (quoted above); Laws 782c (inanimate food).
" This is not uncommon: see Schibli (1990) p.108,n.10 for a discussion.
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prohibition of burial in wool;23 a prohibition on killing (all creatures);24 the
myth of Dionysus and the Titanic crime;25 rites of purification and./or initiation
carried out by mendicant prieslinitiators using books, perhaps cosmogonical;26
a corpus of writings associated with the name of Orpheus;z1 gold lamellae; an
eschatology based on punishment (and reward) in the Underworld,2s with a
prominent role for Persephone.2e This picture presents an amalgam of ideas
which could well have been - and, in some cases, defìniæly were - shared with
other movements.3o
My immediate interest is whether "Orphic" is a notion which can be
associated specifîcally with reincarnation. The latest discoveries (that is, those
postdating the nihilism of Linforth and H.S.Long), are ambiguous in the
extreme, but a survey of these sheds much light on the Platonic eschatologies.
These new resources - the Derveni papyrus, the Olbian bone tablets, the
Hipponion and Pelinna gold lamellae - have completely changed the face and
the focus of Orphic scholarship.3l
t'Plato CraryIus 400c
23 Herodotus 2.81
2a Aristophanes Frogs 1032-1033 (quoted above).
t5 Plato Laws 70lbc: Pindar fr.133
2u Plato Rep ublic 364b-365a; Theophrastus Charac ter s XI'I I
tt Plato Republic 364b-365a; Euripides Hippolytus 952ff.
28 Perhaps Plaø Repubtic 366ab?: ' dl.l.d ydp Èv "Atôou ôírqv ôóoopev óv <ìv év0oôe
oôtxr'¡oorpev, ì cnxoì" ìi æciôeç æcriõolv'. dl'},', ô QíL^e, ffioet l.o1t(ópevoç, ql teL€toì. oô
pé1o ôóvovtqr rqì oi l,óorot Oeoí, óq oi pe1íotnt æóÀetq XÉ1ouot rqi oi Oeôv noîôeç
notqtoì roi rpo$frtclt tôv Oeôv 1evópevot, oì toô0'oötroç ë2¿etv pr¡vóouot.
2e 
See Alderink (1981) p.t7ff . for a complete list of the other senses of "Orphic".
'o Nilsson (1935) p.229
" Th.y are also all from the bounda¡ies of the Greek world: Bu¡kert (1980) p.a0.
268
The Derveni Pap)¡rus is a mid-fourth century allegorir" ,orn."ntary on an
older (c.5008C?) cosmogony ascribed to "Orpheus", found partly burned on
the pyre outside a tomb near Derveni (Macedonia).32
The poem discussed and quoted in the commentary has demonstrated
that not only was there an interest in "Orphic things" in the fourth century,33
but also that there were Orphic cosmogonical poems existing from at least the
sixth century.3a
The commentary is evidently intended as some kind of revelation to
those in the know.3t More relevantly, column 16 can be linked to the view of
"Orphic" priests given by Plato (Republic 364b-e), and Theophrastus (the
'OpQeoteÀeorfiç: Characters XVI). Alderink has assessed this passage:
The Derveni author speaks of those who participated in the
mysteries in cities: of them, he says, it is no wonder that they do
not attain knowledge; they do not hear and at the same time
understand the words. Still others, who are initiated by those
making a craft of sacred rites, are worthy of astonishment and
pity. They merit astonishment because they seem to seek
knowledge but acnrally finish the rites before acquiring the
knowledge or even asking questions; they are to be pitied
because they pay the fees in advance of the rites but leave before
"Sou¡ces: Kapsomenos (1963); Kapsomenos (1964); Merkelbach (1967); Burkert (1968);
Boyancé (1974); Burkert (1971); Funghi (19'19); Burkert (1980); Alderink (1981); Burkert
(7982); West (1983); McClintock (1985); Rusten (1985); Bremmer (1994) pp.87f.
" Alderink (1981) p.2ó
'o Finkelberg (1986) p,322,n.2
"For example, III.8: "I will speak for those entitled. Close your doors, ye profane."
Translation by Bremmer (1994). Unfortunately, as Burkert (1980) p.30 notes, it is also "Ein
bizarrer Text, nicht einfach zu verstehen.."(!)
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their completion, leaving with neither knowledge or fulfilted
expectations. In contrast to the communal and privaûe rituals
stands the enterprise of the author of the commentary:
allegorical inûerpretation of Orpheus' poem with the goal of
seeking and disseminating knowledge.36
Although this adds much to our understanding of ritual, it is too vague to be a
useful source on eschatology. However, it does illustrate that Plato's opinion
that paid initiators were charlatans was not a one-off criticism.3T
The idea that the true knowledge is gained by the deeper understanding
of a theological work, is a throw-back to the idea that Orphism was a book
(written) religion.38 It is interesting to ask whether Orphic ritual is based on
correct interpretation of Orphic writings. There is certainly a large tradition of
Orphic writings - theogonies, Hymns etc.: Plato's Bfpl,crlv ôè öpoôov
rapêyovrar [sc. ayóptor, roi ptivterç] Mouoaíou roi 'OpQéroç (Republic
364e3; OF 3).3e So, burial with a book roll may have had a ritual significance:
did Orphic ritual involve cremation with a book roll?40 The rolled papyrus
found in the right hand of the deceased in the fourth century tomb at Kallatis
(Rumania) may be comparable.al Moreover, an Apulian vase of 330-3208C
36Alderink (1981) p.52. In'West's (1983) and Rusten's (1935) column numbers, 16 becomes
colurm 17. Cf. Bremmer (1994) p,88; Burkert (1982) p.5.
37 As Rusten (1985, p.1a0) notes, it implies that public rituals were equally useless. However,
he believes that the commentator is "..using reductionist logic to deny that there is any way of
gaining lnowledge of the divine.." (p,140).
"Nilsson (1925) p,215.; Alderink (1931) pp.95 and p.116,n.9: salvation achieved tlrough
the reading of sacred books?
'n West (1983), p.23 uanslates "hubbub of books".noBlank (1982),p.1'72
arThe roll was not large (about the size of aciguette). Only two words were retrieved (by
infra-red photography as it cn¡mbled away to dust within three minutes of exposure to ai¡):
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illustrates a mari enthroned n a niaskos, or Heroon, with a book roll in his left
hand. Next to him (at the entrance) stands Orpheus with his |yre.az
The books may be simply funerary gifts, however the more obvious
analogy is a "Book of the Dead".43 Yet, as a number of scholars have noted,4
an esoteric allegorical commentary is far from being a passport for the dead
(TotenpasseÆotenbucher)4s in the way that the gold lamellae (see below)
detail the urgent and relevant concerns of the deceased. Surely the poem of
Orpheus itself would have been more appropriate? The Derveni commentary
does not refer to the underworld or afterlife, and it does not mention the myth
of Dionysus and the Titans.ou Yef, it is diffîcult to deny that the burial of
written matter seems to have been a feature of this Orphic mood.
Burkert (1980) pp.38f.; cf. the comments of Schmidt (1975) p.114, and Condurachi
commenting to Schmidt at the same convegno (p.185).
ntBurkert (1977) p.3 and (1980) pp.38f.; illustrated in West (1933) pl.2 (cf. p.25). The vase
in question is an aurphora from the Antikenmuseum Basel, S 40, discussed in greater detail in
M.Schmidt, A,D.Trendall & A.Cambitoglou Eine Gruppe apulischer Grabvasen in Basel
(1916) pp.32-34, p1.11. For Orpheus in eschatological contexts on (predominantly) Apulian
vase painting, see Trendall (1989) pp.266-270; also (although hardly expressing standard
viewpoints), Smith (1967). We should not forget, however, that at Derveni the book roll was
on the pyre outside the tomb: V/est (1983) p.25,n.67. West (pp,25ff.) gives latter
Bacchic/Dionysiac parallels for books as hieroi logoi.
o'The Tibetan Book of the Dead is read in the place of death for many days after death (49),
because the soul lingers and receives it directions. However, in Greek belief, the soul is gone
at the instånt of death. Are the books and lamellae to be viewed as symbolic, rather than part
of ritual?
ooDillon in response to Burkert (1977) p.15; Seaford (1986) pp.20f.
os A"vademecum"', Ziegler (1942) col.1386; cf. Bremmer (1994) p.87. Those suggesting a
"Book of the Dead" connection: West (1971) pp.65f. & n.2; Gral (1974) p,125; Vermeule
(1979) p.58. Burkert (1975) p,87 calls the Hipponion lamella "un testo bacchico con aff,rnita
egiziano-pitagorica'' - this is certainly covering every option! A third option is that they are
an aide-mémoire for atest of the initiate: that is, those who give the right responses (based on
their initiation) reach Elysium; the rest are diverted (and reincarnated?). Therefore, initiation
is a rehearsal for the transition to death a¡rd the Underworld? - Seaford (1986) p.25. Cf.
Smith (1967) p.96 on the lamellae as "certifrcates of purity".
a6 Burkert (7977) p.5
nt
'West associates the cosmogony of the Derveni papyrus with
metempsychosis through certain cosmic ideas, which "triangulate" the common
doctrine of Pherecydes, the Derveni theogony, and Pythagoras." This is far
from certain; reincarnation is attested as a belief of Pythagoras," but it is not
present in the fragments of Pherecydes (see Appendix A).ae Moreover, the
Derveni papyrus' fragmentary state (it breaks off before the birth of Dionysus)
supports no references to reincarnation.5o
As for the subject matter of the poem under discussion in the Derveni
commentary, it is a "theological cosmogony".sl It has been suggested that the
Orphic cosmogony, and the Orphic beliefs, exist in a macrocosm-microcosm
relationship: that is, the destiny of humans is not separate from the destiny of
the world.s' This has cross-cultural parallels: one way in which the travelling
priests/initiators of the Near East cured ills was by the reciting of
cosmogonies;53 in the Greek evidence (Repubtic 364b-365a), these itinerant
a7 West (1983), pp.1 8ff.
a*This leads on to the next question: who came first, Pythagoreans or Orphics? Nilsson
(1935) p.212; Burkert (1972) p.128-133: general consensus - excepting H.S.Long (1948) -
would see Pythagoreanism as a variant of Orphism. See Bu¡kert (1968) pp.105ff., for an
attempt to extract Pythagorean mathematics and "Naturwissenschaft" from the Derveni
papyrus vi¿ Philolaus.
ae ContraWest (1983), p.19 and West (1971).
toBreurmer (7994) p.81
tt Alderink (1981), p.26
st Alderink (1931) p.51, based on Burkert (1968), p,104
5'Burkert (1990) (p.24); Schwartz (2) (p.zaD'As Burkert (1990) (p.24) believes, "..4s illness
is an indication that something has gone wrong, and is moving towards catastrophe, it is of
vital imporønce to hnd a fresh start; the most thorough method is to create a world anew,
aclirrowledging the dangerous forces proceeding, or still surrounding, this kosmos but
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initiators use books of Orpheus et al to effect their initiations and expiations.sa
Yet the concept of creating the world anew does not seem to be very Greek;
there is tittle Greek apocaþptic literature, although it is possible that
Empedocles' cosmic system included a periodic destruction and renewal.ss
The Derveni papyrus seems to follow the same theogonical development
as, for example, the Rhapsodic Theogony. However, it is cut off before the
union of Zeus and Rhea produces Persephone, and thus before the "Orphic"
myth of Dionysus and the Titans.s6 It is only attested late,57 but it does seem
that the story is not only implied and understood in Pindar fragment 133, but
essential.
extolling the virtuous power that guarantees life and lasting order. Thus, in Babylonian texts,
we find cosmogonies used as charms against toothache or a headache, or for facilitating
childbirth; practically all the literary texts can also be used as mythical precedences of
magical action: to stop evil winds, to procure rain, to wa¡d off pestilence". That is,
cosmogonies function to rene,'¡/ life: Alderink (1981) p.51 and Burkert (1968) p.104.
tnMoreover it is by means of these travelling priests that the cosmogonies are transmitted.
Bremmer (1994) p.7 points out that priests are not influential fìgures in Greek culture unless
they are connected with an important sanctuary,
tt It has been suggested - by the reviewer of West (1933) in CPh LXXXI (1936) p.158 - that
Orphic books are hieroi logoi rather than theogonies. As Burkert (1982) p.8 notes, however,
tìe majority of fragments are mythological/cosmogonical rather than liturgical. For all of the
Orphic theogonies, see West (1983). Cf. Schwabl "Weltschöpfung" RE Suppl. IX (1962) 925
(col. 1467); Bremmer (1990) pp.22ff .
56See this myth in West's restoration (from OF 60-235) of the Rhapsodic Theogony: West
(1983), p.74-75. The more cornmon myth is that Dionysus was the child of Semele, born
from Zeus' thigh: Richardson (1987), p.64; Kerenyi (19'76) pp.256,278. Euripides Rhesus
966links Orpheus and Persephone: Moulinier (1955) p.17.
t' 
Cf ., e.g., Olympiodorus In Plat. Phaedon. 6lc (2,27 = OF 220). Cf. Strachan (1970) for the
body/tomb idea which accompanies this passage. On Olympiodorus: Armstrone G911) p.483;
esp. Boyancé (1948), attempting to demonstrate Olympiodoms' accuracy based on
Xenocrates. For example, Xenocrates fr.20 (Henze), referring to +poupó: "it is Titanic - and
it culminates in Dionysus"; tr, by Alderink (1981) p.69. Seaford (1986) p.9 describes
Xenocrates as contemporary with the lamellae - quite a sretch, as they extend over eight
hundred years.
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West would base the Derveni theogony on the Protogonos Theogony,
which he believes was composed for a Bacchic society in Ionia about 5008C,
and included a doctrine of salvation by Dionysus and a metempsychosic
doctrine, all set in a cosmogony.5s This seems too big a leap to make.
The idea of a Bacchic society seeking Orphic poetry is possible from our
knowledge of the Dionysiac objects in the other tombs/burials at Derveni, and
probable in the light of the discoveries at Olbia. West believes that the common
link is Ionia, because of Pherecydes' (and Pythagoras') connection with this
region. Yet there is not a shred of evidence for a reincamation doctrine in Ionia
at this time.
Dionysus can have a soteriological function. The gold lamellae from
Pelinna, for example, contains the command, "Tell Persephone that Bakkhios
himseH has set you free".sn Free from what? The obvious ans\¡/er is linked to
the myth of Dionysus and the Titanic crime, particularly in the light of the
statement by Olympiodorus (OF 232):
öct ö Aróvuooç lóoeóç Ëocí ciooç' ôrò ral r\.uoeùç o 0eóç,
raì" ó'OpQeoç Qrìotv'
övOproæot ôè telr1éoooç eratóppoç
rcÉpyouor.v róorltor è.v öpotç apQrérqrotv
stWhich may have been parodied by the cosmogony in Aristophanes Birds 690ff. Ç çp 1'
c.414BC). His use of the cosmic Egg has an later Orphic reference. Unfortunately, a comic
attestation is hardly decisive, particularly since Aristophanes appears to be parodying Hesiod
in the sane passage: Nilsson (1935) p.199; Nilsson (1957) pp. 140-l4l (egg as a symbol of
life); Montegu (1958) pp.78-79; Adorno (1975) p.11; West (1976) p.226 (Eastern
comparisons); Guepin (1968) p.260 (egg as a symbol of rebirth),
5e Lamella Pl.2: eïæeîv ÕepoeQóvot o' ötr Bo<x>2¿toç cutòç Ël.uoe - t¡. Graf (1993), p.241
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öpyto t' èrteÀÉoouor l,úolv npoyóv<ov o0epíotcov
potópevou oò ôè toîorv ëyrcr.v rpcÍtoç, oöç r'eOéÀqtoOa,
Iúoerç ë.r te æóvrov ya?,znî:'v roì" oæeípovoç oiotpoo.
Therefore Bakkhios/Dionysus is speaking for the soul of the deceased on the
Pelinna lamella, ensuring that Persephone accepts the soul of the deceased, and
that the soul receives the same rewards/blessings as the other blessed in the
underworld.60 As to the actual freeing, it could relate to a doctrine of the body
as a prison of the soul, from which the soul is released. This would be
compatible with the so-called Orphic doctrine of the soul6l given at Cratylus
400c62 (attributed to oi apQì"'opQéo).63
uocraf (7993),p,2a3
6l Aristotle De anima 410b19 (OF 21) writes that the Orphic epics teach that the soul enters
the body in respiration from the universe, carried by the winds. This is not explicitly
metempsychosic, for, as Alderink notes, it could refer to lhe creation of humans - that is, it is
the finst and only incarnation, part of an anthropogony. Cf. Proclus In Plat.Remp. II 339,11
(OF 223) citing ax Orphic poem of flying souls entering bodies. The most obvious analogy is
to the winged souls of Phaedrus (q.v.); Aristophanes Birds is another. It is easy to link the
idea with the body as prison/tomb doct¡ine (Cratylus 400c) - the soul can be compared to a
caged bird: e.g. Plutarch Consol. ad uxor.10, 611df. See Turcan (1959) for a discussion of
the bird-soul (l'âme-oiseau). Also Courcelle (1965), (1966) ard (1965). The idea of flying
souls, or souls as birds etc., is a common one in other traditions; also bees, butterflies, mottts
etc: Dietrich (1974) p.121. Cf. Aristotle Hist. Anim. 55Ia14. Regarding Aristotle De anima
410b19, Alderink argues that, given the context (Aristotle is denying that the body and soul
a¡e distinct), Aristotle is not ascribirrg a doctrine of reincarnation to the Orphics, but
criticizing the idea of souls entering bodies from the air by pointing out that this does not
account for plants and non-breathing animals. That is, his objections to the Pythagoreans and
Orphics a¡e on different grounds (he objecß to the Pythagorean idea that the soul car inhabit
a number of different bodies), and thus, he is not recognizing reincarnation in Orphic
doctrine (but, presunably, a first and only incarnation). As Alderink admits, this is
argumentum ex siLentio: Alderink (1981) pp,56ff. That is, it is possible that theories of pre-
existence, sepafateness of body and soul, and souls bome on the winds, do not necessarily
have to add up to a theory of transmigration/reincarnation. Cf, Nilsson (1935) p.213. fu
Bu¡kert (1972) p.126 notes, "Metempsychosis is not attested directly for Orphism in any
ancient source - only the pre-existence of the soul." As to why tbis f,rst incarnation occurs,
Alderink connects it to the Titånic myth; I have discussed this in the following note.
62 Cf. Phaedo 62ae and my discussion of the oôpo-ofrpo problem in that chapter (n.3). Also -
Gorgias 493a,525a; Phaedo 6ld-62b,81e-84a 92a: see Adorno (1915) p.14. This idea raises
a great many problems, not the least of which is that Plato's etymologies are often given
tongue-in-cheek: Ferwerda (1985) p.268ff. Yet the concept of the body as prison is usually
interpreted as a Pythagorean doctrine, with the etymology of the body as tomb more
2',15
At Republic 364b-365a, the same function of removing ancestral
wrongdoings is ascribed to the mendicant initiators (whom we can call Orphic
commonly associated with the Orphics. The third etymology (from oóÇor and oôpa) may be
Socrates' own: Rehrenbock (1975) pp.17,24f.,30. Linforth (1941, p,I47) would hold the
thi¡d etymology as Orphic. If the body is the tomb of the soul, this might be associated with
the uncleanliness of death, and the need to avoid the body: Nilsson (1935) pp.219,207f. Cf.
Gorgias 492e (See Appendix C), where Socrates has hea¡d from wise men that we are now
dead and our body (oôpo) is our tomb (orlpo). The most corìmon explanation is that the body
is to be despised because it is the Titanic part of ourselves. This is what the myth of Dionysus
explains: Dionysus-Zagreus lwas torn apart by the Titans, enemies of Zeus, and eaten. Zæus
slew the Tit¿ns with his thunderbolt, and from the soot of their ashes formed humankind.
Therefore, man has elements of the Titans and elements of Dionysus: a mortal has something
immortal inside him, a part of Dionysus. This manifests itself as his soul: the soul is
immortal, and is striving to free itself from its human prison and become divine again. When
the body dies, the soul is judged, and if its st¿y in the body has not been morally pure, the soul
is returned to another body - basically, to try again. Therefore, the aim of movements
believing in reincarnation is to save the soul from further reincarnations - to stop the
dimming of its divine nature: Finkelberg (1986) p.326. This neatly wraps up the etymology of
oó(or in Cratylus 400c, also. Other scholars have doubted that such a strict duality of body
and soul is intended. Alderink, for example, tenders a quite plausible inte¡pretation of the
body as tomb/prison problem based on Phaedo 62b. This passage tells us that we live in the
prison ($poupó) of the soul, watched over by the gods who hold us as their chattels; that is,
the body is a prison where the soul is guarded by the gods who are in fact looking after it.
Thus the soul is imprisoned as a punishment, but this is also a time for acquiring freedom.
Thus, there is no concept that the body is the source of evil: ratler, the soul is in the body for
safekeeping until the penalty is paid. The myth of Dionysus and the Titans is used as an
explanation of why the soul is in the body, and explains the duality of body and soul as a
creation of the laæ sor¡rces in which the myth first appears - cf. Linforth (1941) pp307tr.
Alderink would interpret the concept of the "Titanic nature of man" (Lnws 70lbd) not to
mean that humans have a dual Titanic-Dionysiac nature, but that they "are capable of acting
in a mnnner, or after lhe pattern, of the Titans". The punishment for acting after the pattern
of the Titans is incarnation; salvation/liberation comes ttrrough Dionysus: Alderink (1981)
pp.61ff. Alderink binds this up in a (dual) cosmogony/anthropogony framework, which I do
hnd not convincing. It seems to me that we are intended to regard the soul's sojourn in the
body as an evil and a punishment. If the gods are watching over us, tiey are not really doing a
lot of good, because we have to live out our punishment, regardless. Mansfeld, in a review of
Alderink's book, notes that, "I agree that tlte body as the soul's prison is a less gruesome idea
than the body as the soul's tomb, but it is not a particularly cheerful one either. Possibly, the
Orphics formulated an optimistic cosmology; in as far as life in the body is concemed,
however, their anthropology.,is cerøinly pessimistic, even when thei¡ cosmology is not."
Mnem.osyne (1985) XXXVil 436-438.It is difhcult to postulate a disinterest in the body in
the face of rich grave finds - that is, we might expect that a dualist view of the body/soul
would minimize the body. Cf. Linforth (1947) p.263. On the lack of unifornity in burial
practices, see Macchioro (1930) pp.109-120.
ut As Burkert (1932) p.4 notes, the plural implies scepticism.
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because of their use of Orphic books). And, in Pindar's fragment I33,
Persephone accepts requital for ancient wrong.
I do not think that we should be so ready to fit a doctrine of
reincarnation into this vague picture. Fragment 133 of Pindar does refer to
reincarnation, however, there is no evidence to associate reincarnation
specifically with the myth of Dionysus. The Orphic myth refers to Dionysus'
rebirth in the sense of the resurrection of his body, and while this does not deny
a role to reincarnation, the myth can stand on its own.ø
The tenuousness of any Dionysiac connection with reincamation is
illustrated in other evidence. One of the bone tablets from Olbia not only
demonstrates that "Orphikoi" existed in the ffth century, but that they were
connected with a Dionysiac or Bacchic group.ut Although there may be an
element of antagonism between Orpheus and Dionysus in myth,6u there seems
to be no reason why there cannot be Orphic Bacchics.6T Neither have any
uoldealy, restoration would be the worst thing for the soul - it is indicative of the soul's
failure to escape the body: cf. Kahn (1971) p.9. I have discussed this in regard to Platonic
reincarnation (q.v.).
6s Contralinforth (1941) p.171
uuViz the story in Aeschylus' losl BassaraelBassarides (OF p.14, test.45; cf. Ps-Eratosthenes
OF p.33, test.113) that Orpheus had adopted Apollo-Helios as his god, and Dionysus avenged
this insult by persuading the Thracian women (akaÌulaenads?) to tear Orpheus apart: Nilsson
(1935) pp.203-4; Linforth (1941) p.10; Montegu (1958) p.7; West (1983) p.12; Eliade (1986)
p.114. Yet there is also a parallel, in that the manner of Orpheus' death is simila¡ to the fate
of Dionysus at the hands of the Titans. The antâgonism between Orpheus and women is
presumably not carried over, because much of the "Orphic" DionysiaclBacchic evidence
relates to the participation of women: Graf (1993) pp.255ff .; Detienne (I975) pp.72f,18.
ut There is a considerable amount of evidence to show that there were from the lrst centu-r]
BC: Linforth (1941) pp.207-32; V/est (1983) p.26. As Bremmer (7994) p.86 comments, "The
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strong connection with a fixed cult centre or meeting place,us and both can be
seen as influences on movements other than those specific to their "cult". For
example, Dionysus is linked to the Eleusinian Mysteries,6' as is
Orpheus/Orphism.To
two most popular early mysteries, then, were cults of precisely those two divinities who were
'eccentric' in the Greek pantheon". Of course, Orpheus is not, strictly speaking, a divinity.
utNilsson (1935), p.221.'fhú is, unless one accepß the ridiculous suggestion that the
"Orphic Temple" in Littlecote Park is the flust - and only - example of a pagan Orphic temple
(built in the brief reign of Julian the Apostate): Walters (1982). In the Bacch¿¿, Thebes is the
flust place to become a local centre for the followers of Dionysus, but this does not imply the
usual rules for establishment of a foreign culq see, for example, line 40: Versnel (1990),
p.1.52. Cole (1980) pp.235f .lists the fe'il instances of temples and/or sanctuaries dedicated to
Dionysus, predominantly in Magna Graecia, illustrating the imporønce of Dionysus for
Southern Italians. There were, however, no official mysteries of Dionysus institutionalizedby
a greãt city: Cole (1980) p.236. Likewise, there is no evidence (other than hearsay - see
below) for a great Athenian Orphic cull Montegu (1958) p.87. It appears that the link
between the two lies in their marginalized, private nature. As a parallel, it is a cha¡acteristic
of oriental cults to have no frxed cult centre, unlike the Greek mystery cults: Sfameni
Gasparro (1985), p.xiii. Tradition assigns Onomacritus (under the patronage of Pisistratus) an
important role in inuoducing (or inventing - cf. Herodotus 5.90) Orphic belief at Athens; see
the late testimonia in OF pp.55-56): Fauth (1969) co1.2262; Nilsson (1935) pp.195ff.,202;
Gianoni (1972) p.524; Macchioro (1930) p.74; esp. Guepin (1968) pp.228fr. For example,
Pausanias 8.37,5 (OF p.56 - test.194): æopc ôÈ'Oprlpoo'Ovopórptroç æopolopôv tôv
Trrdv@v tò ðvopcr Âtovúoolr te ouvé0r1rev öplto raì eÌvqt toòç Tttôvoç tôt Âtovóoox
tôv nc0qporcov ènoír¡oev ourouploúq. The evidence is aurbiguous because of its late date. It
appears to be a cornmon motif that tyrants are susceptible to these types of movements - cf.
Theron of Akragas in Pinda¡' s Second Olympian Ode (q.v .): Adomo (L97 5) p.25 .
ueThis is a connection present since the sixth century: Graf (1914) pp.40-78; cf. Guepin
(1968) p.269; Versnel (1990) p.154; Fauth (1969) cols.2267ff. On Dionysus' attributes:
Carpenter & Faraone (1993); Detienne (19'75), (1979) and (1981) for the structualists'
interpretations (omophagy and Other-ness). Considering the lack of evidence for "Orphism"
in the major cities, Detienne is surely incorrect to see it as part of this politicaUsocial protest
movement denying traditional religion and mores. He does admit some doubts: (1975) p.55,
See Burkert's criticisms of this methodology: (1982) p.2
toorpheus (proverbially) introduced mysteries to Attica: Euripides Rhesus 943-4; Ps.-
Demosthenes 25.11 (First Speech Against Aristogeiton) (OF 23); Aristophanes Frogs 1032-
1033; Ephorus apud Diodorus 5,64.4. See West (1983), pp.?A.ff.; Linforth (1941), pp.99ff.
GraT (7974) suggests that one of these mysteries in which Orpheus/Orphic things played a
role was the Eleusinian. However, there is no evidence in the Eleusinian Mysteries for
anything more than the promise of happy aftedife in the Underworld - certainly
reincarnation did not play a role at Eleusis, despite, as Vlastos (1970, p.103,n.38) notes, the
persistent connection of Orpheus and Eleusis. Orpheus is linked to Eleusis by tle poetry
ascribed to him, not by "Orphic" beliefs: Pausanias lX,2'1,2 (OF 304,305); cf. Moulinier
(1955), pp.100ff.; Boyancé (1975). Tierney (1922) p.77 suggests the opposite: "Orphism"
was influenced by tle Eleusinian Mysteries. Other evidence for the foundation of mysteries is
late: Linforth (1941), pp.262-263 gives a thorough list, but it lacks any cornmon thread. On
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They are also similar in the itinerant nature of their initiations, and can
be compared to that other imported ecstatic figure, Cybele, whose itinerant
priests wandered the towns and countryside, converting people and begging
offerings.
'lt
I have already noted the appearance of itinerant initiators in Plato's
Republic 364b-365a - the passage provides most of our information on this
phenomenon,viz,
oyúptor ôè roì póvter"ç éæi nl.ouoicov Oúpoç ióvteç æeí0ouotv
cöç ëoo no,pà oQior ôóvoptç é.r Oeôv ropt(opévq Ouoíatç te
roì" É.rccoôaîç, eire c oõirqpó too 1É1ovev outoô ii æpo1óvcov,
oreîoOor ¡reO' r1õovôv te roì åoptôv, ê.av É. cva å10pòv
rqpfrvar é0él,r¡, ¡rerd opr"xpôv ôorcavôv ôpoicoç ôirarov
côtrcp pl"óyer Ëroycrryoîç oorv rci rotoôÉoporç, toòç Oeoóç,
öç Qaotv, æeíOovtéç oQr"or"v {rcr¡peteîv. toútorç ôè æûotv toîç
}.óyorç pdprupoç rcorqrdç ånóyovtcr, oï pèv roríaç népr
euæeteiaç õrôóvteç, orç
cqv pèv rorócr¡ta raì" il.oôòv ëorrv è.ÀÉogat
þqïôícr>ç' l^eír1 pèv óôóç, pcÍl.o ô'åyyóft vaíer'
cîç ô' tipedç iôpôro 0eol rupoæóporOev ëOqrcv
roí rrvo éôòv ¡rarpúv te roì. tpaleîov roì. avóvcr1' oi ôè tflç
tôv Oeôv urc' ovOpanrov rapa1rrryfrç tòv "Oprlpov
paptópovrct, öc rol é.reîvoç einev -
Àroroì" ôé te raì" Oeoì sutoí,
rai tor)ç pèv Ouoiotot roì" eulcoÀaîç alavcîor"v
l"otpf te rvíor¡ x,e fio"por,pontôo' cÍvOpomot
l.rooópevot, öre rÉv ttç urepÞnn rai apdpcr¡.
pipl"ov ôè öpaôov napéyovran Mooooíou roi 'OpQécoç,
Ie2"nvnç re roì Mor¡oôv èr1óvcov, óç Qaor, ro0' tìç
the connection of Orpheus/Orphism with Demeter and Kore-Persephone: Ziegler (1942)
cols.1395ff.
itBurkert (1979) (p.105). This practice (of begging for a livelihood in the name of Cybele)
was looked on with disapproval, and the first priest (called a metrogyrtes) to come to Athens,
the man who introduced the cult to the Athenians, was given a ha¡sh reception: Suda s.v.
'Metragyrtes': quoted in Versnel (1990) (p.105); Burkert (1985) p.176 believes these people
were viewed with great suspicion. I would agree: the Mormons are perhaps a modern
parallel?
279
Our¡noÀo0otv, rceiOovteç ou póvov iõrótoç <i}.îd rai noÀ.ztç,
óç cÍpo l,óoerç te rai rcOap¡roì" côtrr'¡pdtrov ôrd Ouorôv rai
æorôtôç r¡ôovôv eiou pèv ërt (ôorv, eioì ôè roi cel"eur4oolv,
öç ôi tel"etdç roloôorv, qi rôv é.reî rorôv sfio}.óouorv
npûç, pr\ 0óoovroç ôè ôetvd nepqtévev7z
These priestsiinitiators - Orpheotelestai - have been seen as the only "tangible
reality behind the phenomenon of Orphism".73 Republic 364b-365a gives a
picture of itinerant charlatans taking advantage of the gullible and anxious. The
passage is obviously derisive in tone,Ta but the overall picture it gives - of
individuals servicing individuals - is reinforced by both Column 16 of the
Derveni papyrus (see above) and Theophrastus' Superstitious Man (ö
ôer-otôoíporv : Characters XVI).75
Plato's criticism, reiterated at Protagoras 316d, centres on the fact that
it is grossly untrue that there is a magic way to achieve the same ends as a life
of jusúce.7u It seems reasonable that Plato does not despise Orphic followers
and practices per se," bvt, as Nilsson points out, detests "..the vile jugglers
72Is "greatest cities" a reference to the Eleusinian Mysteries: Guepin (1968) p.237 .
t'Bu¡kert (1982) p.4. Their reputation has made tie movement always seem less than
respectable and legitimate.
tn Cf. Pluta¡ch Apophthegm. lnconic.224e (OF p.58, test.203).
75 It has been suggested that these priests are part of a closed community, in that they train
together, and ale, perhaps, self-perpetuating: this is suggested by Smith in Burkert (1911),
p.29. Certnnly there are parallels for this sort of organization in Greece, for example in the
official initiators (telestai) of the Eleusinian Mysteries, drawn from the Kerkyes or
Eumolpidae families. Burkert (7982) pp.4ff. has an interesting discussion of the family
organisation of telestai, which is also seen in the Hippocratic tradition. The Orpheotelestai
stand out because they lack this community. Cf. West (pp.101-103).
tu One might compare Diogenes' criticism of the Eleusinian Mysteries (D.L. 6.39): why
should a criminal get preferential t¡eatment over an honest man after death just because he
was initiated?
tt Adorno (7975) p,1ó, points out that Plato appears to lnow of two kinds of bools, viz, (1)
theogonies, cosmogonies and myths, and (2) magic fonnulae for initiations. The forrner are
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who..grew like parasites on the mysúc movement and profited by the
superstitions of people and their fea¡ of helll'.78 That is, these charlatans
exerted a form of emotional blackmail over the gullible, by frighæning people
with pictures of the terrors of the afterlife for the uninitiated.?e From Plato we
know some of these punishments (which are often thought to have an origin in
Orphic writings): for example, the uninitiated lie in mire (Phaedo 69c);80 the
righteous live in "eternal drunkennes s" (Republic 363cd).81
The users of these books do not seem closely connected with one
cullmovement or another, but adapt to the needs of anyone requiring their
services. They are not only connected with Orphics, but appears as purifiers
and/or medicine men in On the Sacred Disease (Hippocrates VI.362f.: pcÍ1or"
roì roOoptaì" roì oyóptar raì ol,o(óveç), and also at Phaedrus 244de, where
they deal with the ills produced by ancestral sins.82 What they offer is a quick
unimpeachable sources, and are quoted at Philebus 66c (OF 14) and Cratylus 402b (OF 15);
the latter belong to the cha¡latans. Cf. Alderink (1981) p.17I,n.27 .
Tt Nilsson (1935) p,208
7e I wonder whether Plato also despises those who cannot stick to a life of asceticism, justice
and philosophy? In this context he may well disapprove of these 'casual Orphics' - Alderink
(1981) p.17. Yet, elsewhere, he appears resigned to the limitations of 'ordinary' humans.
tols this symbolic of their impurity? Nilsson (1935) pp.210f.; Montegu (1958) p.86; Guthrie
(1935) p.1ó3.
sl Mouooioç õè toótc¡v veovtxótepo ta1clOò xal o {lòç outoû æopcl Oeôv õrôóqorv toîq
õrxaíorç' eiç "Atõot 1ùp c1o1óvteç rr8 ?"o10¡ rqì rotqrl,ívqvr€ç roì. oupnóoorv tôv óoio¡v
rorqoKerqocvreç éoteQovolpévorç æoroôow'tòv qfiqvîq 2¿póvov iiõq ôróyetv peOóovtcrç,
rlyr¡oú¡revor rdi"l.rotov oprrîç ptoOòv pé0r¡v oióvrov.
This passage goes even further, claiming that the unjust are dealt with harshly in this world
as well as the next. I do not agree with Nilsson (1935) p.210 that Plato is not cnticizing this
view of the afterlife (eternal drunkenness) but merely "crudely" expressing the intense joy of
the just.. This hardly does Plato justice, particularly when it is followed by 364b-365a. Cf.
Montegu (1958) p.85 & n.41.
t'As a phenomenon, they appear to have existed in Greece since the Dark Ages: Burkert
(1983), p.116. Empedocles' fragments 1 1 1 and 1 12 (DK) display his simila¡ mendicant role,
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purification ritual - more acceptable than both the requirement of a full ascetic
lifestyle, or a life of strict justice. They may even have functioned as confessors,
and, as Plato tells us, could also be practitioners of black magic (as Vlastos
notes) because they offer to bring harm to enemies.s3
It seems that the picture of itinerant initiators fits well with the scattered
nature of evidence for Bacchic/Orphic initiaúons. At Olbia, however, the
situation appears somewhat different. Olbiasa appears to have had a long and
fruitful connection with Bacchic initiations.s5 For example, Herodotus 4.78-80
records the initiation of King Sþles into Bacchic rites at O1bia.86 Therefore,
might not the presence of "Orphikoi" among the Bacchic initiands at Olbia be a
83 I frnd an interesúng parallel with this, between the idea of the lamellae of iron (the
defixionum tabellae) which are used for cursing, and the Orphic gold lamellae which may act
as the passwords to the rewards of the afterlife. Of course, it is going beyond the evidence to
suggest that the two traditions are specifically connected, but it does seem ¿ìn unusual
coincidence, particularly when allied with the concept of magic in our sources. There is
considerable evidence for the inscription and deposition in graves of lamellae as curse tablets
from the f,rfth century, where dark coloured mecals (such as lead) might be symbolic of evil: is
the gold of the Orphic lamellae symbolic of the blessings to come? Zuntz (1971) pp.393 &.
278-286. The Orphic associalion with magic is confinned by Euripides Cyclops &6-9 (OF
p.25, test.83), where the chorus claims to have a magic spell of Orpheus, and also by a
reference 
^t 
Alcestis 962 (OF p.17, test.59). Vlastos (1970, p.123, n.99) notes other
references to magic and Orphics. Macchioro (1930, p.253f.,n.2) points out that magical cures
are associated with Orphism inthe Orphic Hymns. See Nilsson (1949), p.95 for a relevant
definition of the difference between magic and religion.
to Is the name "Olbia" signihcant? Cf. the use of öl.proç (happy/blessed) on the gold lamellae:
e.g. OF 32c,32d. Grant (1990) pp.27-30 gives a short history of the site (on the coast of the
Ukraine), noting the discovery of the earliest example of a business letter (written on lead,
c.500BC). The find supports the position of Olbia as a settlement populated by professional
imporlexport merchants, a fu¡ther illustration that these cults did not merely attract the poor
and gullible.
t5 A sixth century inscrip[ion on a mirror details the initiation of a couple at Olbia: Cole
(1993) p.217
tuGraf (1993) p.243. This initiation seems to be by means of the Bacchic ecsúasy familiar
from Euripides B acchae.
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result of the itinerant nature of the Orpheotelestai?81 Further to this, one might
ask whether this Orphic influence could have introduced eschatological belief to
the Dionysiac cult?88
To look at the evidence:8e the bone tablet in question has the
inscriptions BIO>-OANATO>-BIOI, A^H@EIA, AIO<N[ITE>,
OPOIK<OI>.e0 West associates this with life after death, which seems to be a
fair interpretation. "Truth" could refer to the intended results of a Dionysiac or
Orphic initiation, which is again a fairly standard way of describing initiation
into a mystery religion.el Yet life-death-lifee2 does not have to refer to
st As Burkert (1930) p.41 notes, the concept of a moving initiators etc., explains the lack of
consistent teaching, and the wide scattering of similar evidence, such as the gold lamellae.
tt Can we, therefore, describe Orphism as an intellectualized Dionysiac religion? For an
eschatological connection to Dionysus cf. Heraclitus DK22Bl5: eï pr1 1op Ârovóoort æopn1v
êæoroôvto ral üpveov &ropcr niôoíororv, avqrôéotato eipyoot'öv' óuòç ôè 'Aíôr1ç rol
Àróvrooç, öteo:r poívovtot roì l.r¡vot(ouorv. Nilsson (1935) p.222 and (195'7) pp.118ff
discusses the link of Dionysus and Hades.
t'Sources: Tinnefeld (1980); Burkert (1980); West (1982); V/est (1983); Zhmud (1992).T\ey
were found in the temenos, not in a funereal context.
eo nlustrated in West (1983) p.19
er The exact purpose of the tablets is unlmown. Versnel (1990) p.151 - following West (1982)
p.25 - suggests that they are membership tokens (symbols of participation). Cf. Graf (1990)
p.101 on Orpheus and secret societies; Burkert (1982) p.12 tenøtively suggests amulets
attached to votive gaments.
e2 Seaford (1986) pp.lfiff . suggests that the tablets are connected with Heraclitean philosophy,
based on the antithetical style of these phrases. He does not postulate an Olbian Heraclitean
beliel but rather that the Olbian evidence demonstrates that Heraclitus' style originated in
mystery religions. Cf. West (1982) pp,28-29. I do not think that Heraclitus' system refers to
the standard idea of transmigration - viz, body to body. His system appears to involve
transþrmatior? not transmigration of the soul: the souUlife-spirit passes "into the unending
cycle of elemental transfonnation, which is a cycle of life": Kahn (19?9) p.214. That is, at
DK22836,830,862 and 880, death is a transformation between ståtes, and involves a cycle
of transfonnations through the elements (fire, ea¡th, air, water) and back to the soul: see
Seaford (1986) pp.l4-20. Kahn argues that while Heraclitus may have begun with the
Pythagorean concept of transmigration, he placed more emphasis on the idea of change of
state, and did not follow up the traditional duality of soul and body. Thus, death became a
descriptive term for any major change of state in the panpsychic world: "The statement..lDK
228 36l..that the psyche which dies is rebom as water and the water which dies is reborn as
ealth, can be seen as a generalization of the doctrine of transmigration for the whole cycle of
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reincamation - it could logically be connected with rebirth or resurrection, or
even more simply, to the new life in the Underworld in traditional
eschatological belief (as seen in the Eleusinian Mysteries, for example).e3 It is
dangerous to consider it hrm æstimony for a cycle of reincarnation, particularly
when there is no evidence that DionysiacÆacchic rites promised any more than
a blessed life in the Underworld.ea Moreover, as I have noted, rebirth appears
to be indicated in both variants of the myth of Dionysus (Dionysus son of
Semele, and Dionysus victim of the Titans).
This conclusion can be reinforced by, first, the gold lamellae, a number
of which have clear Dionysiac affrnities; second, knowledge of other Dionysiac
cults and cult practices; and, third, the grave inscriptions of Dionysiac initiates.
elemental t¡ansformations, in which every stage is simultaneously a death and a rebirth."
(p.221)Thus everythlrtg is literally aktn (p.222) This is a denial of personal identity: there is
"psychic contiguily or contiact, not strict identify" (p.223). This is well illustrated by the
concept of t¡ansformation into the elements as a m¿ßs - there is no idea of self-contained
existence as a soul unit, nor is there a belief in personal irunortality (p.253). This has its
basis in a concept of flux (p.22Ð - there is no continuity of definite form (p.225). In prac[ical
terms, after "death" the soul is not reincarnated as (one) hre, but rather is transformed along
with other souls i¿to fre, In conventional terms, this is not reincarnation. Heraclitean
reincarnation is also denied by Barnes (1979) p.323,n.13. Cf. Macchioro's (unsupported)
view that Heraclitus introduced Orphism to Greece. See the deøiled discussion of Heraclitus'
eschatology in Ka-hn (1979) pp.270-240. Finkelberg (1986) notes that the Heraclitean
abstinences may parallel those called Orphic-Pythagorean, However, this is fa¡ from certain;
certainly Heraclitus desi¡ed to keep the soul dry,but whether this implied dieøry abstinences,
it is not possible to determine. He did suggest sexual abstinence.
e3Cf. Isocrates Panegyrikos 4.28; Aristophanes Frogs 448-455; Pindar fr. 737; Hom.eric
Hymn to Dem¿ter 480-483.
nnOn the same series of bone tâblets the word YTXH appeÍìrs, Ferwerda sees this as a sign
(and our only evidence) that the Olbian Orphics did at least think about the soul -- this is a
ha¡mless enough opinion! Ferwerda (1985) p.273
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The gold lamellae have been the subject of much debate, but the three
most recent finds seem to indicate that the majority were buried with initiates of
a Bacchic mystery cult.e5 The lamella from Hipponion (810) has two lines
(absent on other lamellae), which tell that the dead (woman) will go along the
sacred road with the other "initiates and Bakkhoi" (póotot roì príx1or") to a
ntThe history of the gold lamellae is complex: Zunn (7971), who produced a full edition of
the lamellae known up to that date, believes that they are Pythagorean. One problem in
determining their influences is that they obviously had a wide transmission (Crete, Thessaly,
Southern ltaly) over a long period of time (the latest lamella - A5 - dates to thi¡d century AD
Rome, and was used as an amulet: Seaford 1994, p.l6), and were probably not specific to only
one initiation cult.
They were classified by Zuntz into types 'A' and 'B': the A lamellae have Persephone as the
key hgure, and the soul's purity is the main criterion for its admittånce to the Underworld.
There is a fonnula for immersion in milk, and the deaths a¡e by lightning. The B lamellae
have the guards of the spring in the Underuodd as the key hgure/s; the soul has to remember
the right procedures for the underworld journey, and the elements of lighhing and the milk
formula are absent (except in B10, from Hipponion). 89 from Thessaly (the J. Paul Getty
Museum lamella) has a longer version of the text found on the ltve lamellae from Eleutherna
(Crete), thus demonstrating that even though fhey were far separate in place and time (by
approximately two hundred years), the Cretan lamellae were not a local development, but part
of a widespread panhellenic radition: Graf (1993) p.240; Frel in the discussion in Bu¡kert
(t977) p.79.
Janko (1984) has attempted to restore a lost archetype for the B texts. It was thought that the
A and B texts were sufficiently different to demonslrate two traditions (one Bacchic, one of
Persephone), but the latest discovery - the two identical lamellae from Pelinna (Thessaty),
have bridged the gap between A and B, and contain \ryhat may be an archetypal text with
features ofboth A and B.
The exact purpose of the gold lamellae is difficult to determine. They may have a ritual
context, and reflect ritual - references to milk and wine may indicate libations, and the poems
themselves may have been recited, either at initiations or funerals, or have served as aide-
mémoire for initiations. In terms of their burial with the dead, there is some evidence that
they were placed on the breast, or near the head for ease of reference: Graf (1993) p.254f;
Macchioro (1930) p.120. In this way they are somewhat like the tablets fixed to the dead
souls at Republic 614b8-616b1. The Petelia lamella (81) was rolled into a cylinder and
placed in a sheath, hung around the neck: Lincoln (7982) p,22.
Were the lamellae (or the archetypal poem) handed out by the travelling priests? See
Bremmer (1994) p.95,n.29; Graf (1993) p.250, As Seaford (1994) p.16 has noted, "'What
makes the lamella special is its direct represencation of anonymous belief, in the context of
ritual practice, unmediated by literature."
It should be noted that the lamellae never give the name of Orpheus: Adorno (7915) p.32.
The symbolism of milk may be that it represents the new beginning: Graf (1993) pp.247ff . Cf .
Lloyd-Jones (1990) pp. 107-108.
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blissful afærlife. Thus, this can be seen as "un documento di misteri bacchicf',e6
as, by association, can the other B texts.
The most intriguing question about B10 must be, what is the difference
between the púotor and the púr2¿ot? Burkert suggests that the mustai are
initiates in general, while the Bakkhoi are initiates specifically from a Bacchic
ecstatic groop.et Therefore B10 is evidence that initiates into a Bacchic cult
could expect an especially blissful afterlife.
The mysterious reference at Phaedo 69c (OF 5: eioìv 1dp ôrì, [óç]
Qoorv oi rcepì tdç tel.etdç, vop0qroQópor pèv toÀl.oí, prÍrlor õé te na0pot)
would seem to reinforce this inærpretation that Bacchic initiates are a separate
category to other initiaæs, and enjoy a particularly blessed fate (in Phaedo, the
analogy is made to living among the gods). The fifth century inscription from
Cumae lends further validity to this, proclaiming a separate tomb for initiates of
Bacchic mysteries: ou OÉptç évtoû04 xeîo0ot i pè tòv pepolleupévov.e8
nu Burkert (1975) p.86.
nt Cf, Cole (1930) p.232 who notes the generic nature of mustai, but believes that both terms
refer to initiation into mysteries of Dionysus, but that the Bakkhoi have received more secret
linowledge than the mustai. The ea¡lier attestâtion for mustai and Bakkhoi in a fragment of
Heraclitus (DK22 814) is of doubful authenticity, so the Hipponion text (late f,rfth century)
is probably the first attestation: Cole (1980) p.232,n.32; Burkert (1980) p.37. But cf.
Euripides Cretans fr.472 N: Versnel (1990) p.151.
e8 Burkert (1977) p.3, raises the question of whether a cemetery implies the existence of a
conmunity. A chamber tomb seems hardly large enough, though. Presurnably, it is reserved
for the extra pure or true initiates: cf. Phaedo 69c. On the Cumae find (l^SS no. 120) and its
significance: Graf (1993) p.249; Cole (1993) p.278; Bremmer (1994) p.88; Macchioro (1930)
p.108; Versnel (1990) p.151.
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The simple distinction in the afterlife between the initiated and non-initiates has
evidently gained a further distinction in this group of evidence.ee
The Pelinna lamellae (cut like ivy leaves - the symbol of Dionysus) add
to this: the second line of the common text proclaims eineîv ÕepoeQóvor o'
öc B<Í<r>poç cotòç ëX.uoe,100 and the final line promises a life among the
other blessed, below the earth. I have discussed the meaning of line 2, above, in
terms of how well it may fit with the myth of Dionysus and the Titans, and thus
with reincarnation. There is, however, no indication on these specifically
Bacchic lamellae for reincarnation beliefs or hopes.tot
A not specifically Bacchicl02 lamella from Thurü (Al = OF 32c) ß
suspected to contain a reference to reincarnation. At line 6 we find rórl.ou ô'
è\ênrav Bapunev0éoç oplaÀÉoro.to' Reincarnation is often connected with
the idea of a cycle of lives, and this could be a reference to something of the
sort.rOa If this lamella does refer to reincarnation, it is the only non-Iiterary
nn Cole (1980) pp.231f. The number of tombs, with Dionysiac associations, gathered together
at Derveni, nay indicate a similar distinction in burial customs. Certainly, the practice of
group-organized burials continued into the Hellenistic and Roman ages, but, as Cole points
out, is was not specific only to Dionysiac groups: Cole (1993) p.285.
too Graf (1993), pp.247f .
tot Cf. the interpretation of Lloyd-Jones (1990).
tot lt is difhcult to identify anonymous evidence of mystery cults, because of the simila¡ities
and inter-relations between cults and groups: Moulinier (1955) pp.107-108; Seaford (1994)
p.16; Nilsson (1935) p.185.
to3 "I flew out of the heavy circle of painful grief': tr. Seaford (7994), p.t6
'oo ZunÍz would suggest that it is a metaphor for the harshness of life, or else is a Pythagorean
reference to the "wheel of Ananke", but it should be noted that he does not believe in any
Orphic traditions: (1971) pp.320-322. Cf. his comment, "A quale orhsmo? Il mio, il tuo, il
suo, il nostro?..Offismos e una voce greca non esistente.." in Offismo in Magna Grecia: Atti
del quattordicesimn convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia: Taranto, 6-10 Ottobre 1974
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evidence that survives in Greece and Magna Grøecia to attest to such a belief
held by 'real people'. The Thurü lamellae (41, 42, A3) are also unusual in
that the speaker claims to be one of the divine.los In this sense, they are similar
to Empedocles fragments 112, 113, 115,146, I47. On A2 (= OF 32d), from
the same tumulus as 41, the deceased claims to have paid the penalty for
unrighteous deeds: this could refer to the similar penalty exacted by
Persephone in Pindar fr. 133, and thus to a common link with the Titanic
myth.lou Unfortunately, the Thurü lamellae give too little information to
confirm the existence of a belief in reincarnation,l0T and the Thurü example
differs from others in a number of ways, so it can hardly be seen as typical.r0s
However, I think that it is the most positive evidence thus far. ff it is a
reference to reincarnation, it illustrates how little spread the doctrine had, in
that of the fifteen leaves from throughout the Greek world, reincarnation only
features on one.
p.158. Seaford (1986) p.24 connects the rórloç with the transition in initiation and death
from one ci¡cle to another, from the undesirable (popurrevtrìç) to the desirable (ipepróç)
circle, and suggests that rings and crowns (the otéQovoç: OF 32c 1.7) mark this transition.
This would seem to me to break with the most logical symbolic significance of the circle, viz,
its binding, bonding and linking nature. Ci. Ziegler (1942) co1.1389.
105 In all of the B texts, except 81, the final fate is not mentioned: a happy afterlife is to be
assumed? B1 (from Petelia) places the deceased among the "other heroes": cf. Janko (1984)
p.99.
tou Graf (1993) pp.2$r.
tot Cf. Burkert (1985) p.299: "In the remaining gold-leaf texts metempsychosis is not
necessarily presupposed, but not excluded either."
tot For example, it is possible that the elaborate tumuli erected at Thudi refer to a special class
of dead, such as victims of lightrring, or heroes: Ztnu (1977) p.337,n.1; Bu¡kert (1975)
pp.93, 1.02f.; contra - Graf (1993) pp.253f. Seaford (1986) pp.4ff. would connect the
lighuring with that which destroyed the Tit¿rs, although noting that the lighhing is probably
imaginary, dreaned up by the initiated who see themselves as "eternally absolved Titans"
(p.8).
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I have made some references to examples of Dionysiac burial and cult
practices. Herodotus 2.8I (OF p.62, test.216) appears to give another which
perhaps refers to a Orphic/Dionysiac reincarnation belief:r0e
ou pévtot ë.ç Te td ipd èoQÉpetot eipivea ouôè
ouyrotoOónrerai" oQr"' oo ydp öotov. ópo}"oyéotot õè ta0ta
toîot 'OpQtroîot rol"eopÉvotot xqi Bar26rxoîot, êoôot ôè
Ailucdotot raì" llt0oyopeíotot. oóðè yop toótr¡v tôv
óp1icr:v peté2¿ovtc öotóv åott èv eiptvéorot eipaot OaQ0frvot.
ë.ort ôè rcepï ottôv ipòç l"óyoç À^e1ópevoç.110
The ban on burial in wool can be linked to reincarnation beliefs by the idea that
it is forbidden to kill ensouled creatures. Yet, it is not necessary to kill a sheep
to produce wool.ttt The other alternatives are that wearing wool goes against
the concept of kinship between ensouled creatures,ll2 or that wool is in some
way impure. There seems to be no rational explanation for the ban, and thus it
may reflect a Pythagorean taboo, and not be linked with reincarnation.ttt Our
lack of knowledge is particularly galling, when we consider that Herodotus was
living in Thurü only one generation prior to the Hipponion lamella.lla
However, it does reiterate the connection (in some way) between Orphic and
Bacchic (and Pythagorean) ritual.tt5
toeThe passage is textually difficult (two alternate readings): see Smitl's (1967, pp,106ff.)
defence of the manuscript Eadition contra Linforth; also Bu¡kert (1977) p.4,n.22 who accepts
the longer version. Cf. Burkert (1972) pp.lZ1ff . with Moulinier (1955) p.9.
tto 
See Lts 5ó, ID 21.80 for a prohibition on wool (and women) in an Egyptian cult on Delos.
rrrlf anything were to be banned it would be sheep stlns and the leather products of other
animals.
tt2Is it robbíng animals?
"'The body in the tumulus yielding lamella A4 was evidently covered in a linen shroud
("lenzuolo bianco molto fine"), although it disappeared on concact with air: Graf (7993) p.252
t'o Graf (7993) p.252
lrsBurkert (1977), p.4; Burkert (1972) p.128. Regarding syncretis¡ic ritual, the Gurob
papyrus fragments (OF 3l; Hellenistic, early third century BC) may suggest a ritual
connected with the Orphics, but, as tle central part of the ritual is a sacrif,rce, it is probably
289
The frnal area of evidence is the corpus of grave inscriptions of
Dionysiac initiates/followers. These are mainly of late Hellenistic and Roman
Imperial date,116 and it is noticeable that there are few promises about the
afterlife after the third century BC, which may be connected with the public
nature of these inscriptions,ttt o. with the secret nature of Dionysiac rites. A
secondary problem is that it is often difficult to detect a specifically Dionysiac
burial,ll8 because of the "secular" overlap of Dionysiac symbols, or deliberate
vagueness.tt' Cole has surveyed these inscriptions and concludes that (1) none
reflect the eschatology of the gold lamellae; (2) few have anything to say about
the afterlife beyond the suggestion that the deceased is at an eternal Bacchic
party; and (3) "..there is no theme of rebirth in the Dionysiac sepulchral
texts."120
*
more relevant to the omophagic (sparagmos) ritual of the Bacchics: Tierney (1922) is
convinced that it is Orphic; see Kern's discussion of this at OF pp.l01-104. Burkert (1987)
ppJ0-71notes its Bacchic-Orphic features. Ritual is often connected with mimetic activity -
the re-enacting of mythology: see Finkelberg (1986) p.326; but especially the structuralists -
Detienne (7975), (1919) and (1981); Detienne & Vernant (1989). Cf. Dowden (7992) pp.l02-
118 for the link of myth and ritual.
ll6Despite the banning of the Bacchanalia by the Senate in 1868C, the lamella from Rome
(A5 = OF 32g) shows the continuity of tradition: Burkert (1993) p.260 discusses this.ttt cole (1993) p.z'|s
tttFor example, when mystery initiations are mentioned, they are usually the Eleusinian
Mysteries: Cole (1993) p.292
tteCole (1993) pp.278-9,294.The prevalence of Dionysiac themes of reveþ on sarcophagi
etc, may indicate no more than the hope for the same to continue in the aftedife.
t'o Cole (1993) pp,293-294. Cf. id. p.295: "..Dionysus is not a savior [sic] who promises to his
worshipers [sic] regeneration, but with the stories of his own rebirth and rejuvenation, he is
one who makes this life more sweet and tie next one, perhaps, only a little less harsh." But
cf. Plutarch Moralia 611de, who says that the Bacchic initiation taught tåem not to fear
death, because it was not dissolution by release of the soul: cited by Cole (1993) p.280.
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This Appendix has attempted to clarify some of the Orphic problems, as
they relate to eschatology. It is clear that there is simply no clear, unambiguous,
unequivocal reference to an organised Orphic movemen! or brotherhood,
æaching beliefs in reincarnation, and the latest discoveries in this area have
shifted the focus of investigations to Bacchic and Dionysiac cults, for whom
reincamati on is never attested.l21
There is no evidence, even, that what the Bacchic initiation promised
v/as ariy more than a happy, or less horrid, afterlife, and as such, this is simply
an addition to the traditional eschatology.'"' Ecstatic Dionysiac groups
followed the earthly pursuits of wine, dance etc., and evidence points to the
continuation of these beyond the grave, rather than to reincarnation or rebirth,
despite the possibility of restoring a theme of rebirth from Dionysiac
t23myrnorogy.
t2l The focus is also hrmly fixed in marginal a¡eas of the Greek world: Versnel (1990) p.155;
Burkert (1980) p,40.
tt'Breruner (1994) p.80 has asked why - if Bacchic mysteries are so concerned with the
afterlife - maenads do not appear on funerary vases, Against this, see the slatuette of a
maenad in the hand of the (female) deceased at Lokri; also, the maenad sculpture outside the
sarcophagus containing the Pelinna lamellae: Bu¡kert (1977) p.3; Graf (1993) p.U3.
Obviously this is not decisive. It seems that there were two Bacchic t¡aditions, as illustrated
by Phaedo 69c (vopgr¡roQópot pèv nol.l.oi, póx1ot ôé æ nc{rpot). It is difficult to link the
omophagy of the Bacchic ecst¿tics with the reported abstinences of the Dionysiac Orphics,
and so, Dionysus of the maenads may not equate with the Orphic Dionysus: note Henrichs'
objections in the discussion in Burkert (19'11) p.22. The solution presumably lies in the
sha¡ed current of ideas, which could allow the gilded crater of Derveni (with its scenes of
Bacchic revelry) to contain the ashes of the dead: Burkert (1977) pp.3f.
t" Cf. Plutarch De esu carnium I.996c: tcl lclp ôì¡ nepì tòv Âróvuoov pepoOeu¡révc
nóOq..aivtlpÉvoç êotr ¡rû0oç eiç t1v æcl"ryyeveoíov: Macchioro (1930) p.77.For Pluta¡ch's
(Pythagorean?) opinions on reincarnation see De esu carnium I.996b,7 .996c (the Titan myth
- OF 210), IL3.991de, 5.998cd. Tsekourakis (1986) pp.135ff. notes that Pluta¡ch does not
regard reincarnation as the main reason for abstinence from meat but searches for 'rational'
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The end result is profoundly dissatisfactory, proving only the existence
of a nebulous network of cross-fertilized beliefs, interwoven through the
mystery religions of the Greek world.l2a The latest discoveries put us no closer
to determining, for example, the source of Plato's ideas on reincamation.t'5
Yet, on the strength of the evidence ftom Meno alone, I would be inclined to
argue that reincarnation is an "Orphic" idea.
The Pindar fragment in Meno, with its reference to Persephone, would
indicate to me a close connection with Southern ltaly. Indeed I wonder
whether we are not too delicate in not equating the beliefs of Magna Graecia
outright with "Orphic things".r2u That is, I would suggest that Plato picked up
his so-called Orphic ideas in Sicily,l27 and that those beliefs that we call Orphic
are in fact Magna Grecian.l28
reasons, such as adoption by necessity, vaguer medical rationales, and just behaviou¡ towa¡ds
animals possessing reason etc. On Plutarch as an Orphic: Feibleman (7959) p.152.
r2aA "collusion": Alderink (1981) p.79; cf. Nilsson (1957) p.122; Seaford (1994) p.16. This
makes it impossible to verify suggestions such as the influence of Orphic thought on, for
example, Anaximander (and více-versø), impossible: Bacigalupo (1965) p.285,n.9;
McClintock (1985); Vlastos (1970) p.102,n.34. Or, compare the common tradition of the
katabasis or underworld journey, which features in so many early testimonia: for example, the
Orphic l<ntabasis - OF p.304, test. 176, 222,223: Nilsson (1935) p.2l[. Cf . Ziegler (1942)
cols.1391ff. for the "Hadesfahrt" motif in the myths of Theseus, Heracles etc.
ttt Cf. however, Lincoln (1952) who believes that Plato's vision of the underworld in the myth
of Er is drawn from the same source as, for example, lamella B1 (OF 32a) from Petelia, and
this source is a Proto-Indo-European cosmologem.
ttuCf. Dieterich (1913) p.84 on the "pythagoreisch-orphisch-bakchischen Gemeinden und
Mysterien" of Southern ltaly. He relates all of the evidence (lamellae etc.) to a Southern
It¿Iian N eþ ia tradition: pp.108,125,127 .
t2TMorgan (1990) has attempted to trace the mystic and mystery references in Plato's
dialogues back to their Bacchic, Pythagorean and Orphic roots (that is, back to popular
religion), by analysing Plato's use of the language, concepts and rituals of mysæry cults, It is
an important study, but flawed by Morgan's treaûnent of "Orphic Pythagoreanism". Morgan
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I do not think that reincarnation can be totally ruled out of the Orphic
corpus of beliefs:r2e I am optimistic that one day evidence will appear for
another so-called Orphic group with a slant towards reincamation.t'o If this
new evidence \ryas associated with Sicily, and Akragas in particular, this would
hardly be a surprise. Both of our best attested beliefs in reincarnation come
from Akragas, and Plato has close connections with nearby Syracuse.
In conclusion, I am not convinced that the origin of reincarnaúon in
Greece lies within an Orphic group or sect, but I am certain that we cannot
lightly dismiss the comparative evidence. As Mansfeld notes: "..if Pind., fr.133
(Schroeder) ap. PIat., Meno 81 a, is 'Orphic'..no amount of special pleading
will be able to dismiss the inference that at least some members of the Orphic
family believed in metempsychosis." 13 1
points out (p.206,n.44) that "Plato is of course our best source for Orphic materials before the
Hellenistic period." In making this statement, it seems that Morgan has unwittingly pointed
to a major problem: viz, how do we linow that Plato is making Orphic references? Secondary
to this, how can we rely on the deliberately vague information given by Plato to reconstruct an
Orphic religion? I think that we need to give the cautionary proviso that when we use the
term "Orphic", it is generic. Morgan, relying on Bu¡kert, appears to make this point, but
ignores its significance. "Orphic þthagoreanism" is equally vague - almost meaningless. As
Morgan points out, Plato was as likely to have met Bacchic influences in Sicity as anything
else. To what extreme do we go? Cf. Jaeger (1959) p.144: "Nothing could be more wrong
than to make Plato an Orphic" or Solmsen (1982Ð p.491n., "..I venture to think that my
account of Pythagoras, Empedocles and Plato is not danaged by my hesitation to allow for
Orphic influence."
t'8 It is interesting for the hypothesis of Magna Graecian association with the origins of
Orphics, that many of the authors who have "Orphic" writings attributed to them in Clement
and the Suda (OF pp.63-74) are from Sicily and Southern ltaly: Nilsson (1935) p.194. As
Sabbatucci (1975) p.38 asks, can we restore some sort of "unita culturale Magna Grecia"?
1'e I sometimes wonder whether the only connecting link between the so-called "Orphic"
evidence is that it is all on unusual medial Cf. Festugiere's comment (quoted by Detienne,
1975 p.51) that it is "un 'étrange pot-pourri"'.
13oCf. Nilsson (1935) pp.2l6f.
l3tReview of Alderink inMnemosyn¿ (1985) XXXVIII43S
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APPENDIX C: PLATO GORGIAS
Gorgias 523a1-526d2 exemplifi.es the difficulties inherent in interpreting
myth. The myth in question is the earliest of the four "great" eschatological myths,
and there is considerable debate about the possible appearance of reincamation in
it.l There are a number of reasons for the doubts:
(1) Most importantly, there is no explicit mention of reincarnation. This is
particularly significant in the light of 492e9-493c4, where Socrates repeats three
tales: first, that it could be true, as Euripides writes, that ciç ô' oiôev, et tò (flv
pév êoc rot0oveîv, tò rotOoveîv ôè (îu .' Second, a wise man once said that
we are dead and that the body (oô¡ro) is our tomb (oflpo); third, a ropyòç ovnp,
ioo4 Etrel,óç ctç ii 'Itohróç compared the soul of an appetitive man (one who
\vas never "fi.lled" to satisfaction) to a leaky jar (tetpqpévoç æí0oç): these men, the
most wretched of all in Hades, are forced to carry water in a sieve (róorcrvov) to a
tetpr'¡pévoç tdOoç. The allegory is extended by the wise man: the sieve is the soul
of the foolish man, unable to hold anything because of its oætoria and 2tq0n.'
"Now this is all fairly strange," Socrates concludes (493c4).
l Annas (1982b), Irwin (1979) p.248 and Crombie (1962), for example, agree that it is not
present; Dodds (1959) and Friedlåinder (1969) believe that it is, but for different reasons.
'492e9-71: ou "¡úp tot Ocrupó(orp'öv eï Eupræíôr¡ç clÀaOî èv roîoôe ).Éyeq lélorv--
tíç õ'oiôev, el tò (flv ¡rév êotr rctOcrveîv,
rò rorOoveîv ôè (frv;
Dodds (1959) p.299 comments that this is the asceúc ideal, and is (p.304) in st¡ict contrast with
Callicles' hedonism. Blank (1991) p.24 notes that the "subtle man" (a5) is unflattering, as is the
kompsos (usually used of the pseudo-wise - esp. sophists). By the use of these spokespeople,
Socrates is disassociating himself from the body/soul views. Cf. my previous discussion of myth;
also Ferwerda (1985) p.270,
3 "unreliabilify" and "forgetfulness": all t¡anslations are from Irwin (1919).
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That the three elements of the story must be treated with suspicion is
obvious (c1. Meno 81a ff., where reincarnation is introduced through the medium
of utterings of "priests and priestesses"). The very absence of reincarnation from
this hotchpotcha of belief is unusual! (See point (3), below)
(2) The most important point made in Gorgias is that justice is the only thing
worth living for (cf. the second analogy to the oóQpovoç and aró}"ootoç lives,
both types of men frlling very different jars àt 493d5-494a6.).5 There are a
number of prongs to this attack: virtue is best; to be dead is the happiest thing for
the soul (for example, 492e3-6). The evil of pleasure is one of the strongest
motivations for the myth: that is, when you die it is not really the end - there is a
final court of retribution.6 Another important point is that only the philosopher
knows the correct way to fulfil the conditions of the correct type of life. The
benefîts of the philosophical life are made clear through comparison with the bad
lives of others, especially the tyrant and sophist (519c3-d7), both of whom
personify injustice.T
o Dodds (1959) pp.297 -299,373 discusses the numerous sources for the story of fte water-carriers,
a primitive story familiar in myth and ritual in va¡ious forrns. See also Keuls,E. Water-carriers in
Hades ??
sThis could also be read as an allegory on reincarnation, except tbat such allegories are
anachronistic and Neoplatonic; cf. the Neoplatonic interpretations of Platonic cosmological
dualism in Proclus: Friedlåinder (1969) pp.187-188.
u Annas (1982b) p.L25
tBlank (1991) pp.31,33 for the idea that Gorgias is primarily concerned with linking ignorance
and [post-mortem] punishment; among the ignorant are sophists and unqualilted politicians
(p.3s).
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Reincarnation would fit well into these ideas, but only if it were a
punishmenr (that is, if life on earth was considered a punishment). However, there
is no sign of this idea in the three stories at 492e9-493c4: rather, the point is made
that the post-mortem punishment is the most important, because it levels the
injustices of life. There is no hint that souls are incarnated back into this world as
(for example) animals; nor is there any parallel with the radical punishment of kms
870d-e, where, in the next life, the murderer dies by the same manner in which he
disposed of his victim.
(3) The eschatological myth is introduced at 523a1-3 in a remarkably clear way -
as abelief of Socrates':"Arot¡e ôr¡, Qaoí, prÍÀo ral"o0 l.óyou, öv où pèv lìynon
pûOov, óç e1ò oÎ.pot, eyô ôè l"ó1ov' óç of.nOî ydp övto oor lé(co cì pÉl"l"ro
Ié1erv.8 This is a unique statement of opinion from Socrates with respect to an
obvious myttr, and would tend to lend weight to the argument that, (a) the features
of the myth are what Socrates believ¿s about the afterlife, and (b) significant
features which are absent, are absent because they are not part of his system of
belief.
t Dodds (1959) p.377 views it as the sort of /ogos discussed in the Seventh lztter - expressing in
imaginable terms a 'truth of religion', and compares lnws 8'72d-e where the Athenian is not su¡e
whether the vindictive doctrine of punishment (exact requital) is a myth or a logos. Blank (1991)
p.35.
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However, I would temper this with a warning that the myth serves a certain
purpose in this dialogue, and reincamation would weaken this message - thus, it is
not so much rejected, as simply left out.
(4) one cannot miss the deliberate duplication of the images of trialsijudgements Ír
this world and the next: Socrates is about to be judged in life, and the judgement
in death not only parallels this, but also overshadows it as the more important
judgement. The idea of finality is explicit - this life is the only chance one gets to
prove one's just nature. The finality of Socrates' own trial is known to the reader
- it ends his life - and this appears to be expressed in the post-mortem judgement:
it is a'Last Judgement'.e From this, as from his own death, there is no wây
back, and indeed - as is illustrated by his decision not to go into exile and thus
escape death - he does not want to struggle against the inevitable (fateldestiny).
This is the same point to which the brief stories about hfe being death link, but we
are without the sense (implicit n Phaedo) that Socrates is offering the arguments
as a comforr to his friends. In Gorgias, he is not surrounded by friends, but by the
worst that life has to offer to the philosopher - viz, tyrannical rule, abuse of power,
and sophistry. Reincarnation has no place in this argument; it could only weaken
the powerful image of finality.lo
e Annas (7982b) p.123
loAnnas (1982b)p.124
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523b5-524a8 makes a clear analogy to Socrates' own trial in Athens: it is said that
souls used to be judged on earth beþre they went to Hades, but the earthly judges
were taken in by the 'clothes' of the embodied souls and by the false wifiresses
whom the souls called; therefore, Zeus replaced the earthly rial with a post-
mortem judgement, where the souls, stripped of their earthly paraphernalia,tt are
judged by divine judges, îva ôrraía 11 rpíorç ñ (523e6).r2
The significance of the myth lies in the implication that Socrates' unjust earthly
punishment will eventually be put right: it is an optimistic myth ("..that the moral
order which we see imperfectly realized in this actual world is yet actually
perfect.");1' even more so for the philosopher who disdains the body in favour of
the soul.la
(5) Certain commentators (particularly Dodds) have taken reincarnation to be
implicit and necessary to make sense of the myth as a deterrent to injustice. The
myth is of the typical eschatological genre.ls The problem rests with the question
of how we know about the fate of the soul in Hades. In itseH, the question is
illogical: there are many other examples of myths which are not communicated
rrCf. Empedocles fr. 126; also Cratylus 403b5.; Annas (1982b) p.723.In the old system, the
souls also lsrew when they were going to die, so tiey could prepare. This was also stopped.
t2 Friedl¿inder (1969) p.175 on the aphess of the judging; Annas (1982b) pp.722ff .
13 Sidgwick The Methods of Ethics, cited by Annas (1982b) pp.723,141,n,19.
1aPerhaps not so good for those who enjoy earthly life; for these, the idea of reincarnation as
righting this life's injustices is obviously more apt; cf. lnws (q.v.) for this.
t5 
See the discussion of the details of these myths in the sections on Phaedo and, Republic.
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directly, but which are purely myths in the sense of stories with a purpose. Cf
Republic 330d4-331a3:
eô ydp ioOt, ë.Qr¡, ô Eórpcteç, öcr, e¡etôdv ctç éy1òç fl toû
oieo0or teÀe.un1oerv, eioép2¿etot oorQ ðéoç roì Qpovtìç repì
cõv ëpæpoo0ev our eïo'rjer. oi te ldp l,eyó¡revor pôOor nepì rôv
åv "Arôou, éç ròv év0dôe aôtrr¡oovto ôeî åreî ôrôóvor
ôixt1v, rotoyel,ópevot tÉroç, rore ôr1 otpéQouotv or¡toô crlv
Vo1,iv tl.i ol,qgeîç ôor"v' roì outóç...onoyíoç õ' oôv roi
ôefpotoç ¡reotòç liyverar roi oval"oyf(etor fiôr¡ roì orconeî ei
rtvcÍ ct qôírr1oev. o pèv oôv eópiororv esutoô Ëv tQ pirp æol},d
oôrrrlpata roì" ér rôv 'ümrorv, röorcep oi æoîôeç, Oopd
éyer"pó¡revoç ôerpaíver rci (f perd rorfrç el.æíôoç' tô ôè pr1ôÈv
é.outô cÍôtrov ouverôócr r1ôeîc ê[æìç oeì. rcúpeoc xoì o1o0r1
yqpotpóQoç, óç raì llívôopoç l,é1er.
"Hades" is well-named: it is truly the region of "unseen" fears, and a strong threat
to be just, now.'u It is a matter of betief. As Socrates notes about Hades,
ött te yríp, ercer,ôdv öruo( ctç r1pôv anoOcÍv¡, aeì" ereî rocv,
QoBoûvtot, roi öct n VUXq TUpvTì to0 oópotoç nop' èreîvov
ané.p1çrau roì" toûto neQópr1vtau (Cratylus 403b1-5)
I think that Dodds is looking too hard for empirical "proofl' of the myth: trying to
match it 'with the katabatic tradition of Republic X.11 Failing to find this, he
would see reincarnation as presupposed - the only way of communicating the post-
mortem message:tt that is, there is no point in having post-mortem punishments
(especially, eternal punishments) if there is no way for them to serve as
rcopoôeíypo.rc^ (525c2-3) to the living via the memory of reincarnated souls. Yet,
tu Annas (1982b) p.124. Compa¡e Christianity: you do not need concrete proof of Heaven/Hell to
be awed/frightened by it.
t' Or Odyssey XI and Aeneid VI. I think that his interest in shamanism is more than a little
responsible for this view.
tt Dodds (1959) esp. p.380; Friedlåinder (1969) p.135.
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not only is there no mention in this dialogue of recollecúon or continuation of
personality through prenataVintercarnate memories, but the myth is not even
accepted as the only truth - Socrates adds the usual tempering note:
Ëyro pÈv oôv, ô Kol,l,íl^etç, urcó re toótorv tôv Àóyrov r.ênetopat,
raì ororô önrr:ç oroQovoôpot tQ rptrñ éç órywottitqv c4v
yultiv...Td1o ô' oôv tqôto pô0óç oor ôoreî ÀéyeoOor óonep
TpCIòç roì" rotoQpoveîç cutôv, rai oöôév T' öv flv 0aupootòv
roroQpoveîv toótolv, ei rq (qtoûweç eilopev autôv pe)"cíol roì.
ol.qOéotepo eorceîv' (526d3- 5 ; 527 a5 -8)
Other commentators have also argued for reincarnation from aÍL argumentum ex
silentio point, particularly on the basis that Gorgias is the first work to display
cha¡acterisúcs of what one might call the Magna Graecian tradition
("Orphism"/Pythagoreanism),1e and is thus a product of Plato's visit to Sicily
c.3388C. Yet the katabasis tradition pre-dates anything found in "Orphism" or
Pythagoreanism, and the concept of carrying water in sieves is part of a wider
tradition of impossible tasks.2O Moreover, there are elements which can also be
ascribed to initiatory mysteries of the Eleusinian kind.2l
Rather, the myth appears to have a traditional background (apart from the
introduction of a unsuccessful earthly judgement, which has obvious symbolic
value),22 and upon this has been superimposed suitable, educative
re Crombie (1962) p.302 notes that "..the sympathetic mention of mystical doctrine would have
been taken as showing reincarnationalist leanings"; cf. Friedlãnder (1969) p.174; Dodds (1959)
pp.297-298; Guthrie (1935) is the most complete source on "Orphic" elements in Gorgias.
'o Cf. C.Sourvinou-Inwood (1986) pp.37-58tt Guthrie (1975) p.305,n.2
" And the judgement occurs at the Meadow, rather than in Hades proper: Dodds (1959) p.313
gives examples.
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rewards/punishments appropriate to the philosopher's likes (philosophers go to the
Isles of the Blessed: 526c2-5) and hates (tyrants and kings: 524e2-525a8;
525d1ff.). There is no suggestion of future earthly lives as punishments or
otherwise.23
I would conclude that Gorgias does not contain any explicir evidence of
reincarnation, and any implícir doctrine seen in the myth is the result of
commentators' unnecessary cross-references with other dialogues (in the interests
of obtaining a "complete" doctrine), the confused "Orphic"-Pythagorean (mystic)
tradition, and unfounded allegorizing. To this I would add that the myttr was not
intended, for the reasons given above, to contain any concept of reincarnation,
regardless of the ready availability of metempsychosis doctrines (ánd their
suitability to certain aspects of the myth). It is unfortunate that these very myths
caused Socrates to be unconvincing to his sophistic audience.2a
" It is also lacking the "quasi-scientific trappings" of later dialogues: Dodds (1959) p.373
2oAnnas (7982b)p.125.
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APPENDIX D: GREEK SHAMANISM AND REINCARNATION
The intriguing point about the theory of shamanism in Ancient Greece is
that the miraculous deeds attributed to the so-called shamanic figures (Orpheus,
þthagoras, Empedocles) have many parallels with northem shamanic ftadition.
I do not intend to linger on shamanism, a phenomenon which I believe to
be greatly over-rated as an observable influence on sixth century Greek
mystic/religious thought.r I would argue that the resemblances between the typical
shaman (defined below) and the so-called Greek miracle-mongers (Pythagoras et
al) are superficial; moroover, there is not a trace of evidence for post-mortem
transmigration in the shamanic tradition.2
"Shaman" is a Siberian word; it designaæs,
..a type of magician recognizable throughout central and north
Asia, the Arctic, the Americas, Indonesia, Australia, and Oceania.
His characteristic feature is his ability to work himself into a state in
which his spirit leaves his body and undertakes journeys and
adventures beyond the reach of ordinary humans. It can fly through
the air for immense distances, visit the centre of the world, and pass
from there to the several levels of heaven; it can plumb the depths
tThe idea was adapted from Meuli "scythica" Hermes 70 (1935) 12l-116 by Dodds (1951)
pp.135-178, and adopted whole-heartedly by Burkert (see note 2.). For a short history of the
phenomenon v ide Phllip (1 966) p. 1 59 and B olton (19 62) p.125.
2 Shamanism has been very fashionable for the past thirty years, but it is interesting to note that
some of its more outspoken represen[atives have now changed their minds. V/.Burkert is one of
these: in the English edition of his lV¿lsfteit unl Wissenschafi (= Lore & Science in AncienÍ
Pythagoreanism, 1972) he has modihed his views on shamanism as an observable phenomenon
in Greece. For example, "..more thorough acquaintance with ancient religion has pushed the
concept of 'shamanism' further into the background": Burkert (1972) [preface]. A more general
view of the whole debate can be seen in Lloyd-Jones (1991) p.191; in his opinion, Meuli's
suggestion is "by no means certain to be right."
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of the sea, or go to the land of the dead. The shaman is thus able to
negotiate with gods and spirits (in their secret language) on the
community's behalf, or converse with the souls of the departed and
bring messages back from them. He can cure the sick by going after
their fugitive souls (if necessary as far as the realm of the dead) and
bringing them back to their owners, or by defeating morbid demons
in combat. He alone can see souls and spirits; often they assume
animal forms, but the shaman can deal with animals and birds too,
and understand their language. He has access to the whole of
nature. His spiritual adventures are dramatically represented to the
onlookers by his mimetic dancing, symbolic acts, fits, trances,
vociferations; or he may report them in lengthy songs.'
One of the problems, as Eliade has noted, has been the tendency to misuse
the term "shaman" as an equivalent to "medicine-man", or leader of any ecstatic
movement: there has been a lack of specification.o A far-greater problem lies in the
evidence itself, which is often contradictory, late, and cited in writers of dubious
authority.
ORPHEUS AS SHAMAN
E.R.Dodds first suggested that Orpheus might be a shaman.s This is an
interesting supposition, especially if one looks to the Thracian background of
Orpheus.6 A number of other connections can be made:
3 West (1983) p,5
oEriade (1964) p.3
s"A psychically unstable person who has received a call to the religious life": Dodds (1951)
p.140; Eliade (1964) p.391 has discussed the position clearly. See note 53, below, for the
diff,rculties associated with Dodds' vague definition.
uDodds (195r)p.r47
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(1) The early poetry associated with the name "Orpheus" can be seen as
representative of a shamanic type, particularly the poem entitled Descent to
Hades.T Other poems appear to be spells or incantations.s According to this
view, the flrst poems attributed to Orpheus were presumably poems composed for
religious groups with rituals similar to shamanic practices.e
(2) Orpheus had a special rapport with animals, whom he charmed with his music;
he also charmed trees and rocks.lo
(3) Orpheus took part in the journey on the Argo;11 his role, it seems, is to
counteract the Sirens.t2 He was also the keleustes, who gave the rh¡hm to the
oarsmen, and the bard.l3 A deeper interpretation of the Argonauts' joumey is that
it was a shamanic voyage to the Underworld. Orpheus is also important because he




t Burkert (1952) p.5: In Euripides Cyclops, one of the satyrs claims to have a magical forrnula of
Orpheus.
n West (1983) pp.6-7.According to rilest, Orpheus may well have been a shaman-hgure (from
northern Europe, and/or from the traditional Thracian aÍea - cf. the story of Zalmoxis in
Herodotus 4.94 - somewhat Hellenized, made semi-divine by links with Apollo, and his special
powers were attributed to his musical ability. Then, by a process of rationalization, Orpheus must
have lost his more shamanic associations.
toln the Finnish poem, Kalevala, the singer - a magician - attracts animals with his song. In
other cultures, it is the job of a shaman-f,rgure to attract animals with music before a hunt: Graf
(1990) p.84.
tt Cf. the orphic Argonautica.
tt Is this "a symbolic defeat of Death"? - Schwartz (1985b) p.21.
13 Graf (1990) p.96. Other, later associations of Orpheus and the Argonauts emphasize his role
as the only initiate in the Sarrotiracian mysteries: ibid; or stress his ability to prophesy - i.e. as
the seer (however, the Argonauts a-lready had another seer on board); or to control the weather.
laSchwa¡tz (1985a) p.20894; Schwa¡tz (19S5b) p.241; note the metope from the Scythian
Treasury at Delphi showing the Argo and Orpheus; the grounds for suspecting fhat the Argo
voyage is shamanic are that tle outward and return journeys a¡e so similar.
3M
(4) Orpheus journeyed to Hades to recover his wife, Eurydice (by charming the
rulers of Hades with his song); earlier versions of the story may have shown that
he succeeded.ts There is a similar "Orpheus Tradition" among North American
Indians, and also along the Pacific rims of Asia and Polynesia.lu In these stories,
however, the "Orpheus-fi.gure" is not usually a shaman.tt Moreover, as Eliade has
shown, katabatic journeys play no role in true shamanism.ls
(5) Orpheus' death; it is generally believed that he was torn to pieces by a band of
Thracian women, possibly under Dionysiac influence.le Dismemberment has been
seen as a typical shamanic initiation ritua1,20 however, there are more obvious
parallels with the myth of the dismemberment of Dionysus by the Titans, and with
the numerous stories of dismemberment in Dionysiac cults.2l
(6) The Orpheotelesf¿s has been regarded as a shaman-type figure: a type of priest,
or initiator, who went around the country purifying individuals,t' removing their
tt That is, conÍraYtgil Georgic IV: Linforth (1941) pp.16ff.
tu Vy'here a man goes to the world of the dead to recover someone, usually a relative, he can lead
back the relative with conditions (for example, that he does not look back while leaving), ald,
usually, he breaks the conditions, and does not succeed.
17 Graf (1990) has argued that the story of a joumey to the world of the dead might have come to
Greece simply as that - a story; the Greeks then used the story without its shamanic connotations:
Graf (1990) p.84. A more obtuse theory is that his wife was simply a ritual substitute for Orpheus
to visit, and return from, the underworld as part of his shamanic initiation: Schwartz (1985b)
p.242.
tt Eliade (1964) p.393
tn Graf (1990) pp.85-86. There a¡e many variations on this: one is that Orpheus had adopted
Apollo-Helios as his god, and Dionysus was avenging this insult. This is the tale told in
Aeschylus' lost Bassarides: Linforth (1941) p.10; Eliade (1986) p.114. Other motives are more
prosaic - for example, Orpheus was ignoring the women after his wife's death, ald they were
jealous. There is also the idea of Orpheus' hostility towards the feminine (seen in his contest with
the Sirens): he cannot tåme his female killers with his song - Eliade (1986) p.114.
'o A fairly permanent one! It is quite well-attested in Tibet, for example: Schwartz (1985b) p.242;
Dlllon Hermathena 138 (1985) p.68, reviewing 'West (1983).
tt Euripides' Bacchae, for example.
22 A sort of door-to-door salesman of salvation, as Plato seems to describe at Republic 364b-365a.
Bu¡kert (1982) p.4; Dodds (1951) p.142: shamanic religion is individual religion. Philip (1966)
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guilt and sin for money. T\e Orpheotelestai are, as Burkert points out, the only
"tangible reality behind the phenomenon of Orphism".2' Th"y seemed to use holy
"Orphic" books,2a and purification played a part in the salvation. These people do
not seem to have belonged to one sect or group, but to have travelled around like
traditional shamans.
The shaman was the person to whom people turned to explain what could
not be explained with reason, and to give the reassurance that reasoning did not
give.2s 'the Orpheotelestes (not closely connected with an "Orphic" cult) seems to
allow people a quick way to purification, rather than leading a fully ascetic
lifestyle; he functions almost in the role of a confessor: the sort of person whom
Plato describes at Republic 364b-365a.26 In other societies there were people with
similar functions. One way in which these shaman-figures cured ill.s was by the
reciting of cosmogonies,2T and this has also been seen as a link with the
Orpheotelestai; for example, Burkert points out that cosmogonies are t¡ansmitted
by these travelling priests.2s
p.161 would argue (contra) that shamans are closely connected to their communities in (truly)
shamanic societies.
t'Bu¡kert (198D p.a
toNilsson (1925) p.215 calls Orphism "..a book religion, the first example of the kind in the
history of Greek religion." I presume - considering the small number of books which would have
been in circulation - that only the initiator used the books,
25 Gould (1987) p.11
26 West (1983) p.21; Parker (1983) pp.303ff.
27 Schwartz (19S5b) p.241. Cf. Burkert (1990) p.24.
2sBurkert (1990) p.U.Ihave discussed this at greater length in Appendix B.
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It seems to me that this evidence is tenuous in the extreme. There are a
number of stumbling blocks: for example, Orpheus is not a human, or even a
legendary figure: he is a mythic character.zt Moreover, the actual link between
Orpheus and Orphism (within which sphere one would expect the shamanic
Orpheus to operate) is far from clear: indeed, the link with Bacchic religion is
much stronger - there is no evidence that Orpheus per se played a pivotal role in
the phenomenon of Orphism.30 A third flaw is that there is no evidence for
attributing any truly shamanic features to the Orpheotelestes.3r As Bremmer notes
(on the whole problem of shamanic influence), "..when there are parallels..these
are not exclusively shamanistic."32 From this alone one could conclude that there
is nothing definitely suggestive of shamanism in the Orphic movement.33
PYTHAGORAS AS SHAMAN
Wa1ter Burkert sees Pythagoras as part of a long tradition of shamanic
figures in early Greece (with Aristeas, Abaris, Epimenides, Phormio and
Empedocles); this is based on the legends of miracle-working and bilocation
common to this group.'o 'With regard to Pythagoras, the connection is made
'n cf. Philip (1966) p.161
3o And, as Eliade (1964) notes (p.389) there is no shamanic link with Dionysiac worship.
" For example, they might have been dwellers on the fringe of the mysteries, degenerated into
unscrupulous "quacks"; cf. Theophrastus' "Superstitious Man" (Characters X\L12) who makes
amonthly visit to the Orpheotelestes - Parker (1983) p.307; see Ussher (79%\ p.152n. for this
interpretåtion. Cf. Plato's disdain of such people at Republic 364b-365a.
" Bremmer (1981p.a1
" Eliade (1964) p.391; cf. his opinion of the di¡ections given to the soul on the gold plates: they
are the dead equivalent of the live soul-joumeys of shamanism; however, since shamanism lacks
a concept of Hades, this is a ratler difficult analogy. See Appendix B,
3aBurkert (1912) pp.148-155 lists the common experiences. Eliade (1964) p.389 notes that
Epimenides' stay in the cave on Ida represents "..a classic initiatory ordeal, but it is not
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clearer by the story of Zalmoxis in Herodotus 4.94ff., the tradition of the
Pythagorean katabatic ¡ourney,ts and the numerous linls with Apollo.36
Hyperborean Apollo is a northern deity, and provides the geographical link
between Pyhagoras and shamanism.
However, the strongest evidence for Pythagoras as shaman comes from
comparative data. Pythagoras fits into a series of miraculous figures - including
Aristeas and Abaris (both linked with Apollo) - who are seen as shamanic. The
problem with such parallels is that they are often only coincidental. Bolton has
rationalised the tradition on Aristeas in medical terms. For example, the tradition
surrounding Aristeas associates him with soul journeys and adventures (which he
can relate to his listeners, including stories of his soul as a bird), bilocation,
divination, the attributes of a medicine-man, and a poem (Arirutspea).31 In
Herodotus 4.ßff Aristeas goes into a trance in a fuller's shop and is left for
dead;38 Bolton sees this as a typical cataleptic trance/seizure (and asks, moreover,
necessarily 'shananic'." However, Epimenides' divination, prophesying, ecstasies and cures do
have parallels in sharnanism. Philip (1966) p.161 cornments that of these names associated with
shamanism and miraculous events, some are real, others legendary or mythical; if we were going
to tefm all such appearaxces "shamanic", then to the list should be added most of the unusual
figures of the archaic age, including Pannenides (who wrote abouta joumey of the soul). As he
notes, because of the nature of the time, "It would be easy to paint a very 'irrational' picture of
thei¡ world." (p.1,62). Cornford (1971) pp.89ff. provides a very confused account of these figures
and offers many comparative examples.
'5Bu¡kert (1912) pp.155-157; Eliade 09e) pp.3921. points out that katabatic joumeys have no
place in shamanic tradition.
36See references in Chapter 1, n.19. But cf. Eliade (1964) p.387 who notes that there is no
parallel between Delphic Apollo (oracles and etc..) and shamanism.
" Bolton (7962) p.726ttCf. the very similar ci¡cumstances of Er at Republic ó14b8: Halliwell (1988) p.172.Ehade
(1964) p.393 would see this as a cataleptic tÍance, and much more reminiscent of shamanism
than other Greek ecstatic traditions. The fact that this story appears in a myth and is ascribed to a
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whether Aristeas' supposed soul journey was not a physical journey). As Bolton
has noted, there is a tradition of such figures being cast in the mould of
Pythagoras;" he would trace this to Heraclides Ponticus, who (he believes) took
unusual stories and made them conform to a pattern of Pythagorean influence.oo
However, Heraclides was not sympathetic to Pythagoras.al
Philip has given a list of problems with shamanism in Greece: viz, it is not a
central feature of society (as it is in Siberia); there is no Greek word equivalent to
"shaman";42 there is no record of practices entirely cha¡acteristic of shamanism;a3
one finds evidence for behaviour categorized as shamanic before the opening of
trade on the Black Sea (from where Dodds argues that shamanism was introduced
to Greece);4 there are no phenomena observable among the closest neighbours to
the Greeks;ot in Greek tradition, the soul-journey is undertaken not for benefit to
Pamphylian, not a Greek, makes it difficult to use as evidence of the phenomena in Greece.
Eliade G9e) p.394 suggests some sort of "archetype of 'gaining existential consciousness'."
3e No doubt one of the reasons being their conìmon Apolline t¡adition: cf. Eliade (196a) p.3SS.
ooBolron (1962) pp.165ff. & 183;cf. Guthrie (1962) pp.163-165.
otfr.81; fr.l29: cited by Burkert (1972) p.160, de Vogel (1970) p.86 agrees with Philip (1966)
that Heraclitus is not referring to Pythagoras as a shaman. She believes that he would have used
other tenns to do this. The question, of course, is which terms in particular? Cf. Burkert on
|OIIx @elow). Philip (1966) p.170,n.14 points out that Heraclides c¿une from Pontus, so may
well have understood any Scythian shamanic beliefs.
o'Contra Burkert (1972) p.164 who believes that |OID is a term equivalent to "shama¡" : cf.
Bu¡kert (1962) "fOIÐ. Zum griechischen 'Scharnanismus"' RhM 105, 36-55, where he
concedes (p.45) that there is no definite evidence for this, or for shamanism.
n'Cf. Bremmer (1987) p.47: "..when there are parallels..tlese are not exclusively shamanistic."
no One cannol argue from this that shamanism was not introduced but was a cross-cultural
phenomena, because there is evidence for only a few unrelated cha¡acteristics, not a whole
system.
o'As Bremrner (1987) pp.411f. notes, there is no evidence that the Scythians - whom Dodds
(1951) believes to have int¡oduced shamanism to Greece - held shamanic beliefs about the soul;
however, Eliade (1964) p.395 believes that they would have known of them, and that there a¡e
some parallels.
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the community (as in true shamanic societies), but often without purpose and on
the traveller's own account; as for the (typical) use of verse, a lot of other people
used verse without any shamanic purpose; bilocation is not equivalent to the soul-
journey. Finally, as Philip notes, the Archaic Age is full of people and events which
are deemed "miraculous":46 curious religious ideas do not necessørily imply
shamnnism, nor is it at all surprising that a tradition of miraculous events
surrounds such people.ot This is the problem of imprecise definitions, again.
Ferwerda points out an interesting problem for Pythagoras as shaman. The
shamanic soul (from where shamans get their power) is the "free soul" of Homer;
why then should there be any belief in the body as a tomb or a prison of the soul, if
it is possible for the soul to wander freely beyond the body during li¡e.aB Tb'rc idea
would upset all evidence found in Plato et al for such beliefs. The point being
made, I believe, is that the soul does not wander during life, and it is death that
brings freedom.ae
ou Philip (1966) p.1ól
otPhilip (1966) p.159. Vernant (1991) pp.322-323 does not refer ro shamans, butmagi (the¡o¡
andres) - figures playing fomrative roles in the troubled and changing society of the seventh and
sixth centuries, among whom he numbers Solon. They are important because they are raised
above society's problems (because of their "exceptional powers") and as such, I presune, have an
impartial view of society's needs. Certainly Pythagoras' reputation as moral reformer to Croton -
cf. Morrison (1955) p.135 - would fit with this. I do not see why such figures have to be divine:
they could, for example, be simply inspiredby the divine.
a8 Ferwerda (1985) pp.277-272
onNote the interesting parallel of Pinda¡ fr.131 Bergk where the soul is awake while the body
sleeps (and vice versa); there is no idea here of the soul physically wandering from the body;




E.R.Dodds suggested that Empedocles was not only a Greek shaman, but
also the last Greek shaman.5o If one looks at fragments 111 and 112, and takes
into account the fragment that mentions Empedocles' sotildaimon flyng about the
cosmos (fr.115), one can make some sort of a case based on comparative
evidence. Unfortunately, the pieces do not all fit.
On the positive side: Empedocles says that he has travelled through the
cosmos, he can heal people, and he has assumed animal forms (fr.117). However,
one does not necessarily need special abilities to do any of these. As I have
indicated (Chapter 3; q.v.), the cosmic adventure, and the incarnation in animals,
could have been elaborated by Empedocles on the grounds that he must have done
these things, and been these things, or else he would not have arrived at his current
high position.5l
Apart from these points, what we have represented in Empedocles - and
what the sequence of fragments 115, 118, 128, 139, 136, I45, l3J, 146, and l4l
to Dodds (1951) p.145
ttMoreover, he regards himself as a god. This is hubris: Zuntz (1971) p.252; no shaman (who
has to communicate with the gods) would overstep the mark in this way. The fact that the word
"daimon" is associated with shamans proves nothing. Dodds (1951) p.166,n.6lwould suggest
that although Zalmoxis is described as a daimon by Herodotus 4.94.1, one should compare
Strabo's account of Zalnoxis (7.3.5) where he is "either a heroized shaman...or else a divine.
prototype of shamans". I cannot agree.
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shows - is Empedocles' belief in a universal doctrine of reincarnation applying to
the whole of humanity.s2
I am far from convinced about the exisænce of shamans in Greece;53 it is,
as N.J.Richardson has written, "a blanket term for a whole range of
phenomena'.54 For instance, Morgan can cite shamanic influences on Socrates,
based on the story of Zalmoxis in Herodotus.ss
Herodotus' story has a lot to answer for in this debate. All links to
shamanism eventually return to Thrace as Greece's the point of contact with this
influence; yet as Minar notes, we must not predicate interdependence of Greek and
Thracian beliefs based solely on the evidence of Herodotus 4.95.5ó As Eliade
confirms, the features of the Zalmoxis story (as told by Herodotus) are not
shamanic:s7 "other 'shamanic' elements persisted in the Thracian religion, but it is
"Kahn (1971, Appendix p.30-36) gives a specihc discussion on Empedocles (and to a lesser
extent Pythagoras) as a shaman, ald concludes that shamanism is not a phenomenon to be
associated witl the Greek thinkers, as it describes a highly specified category of person, not
simply a medicine man or sorcerer.
t'For e^ample, Dodds' (1951) definition of tle Greek shaman (p.1a0) is hardly a full and
accurate description of the phenomena; with such a vague definition, it is easy to øtegorize all
ecstâtic/mystic leaders as shamans, as both Dodds (1951) and West (1983) have done. Lewis'
(1971) comments (p.56) are relevart in this respect: he believes that Dodds has taken a
"misleading model" of shamanism (i.e. a wrong defimition) and that this has "skewed his
interpretation."
to Richardson's review of West (1983): CR XXXV (1985) p.8S.
ttMorgan (1990) p.25: "At least part of Alcibiades' famous description - Socrates' immunity to
cold and drink, his trance-like süate followed by prayer to the sun - smacks of the magical,
ecstâtic and exotic, once again suggesting contract with northern religious traditions either in 432
or in 437-436;'
5uMinar (1942)p.5




not always easy to identify them."58 I interpret this to indicate that the features do
not, therefore, follow the paradigmatic pattern of shamanism (familiar from
Siberia, for example). There are coincidences and parallels, but they can be
explained in other *ays.te As this seems to indicaûe, there is no complete picture
of shamanic culture emerging among Greece's closest neighbours to the north
(Thrace and Scythia), and it is a dangerous move to postulate "pan-shamanism".60
Thus there is little evidence which specifically associates the early Greek
thinkers with shamanism.6l As I have enumerated above, there are significant
problems with the possible cross-fertilization of traditions. As Philip comments,
"..in fact only the persons who are supposed to be explained by 'Greek shamanism'
serve as evidence suggesting that such an institution existed."62 The shaman
tradition seems far removed from the Greek world.63
A more important conclusion is that reincarnation and shamanism have no
connection, not only in the Greek world, but as part of world-wide shamamc
tradition. Burkert would see a close connection (viz., the shamanic soul entering a
5sEliade (1964) p.390. Cf. Lewis (1971) p.100 on rhe "supposedlyThracian" origins of Apollo
(and Dionysus).
5n Eliade 09e) p.388: there may have been "a certain primordial 'sbamanism"'.
uoCf. Dodds (1951) p.147. Moreover, it does not appear in the western neighbours of Iøly and
Etru¡ia either: Philip (1966) p.161; Eliade 09e) p.394,n.82 agrees.




Iiving body); however, as he admits, this is not equivalent to post-martem
transmigration (reincarnation).ú
ua 
B urkert (197 2) p. 1 65 ; cf . Dodds (19 5 1) p.l,aa.
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APPENDIX E: REINCARNATION AND ETERNAL RECURRENCE
Eternal recuffence (cyclic return)l and reincarnation beliefs are often
linked, particularly in sources on the early Greek thinkers Pythagoras and
Empedocles
For example, Bames (The Presocratic Philosophers, II, p.200ff.) raises an
interesting point about Empedocles' cosmic cycle: he believes that Empedocles
was attempting to illustrate the theory of eternal recurrence. He bases this theory
on the "fact" that many other philosophers (Pythagoras, the Stoics, and Nietzsche)
have been attracted to eternal recurrence. He uses Nietzsche to define eternal
recrllïence:
"Now I die and disappear," you would say, "in the totality of things
I am nothing. Souls are as mortal as bodies." But the knot of
causes in which I am bound up returns - it will create me again. I
myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence. I come again
with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with these snakes -
not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: etemally again to
this very same life, the same in largest and in smallest points; and I
teach again the eternal recurrence of all things.z
'With reference to Empedocles, Barnes is arguing that in each repetition of
the cosmic cycle (i.e, in the periods of Strife -+ Love; and Love -+ Strife) identical
events recur to the last detail. This is the reason, he explains, that Empedocles can
l The seminal study is M.Eliade (1954) The Myth of the Eternal Return Bollingen
Foundation,N.Y. (= lst Eng,ed of lz Mythe de I'eternel retour). On the Greek liking for cyclic
time: Gurhrie (1957b) pp.63ff.
'Barnes (1979) lI, p.202: from Nietzsche Also Sprach hrathusÍra III, 'Der Genesende'.
315
speak of immortality: because, in a sense, mortals are immortal because they come
back in the same form eternally.
There are a number of flaws in this theory; frstly, there is no evidence in
the fragments to show that anything of the kind occurred.3 Secondly - a major
philosophical flaw - one would need, as Nietzsche saw, a theory of "causal
determinism" to control the recurrences; thirdly, the nature of the cycle inherently
forbids identical repetitions (except, one would presume, by chance), because
Empedocles allows only six immortal elements in the cosmos; everything else is a
mixture of these six elements. If anything else were to recur, it would therefore be
immortal; this is a direct challenge to the immortalþ of the six elements; the point
is that Empedocles did not \r/ant a challenge to his six elements- What is perhaps
more true is that he never considered the possibility of other (compound) objects
becoming immort¿l, except in the wider sense that ever¡hing would achieve
immortatity by being uncompounded.a
One can argue against eternal recurrence on common sense grounds, also.
There is really no point in having eternal recurrence within a cosmic cycle that also
contains a theory of reincarnation. It is incompatible. Barnes' intended immortality
3 That is, there js evidence for the cyclic destruction, but no evidence to show that the next era is
a recurrence of the previous cycle.
alnwood (p.38,n.88) provides the best argument against Barnes' almost unanswerable theory.
The hnal problem, which Barnes (1979, vol,tr) himself points out (pp.2Mff.), is that of time;
views on the nature of time are manifold, and the Eudemian/Newtonian (cyclic/linear) argument
is unanswerable. In one view, eternal recturence is probable; in the other, impossible.
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is hardly comforting; it is a reduction of the status of the individual to ân
functionless automaton. There is no room to improve in the next recurrence, as
exactly the same events recur, along with the same reactions. The only saving
grace - one presumes - is that one does not remember one's past life. As Barnes
points out, "Such an immortality would be tedious if we had perfect memories; and
it is, indeed, hard to soe why anyone should find comfort in it."5 The one saving
grace of eternal recunence (although not in this case) is that it is one saúsfactory
metaphysical solution to the fascinating mystery of deja vu.
*
With regard to Pythagoras, the case against eternal recuffence is even
simpler, for there is no indication that Pythagoras devised a cosmology comparable
with Empedocles' (i.e. a cosmology adaptable to a doctrine of eternal recurrence);
the available tradition points to a primitive number cosmology (or cosmogony).u
Of course an argument ex silentio is hardly proof of this.
It is unusual that while there is such a strong tradition of belief in
Pythagorean transmigration, there is no similarly strong belief in etemal
lreculÏence.
s Barnes (1979) II, p.203
u Cf. cuthrie (19 62) pp.27 61f .
TExcept among a number of conunentators: cf. Guthrie (1978) pp.193ff., who traces recurrence
of historical events to the Pythagoreans. There a¡e alarger number of beliefs conlra: for example,
Philip (1966) p. 169,n.9.
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There are two Greek references of relevance to a þthagorean belief in
eternal recuffence. First, a fragment thought to be from Dicaearchus:8
¡rrÍ}"r"ota pévtor yvópr¡ra ruopd æôorv éyéveto npôtov ¡rèv otç
óOóvatov eivoí fi1or qv VUIúV, etro ¡retopdÀIor¡oov eiç ä7"?"a
yévn (éolu, rpòç ôè toótorç öcr" rotd nepróôouç cLvdç td
yevópevrÍ nore na.ì'w yíveror, véov ô' ouôèv órl,ôç éoct, xoì öcr
navra td lrvópevo ëpyulo époyevfl ôeî vopí(erv. Qaívetcr Tdp
eiç c4v 'EÀl"dôo td ôóypoto npôroç xopíoor toôto llo0oyópoç.
(DK 14,8a)
This passage hardly shows a reliable understanding of earþ Pythagorean belief;e
for instance, metamorphosis, rather than metempsychosis, appears to be suggested.
The idea that "nothing is ever absolutely new"10 could be linked to reincarnation
as well as recurrence: for example, the idea of all soul matter returning to a
common soul mass. However, it is difficult to explain away the belief that "events
recur in certain cycles". Compare the second relevant passage - Eudemus apud
Simplic. Phys. 7 32,30 (DK 58834):11
et ôé oç rnoteóoete toîç lloOcyopeíotç, röote æo,)'w td oura
opr"0pQ, róyor pu0ol"oy'¡oro tò þoBôíov ëyov u¡rîv ro0qpévor.ç
oötor, raì" td üL?"a ravro ôpoio:ç ëÇet, roì tòv 1póvov eöÀoyov
êoo tòv outòv e1vor.12
This definitely refers to eternal recurrence.
t Cited by Porphyry W 19.
eSee Guthrie's discussion (1962) pp.169-170 on the lack of reliability of these post-Platonic
sources quoted in the Neoplatonic writers; apart from a tendency of the original writers to
confuse Platonic and Pythagorean elements, they were quoted by compilers far less accurate.
loTranslation of KRS no.285.
tt Eudemus, pupil of Aristotle, is presumably a contemporary of Dicaea¡chus.
t'Note the similarity to the passage from Nietzsche, cited above.
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There is a strong comparative (mainly eastern) tradition of periodic cycles
of events. The main comparison has been with the Babylonian "Great Year"
(usually the "..period necessary for sun, moon, and planets as well to reach again
the same positions in relation to each other as they occupied at a given
moment."l3 ), although it is noted that this seems to refer mainly to recurrences of
cosmic catastrophes (floods etc..).14
In terms of a Greek "Great Year" in Pythagoras' teaching, (as I have
discussed in the chapter on Pythagoras) there is late evidence for a 216 year
interval between Pythagoras' incarnations.tt However neither in this, nor any other
source, is there a hint of a "Great Year" akin - for example - to the 10,000 year
cycle of Tim"aeus 39b.
ttGuthrie (1957b) pp.64f.; cf. Guthrie (1978) p.194: the 10,000 year "Grear Year" ar Timaeus
39b.
to Cf. van der Waerden (1965) col.847 who notes that the Eudemus fragment is the only evidence
for "ewige rùy'iederkehr". This is backed up in van der lùy'aerden (1952) with the Eudemus
fragment; cf. van der Vy'aerden (1963) (co1.295). However, he seems to be one of the few who
believe in a connection, along with Gomperz (1901) p.140 who sees it - wrongly - in Heraclitus
and Anaximander, and the Babylonian "'World-year" (pp.l42T; although on p.125 he thinks that
there may have been change without destruction). Cf, van der 'Waerden (1952) p.132 on
Heraclitus: contra Kahn (1974) p.165. van der'Waerden (1952) pp.l29ff . argues that Pythagoras
received the doctrine of eternal recuffence from Eastem sources (he cites influences from
Babylon to India - pp.138-152). It seems to be based on Iamblichus' story that þthagoras had
Babylonian teachers (p.153). Of course, according to tradition, Pythagoras also went to Crete,
Egypt, and an inordinate number of places where he picked up ancient wisdom. The concept of
the well-travelled mystic is common to nearly every Greek "sage" (cf. the legends surrounding
Pherecydes), and there seem to be few who have not had (alleged) contåct with Egypt and the
East. One can hardly use this as definite evidence - it verges on a literary/doxographical device
(cf. Herodotus' numerous ascriptions of Greek wisdom to Egypt), van der'Waerden (1952) p.729
stresses the aspect of cosmic catastrophe in the Babylonian tradition - it is noøbly absent from
the þthagorean evidence; but cf. the discussion of the myth in Plato's Politicus, below.
tt In the Theologumena Arithmeticae 52 (DK 14,8). This is based on 6 cubed: KR p.223f.,n.1; cf.
Philip (1966) p.169,n.9. van der Vy'aerden (1965) col.847-8 comments on the alternative figure of
207 years.
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I cannot see how reincarnation can combine with eternal recurrence to
form a satisfactory view of a life. The problem with eærnal recurrence is that one
lives the same life over and over again, with no possibility for change (although, as
I pointed out, above, one does not know that life is endlessly repeating): the point
of reincarnation is to improve one's life from incarnation to incarnation. Thus I
contend that the two beliefs are not compatible.
As Kirk and Raven note, Pythagoras might have believed in eternal
recurïonce, but later sources could have taken the idea from Empedocles.16 It was
certainly a feature of Stoic thought.lT
There is another option: rather than restoring a doctrine of eternal
recuffence to Pythagoras or Empedocles, it would be more feasible to see these
aspects of their doctrines in terms of cyclic renewal. This can be seen, I believe, in
Plato's unusual aetiologicaltt rnyth tn Politicus. Ancient commentators on Platonic
myth were more than ready to ascribe myths to less "philosophical" sources, and
this may well have occurred as a result of this myth. Certainly the deliberate
vagueness of Plato towards his own sources lends force to this view.
16 Incorrectly; or even Anaximander, for example, who believed in everything being born from
and returning to The apeiron: cf. Eliade (1954) p.120. Also KR pp.223f.,n.1.
t'ib¡d; cf. Eliade (1954) pp.89,n.59 & 119) on the appearance of true eternal recurïence
(anakuklosis) in later þttragoreans and Platonists.
r8 Stewart (1960) p.196
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The basic tenet of the myth (269c-274e: related by the stranger of Elea)le
is that the universe rotates under the guidance of Ktonos, but eventually, at the
right time, he lets go, and the universe begins to rotate in the opposite direction,
under its own steam (for it is a living creature and has stored up the energy of its
revolutions). The reverse rotation is sanctioned by Kronos, because the universe
has partaken of the bodily, and is thus not free from change - it needs to change.
With cosmic change comes human change: destruction of nearly all living creatures
and survival of only a few humans. These humans (including the dead) are affected
by the reversal in that they stop growing old and begin to grow towards youth
again, and eventually back to babies (in mind and body) and then disappear.2o The
dead bodies disappear even faster. The departed generation is replaced by the
earth-born generation who had lived primordially. They are seen to be reborn from
the dead in the universe's womb. Rebirth from death is a sign of cosmic reversal.2t
A few of the "dead" were translated to a different life by Kronos.22 The new
generation lived in a sort of Golden Ag"" (abundant food, no states, common
relations), with Kronos as their shepherd, and with no recollection of their
previous lives. In this existence, men talked with animals (and vice versa), aJI
learning everything to be known. Eventually (after a certain number of compulsory
1e This in itself seems suspicious to me because the myth can be interpreted as a parody of
Parmenidean ontology.
'o ContraGuthrie (1978) p.195, I do not see Heraclitus fr. 88 (KR no. 205) nor Hesiod Works and
Days l8l as examples of this process. Guthrie notes that the latter example is not specific to
cosmic reversal. I would see it more as a portent of coming disaster.
" This is reminiscent of Phaedo 70c4-d5.22cf. Pinda¡ Oty.2; Phaedo 82d9-83c4; Phaedrus ?A:9a.
23Eliade (1954)p.122
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"bi-rths" from the earth (in the manner of seed), Kronos "dropped the tiller"2a of
the universe (as did other gods), and there was a period of destruction and
catastrophe, then a settling back into order of the universe (which was not as
devastated as during the previous reversal). However, the earth (because of its
material content) became forgetful of order, and eventually had to be rescued again
by Kronos taking control of the tiller again.25 The relationships with beasts broke
down, men became feeble, and thus fre (given by Prometheus) and the other aids
had to be given (and further deterioration began). Birth, conception and etc.. were
now in the manner known in this age. Part of the blame is put on the shepherd - it
was ruinous statesmanship that a leader be so different (he was a god) from his
subjects.26
It is a most unusual and obscure myth. It is superhcially similar to
Empedocles' doctrine of the cyclic cosmic system;27 The concept of destruction
and reversal is certainly familiar.28 Other elements are not,2e and indeed there are
'o As Guthrie (19?8) p.196 cormrents, this is an extraordinary story.
2s One might ask why - if he has to keep rescuing the universe - Kronos does not simply hold on
to the tiller all the time: for it seems predestined that he will have to keep taking over?
26 cf. Bumet (1914) p,291 who sees a contrast with a Pythagorean theocracy.
" Skemp (1987) p.87 notes that the picture of the cosmos may be Pythagorean; however
(p.87,n.2) the idea of the universe as a living creature is older. The nautical metaphors are seen
as Pythagorean (pp.95f. & 96,n,1): however, this is a common metaphor, and the use may be
coincidental in that it is particularly appropriate for the context of state leadership.
" Cf. Finkelberg (1986) p.323,n9, who discusses periodic destrucrion in the doxographers (based
on Theophrastus).
2e cf. Skemp (1937) pp.88ff, who comments on the power of "Mind" in the role usually assigned
to Necessity. It is a cosmic system quite different to that in Timneus and Republic Book 10 - the
suggestion implied is that it is a myth invented to fit the didactic context.
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some impressive differences," which may point to an Eastern origin for the
myth. 31
At 272e1-3 there is an obscure reference to rebirth: ..rai tò yirvov riôr1
æôv ovriî.rrrro yévoç, naoaç åxríorr¡ç cîç VuXîç tòç yevéoer"ç oroôeôroruíaç,
öoa frv eróoc¡ rcpootol0èv tooc0tc eiç yflv anê.pp.ara æeooóo'r1ç.. Compare the
detail at 272a1-2: ér yfrç ydp ovepróorcovto navreç, oóôèv pepvr¡pÉvor tôv
æpóo0ev. I presume that, in the case of the adult bodies which gror¡/ younger and
eventually disappear into the earth, it is actually the soul which disappears into the
earth, to be reborn later, rather than the "body". ff so, this is a very unusual
(indeed incompatible) blend of resurrection and reincarnation. Resurrection implies
the "rebirth" of the same body and the same soul, while the events quoted above
must refer to a rebirth from the earth which is in fact a reincamation:32 the process
of ensoulment has occurred before the "body" leaves the earth below. However, I
do not deny that the passages are ambiguous: for example, it is not made clear that
the reborn soul exists in a different body, or the same. It is the same soul, but with
no recollection of its past lives. On comparative evidence (cf. Republic Book 10),
one would presume a different bodily identity. The passages do not seem to
'o Skemp (1937) p.90: for example, ¡he Politicus myth seems to be more of an oscillation flan a
ftue cycle.
3rEgyptian or Zoroastrian thought: Skemp (1987) pp9l,92ff.; cf. Eliade (1954) p.7,n.6 on links
witi Mazdaism,
32 Conlra Stewan (1960) p.196 who sees a coalescence of resurrection and reincarnation in the
myth.
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indicate that the same life is lived again, but their ambiguity hardly leaves room for
definite judgements.33
The important point is that cyclic renewal, and eternal recurrence, are
different ideas, although based on the same concepts. It seems that eternal
recuffence does not fully appear until Stoic thought.3a So while reincarnation can
exist in a theory of cyclic renewal (as could be the case in Pythagorean" and
Empedoclean theory), it is morally purposeless in a system of eternal recurrence.
33cf. Socrates' scepticism at Repubtic 546a of periodic cycles (based on bizarre mathematics):
Eliade (1954) p.132. Phaedo 87b5-88b8 (the analogy of the soul and the weaver) is unlikely to
refer to eternal recurrence.
'ocut¡rie (1957b) p.68. And the Stoic periodic dest¡uction is caused by fire, not "natural"
catåstrophes.
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